UK Space Command Funds Sensor Project to Counter Satellite-Dazzling Lasers
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The UK has launched a £500,000 sensor project, overseen by UK Space Command and the UK Space Agency, to counter laser systems that can dazzle satellites and disrupt communications. It matters because laser interference threatens military comms and ISR used by U.S. and NATO forces.
Reuters, citing official statements, confirmed on Friday, Oct. 3, that the United Kingdom is funding a ~£500,000 ($673k) sensor effort to detect and counter laser “dazzling” aimed at satellites; the project is jointly overseen by UK Space Command and the UK Space Agency. The move follows a summer security review urging stronger protection of military space systems and comes as UK Space Command’s Maj. Gen. Paul Tedman highlighted the operational risk during a visit to RAF Fylingdales, a key UK radar site for space surveillance and missile warning. It matters because directed-energy threats can quickly degrade allied communications, navigation, and reconnaissance relied upon by U.S. forces.Follow Army Recognition on Google News at this link
RAF Fylingdales radar station in North Yorkshire, United Kingdom, provides ballistic missile early warning and space domain awareness for UK and US forces (Picture source: UK MoD)
The technical core of the program focuses on warning and protection sensors against laser illumination. Even though specifications will not be made public, the typical building blocks of such a chain can be outlined. A wide-band laser warning detector identifies incoming energy and estimates the direction of arrival. Processing electronics calculate the probability of an attack, filter out false positives, and send commands to the optical instrument or the attitude control computer. On the passive side, tunable spectral filters and fast-closing shutters protect the detector or focal plane. In terms of active response, a slight attitude maneuver, sometimes by a few degrees, reduces exposure without compromising the main mission. Optical payloads also use hardened materials and redundant architectures to ensure that partial saturation does not jeopardize the entire mission. The whole set must remain frugal in mass, power, and volume, which is the primary constraint in low and medium Earth orbit.
The communications layer follows a different logic centered on resistance to jamming and deliberate interference. Known solutions combine frequency hopping, spread spectrum, robust coding, narrow-beam antennas with null steering, and adaptive cancellation algorithms. Newer platforms introduce intersatellite links to route traffic away from disturbed areas, as well as multi-band architectures that allow switching between SHF and EHF depending on the electromagnetic environment. A hardened ground terminal, if properly pointed and supported by accurate spectrum awareness, remains usable even under pressure. The UK ecosystem has the skills to assemble these components, both through national industry and by leveraging European programs and transatlantic cooperation.
The RAF Fylingdales station, mentioned by General Tedman, remains a key link. Its primary mission is ballistic early warning, but its sensors and processing also contribute to space domain awareness, including tracking of objects, debris, and close approaches. These elements help to contextualize a laser alert and support decision-making. A counter-laser sensor only achieves its purpose if it is connected to a credible orbital picture. Knowing who is operating nearby, when, and on which orbit changes how an alert is classified and how the response is executed, whether through a brief repointing or a deeper mission reconfiguration.
From a tactical and operational standpoint, the goal is to preserve continuity of service for critical functions. Armed forces rely on space for voice and data communications, precision navigation, ISR, synchronization, and often joint coordination. Dazzling at the moment of a collection window cancels a strategic take. Jamming on a command link for unmanned systems degrades a joint task force’s OODA loop. A carrier group or a mechanized brigade loses momentum quickly if bandwidth collapses. The sensors and counter-countermeasures announced by London do not make systems invulnerable; they reduce the probability of effect and, above all, the recovery time. That is often enough to preserve the maneuver. A gain of a few minutes in a targeting chain, or a few decibels on a critical link, turns into usable capability when pressure increases.
European defense space officials have been issuing warnings about hostile activity in orbit that could disrupt operations on land, at sea, and in the air. The United States remains the leading investor in public space programs. In Europe, France and Germany were the two major contributors last year, according to the specialist firm Novaspace. Berlin recently announced a five-year, 35-billion-euro effort for space security, indicating a durable shift in priorities. Paris is advancing its own measures, including an investment of around 1.5 billion euros in Eutelsat, which aims to consolidate its position relative to new-generation private constellations. The United Kingdom, closely tied to the United States for its most sensitive needs, is also working to secure national links in functions deemed critical. The amount published today is not substantial in the context of a defense budget, but it targets a specific vulnerability. And in space, a small component that functions at the right moment often matters more than a grand statement.
