Iranian Mohajer-6 Drone Deployed in Venezuela at El Libertador Air Base Increasing Risks to U.S. Forces
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New photographic evidence confirms the presence of an Iranian-made Mohajer-6 UAV at Venezuela’s El Libertador Air Base in Maracay. The deployment significantly expands Venezuela’s military capabilities and introduces new operational risks for U.S. forces deployed across the Caribbean region.
Images shared on social media on December 30, 2025, appear to confirm that Venezuela has taken delivery of the Iranian-built Mohajer-6 unmanned aerial vehicle, marking the first public evidence of an armed reconnaissance drone in Venezuelan service. According to information published by the X account El Inquisidor, the aircraft was photographed at El Libertador Air Base, the Venezuelan Air Force’s primary operational facility, underscoring a deepening defense relationship between Caracas and Tehran and directly implicating U.S. military operations in the Caribbean.Follow Army Recognition on Google News at this link
An Iranian-made Mohajer-6 unmanned aerial vehicle was spotted on the tarmac of El Libertador Air Base in Venezuela, confirming the drone’s operational deployment by the Venezuelan Air Force. The image, published on December 30, 2025, marks the first visual evidence of Mohajer 6’s presence in Latin America. (Picture source: El Inquisidor X account)
The drone pictured on the tarmac bears the distinct structural features of the Mohajer-6, Iran’s most exported strike-capable UAV. With its twin-boom tail, inverted V-stabilizers, mid-mounted straight wings, and fixed tricycle landing gear, the airframe configuration matches known operational variants of the system already used by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and exported to various conflict zones. Unlike the older Mohajer-2 and Mohajer-3 models previously delivered to Venezuela in the mid-2000s—locally rebranded as Sant Arpia and limited to basic ISR roles—the Mohajer-6 introduces a combat-proven capability that merges long-endurance surveillance with guided munitions delivery.
Developed by Iran’s Qods Aviation Industries and introduced into service in 2018, the Mohajer-6 is a medium-altitude, long-endurance (MALE) drone capable of flying for up to 12 hours with a maximum range of over 200 kilometers. It carries a multi-sensor gimbaled turret outfitted with electro-optical and infrared imaging systems, laser rangefinders, and target designators, enabling it to identify, track, and engage ground and maritime targets in both day and night conditions. The drone can be armed with up to four precision munitions, typically mounted two per wing, and is compatible with several Iranian-made weapon systems. These include the Qaem-series guided bombs—Qaem-1, Qaem-5, and Qaem-9—which employ electro-optical or laser guidance for direct-hit precision against vehicles, command posts, or radar sites. More recent iterations of the drone have also been seen with Almas missiles, a portable guided anti-armor munition with a range of up to 8 km, closely modeled after the Israeli Spike missile and optimized for both static and mobile hard targets.
This deployment must be seen within the broader context of expanding Iranian military exports to Venezuela, particularly since 2022. According to open-source data and internal reporting, Venezuela has received a batch of six Peykaap-3 fast attack missile boats, Iranian-built naval craft modeled for asymmetric coastal defense and equipped for swarm-style tactics. These vessels have been paired with at least 25 CM-90 Nasr anti-ship cruise missiles, delivered in 2023. The CM-90 Nasr, a compact sea-skimming missile with a range of approximately 35 kilometers and a 150 kg warhead, is designed to disable patrol vessels, transports, or amphibious craft operating in Venezuela’s nearshore waters. Combined with radar or drone-based targeting, these systems provide Venezuela with an expanding maritime denial capability directly modeled on Iran’s naval doctrine in the Persian Gulf.
The Mohajer-6 fits seamlessly into this evolving posture. By extending surveillance reach beyond coastal radar and enabling real-time target identification and post-strike assessment, the drone acts as a critical node in an emerging kill chain that could be activated in crisis conditions. Its ability to loiter for extended durations, operate at altitudes up to 18,000 feet, and track naval movements positions it as a direct challenge to U.S. freedom of navigation in the southern Caribbean. The drone’s weapons may not be capable of destroying a U.S. destroyer, but their precision is more than sufficient to inflict damage on logistics vessels, amphibious support ships, or even lightly defended forward-operating bases. In a potential conflict scenario, these assets could be used to harass and attrit forces, gather targeting intelligence for missile units or fast attack craft, and saturate air defense systems through coordinated UAV and surface-launched strikes.
