Trump signals possible U.S. reversal on Türkiye’s F-35 fighter jet ban at NATO Ankara summit
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U.S. President Donald Trump announced at the NATO Summit in Ankara on July 7, 2026, that his administration will evaluate a potential reversal of the congressional ban blocking F-35 fighter jet sales to Türkiye. The public declaration during a bilateral meeting with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan shifts the long-frozen procurement dispute into an active White House policy review. This strategic pivot aligns with a broader U.S. effort to strengthen ties with Ankara and leverage Turkish defense manufacturing capacity amid NATO-wide initiatives to accelerate industrial force generation.
The proposed defense review of the Turkish F-35 ban explores legal mechanisms to reconcile Türkiye’s 2019 procurement of the Russian S-400 Triumf air defense system with U.S. statutory restrictions prohibiting fifth-generation aircraft transfers. Potential frameworks under evaluation include the physical relocation of the missile batteries to a third country or restricted Foreign Military Sales structures, alongside a pending US$700 million F110 turbofan engine package for Türkiye’s indigenous Kaan fighter program.
Related topic: Saudi Arabia may buy up to 48 F-35 fighter jets after new U.S. defense talks
If Türkiye returns only as a buyer, Washington could keep the decision inside the Foreign Military Sales framework, limit Turkish industrial access, and reduce technology-security concerns, but Ankara would not regain the position it held before 2019. (Picture source: AI visual by Army Recognition)
On July 7, 2026, at the NATO Summit in Ankara, U.S. President Donald Trump said he would soon decide whether to sell F-35 fighter jets to Türkiye despite a congressional ban, signaling a potential reversal of restrictions that have blocked Turkish participation since July 2019. The statement, made during Trump’s meeting with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan at the Presidential Complex, marked the first public presidential-level move toward reversing the restrictions imposed after Ankara purchased the Russian S-400 Triumf long-range air defense system. Trump said the United States had a “better relationship” with Türkiye and argued that Ankara had been “much more loyal” than some partners.
He added that F-35 sales were “certainly something we will consider,” while Erdoğan replied that the F-35 issue had already been discussed with Washington and that Türkiye had previously received commitments for five aircraft. The exchange did not authorize deliveries, but it moved the issue from a legally frozen procurement case into an active policy review involving the White House, the Department of Defense, Congress and Türkiye’s future position inside the F-35 program. The immediate change in Ankara was political and procedural, not contractual. Trump did not announce a signed sale, a delivery schedule, a congressional notification or a specific aircraft package. What changed was the public U.S. posture: the U.S. President no longer treated Türkiye’s exclusion from the F-35 program as a settled outcome and instead linked the country’s possible F-35 restoration to the broader state of U.S.-Türkiye relations.
That distinction matters because Türkiye’s 2019 removal carried three separate effects: it stopped aircraft deliveries, ended Ankara’s role as a Joint Strike Fighter production partner, and created a legal prohibition that cannot be lifted by presidential preference alone. Vice President JD Vance previously confirmed that the U.S. Department of Defense and other agencies are reviewing whether the administration can meet the required legal certifications, including whether Türkiye can be judged compliant with U.S. law. Trump’s earlier statement that he intended to bring Erdoğan “something that would make him very happy” gave the Ankara meeting additional weight, because the F-35 dispute and the potential Kaan F110 turbofan engine package had already become the two most visible defense issues in the renewed relationship.
The central legal obstacle remains the U.S. Article 1245, which ties any F-35 transfer to Türkiye to the status of its S-400 system. Türkiye accepted delivery of the Russian S-400 Triumf in 2019, after which Washington removed Ankara from the Joint Strike Fighter program, and Congress then prohibited F-35 transfers while Türkiye possesses or operates the system. The S-400 is not a minor procurement issue in this dispute. It is a Russian long-range air defense system built around surveillance radar, target engagement radar, command vehicles, and interceptor missiles, and Washington’s core concern is that its operation in the same national environment as the F-35 could expose sensitive data related to the aircraft’s low-observable profile, emissions, mission systems, or operating patterns.
