First Visual Evidence Confirms Algeria Has Begun Receiving Russia’s Su-35 Multirole Fighter
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A newly published photograph shows a Sukhoi Su-35 fighter bearing Algerian Air Force markings, offering the first visual confirmation that the aircraft is now operating in Algeria. The sighting underscores a significant leap in Algeria’s air combat capability and immediately draws attention in Washington over potential sanctions tied to Russian arms purchases.
A photograph circulated in early February 2026 on the Force DZ Forum has provided the clearest evidence to date that Algeria has begun taking delivery of the Russian-built Sukhoi Su-35 multirole fighter. The image shows the aircraft on the ground with an Algerian roundel clearly visible on the vertical tail, lending weight to years of unconfirmed reporting about a pending transfer. While Algerian defense officials have not publicly acknowledged the arrival and Moscow has remained silent, the visual confirmation is already prompting renewed debate among U.S. policymakers over the implications of Algeria’s expanding military relationship with Russia.Follow Army Recognition on Google News at this link
The Su-35 is powered by two AL-41F-1S turbofan engines, and it is commonly credited with a maximum speed around Mach 2.25 and a flight range in the 3,600 km class depending on profile and external tanks (Picture source: Vitaly V.Kuzmin)
This visual confirmation adds weight to earlier reporting published by Army Recognition on March 14, 2025, which stated that the Algerian Air Force began operating the Su-35 from Oum Bouaghi Air Base, with Algerian media outlet Algerian start-ship cited on March 13, 2025. In that earlier sequence, Algeria appears positioned to become one of the foreign operators of the Su-35 after Russia and China, while the platform’s export trajectory remains shaped by cancellations and reallocation of airframes. Reports indicate that at least part of the aircraft delivered to Algeria were originally manufactured for Egypt, which ordered the Su-35 in 2018 but later withdrew under Western economic and political pressure. Discussions about transferring those jets to Iran reportedly did not translate into an immediate deal before Tehran later confirmed its own Su-35 purchase in January 2025.
For Algeria, the Su-35 sighting lands in a context of persistent speculation around its next-step modernization plans, including discussion of the Su-57. Here, the Su-35 looks less like a standalone procurement and more like a bridging capability. Analysts quoted in the March 2025 reporting suggest Algeria’s decision is linked to delays in Su-57 production schedules, making the Su-35 an interim solution that sustains readiness while awaiting a next-generation fighter. This approach also aligns with Algeria’s broader procurement logic: maintaining a credible air superiority posture is not optional for Algiers, because it underpins deterrence across the Maghreb and signals strategic autonomy toward both regional rivals and external powers.
The Su-35 is not simply a marginal update of earlier Flanker variants. It is an evolution rooted in the Su-27M development line and shaped by redesign phases that include the Su-37 demonstrator, which introduced thrust-vectoring. The Su-35’s airframe removes the canards seen on Su-30MKI and prototype configurations, relying instead on thrust-vectoring to deliver extreme agility without the aerodynamic penalties of additional lifting surfaces. The aircraft is also associated with increased use of lighter composite materials, reinforced internal structures, and a fully digital glass cockpit, all of which improve mission management and extend service life in high-stress flight profiles.
The Su-35 is powered by two AL-41F-1S turbofan engines, and it is commonly credited with a maximum speed around Mach 2.25 and a flight range in the 3,600 km class depending on profile and external tanks. The aircraft is built for 9-g maneuvering, a design choice that matters less as a marketing line than as an enabler of energy tactics in high-intensity air combat. Third, the Su-35 integrates the Irbis-E passive electronically scanned array (PESA) radar, with open sources often citing detection ranges exceeding 350 km under favorable conditions. Some configurations are also reported to incorporate secondary radar arrays in the wing roots, intended to improve detection geometry and targeting efficiency in certain aspects. Together, these elements reinforce the Su-35’s role as a long-range counter-air platform rather than a simple multirole fighter.
The Algerian Air Force already operates more than 70 Su-30MKA fighters, acquired from 2006, which remain the backbone of Algeria’s combat aviation. The Su-30MKA itself is a mature platform with phased array radar and thrust-vectoring engines, supporting air defense, strike, and reconnaissance missions. In this sense, the Su-35 is a logical extension: it can integrate into an existing Russian-origin ecosystem of training, tactics, weapons, and sustainment. Some reports even suggest Algeria may consider upgrading parts of its Su-30MKA fleet using Su-35-derived components such as engines or radar, a pathway that would reduce logistical fragmentation while gradually lifting overall fleet performance.
