U.S. Air Force Moves to Strengthen Expeditionary Airfields With 54 Counter-Drone Systems
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The U.S. Air Force is seeking up to 54 compact, man-portable counter-drone systems for the 621st Contingency Response Group, combining passive radio-frequency detection, electronic-warfare disruption and close-range kinetic defeat. The requirement is intended to give rapidly deploying Airmen a layered defense against Group 1 and Group 2 unmanned aircraft while opening or operating expeditionary airfields in austere or contested environments.
The equipment is intended for the 621st CRG (Contingency Response Group) at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey, a unit tasked with rapidly deploying personnel to establish and sustain contingency air mobility operations worldwide. That mission demands lightweight systems that teams can carry, quickly set up, and reposition as they move between temporary or dispersed operating locations.
Related Topic: U.S. Expands Counter-Drone Defense to Protect Critical Infrastructure From Low-Cost Drone Attacks
Illustrative image: A U.S. Army soldier inspects a RAV-4 counter-drone system at Pabradė Training Area in Lithuania on May 3, 2026. The U.S. Air Force is seeking portable counter-UAS capabilities combining RF detection, electronic warfare and kinetic defeat to strengthen the protection of expeditionary airfields. (U.S. Army photo)
The initial requirement calls for 12 compact counter-small UAS systems, plus four passive RF detection systems, four portable electronic-warfare defeat systems, and four kinetic-defeat systems. Options could increase those totals to 54 C-UAS systems and 18 units in each of the three supporting categories, creating a larger deployable inventory for contingency-response missions.
The RF detection capability must detect, track, and identify Group 1 and Group 2 drones and their associated ground-control stations. Passive sensing is particularly useful for expeditionary forces because it can provide warning and identification without requiring a continuously transmitting radar, while also helping defenders characterize the control links associated with small unmanned aircraft.
The electronic-warfare component is intended to provide a portable soft-kill option by disrupting hostile drone command, control, navigation or data links. This can allow deployed personnel to engage low-cost unmanned aircraft without relying exclusively on kinetic interceptors, although effectiveness will depend on the drone’s control architecture, degree of autonomy, and resistance to electronic attack.
A third layer adds close-range kinetic defeat against maneuvering small UAS. This provides a physical engagement option for drones that continue toward protected areas despite electronic disruption, operate autonomously or cannot otherwise be stopped through non-kinetic means.
Taken together, the requirement points to a layered approach in which detection, electronic attack and kinetic defeat are intended to complement one another rather than function as isolated capabilities. For contingency forces, that flexibility is important because the type of small-UAS threat may differ significantly between deployments, from remotely piloted commercial drones to more autonomous systems less vulnerable to link disruption.
The expeditionary context makes that layered approach especially relevant. Temporary airfields can concentrate transport aircraft, fuel, cargo-handling equipment, communications systems and personnel inside a relatively limited area while lacking the fixed defenses available at established installations. Small drones can exploit that vulnerability for reconnaissance, disruption or direct attack.
Experience from the war in Ukraine has reinforced how inexpensive unmanned aircraft can threaten airfields, logistics hubs, command posts and support infrastructure well behind the front line. At the same time, repeated drone activity around military facilities and airports in Europe and the United Kingdom has highlighted the difficulty of protecting fixed sites against small aircraft that are cheap, mobile and difficult to detect.
For rapidly deployable U.S. Air Force units, the challenge is even more acute because contingency locations may need to become operational before extensive base-defense infrastructure can be established. A man-portable counter-UAS package lets security and operational teams bring at least part of that defensive capability with them, rather than depending entirely on systems installed after arrival.
The requirement also reflects the growing importance of protecting the logistics functions that make expeditionary air operations possible. A small drone does not need to destroy a transport aircraft to have an operational effect; surveillance of aircraft movements, disruption of fueling or cargo operations, or damage to communications and support equipment can slow or temporarily halt activity at a forward location.
The September 24 update also adds DZYNE Dronebuster DB5 systems for the 87th Air Base Wing. The handheld electronic-warfare system provides a short-range option for disrupting hostile drones, reinforcing the Air Force’s emphasis on portable counter-UAS tools that can be distributed among security and operational teams.
The inclusion of the Dronebuster DB5 should not, however, be interpreted as an award to DZYNE for the broader layered requirement. Its addition concerns a specific component for the 87th Air Base Wing and sits alongside the wider Air Mobility Command effort to acquire several complementary counter-UAS capabilities.
For the 621st CRG, the requirement reflects a broader shift toward layered and rapidly deployable counter-UAS protection for expeditionary airfields. Passive RF detection, electronic disruption and close-range kinetic defeat would give deployed Airmen multiple options against small drones threatening aircraft, logistics nodes and support infrastructure in austere or contested environments.
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• Land Defense News• Naval Defense News• Defense Aerospace NewsWritten by Alain Servaes – Chief Editor, Army Recognition GroupAlain Servaes is a former infantry non-commissioned officer and the founder of Army Recognition. With over 20 years in defense journalism, he provides expert analysis on military equipment, NATO operations, and the global defense industry.