The integration of Iranian-made drones, missiles, and fast boats represents more than a material upgrade for Venezuela—it reflects a strategic shift in doctrine. Iran is not simply supplying hardware; it is exporting a blueprint for asymmetrical warfare built on mobility, precision, and deniability. Venezuela’s adoption of this model is evident not only in its acquisition patterns but in how it is positioning platforms like the Mohajer-6 within the command structure of the Venezuelan Air Force. The drone’s stationing at El Libertador Air Base—home to both tactical aviation and intelligence units—suggests its role will extend beyond reconnaissance, potentially serving as a frontline tool for area denial, surveillance of U.S. military assets, and even limited strike missions against soft or logistical targets.
For U.S. military planners, this development deepens the operational challenges in the Caribbean basin. The presence of Mohajer-6 drones in Venezuela introduces a persistent aerial surveillance capability within range of major maritime chokepoints, including the approaches to the Panama Canal and key regional ports used by U.S. and allied naval forces. It also introduces a new aerial vector for escalation in any regional confrontation, particularly if the drones are used to shadow or engage U.S. Navy vessels or surveillance flights. Their use in recent conflicts, from Syria to Ethiopia, has proven that the Mohajer-6, while not a strategic game-changer in isolation, can be highly effective in contested environments when paired with layered assets and local command autonomy.
The deployment of the Mohajer-6 drone in Venezuela signals more than just an incremental upgrade in the country’s defense inventory—it reflects a deeper alignment with Iran’s strategic doctrine of asymmetric warfare and marks a bold geopolitical challenge to U.S. influence in the Western Hemisphere. As Iran exports not just equipment but combat-tested tactics, Venezuela is emerging as a forward operating partner for Tehran in Latin America. For U.S. forces operating in the region, the combination of drones, anti-ship missiles, and swarm-capable naval assets will likely force a recalibration of planning assumptions, with a greater emphasis on counter-UAV systems, electronic warfare, and air-maritime integration.
While neither Caracas nor Tehran has officially confirmed the delivery, the photographic evidence published by El Inquisidor leaves little doubt that the Mohajer-6 has entered operational service with Venezuela. Army Recognition will continue to monitor developments in this evolving security landscape and assess the broader implications of Iranian drone proliferation in the Americas.Written by Alain Servaes – Chief Editor, Army Recognition GroupAlain Servaes is a former infantry non-commissioned officer and the founder of Army Recognition. With over 20 years in defense journalism, he provides expert analysis on military equipment, NATO operations, and the global defense industry.
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New photographic evidence confirms the presence of an Iranian-made Mohajer-6 UAV at Venezuela’s El Libertador Air Base in Maracay. The deployment significantly expands Venezuela’s military capabilities and introduces new operational risks for U.S. forces deployed across the Caribbean region.
Images shared on social media on December 30, 2025, appear to confirm that Venezuela has taken delivery of the Iranian-built Mohajer-6 unmanned aerial vehicle, marking the first public evidence of an armed reconnaissance drone in Venezuelan service. According to information published by the X account El Inquisidor, the aircraft was photographed at El Libertador Air Base, the Venezuelan Air Force’s primary operational facility, underscoring a deepening defense relationship between Caracas and Tehran and directly implicating U.S. military operations in the Caribbean.
Follow Army Recognition on Google News at this link
An Iranian-made Mohajer-6 unmanned aerial vehicle was spotted on the tarmac of El Libertador Air Base in Venezuela, confirming the drone’s operational deployment by the Venezuelan Air Force. The image, published on December 30, 2025, marks the first visual evidence of Mohajer 6’s presence in Latin America. (Picture source: El Inquisidor X account)
The drone pictured on the tarmac bears the distinct structural features of the Mohajer-6, Iran’s most exported strike-capable UAV. With its twin-boom tail, inverted V-stabilizers, mid-mounted straight wings, and fixed tricycle landing gear, the airframe configuration matches known operational variants of the system already used by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and exported to various conflict zones. Unlike the older Mohajer-2 and Mohajer-3 models previously delivered to Venezuela in the mid-2000s—locally rebranded as Sant Arpia and limited to basic ISR roles—the Mohajer-6 introduces a combat-proven capability that merges long-endurance surveillance with guided munitions delivery.
Developed by Iran’s Qods Aviation Industries and introduced into service in 2018, the Mohajer-6 is a medium-altitude, long-endurance (MALE) drone capable of flying for up to 12 hours with a maximum range of over 200 kilometers. It carries a multi-sensor gimbaled turret outfitted with electro-optical and infrared imaging systems, laser rangefinders, and target designators, enabling it to identify, track, and engage ground and maritime targets in both day and night conditions. The drone can be armed with up to four precision munitions, typically mounted two per wing, and is compatible with several Iranian-made weapon systems. These include the Qaem-series guided bombs—Qaem-1, Qaem-5, and Qaem-9—which employ electro-optical or laser guidance for direct-hit precision against vehicles, command posts, or radar sites. More recent iterations of the drone have also been seen with Almas missiles, a portable guided anti-armor munition with a range of up to 8 km, closely modeled after the Israeli Spike missile and optimized for both static and mobile hard targets.