In weapons terms, the Su-35 is built to carry a wide mix of air-to-air and air-to-ground munitions. Open-source references associate the aircraft with R-77 and R-73 air-to-air missiles, and with strike stores including Kh-31 and Kh-59 missiles as well as KAB-series guided bombs such as KAB-500 and KAB-1500. The 30 mm GSh-30-1 cannon provides a short-range option for close engagements. Payload capacity is often described as above 8,000 kg with up to 14 external hardpoints, which allows Algeria to tailor loadouts for defensive counter-air, maritime strike support, or deep interdiction. Even without confirmation of the exact Algerian weapons package, the platform’s carriage options and sensor suite widen mission planning space considerably.
The Su-35 integration changes how Algeria can structure air operations. The fighter’s long-range detection and engagement logic supports layered air defense beyond national borders, including forward combat air patrols designed to intercept threats earlier and under better conditions. It can escort strike packages, sanitize corridors, and pressure opposing aircraft operating from standoff distances. The aircraft’s thrust-vectoring agility is useful in within-visual-range scenarios, yet the decisive advantage lies in information and reach: long-range radar performance, passive detection channels, and electronic warfare can shape engagements before the merge. In a Maghreb context, this matters for deterrence as much as for warfighting, because it complicates an adversary’s assumptions about survivability, response time, and freedom of action in contested airspace.
That is precisely why Washington reacts. During testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Robert Palladino, head of the State Department’s Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, states that US authorities take the media reports seriously and view them with concern. His remarks explicitly point to CAATSA (Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act), the US legal framework intended to impose costs on certain defense transactions involving Russia. Palladino notes that deals of this kind can lead to sanctions decisions, while also stressing that the United States continues to work with the Algerian government where interests align, often through private channels, even as disagreements persist. The message is calibrated, but the warning is direct: fighter acquisitions from Russia are not treated as neutral procurement.
For Algeria, this creates a familiar dilemma. Russian combat aircraft offer performance and delivery pathways that many customers find attractive, yet they come with secondary effects in finance, diplomacy, and sustainment. Aircraft like the Su-35 are not one-off purchases: they imply training pipelines, spare parts ecosystems, munitions stockpiles, depot-level maintenance arrangements, and sometimes contractor support. In a sanctions environment, even partial restrictions can complicate banking, insurance, and third-party servicing, and can influence future modernization options, including avionics upgrades or integration of non-Russian weapons.
If CAATSA becomes a lever against Algeria, consequences could ripple into broader cooperation files, including counterterrorism coordination, Mediterranean security, and regional crisis management. At the same time, the visible presence of a Su-35 in Algerian markings demonstrates that Moscow’s defense exports retain traction despite isolation efforts, sustaining influence through platforms that can reconfigure regional balances in measurable ways while tightening the link between procurement decisions and strategic alignment.
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A newly published photograph shows a Sukhoi Su-35 fighter bearing Algerian Air Force markings, offering the first visual confirmation that the aircraft is now operating in Algeria. The sighting underscores a significant leap in Algeria’s air combat capability and immediately draws attention in Washington over potential sanctions tied to Russian arms purchases.
A photograph circulated in early February 2026 on the Force DZ Forum has provided the clearest evidence to date that Algeria has begun taking delivery of the Russian-built Sukhoi Su-35 multirole fighter. The image shows the aircraft on the ground with an Algerian roundel clearly visible on the vertical tail, lending weight to years of unconfirmed reporting about a pending transfer. While Algerian defense officials have not publicly acknowledged the arrival and Moscow has remained silent, the visual confirmation is already prompting renewed debate among U.S. policymakers over the implications of Algeria’s expanding military relationship with Russia.
Follow Army Recognition on Google News at this link
The Su-35 is powered by two AL-41F-1S turbofan engines, and it is commonly credited with a maximum speed around Mach 2.25 and a flight range in the 3,600 km class depending on profile and external tanks (Picture source: Vitaly V.Kuzmin)
This visual confirmation adds weight to earlier reporting published by Army Recognition on March 14, 2025, which stated that the Algerian Air Force began operating the Su-35 from Oum Bouaghi Air Base, with Algerian media outlet Algerian start-ship cited on March 13, 2025. In that earlier sequence, Algeria appears positioned to become one of the foreign operators of the Su-35 after Russia and China, while the platform’s export trajectory remains shaped by cancellations and reallocation of airframes. Reports indicate that at least part of the aircraft delivered to Algeria were originally manufactured for Egypt, which ordered the Su-35 in 2018 but later withdrew under Western economic and political pressure. Discussions about transferring those jets to Iran reportedly did not translate into an immediate deal before Tehran later confirmed its own Su-35 purchase in January 2025.
For Algeria, the Su-35 sighting lands in a context of persistent speculation around its next-step modernization plans, including discussion of the Su-57. Here, the Su-35 looks less like a standalone procurement and more like a bridging capability. Analysts quoted in the March 2025 reporting suggest Algeria’s decision is linked to delays in Su-57 production schedules, making the Su-35 an interim solution that sustains readiness while awaiting a next-generation fighter. This approach also aligns with Algeria’s broader procurement logic: maintaining a credible air superiority posture is not optional for Algiers, because it underpins deterrence across the Maghreb and signals strategic autonomy toward both regional rivals and external powers.