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The U.S. Air Force is seeking up to 54 compact, man-portable counter-drone systems for the 621st Contingency Response Group, combining passive radio-frequency detection, electronic-warfare disruption and close-range kinetic defeat. The requirement is intended to give rapidly deploying Airmen a layered defense against Group 1 and Group 2 unmanned aircraft while opening or operating expeditionary airfields in austere or contested environments.
The equipment is intended for the 621st CRG (Contingency Response Group) at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey, a unit tasked with rapidly deploying personnel to establish and sustain contingency air mobility operations worldwide. That mission demands lightweight systems that teams can carry, quickly set up, and reposition as they move between temporary or dispersed operating locations.
Related Topic: U.S. Expands Counter-Drone Defense to Protect Critical Infrastructure From Low-Cost Drone Attacks
Illustrative image: A U.S. Army soldier inspects a RAV-4 counter-drone system at Pabradė Training Area in Lithuania on May 3, 2026. The U.S. Air Force is seeking portable counter-UAS capabilities combining RF detection, electronic warfare and kinetic defeat to strengthen the protection of expeditionary airfields. (U.S. Army photo)
The initial requirement calls for 12 compact counter-small UAS systems, plus four passive RF detection systems, four portable electronic-warfare defeat systems, and four kinetic-defeat systems. Options could increase those totals to 54 C-UAS systems and 18 units in each of the three supporting categories, creating a larger deployable inventory for contingency-response missions.
The RF detection capability must detect, track, and identify Group 1 and Group 2 drones and their associated ground-control stations. Passive sensing is particularly useful for expeditionary forces because it can provide warning and identification without requiring a continuously transmitting radar, while also helping defenders characterize the control links associated with small unmanned aircraft.
The electronic-warfare component is intended to provide a portable soft-kill option by disrupting hostile drone command, control, navigation or data links. This can allow deployed personnel to engage low-cost unmanned aircraft without relying exclusively on kinetic interceptors, although effectiveness will depend on the drone’s control architecture, degree of autonomy, and resistance to electronic attack.
A third layer adds close-range kinetic defeat against maneuvering small UAS. This provides a physical engagement option for drones that continue toward protected areas despite electronic disruption, operate autonomously or cannot otherwise be stopped through non-kinetic means.
Taken together, the requirement points to a layered approach in which detection, electronic attack and kinetic defeat are intended to complement one another rather than function as isolated capabilities. For contingency forces, that flexibility is important because the type of small-UAS threat may differ significantly between deployments, from remotely piloted commercial drones to more autonomous systems less vulnerable to link disruption.
The expeditionary context makes that layered approach especially relevant. Temporary airfields can concentrate transport aircraft, fuel, cargo-handling equipment, communications systems and personnel inside a relatively limited area while lacking the fixed defenses available at established installations. Small drones can exploit that vulnerability for reconnaissance, disruption or direct attack.
Experience from the war in Ukraine has reinforced how inexpensive unmanned aircraft can threaten airfields, logistics hubs, command posts and support infrastructure well behind the front line. At the same time, repeated drone activity around military facilities and airports in Europe and the United Kingdom has highlighted the difficulty of protecting fixed sites against small aircraft that are cheap, mobile and difficult to detect.
For rapidly deployable U.S. Air Force units, the challenge is even more acute because contingency locations may need to become operational before extensive base-defense infrastructure can be established. A man-portable counter-UAS package lets security and operational teams bring at least part of that defensive capability with them, rather than depending entirely on systems installed after arrival.
The requirement also reflects the growing importance of protecting the logistics functions that make expeditionary air operations possible. A small drone does not need to destroy a transport aircraft to have an operational effect; surveillance of aircraft movements, disruption of fueling or cargo operations, or damage to communications and support equipment can slow or temporarily halt activity at a forward location.
The September 24 update also adds DZYNE Dronebuster DB5 systems for the 87th Air Base Wing. The handheld electronic-warfare system provides a short-range option for disrupting hostile drones, reinforcing the Air Force’s emphasis on portable counter-UAS tools that can be distributed among security and operational teams.
The inclusion of the Dronebuster DB5 should not, however, be interpreted as an award to DZYNE for the broader layered requirement. Its addition concerns a specific component for the 87th Air Base Wing and sits alongside the wider Air Mobility Command effort to acquire several complementary counter-UAS capabilities.
For the 621st CRG, the requirement reflects a broader shift toward layered and rapidly deployable counter-UAS protection for expeditionary airfields. Passive RF detection, electronic disruption and close-range kinetic defeat would give deployed Airmen multiple options against small drones threatening aircraft, logistics nodes and support infrastructure in austere or contested environments.
Explore More Defense News
• Land Defense News
• Naval Defense News
• Defense Aerospace News
Written by Alain Servaes – Chief Editor, Army Recognition Group
Alain Servaes is a former infantry non-commissioned officer and the founder of Army Recognition. With over 20 years in defense journalism, he provides expert analysis on military equipment, NATO operations, and the global defense industry.
