President Trump said U.S. will sell F-35 fighter jets to Saudi Arabia
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Donald Trump said in the Oval Office that the United States “will be selling F-35s” to Saudi Arabia, as a formal request for up to 48 aircraft clears a key Pentagon stage under the Foreign Military Sales process. The move would mark a major shift in US policy on exporting fifth-generation combat aircraft to Arab states and sharpen the debate over Israel’s legally protected qualitative military edge.
Speaking in the Oval Office on 17 November, President Donald Trump told reporters that the United States “will be selling F-35s” to Saudi Arabia, signaling his intention to approve a multi-billion-dollar fighter deal on the eve of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s visit to the White House. His comments follow weeks of behind-the-scenes progress on a Saudi request for up to 48 F-35A Lightning II jets, which Reuters reports has passed a key review step at the Pentagon under the Foreign Military Sales process. If fully executed, the package would include infrastructure, training, and long-term support, and would lock Riyadh into the most advanced Western fighter ecosystem currently available for export. The decision would also test Washington’s long-standing commitments under US law to preserve Israel’s qualitative military edge, as well as raise fresh questions about Saudi Arabia’s fast-growing technological relationship with China.Follow Army Recognition on Google News at this link
In its F-35A variant, the aircraft carries about 18,500 pounds of internal fuel, giving it a combat radius of around 670 nautical miles, extendable with external tanks planned for future blocks, while maintaining an acceptable low-observable profile (Picture source: US DoD)
According to various reports in the Middle East and Europe, the request covers a maximum of 48 F-35s, enough to form two fully operational squadrons, with an associated package of infrastructure, training, and logistical support. This expansion would add to an already substantial fleet of F-15C/D/S/SA and roughly 70 or more Eurofighter Typhoons, as well as the remaining Panavia Tornado IDS still in service with the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF). It would fit into a broader trajectory in which Riyadh is simultaneously exploring other air superiority options, including a potential purchase of 54 French Rafale fighters, a second batch of 48 Typhoons, or participation in Türkiye’s KAAN programme with up to 100 aircraft under consideration, which would make the kingdom one of the leading regional air power hubs by around 2035.
From a technical perspective, the F-35 Lightning II remains one of the most advanced fifth-generation multirole fighters available for export. In its F-35A variant, the aircraft carries about 18,500 pounds of internal fuel, giving it a combat radius of around 670 nautical miles, extendable with external tanks planned for future blocks, while maintaining an acceptable low-observable profile. In a non-stealth configuration, it can carry nearly 8 tonnes of offensive payload and employ a wide range of guided air-to-air and air-to-surface munitions, complemented by an internal 25 mm cannon for close air support tasks. Its AN/APG-81 active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar provides advanced air-to-air and air-to-surface modes, including high-resolution SAR mapping, moving target tracking, and electronic warfare functions, delivering all-weather targeting capacity and data fusion that the F-15/Typhoon generation can only match through substantial modernisation.
These radar capabilities are reinforced by the combination of the Distributed Aperture System and the Electro-Optical Targeting System, which provides 360-degree infrared coverage, missile warning, and air-to-air as well as air-to-surface target designation while remaining compatible with the aircraft’s low-observable profile. These sensors continuously generate electro-optical and infrared data streams that feed the pilot’s situational awareness and, more importantly, the wider combat network. Once integrated into Multifunction Advanced Data Link and Link 16 architectures, Saudi F-35s function as advanced sensor nodes, able to build and share a common operational or maritime picture (RMP/COP) in support of F-15SA and Typhoon formations and, in time, of MALE (Medium Altitude Long Endurance) drone systems under development within the Vision 2030 framework.
At the doctrinal level, the introduction of F-35s into the RSAF would move Saudi Arabia into a different operational category. Low-observable patrols can conduct suppression and destruction of enemy air defences (SEAD/DEAD) while remaining under emissions control (EMCON), prioritising passive sensors and revealing their position only when firing weapons or transmitting when strictly necessary. In the Gulf environment, these mission profiles combine with surveillance of maritime supply routes in the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea, as well as protection of oil and gas infrastructure against missile and drone threats. Integrated into a collaborative air combat concept, F-35s can act as “playmakers” for mixed F-15/Typhoon packages, pushing deep into contested airspace to detect, classify, and disrupt defence networks while guiding the strikes of older platforms from safer distances.
