Sweden Backs Ukraine’s Plan for 100 to 150 Gripen E Jets Signaling Airpower Shift in Europe
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Sweden and Ukraine signed a letter of intent for Kyiv to acquire between 100 and 150 Saab JAS 39 Gripen E fighters, one of the largest potential export deals in Swedish defense history. The move positions Ukraine for a postwar air force built around NATO-compatible aircraft with low operating costs and rapid deployment capability.
On 22 October 2025, in Linköping, Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson and President Volodymyr Zelensky announced a letter of intent for Ukraine to acquire 100 to 150 Saab JAS 39 Gripen E fighters, signaling a potential restructuring of European airpower in the postwar era. The figures, unprecedented for a single export customer, would double Sweden’s largest historical Gripen sale and anchor a long-term industrial and political partnership. The announcement matters because it frames Ukraine’s future air force around a platform optimized for dispersed operations, low sustainment costs, and NATO-grade interoperability. As reported by Swedish News Agency TV4, the document sets a framework for one of Saab’s largest export prospects to date.
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The Gripen E is a cutting-edge multirole fighter jet designed for agile, high-performance operations with advanced sensors, electronic warfare capabilities, and NATO interoperability, optimized for flying in contested airspace (Picture Source: Swedish MoD)
Ukraine’s request for at least 100 and possibly up to 150 airframes is not merely a headline number; it is a force-structure blueprint. At triple-squadron scale and beyond, such a fleet would enable continuous air policing, ground-attack and SEAD/DEAD rotations, and dedicated training and conversion units, moving Ukraine from “capability injection” to a sustainable, sovereign combat aviation model. The letter of intent (LOI) formalizes political and industrial intent without constituting a binding sale; it is the gateway to configuration talks, financing, training pipelines, and phased delivery schedules. Swedish officials cautioned that even under current capacity the earliest deliveries would be roughly three years after any definitive contract, underscoring that this plan is framed for Ukraine’s post-war air force.
Operationally, the Gripen E is the latest evolution of Sweden’s road-based fighter concept, higher-thrust engine, extended range, modern EW suite, AESA radar, and extensive datalink integration, designed to fight from dispersed sites under electronic attack. Sweden has only just begun introducing the E into service, with initial aircraft arriving to the Swedish Air Force this month, a milestone that anchors maturity for export users and training paths. The Linköping meeting took place at Saab’s production hub for both Gripen and GlobalEye, tying the announcement directly to the manufacturing base that would expand to meet a Ukrainian order.
Compared with peer platforms, Gripen’s differentiators are survivability through dispersion, rapid turnaround on austere strips, and historically low operating costs relative to Western 4.5-gen types, advantages that matter for a country living under persistent missile and drone attack. While F-16s provide an essential near-term bridge, a large Gripen E fleet would offer complementary strengths: native design for road operations, highly automated maintenance, and a reputation for lower flight-hour costs compared with Eurofighter or Rafale in multiple studies. These traits, coupled with an EW-heavy architecture, could give Ukraine a more resilient day-to-day sortie base once mass is achieved.
Strategically, a minimum of 100 aircraft reshapes the regional balance. Geopolitically, it deepens Sweden–Ukraine ties and binds a newly NATO-aligned Nordic defense ecosystem to Kyiv’s long-term security, while signaling to Moscow that Ukraine’s post-war force will not be a boutique fleet but a standing, modern air arm. Geostrategically, scale unlocks credible defensive counter-air, standoff strike enablement, and persistent ISR cueing in concert with partners. Militarily, it standardizes much of Ukraine’s future training, weapons integration, and data-link networks with NATO practice, easing coalition operations and logistics. TV4 and other outlets also report Stockholm could free up a small number of older C/D airframes, on the order of “just over ten”, as a bridge, dovetailing with a phased E-model buildup.
On budget and contracting, no price has been announced. As a benchmark, Brazil’s 36-jet Gripen E/F program was contracted in 2014 at SEK 39.3 billion (about $5.4 billion then) including development, training, and support, illustrating how package content strongly shapes unit averages. Any Ukrainian deal of 100+ aircraft would therefore be a multi-year, multi-billion-euro program spanning production ramp-ups, training systems, munitions, and industrial participation. Sweden’s government has stressed the LOI is the start of negotiations, not a concluded sale, and that deliveries, if contracted, would follow a long-term cadence aligned with Saab’s capacity and Sweden’s own transition to Gripen E.
This announcement points to a decisive, long-range choice: building a capable, sustainable Ukrainian air force at meaningful scale with a platform engineered for Europe’s contested skies. If the LOI hardens into contract terms, and if partners sequence near-term stopgaps with older airframes, Ukraine could move from incremental fixes to a durable airpower architecture, one sized to deter, to defend, and to integrate seamlessly with NATO operations for the long term.
Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.
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Sweden and Ukraine signed a letter of intent for Kyiv to acquire between 100 and 150 Saab JAS 39 Gripen E fighters, one of the largest potential export deals in Swedish defense history. The move positions Ukraine for a postwar air force built around NATO-compatible aircraft with low operating costs and rapid deployment capability.
On 22 October 2025, in Linköping, Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson and President Volodymyr Zelensky announced a letter of intent for Ukraine to acquire 100 to 150 Saab JAS 39 Gripen E fighters, signaling a potential restructuring of European airpower in the postwar era. The figures, unprecedented for a single export customer, would double Sweden’s largest historical Gripen sale and anchor a long-term industrial and political partnership. The announcement matters because it frames Ukraine’s future air force around a platform optimized for dispersed operations, low sustainment costs, and NATO-grade interoperability. As reported by Swedish News Agency TV4, the document sets a framework for one of Saab’s largest export prospects to date.
The Gripen E is a cutting-edge multirole fighter jet designed for agile, high-performance operations with advanced sensors, electronic warfare capabilities, and NATO interoperability, optimized for flying in contested airspace (Picture Source: Swedish MoD)
Ukraine’s request for at least 100 and possibly up to 150 airframes is not merely a headline number; it is a force-structure blueprint. At triple-squadron scale and beyond, such a fleet would enable continuous air policing, ground-attack and SEAD/DEAD rotations, and dedicated training and conversion units, moving Ukraine from “capability injection” to a sustainable, sovereign combat aviation model. The letter of intent (LOI) formalizes political and industrial intent without constituting a binding sale; it is the gateway to configuration talks, financing, training pipelines, and phased delivery schedules. Swedish officials cautioned that even under current capacity the earliest deliveries would be roughly three years after any definitive contract, underscoring that this plan is framed for Ukraine’s post-war air force.
Operationally, the Gripen E is the latest evolution of Sweden’s road-based fighter concept, higher-thrust engine, extended range, modern EW suite, AESA radar, and extensive datalink integration, designed to fight from dispersed sites under electronic attack. Sweden has only just begun introducing the E into service, with initial aircraft arriving to the Swedish Air Force this month, a milestone that anchors maturity for export users and training paths. The Linköping meeting took place at Saab’s production hub for both Gripen and GlobalEye, tying the announcement directly to the manufacturing base that would expand to meet a Ukrainian order.
Compared with peer platforms, Gripen’s differentiators are survivability through dispersion, rapid turnaround on austere strips, and historically low operating costs relative to Western 4.5-gen types, advantages that matter for a country living under persistent missile and drone attack. While F-16s provide an essential near-term bridge, a large Gripen E fleet would offer complementary strengths: native design for road operations, highly automated maintenance, and a reputation for lower flight-hour costs compared with Eurofighter or Rafale in multiple studies. These traits, coupled with an EW-heavy architecture, could give Ukraine a more resilient day-to-day sortie base once mass is achieved.
Strategically, a minimum of 100 aircraft reshapes the regional balance. Geopolitically, it deepens Sweden–Ukraine ties and binds a newly NATO-aligned Nordic defense ecosystem to Kyiv’s long-term security, while signaling to Moscow that Ukraine’s post-war force will not be a boutique fleet but a standing, modern air arm. Geostrategically, scale unlocks credible defensive counter-air, standoff strike enablement, and persistent ISR cueing in concert with partners. Militarily, it standardizes much of Ukraine’s future training, weapons integration, and data-link networks with NATO practice, easing coalition operations and logistics. TV4 and other outlets also report Stockholm could free up a small number of older C/D airframes, on the order of “just over ten”, as a bridge, dovetailing with a phased E-model buildup.
On budget and contracting, no price has been announced. As a benchmark, Brazil’s 36-jet Gripen E/F program was contracted in 2014 at SEK 39.3 billion (about $5.4 billion then) including development, training, and support, illustrating how package content strongly shapes unit averages. Any Ukrainian deal of 100+ aircraft would therefore be a multi-year, multi-billion-euro program spanning production ramp-ups, training systems, munitions, and industrial participation. Sweden’s government has stressed the LOI is the start of negotiations, not a concluded sale, and that deliveries, if contracted, would follow a long-term cadence aligned with Saab’s capacity and Sweden’s own transition to Gripen E.
This announcement points to a decisive, long-range choice: building a capable, sustainable Ukrainian air force at meaningful scale with a platform engineered for Europe’s contested skies. If the LOI hardens into contract terms, and if partners sequence near-term stopgaps with older airframes, Ukraine could move from incremental fixes to a durable airpower architecture, one sized to deter, to defend, and to integrate seamlessly with NATO operations for the long term.
Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.
