NATO Now Outproduces the Russian Wartime Defense Industry in Missiles and Drones
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NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte announced in Bucharest that the Alliance now outproduces Russia in ammunition, a shift driven by new European and U.S. shell factories. The industrial turnaround could reshape battlefield dynamics in Ukraine by easing shortages and tightening deterrence.
On November 5, 2025, during its visit to Romania, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte told the NATO-Industry Forum in Bucharest that the Alliance is no longer behind Russia in ammunition output. Kyiv Post reported the message and quoted Rutte’s warning that Moscow remains a long-term threat even as allies “turn the tide.” NATO’s official transcript captured his core line: “Until recently, Russia was producing more ammunition than all NATO Allies put together. But not anymore.”Follow Army Recognition on Google News at this link
NATO now outproduces Russia in ammunition, strengthening Ukraine’s firepower and the Alliance’s edge (Picture source: KNDS/Rheinmetall/Social medias).
The declaration matters because industrial capacity is now the decisive variable in an artillery-centric war. Europe’s Act in Support of Ammunition Production is pushing shell capacity toward two million rounds per year by the end of 2025, while the United States has opened new automated “Universal Artillery Projectile Lines” in Mesquite, Texas, and added a 155 mm load-assemble-pack facility in Camden, Arkansas. Washington admits the 100,000-per-month target will slip into 2026, but the trajectory is unmistakable. The effect is to ease Ukrainian rationing, narrow Russia’s daily fires advantage, and restore deterrence by signaling that NATO magazines will refill faster than the Kremlin can deplete them.
On the battlefield, volume intersects with precision. The first pillar is GMLRS, the 227 mm GPS-aided rocket fired from HIMARS and M270. The M31 unitary round carries a roughly 200-pound class high-explosive warhead to more than 70 km with GPS-aided circular error probable near 10 meters, while the Alternate Warhead variant specializes in area fragmentation against light vehicles and troops. The Extended-Range GMLRS is entering production following 150 km test shots, multiplying launcher standoff and complicating Russian counter-battery tracking.
The second pillar is ATACMS, the 300 km surface-to-surface missile compatible with HIMARS. Early transfers to Ukraine included M39 cluster-payload missiles that dispense 950 M74 submunitions, ideal for parked aviation and air defense complexes. Later unitary M57 rounds add a 500-pound class penetrating blast warhead for hardened targets. IISS analysis of Ukraine’s initial ATACMS strikes on Russian airfields demonstrated how a limited set of tactical ballistic missiles can force aviation and surface-to-air assets deeper into the rear, widening corridors for Ukrainian strike packages.
The third pillar is the Franco-British Storm Shadow or SCALP-EG, a low-observable cruise missile with terrain-following guidance, a BROACH two-stage penetrator warhead around 450 kg, and a range of around 250 km. Propelled by a Microturbo TRI 60-30 engine at subsonic speed and flown from Su-24M platforms in Ukrainian service, Storm Shadow has repeatedly neutralized hardened headquarters and Black Sea logistics nodes that are expensive for Russia to defend.
Precision missiles remain scarce by design, but parity in shell output restores the sustained fires that make precision count. Ukrainian batteries can pin Russian units with 155 mm barrages, then layer GMLRS salvos and ATACMS raids that attrit air defenses, fuel depots, and rail junctions inside 300 km. With Storm Shadow shaping depth targets, NATO’s advantage in guidance, seekers, and networked targeting converts into more kills per shot and tighter logistics. This is a battlefield math problem that starts in factories, not on maps.
The industrial picture behind Rutte’s statement is hardening into permanent capacity. Rheinmetall has opened and planned new lines across Europe and aims for up to 1.5 million 155 mm shells annually by 2027, while Spain’s Rheinmetall Expal has reached a 450,000-round rate. Nammo is expanding energetics and shell output across Scandinavia and Denmark, and NATO’s National Armaments Directors are coordinating powder and charge production to remove chokepoints. Multiyear contracts and co-production for Ukraine are turning emergency surges into enduring baselines.
None of this means Russia is running out of ammunition. Moscow has shifted to a wartime economy with military outlays around 6 to 7 percent of GDP in 2025, added shifts at state plants, and sought external supply. Reuters and South Korean and Western assessments indicate North Korea has shipped thousands of containers likely containing millions of shells, while Russia is investing in new explosives capacity to sustain high consumption. The difference is sustainability. NATO’s diversified, capital-intensive base is scaling under rule-of-law contracts, while Russia’s production depends on mobilized spending, legacy tooling, and sanction-routed imports.