The export process itself remains governed by the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) mechanism, which imposes a sequence of approvals between the Pentagon, the State Department, the White House, and, ultimately, Congress under the Arms Export Control Act. At each stage, the administration must certify that Israel’s qualitative military edge (QME) is preserved, either through technical limitations on the Saudi aircraft configuration or through additional capabilities granted to the Israel Defense Forces, as was the case with the 2020 F-35A deal for the United Arab Emirates, ultimately frozen under Joe Biden. Early reactions from Jerusalem suggest that the political calculation will be complex, with part of the Israeli political class instinctively fearing a reduction in the country’s air superiority.
Another sensitive dimension concerns the link between this capability leap and Saudi Arabia’s structural economic rapprochement with China. A Saudi F-35 fleet, by design, requires strict digital hygiene around mission data, connected maintenance, and C4ISR networks, at a time when the kingdom increasingly relies on Chinese partners in telecommunications, port infrastructure, cloud services, and Vision 2030 industrial programmes. From Washington’s perspective, the risk is that elements of the US defence industrial base and the F-35 mission data files could be exposed to economic intelligence channels linked to China, whether through dual-use suppliers present on bases, intertwined supply chains, or data flows passing through Chinese-origin equipment. Any approval of the deal would therefore entail technological decoupling clauses and thorough cybersecurity audits, likely to limit some offset projects with Chinese groups and to constrain how far Sino-Saudi cooperation can extend in energy, infrastructure, and the digital sector.
For international security, the November 2025 episode confirms that advanced combat aircraft remain a central instrument in US security diplomacy. By opening the way to a Saudi F-35 fleet, Washington reinforces its strategic alignment with Riyadh and underpins its regional posture, but also runs the risk of feeding a qualitative airpower competition in the Middle East, where Iran and other actors will seek to compensate through denser air defences and increased proliferation of missiles and drones. The combination of a still fragile stabilisation force in Gaza, a small circle of fifth-generation operators, and unresolved debates over Palestinian statehood produces an unstable equilibrium, in which robust defence architectures coexist with increasingly pronounced political fault lines.
Written By Erwan Halna du Fretay – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Erwan Halna du Fretay is a graduate of a Master’s degree in International Relations and has experience in the study of conflicts and global arms transfers. His research interests lie in security and strategic studies, particularly the dynamics of the defense industry, the evolution of military technologies, and the strategic transformation of armed forces.
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Donald Trump said in the Oval Office that the United States “will be selling F-35s” to Saudi Arabia, as a formal request for up to 48 aircraft clears a key Pentagon stage under the Foreign Military Sales process. The move would mark a major shift in US policy on exporting fifth-generation combat aircraft to Arab states and sharpen the debate over Israel’s legally protected qualitative military edge.
Speaking in the Oval Office on 17 November, President Donald Trump told reporters that the United States “will be selling F-35s” to Saudi Arabia, signaling his intention to approve a multi-billion-dollar fighter deal on the eve of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s visit to the White House. His comments follow weeks of behind-the-scenes progress on a Saudi request for up to 48 F-35A Lightning II jets, which Reuters reports has passed a key review step at the Pentagon under the Foreign Military Sales process. If fully executed, the package would include infrastructure, training, and long-term support, and would lock Riyadh into the most advanced Western fighter ecosystem currently available for export. The decision would also test Washington’s long-standing commitments under US law to preserve Israel’s qualitative military edge, as well as raise fresh questions about Saudi Arabia’s fast-growing technological relationship with China.
Follow Army Recognition on Google News at this link
In its F-35A variant, the aircraft carries about 18,500 pounds of internal fuel, giving it a combat radius of around 670 nautical miles, extendable with external tanks planned for future blocks, while maintaining an acceptable low-observable profile (Picture source: US DoD)
According to various reports in the Middle East and Europe, the request covers a maximum of 48 F-35s, enough to form two fully operational squadrons, with an associated package of infrastructure, training, and logistical support. This expansion would add to an already substantial fleet of F-15C/D/S/SA and roughly 70 or more Eurofighter Typhoons, as well as the remaining Panavia Tornado IDS still in service with the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF). It would fit into a broader trajectory in which Riyadh is simultaneously exploring other air superiority options, including a potential purchase of 54 French Rafale fighters, a second batch of 48 Typhoons, or participation in Türkiye’s KAAN programme with up to 100 aircraft under consideration, which would make the kingdom one of the leading regional air power hubs by around 2035.