The Su-35 is not simply a marginal update of earlier Flanker variants. It is an evolution rooted in the Su-27M development line and shaped by redesign phases that include the Su-37 demonstrator, which introduced thrust-vectoring. The Su-35’s airframe removes the canards seen on Su-30MKI and prototype configurations, relying instead on thrust-vectoring to deliver extreme agility without the aerodynamic penalties of additional lifting surfaces. The aircraft is also associated with increased use of lighter composite materials, reinforced internal structures, and a fully digital glass cockpit, all of which improve mission management and extend service life in high-stress flight profiles.
The Su-35 is powered by two AL-41F-1S turbofan engines, and it is commonly credited with a maximum speed around Mach 2.25 and a flight range in the 3,600 km class depending on profile and external tanks. The aircraft is built for 9-g maneuvering, a design choice that matters less as a marketing line than as an enabler of energy tactics in high-intensity air combat. Third, the Su-35 integrates the Irbis-E passive electronically scanned array (PESA) radar, with open sources often citing detection ranges exceeding 350 km under favorable conditions. Some configurations are also reported to incorporate secondary radar arrays in the wing roots, intended to improve detection geometry and targeting efficiency in certain aspects. Together, these elements reinforce the Su-35’s role as a long-range counter-air platform rather than a simple multirole fighter.
The Algerian Air Force already operates more than 70 Su-30MKA fighters, acquired from 2006, which remain the backbone of Algeria’s combat aviation. The Su-30MKA itself is a mature platform with phased array radar and thrust-vectoring engines, supporting air defense, strike, and reconnaissance missions. In this sense, the Su-35 is a logical extension: it can integrate into an existing Russian-origin ecosystem of training, tactics, weapons, and sustainment. Some reports even suggest Algeria may consider upgrading parts of its Su-30MKA fleet using Su-35-derived components such as engines or radar, a pathway that would reduce logistical fragmentation while gradually lifting overall fleet performance.
In weapons terms, the Su-35 is built to carry a wide mix of air-to-air and air-to-ground munitions. Open-source references associate the aircraft with R-77 and R-73 air-to-air missiles, and with strike stores including Kh-31 and Kh-59 missiles as well as KAB-series guided bombs such as KAB-500 and KAB-1500. The 30 mm GSh-30-1 cannon provides a short-range option for close engagements. Payload capacity is often described as above 8,000 kg with up to 14 external hardpoints, which allows Algeria to tailor loadouts for defensive counter-air, maritime strike support, or deep interdiction. Even without confirmation of the exact Algerian weapons package, the platform’s carriage options and sensor suite widen mission planning space considerably.
The Su-35 integration changes how Algeria can structure air operations. The fighter’s long-range detection and engagement logic supports layered air defense beyond national borders, including forward combat air patrols designed to intercept threats earlier and under better conditions. It can escort strike packages, sanitize corridors, and pressure opposing aircraft operating from standoff distances. The aircraft’s thrust-vectoring agility is useful in within-visual-range scenarios, yet the decisive advantage lies in information and reach: long-range radar performance, passive detection channels, and electronic warfare can shape engagements before the merge. In a Maghreb context, this matters for deterrence as much as for warfighting, because it complicates an adversary’s assumptions about survivability, response time, and freedom of action in contested airspace.
That is precisely why Washington reacts. During testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Robert Palladino, head of the State Department’s Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, states that US authorities take the media reports seriously and view them with concern. His remarks explicitly point to CAATSA (Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act), the US legal framework intended to impose costs on certain defense transactions involving Russia. Palladino notes that deals of this kind can lead to sanctions decisions, while also stressing that the United States continues to work with the Algerian government where interests align, often through private channels, even as disagreements persist. The message is calibrated, but the warning is direct: fighter acquisitions from Russia are not treated as neutral procurement.
For Algeria, this creates a familiar dilemma. Russian combat aircraft offer performance and delivery pathways that many customers find attractive, yet they come with secondary effects in finance, diplomacy, and sustainment. Aircraft like the Su-35 are not one-off purchases: they imply training pipelines, spare parts ecosystems, munitions stockpiles, depot-level maintenance arrangements, and sometimes contractor support. In a sanctions environment, even partial restrictions can complicate banking, insurance, and third-party servicing, and can influence future modernization options, including avionics upgrades or integration of non-Russian weapons.
If CAATSA becomes a lever against Algeria, consequences could ripple into broader cooperation files, including counterterrorism coordination, Mediterranean security, and regional crisis management. At the same time, the visible presence of a Su-35 in Algerian markings demonstrates that Moscow’s defense exports retain traction despite isolation efforts, sustaining influence through platforms that can reconfigure regional balances in measurable ways while tightening the link between procurement decisions and strategic alignment.
