Could the Syrian Army soon receive Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones?
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A Syrian official claims that the Turkish government is considering selling Bayraktar TB2 drones to Syria, a report that remains unconfirmed but may signal shifting bilateral relations.
According to Syria Retold Daily on January 11, 2026, a senior Syrian military official claimed the Turkish government is considering the sale of Bayraktar TB2 unmanned aerial vehicles to the Syrian Arab Army, though no procurement step or public interest has been confirmed to date. If accurate, the information would indicate a possible shift in the relations between the two countries, as Türkiye and the Syrian transitional authorities signed a memorandum of understanding in August 2025 that formalized Ankara’s military support.Follow Army Recognition on Google News at this link
Even a small number of TB2s would greatly help the Syrian forces for surveillance, target identification, and limited precision strikes, rather than deep attack missions. (Picture source: Baykar)
Following the fall of Assad, Türkiye signed a formal military cooperation agreement with the new Syrian authorities in August 2025 that covers training, logistics, advisory support, and the supply of selected military equipment, including drones, marking a clear break from the hostile relationship that existed during the Assad era. Under this framework, Syrian soldiers have begun training in Turkish military facilities, Syrian cadets have been admitted to Turkish military academies across land, air, and naval tracks, and Turkish officers have provided institutional guidance on command structures, logistics, and force organization. The agreement also foresees the delivery of weapons systems and equipment, including armored vehicles and support assets, making Ankara the most influential external partner in the rebuilding of Syria’s armed forces, although quantities and timelines remain undisclosed.
The Syrian Arab Armed Forces today remain large on paper but uneven in real capability after more than a decade of war and division. Manpower is still estimated in the low hundreds of thousands when regular units, reserves, and affiliated formations are combined, but readiness differs widely by unit and region. Ground forces remain the core of the military forces, relying mainly on old Soviet tanks such as the T-55, T-62, and T-72, BMP infantry fighting vehicles, and a broad mix of towed and self-propelled artillery. Air force capabilities persist, but with reduced aircraft availability, limited pilot training cycles, and constrained maintenance capacity. Air defense forces retain legacy systems, though coverage and effectiveness differ by area. As a result, overall strength is inconsistent and closely tied to logistics and local conditions.
Current missions of Syrian forces focus mainly on internal security and maintaining control over territory rather than conducting large-scale offensive operations. Units are deployed to secure major cities, transport routes, border crossings, and critical infrastructure such as power and energy facilities. In more sensitive regions, forces concentrate on monitoring rival armed groups and preventing infiltration or sudden attacks. Air assets are used selectively for reconnaissance and occasional strikes when conditions allow, rather than sustained air campaigns. Air defense units prioritize protecting key sites instead of providing broad nationwide coverage. These missions reflect limited resources and a preference for defensive, intelligence-driven operations over large-scale maneuver warfare.
Since the fall of Assad, relations between Syria and Turkiye have gradually shifted from open confrontation to cautious, interest-based engagement. Ankara’s main concerns have centered on managing its southern frontier, limiting hostile armed activity near Turkish-controlled areas, and managing refugee-related pressures. Damascus, facing a new political reality, has sought pragmatic contact with neighboring states that hold influence in northern Syria. This has led to indirect communication and selective coordination rather than formal alliances. In this context, even limited military cooperation carries strong political meaning. Any defense-related move is therefore closely watched for what it could politically signal rather than for its immediate military effect.
The reported consideration of a Turkish-made drone for the Syrian Army highlights both the evolution and the limits of this relationship. Turkish drones were previously used against Syrian government forces, making any potential transfer politically delicate. A sale would also imply some level of training, technical support, and ongoing maintenance by Turkish forces, since unmanned systems depend on ground control stations and secure communications. At the same time, the lack of details on conditions, oversight mechanisms, or scale could suggest in the future a constrained and potentially symbolic step rather than a broad partnership. The claim points to a possible opening, but not to a clear or lasting framework for cooperation. Its impact would depend on whether it remains unverified or develops into something more concrete, but this information should not be ignored, as relations between Syria and Turkey could continue to develop in a favourable direction.
