UAE studies China’s Feilong 300D loitering munition as a low-cost long-range strike option
{loadposition bannertop}
{loadposition sidebarpub}
The United Arab Emirates is reviewing the Chinese-made Feilong 300D loitering munition as a potential addition to its long-range strike mix, according to intelligence-linked reporting. The possibility highlights Abu Dhabi’s interest in low-cost mass strike systems and its ongoing effort to balance Chinese options with long-standing U.S. and European defense ties.
According to information reported by specialized intelligence channels on November 20, 2025, the United Arab Emirates is examining China’s Feilong-300D loitering munition as a potential option for its long-range strike inventory. The reporting describes the Feilong-300D, developed by Norinco, as a low-cost, long-range “suicide drone” whose affordability and mass-production potential have drawn early attention from several Middle Eastern states, including the UAE. It frames the issue around three dimensions: the drivers of Emirati interest, Abu Dhabi’s view of the system, and the strategic considerations that would shape any decision.Follow Army Recognition on Google News at this link
China’s Feilong-300D loitering munition features a delta-wing design, a gasoline piston engine, modular warhead options, and an advertised strike range of around 1,000 kilometers. Developed for low-cost mass production, it is intended to overwhelm air defenses through large-scale, long-range saturation attacks (Picture source: CNA).
For now, there is no official confirmation of negotiations, requests for information, or test campaigns. The Feilong-300D, therefore, sits in a grey zone between rumor and plausible option, but it is a revealing hypothesis. Chinese and international defense coverage describe the Feilong-300D as a delta-wing loitering munition powered by a gasoline piston engine, capable of reaching roughly 1,000 kilometers and marketed at an extraordinary headline price of about 10,000 dollars per unit. Showcased at Airshow China in Zhuhai, it has been positioned as a system aimed at price-sensitive states seeking massed long-range strike capacity rather than a boutique fleet of advanced drones.
Technical details remain partial, but enough is public to outline its concept. Available information suggests a modular warhead family, likely in the same weight class as other long-range loitering systems, and a guidance suite built around inertial and satellite navigation with possible automated target features. The airframe uses composite materials, a pusher-prop layout to reduce its radar and infrared visibility, and an engine and fuel type chosen for low cost and logistics simplicity. Its design philosophy is openly attritional: field large numbers, accept losses, and force the defender to expend far more expensive interceptors.
For the UAE, this doesn’t land on doctrinally empty terrain. Abu Dhabi has already prioritized loitering munitions within its indigenous defense industry through EDGE Group’s HUNTER family. In 2023, the UAE Armed Forces signed a major contract with the EDGE subsidiary HALCON to acquire HUNTER 2-S, HUNTER 5, and HUNTER 10 systems. These give the country a tiered set of tube-launched and fixed-wing loitering munitions with tactical ranges around 50 to 100 kilometers and payloads from 2 to 10 kilograms. The lighter HUNTER 2-S offers short-range, swarm-enabled employment, while the HUNTER 10 provides increased endurance and a larger warhead for deeper precision strikes.
A Chinese system like the Feilong-300D would not replace these indigenous drones but would widen the UAE’s arsenal into the strategic distance band. HUNTER 2-S is a tactical weapon optimized for close-range saturation and AI-enabled cooperation. Feilong, by contrast, promises a deep-strike capability at a cost far below cruise missiles or high-end UCAVs. In a crisis scenario, a mixed fleet would allow the UAE to launch dense salvos of indigenous short- and medium-range loitering munitions while holding long-range Feilong-type assets in reserve for targets deep inside contested territory. From a pure cost-benefit standpoint, Emirati planners would be expected to at least run feasibility assessments.
Yet it is just as important to underline what has not occurred. There are no visible indicators of a formal UAE request for proposals, no public testing, and no announcement from Norinco regarding export customers. The reports describe preliminary exploration rather than a binding commitment, consistent with Abu Dhabi’s pattern of quietly evaluating foreign systems before determining whether they merit integration into an increasingly sophisticated command-and-control environment. A real procurement move would likely leave observable markers over time, such as joint demonstrations at IDEX or UMEX or disclosures through national procurement authorities.