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The UK has launched a £500,000 sensor project, overseen by UK Space Command and the UK Space Agency, to counter laser systems that can dazzle satellites and disrupt communications. It matters because laser interference threatens military comms and ISR used by U.S. and NATO forces.
Reuters, citing official statements, confirmed on Friday, Oct. 3, that the United Kingdom is funding a ~£500,000 ($673k) sensor effort to detect and counter laser “dazzling” aimed at satellites; the project is jointly overseen by UK Space Command and the UK Space Agency. The move follows a summer security review urging stronger protection of military space systems and comes as UK Space Command’s Maj. Gen. Paul Tedman highlighted the operational risk during a visit to RAF Fylingdales, a key UK radar site for space surveillance and missile warning. It matters because directed-energy threats can quickly degrade allied communications, navigation, and reconnaissance relied upon by U.S. forces.
Follow Army Recognition on Google News at this link
RAF Fylingdales radar station in North Yorkshire, United Kingdom, provides ballistic missile early warning and space domain awareness for UK and US forces (Picture source: UK MoD)
The technical core of the program focuses on warning and protection sensors against laser illumination. Even though specifications will not be made public, the typical building blocks of such a chain can be outlined. A wide-band laser warning detector identifies incoming energy and estimates the direction of arrival. Processing electronics calculate the probability of an attack, filter out false positives, and send commands to the optical instrument or the attitude control computer. On the passive side, tunable spectral filters and fast-closing shutters protect the detector or focal plane. In terms of active response, a slight attitude maneuver, sometimes by a few degrees, reduces exposure without compromising the main mission. Optical payloads also use hardened materials and redundant architectures to ensure that partial saturation does not jeopardize the entire mission. The whole set must remain frugal in mass, power, and volume, which is the primary constraint in low and medium Earth orbit.
The communications layer follows a different logic centered on resistance to jamming and deliberate interference. Known solutions combine frequency hopping, spread spectrum, robust coding, narrow-beam antennas with null steering, and adaptive cancellation algorithms. Newer platforms introduce intersatellite links to route traffic away from disturbed areas, as well as multi-band architectures that allow switching between SHF and EHF depending on the electromagnetic environment. A hardened ground terminal, if properly pointed and supported by accurate spectrum awareness, remains usable even under pressure. The UK ecosystem has the skills to assemble these components, both through national industry and by leveraging European programs and transatlantic cooperation.
The RAF Fylingdales station, mentioned by General Tedman, remains a key link. Its primary mission is ballistic early warning, but its sensors and processing also contribute to space domain awareness, including tracking of objects, debris, and close approaches. These elements help to contextualize a laser alert and support decision-making. A counter-laser sensor only achieves its purpose if it is connected to a credible orbital picture. Knowing who is operating nearby, when, and on which orbit changes how an alert is classified and how the response is executed, whether through a brief repointing or a deeper mission reconfiguration.
From a tactical and operational standpoint, the goal is to preserve continuity of service for critical functions. Armed forces rely on space for voice and data communications, precision navigation, ISR, synchronization, and often joint coordination. Dazzling at the moment of a collection window cancels a strategic take. Jamming on a command link for unmanned systems degrades a joint task force’s OODA loop. A carrier group or a mechanized brigade loses momentum quickly if bandwidth collapses. The sensors and counter-countermeasures announced by London do not make systems invulnerable; they reduce the probability of effect and, above all, the recovery time. That is often enough to preserve the maneuver. A gain of a few minutes in a targeting chain, or a few decibels on a critical link, turns into usable capability when pressure increases.
European defense space officials have been issuing warnings about hostile activity in orbit that could disrupt operations on land, at sea, and in the air. The United States remains the leading investor in public space programs. In Europe, France and Germany were the two major contributors last year, according to the specialist firm Novaspace. Berlin recently announced a five-year, 35-billion-euro effort for space security, indicating a durable shift in priorities. Paris is advancing its own measures, including an investment of around 1.5 billion euros in Eutelsat, which aims to consolidate its position relative to new-generation private constellations. The United Kingdom, closely tied to the United States for its most sensitive needs, is also working to secure national links in functions deemed critical. The amount published today is not substantial in the context of a defense budget, but it targets a specific vulnerability. And in space, a small component that functions at the right moment often matters more than a grand statement.