For the U.S. administration to move forward, it must certify that Türkiye no longer operates or possesses the S-400. One option under examination would move the battery to a third country, but that solution would have to satisfy U.S. law, congressional scrutiny and Russian end-user restrictions attached to the original export contract. If the system remains in Turkish possession under another label, or if Ankara retains practical access to it, Congress would have strong grounds to challenge any certification. Türkiye’s demand is not limited to the delivery of the five stored F-35s mentioned by Erdoğan. Ankara wants a recognition that it was previously a program partner, not only a customer, and that its removal disrupted both its air force modernization plan and its defense-industrial role.
Before its suspension, Türkiye was part of the F-35 global supply chain, with Turkish companies involved in manufacturing components for the aircraft and its support structure. That role included work in airframe structures, landing gear parts, wiring, composite elements and engine-related production. After 2019, those responsibilities were redistributed to other suppliers, meaning Turkish re-entry would require new certification, contract changes, security reviews and production planning. The fate of the F-35s already produced for Türkiye also remains unresolved. Washington and Ankara must determine whether those aircraft remain physically available, whether they were reassigned, whether Türkiye would receive new-build stealth fighters, and whether any initial package would be limited to the five aircraft Erdoğan cited or serve as the first tranche of a larger restoration plan.
The issue is also tied to Türkiye’s indigenous Kaan fighter program. Ankara is now developing the Kaan to reduce dependence on U.S. fighter supply and to preserve a national route toward advanced fighter production. The potential U.S. approval of an engine package worth more than US$700 million for the Kaan shows that Washington is already allowing selected aerospace cooperation even before the F-35 dispute is solved. This creates a layered negotiation. If Türkiye receives F-35s, the Kaan remains relevant as a long-term national combat aircraft program and as an industrial sovereignty project. If the F-35 remains blocked, the Kaan becomes more central to Türkiye’s future force structure, but Ankara still faces hard requirements in engines, avionics, sensors, weapons integration, software, testing, production scale, and sustainment.
Washington therefore has to decide whether allowing limited F-35 access would pull Türkiye back into NATO’s fifth-generation fighter architecture or whether it would simply run in parallel with a Turkish program that Ankara will likely continue regardless of U.S. policy. The Ankara summit placed this fighter issue inside a wider NATO shift toward industrial capacity and force generation. The summit opened with a Defence Industry Forum focused on production output, munitions, procurement, supply chains and multinational capability development. NATO members are implementing the commitment to raise defense expenditure to 5% of GDP by 2035, which will place sustained pressure on industry to produce ammunition, air defense systems, transport aircraft, tanker capacity, missiles, drones, radars and secure communications at higher volumes.
Secretary General Mark Rutte announced the expansion of multinational air mobility through additional Airbus A330 MRTT tanker aircraft and the launch of a new multinational initiative centered on the Airbus A400M transport fleet. These decisions connect directly to the Turkish question because they show NATO moving toward pooled assets, shared procurement and larger industrial frameworks. In the same setting, Turkish Defense Minister Yaşar Güler highlighted increased 155 mm artillery ammunition production capacity and cited investments by Roketsan, Aselsan and Havelsan in missiles, radar, electronic warfare, command-and-control, software, simulation and AI-enabled military systems. Türkiye is therefore positioning itself not only as a potential F-35 recipient, but also as a defense-industrial contributor at a time when NATO is trying to expand its defense production.
A Turkish return to the F-35 would require decisions on several industrial models. One model would bring Türkiye back only as a Foreign Military Sales (FMS) customer, allowing F-35 delivery while limiting Turkish access to the production chain and reducing technology-security exposure. A second model would restore some industrial participation, but that would be harder because workshare removed after 2019 has already been absorbed by other suppliers. A third model would phase Türkiye back in over time, beginning with aircraft procurement and later adding limited maintenance, sustainment, or component production if legal and security conditions are met. Each model carries different consequences. A customer-only return would be easier to defend in Congress but less valuable for Ankara.
