Russia Announces New Nuclear-Propelled Cruise Missiles Wave Capable of Hypersonic Speeds
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Russia publicly said it has begun work on a new generation of nuclear-powered cruise missiles, with President Vladimir Putin describing a Mach 3 target and a path to hypersonic capability at a Kremlin awards ceremony for the Burevestnik and Poseidon teams. The message, paired with recent claims of a 14,000 km Burevestnik trial, points to multiple variants that could pressure air and missile defenses and complicate future arms control.
Moscow’s newest messaging on strategic weapons points beyond the Burevestnik program toward a family of nuclear-powered cruise missiles. At an awards ceremony on 4 November 2025 for the teams behind Burevestnik and Poseidon, President Vladimir Putin said work has begun on a “next generation” of nuclear-powered cruise missiles designed to fly roughly three times the speed of sound, with a pathway to hypersonic performance, as reported by TASS, the Russian news agency. The statement follows recent claims of long-endurance Burevestnik trials and signals a move from a single demonstrator to multiple variants. For allies and adversaries alike, the relevance is immediate: a diversified portfolio of virtually unlimited-range cruise missiles would strain air and missile defenses and complicate arms-control frameworks.
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Russia is signaling a shift from a single Burevestnik demo to a family of nuclear powered cruise missiles targeting around Mach 3, a development that pressures U.S. missile defense and arms control planning (Picture Source: Russian MoD)
Burevestnik (NATO: SSC-X-9 “Skyfall”) has been trailed by the Kremlin since the 2018 presidential address that first outlined a miniature reactor integrated into a low-flying, nuclear-armed cruise missile designed for “practically unlimited” range and circuitous routing. In late October, Russian officials again highlighted decisive testing, with claims that a recent flight covered around 14,000 km over some 15 hours. Those publicised milestones, framed by Russia as a response to the erosion of Cold War-era constraints like the ABM Treaty, set the backdrop for Putin’s pivot from one system to a wider family.
The technical claim now matters as much as the political one. Saying the “next generation” will be roughly Mach 3 and “hypersonic in the future” implies a shift from the subsonic nuclear-ramjet profile long associated with Burevestnik toward higher-energy air-breathing cycles. A supersonic nuclear-thermal ramjet is conceptually feasible and was the basis of the U.S. Project Pluto/SLAM designs in the 1950s–60s, though never fielded for safety, testability and strategic-value reasons. Moscow’s promise to reduce reactor spin-up to “seconds,” a line echoed in Russian coverage of the awards ceremony, underscores how miniaturised power units are central to any supersonic or future hypersonic variant.
Russia is unlikely to stop at one basing mode if it truly moves to serialise nuclear-powered cruise missiles. The pattern from conventional cruise-missile families (air-launched Kh-101/102, sea-launched Kalibr, and ground-launched derivatives after the INF collapse) suggests an incentive to proliferate variants across services to maximise survivability and angles of approach. In practical terms, three pathways are plausible. A road-mobile ground launcher is the most straightforward, matching prior Burevestnik field imagery and avoiding shipboard reactor-safety burdens. A navalised canister for select submarines or large surface combatants would multiply launch azimuths but raises design and safety hurdles for storage, handling and emergency procedures at sea. An air-launched missile would be the most flexible operationally, especially from Tu-160M or Tu-95MSM platforms, but poses acute safety questions while mating a live micro-reactor to a bomber and would likely demand a smaller, lighter variant. None of these are confirmed, yet the direction of travel, “new generations” and “work has started”, suggests Russia is at least exploring multiple basing options to complicate Western warning and interception.
Diversifying nuclear-powered cruise missiles would bring clear military advantages for Russia. First, multi-variant basing expands the engagement geometry, enabling “multi-axis” routes that skirt radar fences and exploit terrain-masking at very low altitude. Second, persistent endurance allows missiles to hold at distance, loiter for timing, or re-route around defended corridors, compressing defenders’ decision timelines and increasing the chance of late-detected penetrations. Third, an eventual supersonic profile would further shrink warning and engagement windows while raising the kinematic bar for interceptors; a later hypersonic profile, if realised, would be still more stressing. Finally, spreading a nuclear-powered threat across ground, sea and air inventories creates redundancy and reduces Russia’s reliance on ballistic or boost-glide systems for penetrating U.S./NATO defenses, aligning with the Kremlin’s long-standing argument that U.S. missile defense after the ABM Treaty’s demise demands new offensive means.
The trade-offs are substantial. Any nuclear-ramjet concept inherits severe safety, environmental and political risks, from reactor integrity in accidents to radiological issues during testing or failure at sea and in foreign airspace. The 2019 Nyonoksa incident, widely linked by outside analysts to the Burevestnik program, is an enduring caution. Reliability and guidance over intercontinental, low-altitude routes also remain non-trivial: maintaining stable navigation, communications, and terrain-following over days-long flights is harder than one dramatic test. And because the value proposition is overwhelmingly nuclear, fielding a reactor-powered conventional missile would invite outsized risk for limited military gain, deployment choices will be scrutinised under nuclear signaling and escalation-management lenses.
Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.
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Russia publicly said it has begun work on a new generation of nuclear-powered cruise missiles, with President Vladimir Putin describing a Mach 3 target and a path to hypersonic capability at a Kremlin awards ceremony for the Burevestnik and Poseidon teams. The message, paired with recent claims of a 14,000 km Burevestnik trial, points to multiple variants that could pressure air and missile defenses and complicate future arms control.
Moscow’s newest messaging on strategic weapons points beyond the Burevestnik program toward a family of nuclear-powered cruise missiles. At an awards ceremony on 4 November 2025 for the teams behind Burevestnik and Poseidon, President Vladimir Putin said work has begun on a “next generation” of nuclear-powered cruise missiles designed to fly roughly three times the speed of sound, with a pathway to hypersonic performance, as reported by TASS, the Russian news agency. The statement follows recent claims of long-endurance Burevestnik trials and signals a move from a single demonstrator to multiple variants. For allies and adversaries alike, the relevance is immediate: a diversified portfolio of virtually unlimited-range cruise missiles would strain air and missile defenses and complicate arms-control frameworks.
Russia is signaling a shift from a single Burevestnik demo to a family of nuclear powered cruise missiles targeting around Mach 3, a development that pressures U.S. missile defense and arms control planning (Picture Source: Russian MoD)
Burevestnik (NATO: SSC-X-9 “Skyfall”) has been trailed by the Kremlin since the 2018 presidential address that first outlined a miniature reactor integrated into a low-flying, nuclear-armed cruise missile designed for “practically unlimited” range and circuitous routing. In late October, Russian officials again highlighted decisive testing, with claims that a recent flight covered around 14,000 km over some 15 hours. Those publicised milestones, framed by Russia as a response to the erosion of Cold War-era constraints like the ABM Treaty, set the backdrop for Putin’s pivot from one system to a wider family.
The technical claim now matters as much as the political one. Saying the “next generation” will be roughly Mach 3 and “hypersonic in the future” implies a shift from the subsonic nuclear-ramjet profile long associated with Burevestnik toward higher-energy air-breathing cycles. A supersonic nuclear-thermal ramjet is conceptually feasible and was the basis of the U.S. Project Pluto/SLAM designs in the 1950s–60s, though never fielded for safety, testability and strategic-value reasons. Moscow’s promise to reduce reactor spin-up to “seconds,” a line echoed in Russian coverage of the awards ceremony, underscores how miniaturised power units are central to any supersonic or future hypersonic variant.
Russia is unlikely to stop at one basing mode if it truly moves to serialise nuclear-powered cruise missiles. The pattern from conventional cruise-missile families (air-launched Kh-101/102, sea-launched Kalibr, and ground-launched derivatives after the INF collapse) suggests an incentive to proliferate variants across services to maximise survivability and angles of approach. In practical terms, three pathways are plausible. A road-mobile ground launcher is the most straightforward, matching prior Burevestnik field imagery and avoiding shipboard reactor-safety burdens. A navalised canister for select submarines or large surface combatants would multiply launch azimuths but raises design and safety hurdles for storage, handling and emergency procedures at sea. An air-launched missile would be the most flexible operationally, especially from Tu-160M or Tu-95MSM platforms, but poses acute safety questions while mating a live micro-reactor to a bomber and would likely demand a smaller, lighter variant. None of these are confirmed, yet the direction of travel, “new generations” and “work has started”, suggests Russia is at least exploring multiple basing options to complicate Western warning and interception.
Diversifying nuclear-powered cruise missiles would bring clear military advantages for Russia. First, multi-variant basing expands the engagement geometry, enabling “multi-axis” routes that skirt radar fences and exploit terrain-masking at very low altitude. Second, persistent endurance allows missiles to hold at distance, loiter for timing, or re-route around defended corridors, compressing defenders’ decision timelines and increasing the chance of late-detected penetrations. Third, an eventual supersonic profile would further shrink warning and engagement windows while raising the kinematic bar for interceptors; a later hypersonic profile, if realised, would be still more stressing. Finally, spreading a nuclear-powered threat across ground, sea and air inventories creates redundancy and reduces Russia’s reliance on ballistic or boost-glide systems for penetrating U.S./NATO defenses, aligning with the Kremlin’s long-standing argument that U.S. missile defense after the ABM Treaty’s demise demands new offensive means.
The trade-offs are substantial. Any nuclear-ramjet concept inherits severe safety, environmental and political risks, from reactor integrity in accidents to radiological issues during testing or failure at sea and in foreign airspace. The 2019 Nyonoksa incident, widely linked by outside analysts to the Burevestnik program, is an enduring caution. Reliability and guidance over intercontinental, low-altitude routes also remain non-trivial: maintaining stable navigation, communications, and terrain-following over days-long flights is harder than one dramatic test. And because the value proposition is overwhelmingly nuclear, fielding a reactor-powered conventional missile would invite outsized risk for limited military gain, deployment choices will be scrutinised under nuclear signaling and escalation-management lenses.
Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.
