E-7 Wedgetail Scrapped by Air Force Over Cost Overruns and Vulnerability Risks
E-7 Wedgetail Scrapped by Air Force Over Cost Overruns and Vulnerability Risks
Published:
July 1, 2025
/
Updated:
July 1, 2025
Breaking News
Editorial Team
U.S. Air Force photo by Airman Trevor Bell
The U.S. Air Force has decided to halt the E-7 Wedgetail airborne early-warning and control program, ending a three-year effort to replace the aging E-3 Sentry fleet with a more modern, radar-equipped 737 derivative. Defense officials disclosed the move during the FY-26 budget rollout, noting that expected unit cost had climbed from about $588 million to roughly $724 million and that the aircraft lacked the resilience needed in a highly contested battlespace.
Program cancellation became public on June 26, when a senior military official briefed reporters on the fiscal package. The official said that investing in a space-based air-moving-target-indicator (AMTI) network now offers a faster, cheaper path to global coverage than fielding a limited number of airframes. The Wedgetail, the official added, “remains a fine airplane, but it cannot give us the broad sensing layer we need.”
Survivability weighed as heavily as money. Threat models show that future peer air-defense systems will track and engage non-stealthy command-and-control aircraft soon after take-off. Analysts inside the Air Staff judged that simply hardening the E-7 would add prohibitive weight and still leave wide radar cross-sections vulnerable to long-range missiles.
The Wedgetail traces its roots to the Royal Australian Air Force, which accepted the first jets in 2012. Boeing adapted the 737-700 airframe, slotting an active electronically scanned array into the distinctive “top-hat” dorsal fin. The design impressed U.S. planners in 2021, when the Air Force named the E-7 its intended replacement for the E-3.
Initial U.S. estimates pegged acquisition of 26 jets at about $14 billion. A $2.6 billion contract for two prototypes followed in 2024. But later Government Accountability Office work showed the development bill for those first two jets alone had climbed to $3.6 billion, while the first flight slipped nine months to May 2027.
Cost growth was not the only red flag. Combat modeling carried out last winter suggested each Wedgetail would need large fighter escorts and offboard jamming just to survive in the Indo-Pacific. Layering that much protection around one niche platform made little fiscal sense compared with placing the radar in orbit.
Pentagon officials now point to the Golden Dome satellite constellation as the long-term answer. The FY-26 request sets aside roughly $25 billion for the wider missile-and-air defense shield, including $2 billion specifically tagged for AMTI payloads. Senior leaders argue that proliferated satellites will offer global persistence, be harder to destroy, and scale production faster than any crewed jet.
One official summed up the view in plain terms: “We are bullish on space, and we think that’s a capability we can field sooner than Wedgetail.” That comment echoed earlier testimony by Space Force Chief Gen. Chance Saltzman, who predicted initial orbital tracking data by the end of this decade.
Money freed by canceling the jet reflows into several lines:
$807 million for the Collaborative Combat Aircraft project.
$3.1 billion for 21 additional F-15EX fighters.
$36 billion overall procurement spread across aircraft, munitions, and satellites.
About $200 million remains in the FY-26 research account to close out Wedgetail activity – funds that cover contract termination fees, data archiving, and workforce transition.
Loss of the E-7 creates a short-term gap in wide-area airborne warning. Half the E-3 fleet is already in storage, and service life extensions on the remainder end in 2029. Operators now plan to rely on Navy E-2D Hawkeyes as an interim fix, buying five extra aircraft and exploring joint-crew arrangements for allied deployments.
Industry reaction was muted. Boeing declined to issue a formal statement but privately expressed disappointment, noting years of engineering talent invested in the American variant. Suppliers in Oklahoma, Texas, and Washington state face the prospect of layoffs unless other programs absorb the skilled labor base.
Independent analysts warn of broader industrial effects. Wedgetail final assembly drew on 737 line capacity at Renton, offering commercial-to-defense cross-flow during the MAX production slowdown. Without that work, Boeing Defense may struggle to keep niche modifications profitable.
On Capitol Hill, Sen. Lisa Murkowski pressed Air Force leaders for more data during a defense-appropriations hearing, arguing that “we haven’t heard sufficient justification for cancelling such a critical node.” Lawmakers from Oklahoma and Alaska – homes to the E-3 wings – have signaled interest in blocking the move until an executable replacement plan appears.