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NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte announced in Bucharest that the Alliance now outproduces Russia in ammunition, a shift driven by new European and U.S. shell factories. The industrial turnaround could reshape battlefield dynamics in Ukraine by easing shortages and tightening deterrence.
On November 5, 2025, during its visit to Romania, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte told the NATO-Industry Forum in Bucharest that the Alliance is no longer behind Russia in ammunition output. Kyiv Post reported the message and quoted Rutte’s warning that Moscow remains a long-term threat even as allies “turn the tide.” NATO’s official transcript captured his core line: “Until recently, Russia was producing more ammunition than all NATO Allies put together. But not anymore.”
Follow Army Recognition on Google News at this link
NATO now outproduces Russia in ammunition, strengthening Ukraine’s firepower and the Alliance’s edge (Picture source: KNDS/Rheinmetall/Social medias).
The declaration matters because industrial capacity is now the decisive variable in an artillery-centric war. Europe’s Act in Support of Ammunition Production is pushing shell capacity toward two million rounds per year by the end of 2025, while the United States has opened new automated “Universal Artillery Projectile Lines” in Mesquite, Texas, and added a 155 mm load-assemble-pack facility in Camden, Arkansas. Washington admits the 100,000-per-month target will slip into 2026, but the trajectory is unmistakable. The effect is to ease Ukrainian rationing, narrow Russia’s daily fires advantage, and restore deterrence by signaling that NATO magazines will refill faster than the Kremlin can deplete them.
On the battlefield, volume intersects with precision. The first pillar is GMLRS, the 227 mm GPS-aided rocket fired from HIMARS and M270. The M31 unitary round carries a roughly 200-pound class high-explosive warhead to more than 70 km with GPS-aided circular error probable near 10 meters, while the Alternate Warhead variant specializes in area fragmentation against light vehicles and troops. The Extended-Range GMLRS is entering production following 150 km test shots, multiplying launcher standoff and complicating Russian counter-battery tracking.
The second pillar is ATACMS, the 300 km surface-to-surface missile compatible with HIMARS. Early transfers to Ukraine included M39 cluster-payload missiles that dispense 950 M74 submunitions, ideal for parked aviation and air defense complexes. Later unitary M57 rounds add a 500-pound class penetrating blast warhead for hardened targets. IISS analysis of Ukraine’s initial ATACMS strikes on Russian airfields demonstrated how a limited set of tactical ballistic missiles can force aviation and surface-to-air assets deeper into the rear, widening corridors for Ukrainian strike packages.
The third pillar is the Franco-British Storm Shadow or SCALP-EG, a low-observable cruise missile with terrain-following guidance, a BROACH two-stage penetrator warhead around 450 kg, and a range of around 250 km. Propelled by a Microturbo TRI 60-30 engine at subsonic speed and flown from Su-24M platforms in Ukrainian service, Storm Shadow has repeatedly neutralized hardened headquarters and Black Sea logistics nodes that are expensive for Russia to defend.
Precision missiles remain scarce by design, but parity in shell output restores the sustained fires that make precision count. Ukrainian batteries can pin Russian units with 155 mm barrages, then layer GMLRS salvos and ATACMS raids that attrit air defenses, fuel depots, and rail junctions inside 300 km. With Storm Shadow shaping depth targets, NATO’s advantage in guidance, seekers, and networked targeting converts into more kills per shot and tighter logistics. This is a battlefield math problem that starts in factories, not on maps.
The industrial picture behind Rutte’s statement is hardening into permanent capacity. Rheinmetall has opened and planned new lines across Europe and aims for up to 1.5 million 155 mm shells annually by 2027, while Spain’s Rheinmetall Expal has reached a 450,000-round rate. Nammo is expanding energetics and shell output across Scandinavia and Denmark, and NATO’s National Armaments Directors are coordinating powder and charge production to remove chokepoints. Multiyear contracts and co-production for Ukraine are turning emergency surges into enduring baselines.
None of this means Russia is running out of ammunition. Moscow has shifted to a wartime economy with military outlays around 6 to 7 percent of GDP in 2025, added shifts at state plants, and sought external supply. Reuters and South Korean and Western assessments indicate North Korea has shipped thousands of containers likely containing millions of shells, while Russia is investing in new explosives capacity to sustain high consumption. The difference is sustainability. NATO’s diversified, capital-intensive base is scaling under rule-of-law contracts, while Russia’s production depends on mobilized spending, legacy tooling, and sanction-routed imports.