The Bayraktar TB2 was developed in Turkiye by Baykar during the early 2010s as part of an effort to reduce reliance on foreign unmanned systems and build a domestically controlled armed drone capability. Its first flight took place in 2014, and it entered service with Turkish forces shortly afterward, initially in an intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance role before being cleared for armed missions. Over time, production expanded steadily, with total output exceeding 600 units, reflecting both domestic demand and exports. The system was gradually adapted based on operational experience, including changes driven by combat use and by restrictions on foreign-supplied components. This led to the introduction of locally produced subsystems and, later, upgraded variants incorporating satellite communications and improved avionics.
The TB2 is a medium-altitude long-endurance unmanned aerial vehicle optimized for persistence rather than speed. It features a wingspan of about 12 meters, a length of roughly 6.5 meters, and a maximum takeoff weight close to 700 kg. Propulsion is provided by a single internal combustion engine driving a rear-mounted propeller, a configuration chosen for efficiency and endurance. The airframe uses a twin-boom tail and a high-aspect-ratio wing to support stable flight at medium altitude over long periods. The system is operated from a ground control station by a small crew responsible for piloting, sensor management, and mission control, with communications handled through line-of-sight data links or satellite links on upgraded versions.
The TB2 is designed to combine persistent surveillance with limited precision strike functions. Endurance can exceed 24 hours depending on payload and mission profile, allowing continuous monitoring of areas of interest. The payload capacity is around 150 kg, typically allocated to electro-optical and infrared sensors and lightweight laser-guided munitions such as MAM-C and MAM-L. Operational altitude is generally in the range of 18,000 to 25,000 feet, with line-of-sight control extending up to several hundred kilometers, or farther when satellite communications are used. The platform is best suited to permissive or moderately contested environments, where its endurance and sensors enable target detection and tracking, while survivability depends on altitude management, tactics, and the density of opposing air defense and electronic warfare systems.
Written by Jérôme Brahy
Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
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A Syrian official claims that the Turkish government is considering selling Bayraktar TB2 drones to Syria, a report that remains unconfirmed but may signal shifting bilateral relations.
According to Syria Retold Daily on January 11, 2026, a senior Syrian military official claimed the Turkish government is considering the sale of Bayraktar TB2 unmanned aerial vehicles to the Syrian Arab Army, though no procurement step or public interest has been confirmed to date. If accurate, the information would indicate a possible shift in the relations between the two countries, as Türkiye and the Syrian transitional authorities signed a memorandum of understanding in August 2025 that formalized Ankara’s military support.
Follow Army Recognition on Google News at this link
Even a small number of TB2s would greatly help the Syrian forces for surveillance, target identification, and limited precision strikes, rather than deep attack missions. (Picture source: Baykar)
Following the fall of Assad, Türkiye signed a formal military cooperation agreement with the new Syrian authorities in August 2025 that covers training, logistics, advisory support, and the supply of selected military equipment, including drones, marking a clear break from the hostile relationship that existed during the Assad era. Under this framework, Syrian soldiers have begun training in Turkish military facilities, Syrian cadets have been admitted to Turkish military academies across land, air, and naval tracks, and Turkish officers have provided institutional guidance on command structures, logistics, and force organization. The agreement also foresees the delivery of weapons systems and equipment, including armored vehicles and support assets, making Ankara the most influential external partner in the rebuilding of Syria’s armed forces, although quantities and timelines remain undisclosed.
The Syrian Arab Armed Forces today remain large on paper but uneven in real capability after more than a decade of war and division. Manpower is still estimated in the low hundreds of thousands when regular units, reserves, and affiliated formations are combined, but readiness differs widely by unit and region. Ground forces remain the core of the military forces, relying mainly on old Soviet tanks such as the T-55, T-62, and T-72, BMP infantry fighting vehicles, and a broad mix of towed and self-propelled artillery. Air force capabilities persist, but with reduced aircraft availability, limited pilot training cycles, and constrained maintenance capacity. Air defense forces retain legacy systems, though coverage and effectiveness differ by area. As a result, overall strength is inconsistent and closely tied to logistics and local conditions.