This deployment must be seen within the broader context of expanding Iranian military exports to Venezuela, particularly since 2022. According to open-source data and internal reporting, Venezuela has received a batch of six Peykaap-3 fast attack missile boats, Iranian-built naval craft modeled for asymmetric coastal defense and equipped for swarm-style tactics. These vessels have been paired with at least 25 CM-90 Nasr anti-ship cruise missiles, delivered in 2023. The CM-90 Nasr, a compact sea-skimming missile with a range of approximately 35 kilometers and a 150 kg warhead, is designed to disable patrol vessels, transports, or amphibious craft operating in Venezuela’s nearshore waters. Combined with radar or drone-based targeting, these systems provide Venezuela with an expanding maritime denial capability directly modeled on Iran’s naval doctrine in the Persian Gulf.
The Mohajer-6 fits seamlessly into this evolving posture. By extending surveillance reach beyond coastal radar and enabling real-time target identification and post-strike assessment, the drone acts as a critical node in an emerging kill chain that could be activated in crisis conditions. Its ability to loiter for extended durations, operate at altitudes up to 18,000 feet, and track naval movements positions it as a direct challenge to U.S. freedom of navigation in the southern Caribbean. The drone’s weapons may not be capable of destroying a U.S. destroyer, but their precision is more than sufficient to inflict damage on logistics vessels, amphibious support ships, or even lightly defended forward-operating bases. In a potential conflict scenario, these assets could be used to harass and attrit forces, gather targeting intelligence for missile units or fast attack craft, and saturate air defense systems through coordinated UAV and surface-launched strikes.
The integration of Iranian-made drones, missiles, and fast boats represents more than a material upgrade for Venezuela—it reflects a strategic shift in doctrine. Iran is not simply supplying hardware; it is exporting a blueprint for asymmetrical warfare built on mobility, precision, and deniability. Venezuela’s adoption of this model is evident not only in its acquisition patterns but in how it is positioning platforms like the Mohajer-6 within the command structure of the Venezuelan Air Force. The drone’s stationing at El Libertador Air Base—home to both tactical aviation and intelligence units—suggests its role will extend beyond reconnaissance, potentially serving as a frontline tool for area denial, surveillance of U.S. military assets, and even limited strike missions against soft or logistical targets.
For U.S. military planners, this development deepens the operational challenges in the Caribbean basin. The presence of Mohajer-6 drones in Venezuela introduces a persistent aerial surveillance capability within range of major maritime chokepoints, including the approaches to the Panama Canal and key regional ports used by U.S. and allied naval forces. It also introduces a new aerial vector for escalation in any regional confrontation, particularly if the drones are used to shadow or engage U.S. Navy vessels or surveillance flights. Their use in recent conflicts, from Syria to Ethiopia, has proven that the Mohajer-6, while not a strategic game-changer in isolation, can be highly effective in contested environments when paired with layered assets and local command autonomy.
The deployment of the Mohajer-6 drone in Venezuela signals more than just an incremental upgrade in the country’s defense inventory—it reflects a deeper alignment with Iran’s strategic doctrine of asymmetric warfare and marks a bold geopolitical challenge to U.S. influence in the Western Hemisphere. As Iran exports not just equipment but combat-tested tactics, Venezuela is emerging as a forward operating partner for Tehran in Latin America. For U.S. forces operating in the region, the combination of drones, anti-ship missiles, and swarm-capable naval assets will likely force a recalibration of planning assumptions, with a greater emphasis on counter-UAV systems, electronic warfare, and air-maritime integration.
While neither Caracas nor Tehran has officially confirmed the delivery, the photographic evidence published by El Inquisidor leaves little doubt that the Mohajer-6 has entered operational service with Venezuela. Army Recognition will continue to monitor developments in this evolving security landscape and assess the broader implications of Iranian drone proliferation in the Americas.
Written by Alain Servaes – Chief Editor, Army Recognition Group
Alain Servaes is a former infantry non-commissioned officer and the founder of Army Recognition. With over 20 years in defense journalism, he provides expert analysis on military equipment, NATO operations, and the global defense industry.