The hypothesis nonetheless aligns with a broader trajectory in China–UAE defense and diplomatic relations. The two countries elevated their relationship to a comprehensive strategic partnership in 2018, with cooperation expanding across emerging technologies, artificial intelligence, and industrial development. Militarily, the UAE has already operated multiple Chinese platforms, including Wing Loong I and Wing Loong II UAVs, which later appeared in regional conflicts. More recent developments point to Emirati interest in Chinese early warning radars, hypersonic threat detection technologies, and advanced electronic warfare solutions. The result is a maturing relationship in which unmanned systems, sensors, and autonomous technologies play an increasingly central role.
At the same time, any consideration of the Feilong-300D would unfold under the shadow of the UAE’s deep and long-standing defense ties with the United States and Europe. Chinese unmanned systems initially found openings in the Gulf because Western exports were constrained by arms control regimes and political hesitations, but Washington continues to view Chinese military technology in Gulf C4ISR networks as a strategic vulnerability. Integrating a Chinese long-range loitering munition into Emirati air and missile defense architecture would inevitably trigger scrutiny, raising questions about data integrity, cyber exposure, and the broader political messaging. Nevertheless, Abu Dhabi has long used diversified procurement to increase leverage with Western suppliers, and even unofficial exploration of Chinese options can influence negotiations on price, delivery schedules, and technology transfer.
Industrial and proliferation considerations also weigh heavily. The UAE is transitioning from a drone buyer to a regional drone exporter, with locally built systems increasingly appearing in African and Middle Eastern theaters. Introducing a very low-cost, long-range loitering munition into this environment would raise sensitive questions about regional diffusion and compliance with end-use controls. Conversely, if China offered local production or customization within UAE industrial zones, the Feilong-300D could fit more naturally into the country’s “Make it in the Emirates” strategy.
From a military-technical perspective, the trade-offs remain sharp. A 10,000-dollar long-range loitering munition is clearly attractive for saturating enemy defenses, but its real performance under jamming, intercept, or adverse weather remains untested in publicly known conditions. EDGE’s HUNTER series already benefits from integration into Emirati command networks, and any foreign system would need to meet the same expectations for interoperability and reliability.
In that sense, the Feilong-300D is already informative even without a procurement contract. It reveals the new economics of long-range strike, tests the boundaries of China–UAE military cooperation, and underscores Abu Dhabi’s determination to keep multiple technological pathways open. Until concrete evidence emerges, the Feilong-300D remains a hypothesis rather than a confirmed addition to the UAE arsenal.
{loadposition bannertop}
{loadposition sidebarpub}
The United Arab Emirates is reviewing the Chinese-made Feilong 300D loitering munition as a potential addition to its long-range strike mix, according to intelligence-linked reporting. The possibility highlights Abu Dhabi’s interest in low-cost mass strike systems and its ongoing effort to balance Chinese options with long-standing U.S. and European defense ties.
According to information reported by specialized intelligence channels on November 20, 2025, the United Arab Emirates is examining China’s Feilong-300D loitering munition as a potential option for its long-range strike inventory. The reporting describes the Feilong-300D, developed by Norinco, as a low-cost, long-range “suicide drone” whose affordability and mass-production potential have drawn early attention from several Middle Eastern states, including the UAE. It frames the issue around three dimensions: the drivers of Emirati interest, Abu Dhabi’s view of the system, and the strategic considerations that would shape any decision.
Follow Army Recognition on Google News at this link
China’s Feilong-300D loitering munition features a delta-wing design, a gasoline piston engine, modular warhead options, and an advertised strike range of around 1,000 kilometers. Developed for low-cost mass production, it is intended to overwhelm air defenses through large-scale, long-range saturation attacks (Picture source: CNA).
For now, there is no official confirmation of negotiations, requests for information, or test campaigns. The Feilong-300D, therefore, sits in a grey zone between rumor and plausible option, but it is a revealing hypothesis. Chinese and international defense coverage describe the Feilong-300D as a delta-wing loitering munition powered by a gasoline piston engine, capable of reaching roughly 1,000 kilometers and marketed at an extraordinary headline price of about 10,000 dollars per unit. Showcased at Airshow China in Zhuhai, it has been positioned as a system aimed at price-sensitive states seeking massed long-range strike capacity rather than a boutique fleet of advanced drones.
Technical details remain partial, but enough is public to outline its concept. Available information suggests a modular warhead family, likely in the same weight class as other long-range loitering systems, and a guidance suite built around inertial and satellite navigation with possible automated target features. The airframe uses composite materials, a pusher-prop layout to reduce its radar and infrared visibility, and an engine and fuel type chosen for low cost and logistics simplicity. Its design philosophy is openly attritional: field large numbers, accept losses, and force the defender to expend far more expensive interceptors.