A full industrial return would be more attractive for Türkiye but more difficult for Washington because it would require supply-chain reintegration after seven years of exclusion. The number of aircraft would also matter. Five aircraft would be politically symbolic and operationally limited, while a larger package would affect Turkish Air Force modernization, regional air balances and the long-term composition of NATO fifth-generation fighter fleets. Congress is the key domestic constraint for Trump because the ban is legal, not only administrative. Senator Lindsey Graham supported finding a solution but acknowledged expected resistance on Capitol Hill, where Türkiye’s relations with Israel, the S-400 issue and CAATSA sanctions remain politically sensitive.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu publicly opposed the transfer of F-35 or fighter engines to Türkiye, arguing that such a move could affect Israel’s qualitative military edge in the Middle East. That objection has strategic weight because the F-35 is not simply a replacement fighter. It provides low observability, advanced sensors, electronic warfare capacity, secure data links and integration into a wider intelligence, surveillance and targeting network. Israel’s concern is therefore not only the number of Turkish aircraft, but the effect of a NATO member with tense relations with Israel and Greece operating the same fifth-generation fighter family in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East.
A formal notification to Congress would likely trigger debate over Türkiye’s S-400 compliance, relations with Israel, tensions with Greece and Cyprus, and the broader meaning of restoring high-end U.S. defense cooperation with Ankara. The remaining decisions are concrete and sequential. The Trump administration must determine whether Article 1245 certification is legally possible, whether the S-400 is removed from Turkish territory, transferred to a third country, placed in verifiable storage, or otherwise neutralized in a way Congress accepts. Washington must decide whether Türkiye returns as a buyer only, an industrial partner, or a phased participant with limited rights.
Both governments must settle the fate of the F-35s previously allocated to Türkiye, the number of aircraft in any first package, the delivery sequence, the role of CAATSA sanctions relief, and the relationship between F-35 restoration and the US$700 million Kaan engine package. Congress can still delay or block implementation even if Trump supports the policy, while Israeli objections and regional concerns will raise the political cost of any transfer. The most likely near-term result is therefore not immediate delivery of F-35s to Türkiye, but a structured negotiation linking the S-400’s physical status, legal certification, congressional notification, industrial reintegration, Kaan support and broader U.S.-Türkiye defense normalization. Ankara turned the F-35 issue back into an active strategic negotiation, but deliveries will depend on whether Washington can turn a political signal into a legally defensible and industrially workable agreement.
Written by Jérôme Brahy
Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
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U.S. President Donald Trump announced at the NATO Summit in Ankara on July 7, 2026, that his administration will evaluate a potential reversal of the congressional ban blocking F-35 fighter jet sales to Türkiye. The public declaration during a bilateral meeting with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan shifts the long-frozen procurement dispute into an active White House policy review. This strategic pivot aligns with a broader U.S. effort to strengthen ties with Ankara and leverage Turkish defense manufacturing capacity amid NATO-wide initiatives to accelerate industrial force generation.
The proposed defense review of the Turkish F-35 ban explores legal mechanisms to reconcile Türkiye’s 2019 procurement of the Russian S-400 Triumf air defense system with U.S. statutory restrictions prohibiting fifth-generation aircraft transfers. Potential frameworks under evaluation include the physical relocation of the missile batteries to a third country or restricted Foreign Military Sales structures, alongside a pending US$700 million F110 turbofan engine package for Türkiye’s indigenous Kaan fighter program.
Related topic: Saudi Arabia may buy up to 48 F-35 fighter jets after new U.S. defense talks
If Türkiye returns only as a buyer, Washington could keep the decision inside the Foreign Military Sales framework, limit Turkish industrial access, and reduce technology-security concerns, but Ankara would not regain the position it held before 2019. (Picture source: AI visual by Army Recognition)
On July 7, 2026, at the NATO Summit in Ankara, U.S. President Donald Trump said he would soon decide whether to sell F-35 fighter jets to Türkiye despite a congressional ban, signaling a potential reversal of restrictions that have blocked Turkish participation since July 2019. The statement, made during Trump’s meeting with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan at the Presidential Complex, marked the first public presidential-level move toward reversing the restrictions imposed after Ankara purchased the Russian S-400 Triumf long-range air defense system. Trump said the United States had a “better relationship” with Türkiye and argued that Ankara had been “much more loyal” than some partners.