Service leaders counter that Golden Dome prototypes will downlink air tracks by late 2029. Space Force Vice Chief Gen. Michael Guetlein puts full operating capability in the early 2030s, roughly the same window once projected for a second E-7 production batch.
Golden Dome itself remains controversial. The Congressional Budget Office pegs 20-year costs for the space layer at more than $540 billion. Critics also point to technical risk, including satellite survivability in the face of anti-satellite weapons and the need for resilient ground networks.
The Air Force insists the risk is balanced by flexibility. A constellation of small satellites can lose nodes and still function. Upgrades push faster through block builds, avoiding decade-long aircraft retrofit cycles.
Key factors behind the cancellation:
Unit cost growth from $588 million to $724 million.
$3.6 billion development overrun on two prototypes.
Nine-month schedule slip on first flight.
Modeling that shows high vulnerability in contested airspace.
Opportunity to redirect funds toward space-based sensors with global reach.
Next steps for the Air Force:
Work with the Navy to field five additional E-2D Hawkeyes.
Fund mission-system software that lets fighters ingest satellite tracks directly.
Retire remaining E-3s by FY-29 while sustaining limited AWACS coverage through allied platforms.
Issue an early-2026 Broad Agency Announcement seeking commercial constellations for real-time AMTI.
Re-train air battle managers for multi-domain operations centers that fuse space and air feeds.
Allies already flying the E-7 – including Australia, the U.K., South Korea, and Turkey – continue to support the jet. U.S. cancellation does not affect their fleets, but it reduces the long-term prospect of shared sustainment lines. Partner officers who spoke with Defense-Aerospace voiced concern over losing a common U.S. platform yet welcomed expanded sensor-sharing over space links.
From an operational standpoint, the critical challenge is bridging the “scout gap” between the last E-3 retirement and the first operational satellite cluster. Tactical planners must refine kill-chains that assume intermittent track custody and heavier reliance on stealth fighters’ organic sensors.
Our analysis shows the Air Force made a calculus: accept near-term risk to fund a network that scales. If Golden Dome stays on schedule – and Congress continues to write checks – the service gains a theater-agnostic, hard-to-kill sensor web before 2033. If the satellites slip, commanders may confront a visibility gap over key regions.
For industry, the lesson is stark. Even well-regarded aircraft can fall when digital alternatives promise broader reach at lower cost. Firms tied to legacy battle-management platforms will likely pivot toward payloads, data fusion, and autonomy rather than airframes.
Bottom line: Wedgetail’s demise reflects a larger shift. The Air Force no longer sees big radar jets as survivable or scalable. Space assets, mesh networks, and fighter-borne processors now form the core of its future sensing architecture. Keeping that vision on track will depend on sustained funding and rapid satellite integration over the next five years.
REFERENCE SOURCES
https://www.boeing.com/defense/e-7-airborne-early-warning-and-control
https://www.defensenews.com/air/2025/06/27/us-air-force-to-retire-all-a-10s-cancel-e-7-under-2026-spending-plan/
https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/4228828/background-briefing-on-fy-2026-defense-budget/
https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/us-tests-radar-that-could-link-into-golden-dome-detect-china-russia-threats-2025-06-24/
https://www.defenseone.com/policy/2025/06/despite-golden-dome-space-force-budget-would-shrink-again-under-2026-spending-plan/405764/
https://breakingdefense.com/2025/06/air-force-cancels-e-7-wedgetail-citing-survivability-and-cost-concerns/
https://simpleflying.com/bad-news-boeing-pentagon-reportedly-cancels-us-air-force-e7-wedgetail-program/
The post E-7 Wedgetail Scrapped by Air Force Over Cost Overruns and Vulnerability Risks appeared first on defense-aerospace.
The U.S. Air Force has decided to halt the E-7 Wedgetail airborne early-warning and control program, ending a three-year effort to replace the aging E-3 Sentry fleet with a more modern, radar-equipped 737 derivative. Defense officials disclosed the move during the FY-26 budget rollout, noting that expected unit cost had climbed from about $588 million to roughly $724 million and that the aircraft lacked the resilience needed in a highly contested battlespace.
The post E-7 Wedgetail Scrapped by Air Force Over Cost Overruns and Vulnerability Risks appeared first on defense-aerospace.