For the UAE, this doesn’t land on doctrinally empty terrain. Abu Dhabi has already prioritized loitering munitions within its indigenous defense industry through EDGE Group’s HUNTER family. In 2023, the UAE Armed Forces signed a major contract with the EDGE subsidiary HALCON to acquire HUNTER 2-S, HUNTER 5, and HUNTER 10 systems. These give the country a tiered set of tube-launched and fixed-wing loitering munitions with tactical ranges around 50 to 100 kilometers and payloads from 2 to 10 kilograms. The lighter HUNTER 2-S offers short-range, swarm-enabled employment, while the HUNTER 10 provides increased endurance and a larger warhead for deeper precision strikes.
A Chinese system like the Feilong-300D would not replace these indigenous drones but would widen the UAE’s arsenal into the strategic distance band. HUNTER 2-S is a tactical weapon optimized for close-range saturation and AI-enabled cooperation. Feilong, by contrast, promises a deep-strike capability at a cost far below cruise missiles or high-end UCAVs. In a crisis scenario, a mixed fleet would allow the UAE to launch dense salvos of indigenous short- and medium-range loitering munitions while holding long-range Feilong-type assets in reserve for targets deep inside contested territory. From a pure cost-benefit standpoint, Emirati planners would be expected to at least run feasibility assessments.
Yet it is just as important to underline what has not occurred. There are no visible indicators of a formal UAE request for proposals, no public testing, and no announcement from Norinco regarding export customers. The reports describe preliminary exploration rather than a binding commitment, consistent with Abu Dhabi’s pattern of quietly evaluating foreign systems before determining whether they merit integration into an increasingly sophisticated command-and-control environment. A real procurement move would likely leave observable markers over time, such as joint demonstrations at IDEX or UMEX or disclosures through national procurement authorities.
The hypothesis nonetheless aligns with a broader trajectory in China–UAE defense and diplomatic relations. The two countries elevated their relationship to a comprehensive strategic partnership in 2018, with cooperation expanding across emerging technologies, artificial intelligence, and industrial development. Militarily, the UAE has already operated multiple Chinese platforms, including Wing Loong I and Wing Loong II UAVs, which later appeared in regional conflicts. More recent developments point to Emirati interest in Chinese early warning radars, hypersonic threat detection technologies, and advanced electronic warfare solutions. The result is a maturing relationship in which unmanned systems, sensors, and autonomous technologies play an increasingly central role.
At the same time, any consideration of the Feilong-300D would unfold under the shadow of the UAE’s deep and long-standing defense ties with the United States and Europe. Chinese unmanned systems initially found openings in the Gulf because Western exports were constrained by arms control regimes and political hesitations, but Washington continues to view Chinese military technology in Gulf C4ISR networks as a strategic vulnerability. Integrating a Chinese long-range loitering munition into Emirati air and missile defense architecture would inevitably trigger scrutiny, raising questions about data integrity, cyber exposure, and the broader political messaging. Nevertheless, Abu Dhabi has long used diversified procurement to increase leverage with Western suppliers, and even unofficial exploration of Chinese options can influence negotiations on price, delivery schedules, and technology transfer.
Industrial and proliferation considerations also weigh heavily. The UAE is transitioning from a drone buyer to a regional drone exporter, with locally built systems increasingly appearing in African and Middle Eastern theaters. Introducing a very low-cost, long-range loitering munition into this environment would raise sensitive questions about regional diffusion and compliance with end-use controls. Conversely, if China offered local production or customization within UAE industrial zones, the Feilong-300D could fit more naturally into the country’s “Make it in the Emirates” strategy.
From a military-technical perspective, the trade-offs remain sharp. A 10,000-dollar long-range loitering munition is clearly attractive for saturating enemy defenses, but its real performance under jamming, intercept, or adverse weather remains untested in publicly known conditions. EDGE’s HUNTER series already benefits from integration into Emirati command networks, and any foreign system would need to meet the same expectations for interoperability and reliability.
In that sense, the Feilong-300D is already informative even without a procurement contract. It reveals the new economics of long-range strike, tests the boundaries of China–UAE military cooperation, and underscores Abu Dhabi’s determination to keep multiple technological pathways open. Until concrete evidence emerges, the Feilong-300D remains a hypothesis rather than a confirmed addition to the UAE arsenal.
