Analysis: China develops first 6G electronic warfare system to disrupt radar of US F-35 fighter jet
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As reported by the South China Morning Post on June 17, 2025, Chinese researchers have officially confirmed the development of a new 6G-powered electronic warfare system, which they claim is the first known device able to conduct simultaneous jamming and communication across the same high-frequency spectrum. The system reportedly integrates a photonic core that enables jamming and data exchange to take place within the same signal-processing channel, eliminating the need for frequency separation.Follow Army Recognition on Google News at this link
This 6G-powered electronic warfare system can generate over 3,600 false radar targets in real time, directly within the frequency spectrum used by the AN/APG-85 radar equipping the US-made F-35 Lightning II stealth fighter jet. (Picture source: US DoD)
According to Interesting Engineering, this 6G-powered electronic warfare system can generate over 3,600 false radar targets in real time and maintain full-duplex communications with more than 300 connected platforms through high-speed optical fiber. The system is specifically designed to operate in the 12 GHz and above range, directly within the frequency spectrum used by X-band airborne radars, including the AN/APG-85 radar equipping the US-made F-35 Lightning II stealth fighter jet. With a total investment of approximately 71.8 million yuan, or around 10 million U.S. dollars, the system has reportedly moved beyond laboratory experimentation and entered early-stage industrial testing.
As described in the Optical Communication Technology journal, the electronic warfare system is built around a microwave photonic radio frequency front end. This architecture enables the simultaneous processing of jamming and communication functions by employing a dual-polarisation IQ modulator, which shapes signals in real time. An active optical fiber loop introduces precisely delayed clones of intercepted signals with storage durations of up to 600 microseconds. These delayed signals replicate the characteristics of legitimate radar returns, allowing the platform to create coherent, time-aligned false targets that could deceive advanced radar systems. The system operates above 12 GHz, which places it in direct overlap with the frequency range used by X-band AESA radars such as the AN/APG-85. Additionally, the optical architecture supports a broader operational bandwidth than conventional electronic systems, reduces electromagnetic interference, and lowers power consumption. The integration of over 300 platforms through fiber-optic links also enables the device to function as a distributed command-and-control node, while continuing to perform high-frequency jamming in real time.
The AN/APG-85 radar, developed by Northrop Grumman, is a Gallium Nitride-based active electronically scanned array system introduced with Lot 17 and Block 4 F-35 aircraft. Operating in the X-band range of approximately 8 to 12 GHz, it supports long-range air-to-air detection, high-resolution synthetic aperture radar (SAR) imaging, and electronic protection. It is designed to replace the earlier AN/APG-81 radar and is fully integrated with the F-35’s electronic warfare and sensor fusion systems. Although the radar includes features such as frequency agility, pulse compression, and low-probability-of-intercept waveforms, its operating spectrum overlaps with the range targeted by China’s 6G electronic warfare platform. The photonic-based system’s ability to generate thousands of delayed, spoofed radar returns at gigahertz speeds could potentially overwhelm the radar’s filtering algorithms, especially in high-density or contested environments. This introduces the possibility of degraded tracking performance, compromised target identification, and reduced situational awareness during radar-guided engagements.
The F-35’s operational architecture relies on a fusion engine that integrates radar, infrared, electronic warfare, and datalink inputs into a single decision-making interface. The software environment includes over 8 million lines of code, which handle everything from flight control to threat detection and targeting. The system depends on uninterrupted and accurate sensor input to maintain combat performance. If jamming introduces high volumes of false radar data that pass validity checks, the automated decision-making logic may be compromised. Although the F-35’s mission systems incorporate advanced filtering and anomaly detection protocols, they were not originally built to defend against multipoint, high-speed spoofing from photon-based platforms. In addition, the Chinese system’s use of full-duplex jamming at the same operational frequency undermines traditional assumptions about spectral deconfliction. This creates a scenario where even encrypted, frequency-hopping radars could be affected by dynamically reconstructed signals with timing and frequency profiles that match those of authentic threats.