Current missions of Syrian forces focus mainly on internal security and maintaining control over territory rather than conducting large-scale offensive operations. Units are deployed to secure major cities, transport routes, border crossings, and critical infrastructure such as power and energy facilities. In more sensitive regions, forces concentrate on monitoring rival armed groups and preventing infiltration or sudden attacks. Air assets are used selectively for reconnaissance and occasional strikes when conditions allow, rather than sustained air campaigns. Air defense units prioritize protecting key sites instead of providing broad nationwide coverage. These missions reflect limited resources and a preference for defensive, intelligence-driven operations over large-scale maneuver warfare.
Since the fall of Assad, relations between Syria and Turkiye have gradually shifted from open confrontation to cautious, interest-based engagement. Ankara’s main concerns have centered on managing its southern frontier, limiting hostile armed activity near Turkish-controlled areas, and managing refugee-related pressures. Damascus, facing a new political reality, has sought pragmatic contact with neighboring states that hold influence in northern Syria. This has led to indirect communication and selective coordination rather than formal alliances. In this context, even limited military cooperation carries strong political meaning. Any defense-related move is therefore closely watched for what it could politically signal rather than for its immediate military effect.
The reported consideration of a Turkish-made drone for the Syrian Army highlights both the evolution and the limits of this relationship. Turkish drones were previously used against Syrian government forces, making any potential transfer politically delicate. A sale would also imply some level of training, technical support, and ongoing maintenance by Turkish forces, since unmanned systems depend on ground control stations and secure communications. At the same time, the lack of details on conditions, oversight mechanisms, or scale could suggest in the future a constrained and potentially symbolic step rather than a broad partnership. The claim points to a possible opening, but not to a clear or lasting framework for cooperation. Its impact would depend on whether it remains unverified or develops into something more concrete, but this information should not be ignored, as relations between Syria and Turkey could continue to develop in a favourable direction.
The Bayraktar TB2 was developed in Turkiye by Baykar during the early 2010s as part of an effort to reduce reliance on foreign unmanned systems and build a domestically controlled armed drone capability. Its first flight took place in 2014, and it entered service with Turkish forces shortly afterward, initially in an intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance role before being cleared for armed missions. Over time, production expanded steadily, with total output exceeding 600 units, reflecting both domestic demand and exports. The system was gradually adapted based on operational experience, including changes driven by combat use and by restrictions on foreign-supplied components. This led to the introduction of locally produced subsystems and, later, upgraded variants incorporating satellite communications and improved avionics.
The TB2 is a medium-altitude long-endurance unmanned aerial vehicle optimized for persistence rather than speed. It features a wingspan of about 12 meters, a length of roughly 6.5 meters, and a maximum takeoff weight close to 700 kg. Propulsion is provided by a single internal combustion engine driving a rear-mounted propeller, a configuration chosen for efficiency and endurance. The airframe uses a twin-boom tail and a high-aspect-ratio wing to support stable flight at medium altitude over long periods. The system is operated from a ground control station by a small crew responsible for piloting, sensor management, and mission control, with communications handled through line-of-sight data links or satellite links on upgraded versions.
The TB2 is designed to combine persistent surveillance with limited precision strike functions. Endurance can exceed 24 hours depending on payload and mission profile, allowing continuous monitoring of areas of interest. The payload capacity is around 150 kg, typically allocated to electro-optical and infrared sensors and lightweight laser-guided munitions such as MAM-C and MAM-L. Operational altitude is generally in the range of 18,000 to 25,000 feet, with line-of-sight control extending up to several hundred kilometers, or farther when satellite communications are used. The platform is best suited to permissive or moderately contested environments, where its endurance and sensors enable target detection and tracking, while survivability depends on altitude management, tactics, and the density of opposing air defense and electronic warfare systems.
Written by Jérôme Brahy
Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