He added that F-35 sales were “certainly something we will consider,” while Erdoğan replied that the F-35 issue had already been discussed with Washington and that Türkiye had previously received commitments for five aircraft. The exchange did not authorize deliveries, but it moved the issue from a legally frozen procurement case into an active policy review involving the White House, the Department of Defense, Congress and Türkiye’s future position inside the F-35 program. The immediate change in Ankara was political and procedural, not contractual. Trump did not announce a signed sale, a delivery schedule, a congressional notification or a specific aircraft package. What changed was the public U.S. posture: the U.S. President no longer treated Türkiye’s exclusion from the F-35 program as a settled outcome and instead linked the country’s possible F-35 restoration to the broader state of U.S.-Türkiye relations.
That distinction matters because Türkiye’s 2019 removal carried three separate effects: it stopped aircraft deliveries, ended Ankara’s role as a Joint Strike Fighter production partner, and created a legal prohibition that cannot be lifted by presidential preference alone. Vice President JD Vance previously confirmed that the U.S. Department of Defense and other agencies are reviewing whether the administration can meet the required legal certifications, including whether Türkiye can be judged compliant with U.S. law. Trump’s earlier statement that he intended to bring Erdoğan “something that would make him very happy” gave the Ankara meeting additional weight, because the F-35 dispute and the potential Kaan F110 turbofan engine package had already become the two most visible defense issues in the renewed relationship.
The central legal obstacle remains the U.S. Article 1245, which ties any F-35 transfer to Türkiye to the status of its S-400 system. Türkiye accepted delivery of the Russian S-400 Triumf in 2019, after which Washington removed Ankara from the Joint Strike Fighter program, and Congress then prohibited F-35 transfers while Türkiye possesses or operates the system. The S-400 is not a minor procurement issue in this dispute. It is a Russian long-range air defense system built around surveillance radar, target engagement radar, command vehicles, and interceptor missiles, and Washington’s core concern is that its operation in the same national environment as the F-35 could expose sensitive data related to the aircraft’s low-observable profile, emissions, mission systems, or operating patterns.
For the U.S. administration to move forward, it must certify that Türkiye no longer operates or possesses the S-400. One option under examination would move the battery to a third country, but that solution would have to satisfy U.S. law, congressional scrutiny and Russian end-user restrictions attached to the original export contract. If the system remains in Turkish possession under another label, or if Ankara retains practical access to it, Congress would have strong grounds to challenge any certification. Türkiye’s demand is not limited to the delivery of the five stored F-35s mentioned by Erdoğan. Ankara wants a recognition that it was previously a program partner, not only a customer, and that its removal disrupted both its air force modernization plan and its defense-industrial role.
Before its suspension, Türkiye was part of the F-35 global supply chain, with Turkish companies involved in manufacturing components for the aircraft and its support structure. That role included work in airframe structures, landing gear parts, wiring, composite elements and engine-related production. After 2019, those responsibilities were redistributed to other suppliers, meaning Turkish re-entry would require new certification, contract changes, security reviews and production planning. The fate of the F-35s already produced for Türkiye also remains unresolved. Washington and Ankara must determine whether those aircraft remain physically available, whether they were reassigned, whether Türkiye would receive new-build stealth fighters, and whether any initial package would be limited to the five aircraft Erdoğan cited or serve as the first tranche of a larger restoration plan.
The issue is also tied to Türkiye’s indigenous Kaan fighter program. Ankara is now developing the Kaan to reduce dependence on U.S. fighter supply and to preserve a national route toward advanced fighter production. The potential U.S. approval of an engine package worth more than US$700 million for the Kaan shows that Washington is already allowing selected aerospace cooperation even before the F-35 dispute is solved. This creates a layered negotiation. If Türkiye receives F-35s, the Kaan remains relevant as a long-term national combat aircraft program and as an industrial sovereignty project. If the F-35 remains blocked, the Kaan becomes more central to Türkiye’s future force structure, but Ankara still faces hard requirements in engines, avionics, sensors, weapons integration, software, testing, production scale, and sustainment.
Washington therefore has to decide whether allowing limited F-35 access would pull Türkiye back into NATO’s fifth-generation fighter architecture or whether it would simply run in parallel with a Turkish program that Ankara will likely continue regardless of U.S. policy. The Ankara summit placed this fighter issue inside a wider NATO shift toward industrial capacity and force generation. The summit opened with a Defence Industry Forum focused on production output, munitions, procurement, supply chains and multinational capability development. NATO members are implementing the commitment to raise defense expenditure to 5% of GDP by 2035, which will place sustained pressure on industry to produce ammunition, air defense systems, transport aircraft, tanker capacity, missiles, drones, radars and secure communications at higher volumes.