Outside of direct signal manipulation, the F-35’s dependence on U.S.-controlled digital infrastructure represents another potential vulnerability. With the exception of the Israeli F-35I variant, which is permitted to modify mission systems, all F-35 operators, including Japan, Belgium, Germany, and South Korea, rely on centralized reprogramming labs for mission data files, software updates, and cryptographic keys. These are distributed via the Operational Data Integrated Network (ODIN), formerly ALIS. As a result, F-35s are unable to independently adjust or reconfigure their software environment during deployment. If the aircraft’s sensor inputs become compromised through sustained spoofing, the fusion engine may generate misleading threat overlays, incorrect navigational data, or delayed targeting solutions. While no confirmed remote “kill switch” exists within the F-35’s architecture, this software dependency and centralized control limit operator flexibility in high-intensity electronic warfare scenarios, particularly when software-based functions rely on the integrity of radar data affected by spoofing.
According to the peer-reviewed paper published in Acta Optica Sinica on May 26, 2025, Professor Deng’s team has developed a signal structure that combines sensing, spoofing, jamming, and communications into a compact, multifunctional platform. The architecture is designed to reduce hardware complexity while increasing bandwidth, signal resolution, and operational versatility. The use of a photon-electron hybrid system allows for millimeter-wave signal processing with reduced RF component count and tunable functionality. These features enable signal spoofing that would typically require multiple separate systems, allowing the device to be deployed in mobile, fixed, or potentially airborne formats. While the specific deployment status of the system has not been disclosed, Chinese media sources indicate that industrial application has already begun. This development also coincides with China surpassing the United States in the number of registered 6G-related patents, reflecting broader ambitions to lead in both military and civilian applications of sixth-generation communications technology.
The strategic implications of this system include the potential to disrupt radar-centric operations and electronic communications of advanced platforms such as the F-35. By integrating signal jamming and communication into one photonic-based architecture, the Chinese platform represents a shift from power-focused denial strategies toward precision manipulation of the electromagnetic spectrum. If fielded in contested areas, it could degrade the performance of stealth fighters, interfere with data-sharing networks, and compromise sensor fusion reliability. The ability to inject synthetic targets with sub-millisecond timing and full-spectrum frequency mimicry challenges the resilience of current Western electronic warfare countermeasures. In response, operators of software-intensive systems like the F-35 may need to implement AI-assisted anomaly detection, sovereign control over mission software, and increased onboard signal-processing capacity. These adjustments would be necessary to reduce the operational risks associated with sustained exposure to high-frequency, photon-based jamming and to maintain sensor fidelity under emerging electromagnetic threat conditions.
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As reported by the South China Morning Post on June 17, 2025, Chinese researchers have officially confirmed the development of a new 6G-powered electronic warfare system, which they claim is the first known device able to conduct simultaneous jamming and communication across the same high-frequency spectrum. The system reportedly integrates a photonic core that enables jamming and data exchange to take place within the same signal-processing channel, eliminating the need for frequency separation.
Follow Army Recognition on Google News at this link
This 6G-powered electronic warfare system can generate over 3,600 false radar targets in real time, directly within the frequency spectrum used by the AN/APG-85 radar equipping the US-made F-35 Lightning II stealth fighter jet. (Picture source: US DoD)
According to Interesting Engineering, this 6G-powered electronic warfare system can generate over 3,600 false radar targets in real time and maintain full-duplex communications with more than 300 connected platforms through high-speed optical fiber. The system is specifically designed to operate in the 12 GHz and above range, directly within the frequency spectrum used by X-band airborne radars, including the AN/APG-85 radar equipping the US-made F-35 Lightning II stealth fighter jet. With a total investment of approximately 71.8 million yuan, or around 10 million U.S. dollars, the system has reportedly moved beyond laboratory experimentation and entered early-stage industrial testing.
As described in the Optical Communication Technology journal, the electronic warfare system is built around a microwave photonic radio frequency front end. This architecture enables the simultaneous processing of jamming and communication functions by employing a dual-polarisation IQ modulator, which shapes signals in real time. An active optical fiber loop introduces precisely delayed clones of intercepted signals with storage durations of up to 600 microseconds. These delayed signals replicate the characteristics of legitimate radar returns, allowing the platform to create coherent, time-aligned false targets that could deceive advanced radar systems. The system operates above 12 GHz, which places it in direct overlap with the frequency range used by X-band AESA radars such as the AN/APG-85. Additionally, the optical architecture supports a broader operational bandwidth than conventional electronic systems, reduces electromagnetic interference, and lowers power consumption. The integration of over 300 platforms through fiber-optic links also enables the device to function as a distributed command-and-control node, while continuing to perform high-frequency jamming in real time.