From a technical perspective, the F-35 Lightning II remains one of the most advanced fifth-generation multirole fighters available for export. In its F-35A variant, the aircraft carries about 18,500 pounds of internal fuel, giving it a combat radius of around 670 nautical miles, extendable with external tanks planned for future blocks, while maintaining an acceptable low-observable profile. In a non-stealth configuration, it can carry nearly 8 tonnes of offensive payload and employ a wide range of guided air-to-air and air-to-surface munitions, complemented by an internal 25 mm cannon for close air support tasks. Its AN/APG-81 active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar provides advanced air-to-air and air-to-surface modes, including high-resolution SAR mapping, moving target tracking, and electronic warfare functions, delivering all-weather targeting capacity and data fusion that the F-15/Typhoon generation can only match through substantial modernisation.
These radar capabilities are reinforced by the combination of the Distributed Aperture System and the Electro-Optical Targeting System, which provides 360-degree infrared coverage, missile warning, and air-to-air as well as air-to-surface target designation while remaining compatible with the aircraft’s low-observable profile. These sensors continuously generate electro-optical and infrared data streams that feed the pilot’s situational awareness and, more importantly, the wider combat network. Once integrated into Multifunction Advanced Data Link and Link 16 architectures, Saudi F-35s function as advanced sensor nodes, able to build and share a common operational or maritime picture (RMP/COP) in support of F-15SA and Typhoon formations and, in time, of MALE (Medium Altitude Long Endurance) drone systems under development within the Vision 2030 framework.
At the doctrinal level, the introduction of F-35s into the RSAF would move Saudi Arabia into a different operational category. Low-observable patrols can conduct suppression and destruction of enemy air defences (SEAD/DEAD) while remaining under emissions control (EMCON), prioritising passive sensors and revealing their position only when firing weapons or transmitting when strictly necessary. In the Gulf environment, these mission profiles combine with surveillance of maritime supply routes in the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea, as well as protection of oil and gas infrastructure against missile and drone threats. Integrated into a collaborative air combat concept, F-35s can act as “playmakers” for mixed F-15/Typhoon packages, pushing deep into contested airspace to detect, classify, and disrupt defence networks while guiding the strikes of older platforms from safer distances.
The export process itself remains governed by the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) mechanism, which imposes a sequence of approvals between the Pentagon, the State Department, the White House, and, ultimately, Congress under the Arms Export Control Act. At each stage, the administration must certify that Israel’s qualitative military edge (QME) is preserved, either through technical limitations on the Saudi aircraft configuration or through additional capabilities granted to the Israel Defense Forces, as was the case with the 2020 F-35A deal for the United Arab Emirates, ultimately frozen under Joe Biden. Early reactions from Jerusalem suggest that the political calculation will be complex, with part of the Israeli political class instinctively fearing a reduction in the country’s air superiority.
Another sensitive dimension concerns the link between this capability leap and Saudi Arabia’s structural economic rapprochement with China. A Saudi F-35 fleet, by design, requires strict digital hygiene around mission data, connected maintenance, and C4ISR networks, at a time when the kingdom increasingly relies on Chinese partners in telecommunications, port infrastructure, cloud services, and Vision 2030 industrial programmes. From Washington’s perspective, the risk is that elements of the US defence industrial base and the F-35 mission data files could be exposed to economic intelligence channels linked to China, whether through dual-use suppliers present on bases, intertwined supply chains, or data flows passing through Chinese-origin equipment. Any approval of the deal would therefore entail technological decoupling clauses and thorough cybersecurity audits, likely to limit some offset projects with Chinese groups and to constrain how far Sino-Saudi cooperation can extend in energy, infrastructure, and the digital sector.
For international security, the November 2025 episode confirms that advanced combat aircraft remain a central instrument in US security diplomacy. By opening the way to a Saudi F-35 fleet, Washington reinforces its strategic alignment with Riyadh and underpins its regional posture, but also runs the risk of feeding a qualitative airpower competition in the Middle East, where Iran and other actors will seek to compensate through denser air defences and increased proliferation of missiles and drones. The combination of a still fragile stabilisation force in Gaza, a small circle of fifth-generation operators, and unresolved debates over Palestinian statehood produces an unstable equilibrium, in which robust defence architectures coexist with increasingly pronounced political fault lines.
Written By Erwan Halna du Fretay – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Erwan Halna du Fretay is a graduate of a Master’s degree in International Relations and has experience in the study of conflicts and global arms transfers. His research interests lie in security and strategic studies, particularly the dynamics of the defense industry, the evolution of military technologies, and the strategic transformation of armed forces.