Secretary General Mark Rutte announced the expansion of multinational air mobility through additional Airbus A330 MRTT tanker aircraft and the launch of a new multinational initiative centered on the Airbus A400M transport fleet. These decisions connect directly to the Turkish question because they show NATO moving toward pooled assets, shared procurement and larger industrial frameworks. In the same setting, Turkish Defense Minister Yaşar Güler highlighted increased 155 mm artillery ammunition production capacity and cited investments by Roketsan, Aselsan and Havelsan in missiles, radar, electronic warfare, command-and-control, software, simulation and AI-enabled military systems. Türkiye is therefore positioning itself not only as a potential F-35 recipient, but also as a defense-industrial contributor at a time when NATO is trying to expand its defense production.
A Turkish return to the F-35 would require decisions on several industrial models. One model would bring Türkiye back only as a Foreign Military Sales (FMS) customer, allowing F-35 delivery while limiting Turkish access to the production chain and reducing technology-security exposure. A second model would restore some industrial participation, but that would be harder because workshare removed after 2019 has already been absorbed by other suppliers. A third model would phase Türkiye back in over time, beginning with aircraft procurement and later adding limited maintenance, sustainment, or component production if legal and security conditions are met. Each model carries different consequences. A customer-only return would be easier to defend in Congress but less valuable for Ankara.
A full industrial return would be more attractive for Türkiye but more difficult for Washington because it would require supply-chain reintegration after seven years of exclusion. The number of aircraft would also matter. Five aircraft would be politically symbolic and operationally limited, while a larger package would affect Turkish Air Force modernization, regional air balances and the long-term composition of NATO fifth-generation fighter fleets. Congress is the key domestic constraint for Trump because the ban is legal, not only administrative. Senator Lindsey Graham supported finding a solution but acknowledged expected resistance on Capitol Hill, where Türkiye’s relations with Israel, the S-400 issue and CAATSA sanctions remain politically sensitive.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu publicly opposed the transfer of F-35 or fighter engines to Türkiye, arguing that such a move could affect Israel’s qualitative military edge in the Middle East. That objection has strategic weight because the F-35 is not simply a replacement fighter. It provides low observability, advanced sensors, electronic warfare capacity, secure data links and integration into a wider intelligence, surveillance and targeting network. Israel’s concern is therefore not only the number of Turkish aircraft, but the effect of a NATO member with tense relations with Israel and Greece operating the same fifth-generation fighter family in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East.
A formal notification to Congress would likely trigger debate over Türkiye’s S-400 compliance, relations with Israel, tensions with Greece and Cyprus, and the broader meaning of restoring high-end U.S. defense cooperation with Ankara. The remaining decisions are concrete and sequential. The Trump administration must determine whether Article 1245 certification is legally possible, whether the S-400 is removed from Turkish territory, transferred to a third country, placed in verifiable storage, or otherwise neutralized in a way Congress accepts. Washington must decide whether Türkiye returns as a buyer only, an industrial partner, or a phased participant with limited rights.
Both governments must settle the fate of the F-35s previously allocated to Türkiye, the number of aircraft in any first package, the delivery sequence, the role of CAATSA sanctions relief, and the relationship between F-35 restoration and the US$700 million Kaan engine package. Congress can still delay or block implementation even if Trump supports the policy, while Israeli objections and regional concerns will raise the political cost of any transfer. The most likely near-term result is therefore not immediate delivery of F-35s to Türkiye, but a structured negotiation linking the S-400’s physical status, legal certification, congressional notification, industrial reintegration, Kaan support and broader U.S.-Türkiye defense normalization. Ankara turned the F-35 issue back into an active strategic negotiation, but deliveries will depend on whether Washington can turn a political signal into a legally defensible and industrially workable agreement.
Written by Jérôme Brahy
Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
Explore More Defense News
• Land Defense News
• Naval Defense News
• Defense Aerospace News