The AN/APG-85 radar, developed by Northrop Grumman, is a Gallium Nitride-based active electronically scanned array system introduced with Lot 17 and Block 4 F-35 aircraft. Operating in the X-band range of approximately 8 to 12 GHz, it supports long-range air-to-air detection, high-resolution synthetic aperture radar (SAR) imaging, and electronic protection. It is designed to replace the earlier AN/APG-81 radar and is fully integrated with the F-35’s electronic warfare and sensor fusion systems. Although the radar includes features such as frequency agility, pulse compression, and low-probability-of-intercept waveforms, its operating spectrum overlaps with the range targeted by China’s 6G electronic warfare platform. The photonic-based system’s ability to generate thousands of delayed, spoofed radar returns at gigahertz speeds could potentially overwhelm the radar’s filtering algorithms, especially in high-density or contested environments. This introduces the possibility of degraded tracking performance, compromised target identification, and reduced situational awareness during radar-guided engagements.
The F-35’s operational architecture relies on a fusion engine that integrates radar, infrared, electronic warfare, and datalink inputs into a single decision-making interface. The software environment includes over 8 million lines of code, which handle everything from flight control to threat detection and targeting. The system depends on uninterrupted and accurate sensor input to maintain combat performance. If jamming introduces high volumes of false radar data that pass validity checks, the automated decision-making logic may be compromised. Although the F-35’s mission systems incorporate advanced filtering and anomaly detection protocols, they were not originally built to defend against multipoint, high-speed spoofing from photon-based platforms. In addition, the Chinese system’s use of full-duplex jamming at the same operational frequency undermines traditional assumptions about spectral deconfliction. This creates a scenario where even encrypted, frequency-hopping radars could be affected by dynamically reconstructed signals with timing and frequency profiles that match those of authentic threats.
Outside of direct signal manipulation, the F-35’s dependence on U.S.-controlled digital infrastructure represents another potential vulnerability. With the exception of the Israeli F-35I variant, which is permitted to modify mission systems, all F-35 operators, including Japan, Belgium, Germany, and South Korea, rely on centralized reprogramming labs for mission data files, software updates, and cryptographic keys. These are distributed via the Operational Data Integrated Network (ODIN), formerly ALIS. As a result, F-35s are unable to independently adjust or reconfigure their software environment during deployment. If the aircraft’s sensor inputs become compromised through sustained spoofing, the fusion engine may generate misleading threat overlays, incorrect navigational data, or delayed targeting solutions. While no confirmed remote “kill switch” exists within the F-35’s architecture, this software dependency and centralized control limit operator flexibility in high-intensity electronic warfare scenarios, particularly when software-based functions rely on the integrity of radar data affected by spoofing.
According to the peer-reviewed paper published in Acta Optica Sinica on May 26, 2025, Professor Deng’s team has developed a signal structure that combines sensing, spoofing, jamming, and communications into a compact, multifunctional platform. The architecture is designed to reduce hardware complexity while increasing bandwidth, signal resolution, and operational versatility. The use of a photon-electron hybrid system allows for millimeter-wave signal processing with reduced RF component count and tunable functionality. These features enable signal spoofing that would typically require multiple separate systems, allowing the device to be deployed in mobile, fixed, or potentially airborne formats. While the specific deployment status of the system has not been disclosed, Chinese media sources indicate that industrial application has already begun. This development also coincides with China surpassing the United States in the number of registered 6G-related patents, reflecting broader ambitions to lead in both military and civilian applications of sixth-generation communications technology.
The strategic implications of this system include the potential to disrupt radar-centric operations and electronic communications of advanced platforms such as the F-35. By integrating signal jamming and communication into one photonic-based architecture, the Chinese platform represents a shift from power-focused denial strategies toward precision manipulation of the electromagnetic spectrum. If fielded in contested areas, it could degrade the performance of stealth fighters, interfere with data-sharing networks, and compromise sensor fusion reliability. The ability to inject synthetic targets with sub-millisecond timing and full-spectrum frequency mimicry challenges the resilience of current Western electronic warfare countermeasures. In response, operators of software-intensive systems like the F-35 may need to implement AI-assisted anomaly detection, sovereign control over mission software, and increased onboard signal-processing capacity. These adjustments would be necessary to reduce the operational risks associated with sustained exposure to high-frequency, photon-based jamming and to maintain sensor fidelity under emerging electromagnetic threat conditions.
