Russian Next-Gen Kometa Module Could Extend UMPK-PD Glide Bomb Strikes Deeper into Ukraine
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On July 8, 2025, Russian sources revealed that a next-generation Kometa module could allow UMPK-PD glide bombs to strike deeper into Ukraine with greater resistance to electronic warfare. The claim comes as Moscow’s air force increasingly relies on its modernized UMPK-PD glide bombs to conduct stand-off strikes up to 95 km into Ukrainian territory. This technological push to integrate a next-generation Kometa module, now officially revealed in Russian state media, features a newly developed 24-element phased Controlled Reception Pattern Antenna (CRPA) array. According to 1RU, the module is internally designated as Kometa-M24 and is intended to make the FAB-250 and FAB-500 bombs with UMPK kits significantly more resilient to Ukrainian jamming attempts.Follow Army Recognition on Google News at this link
A key vulnerability of these satellite-guided munitions has been Ukraine’s ability to jam or spoof the guidance link. Moscow’s bet on the Kometa-M24 shows an urgent effort to keep its stand-off strike capability viable (Picture source: Ukrainian Air Force)
The Kometa-M24 is described as a new standard for Russian stand-off bombs, marking a transition from older modules that used 8- or 12-element arrays. The new 24-element CRPA is designed to provide fully adaptive anti-jam capabilities by dynamically filtering and reconfiguring its antenna pattern, making it more difficult for Ukrainian electronic warfare units to spoof or degrade satellite signals. The Russian report emphasizes that this module is not only more robust against jamming but also modular: it can be integrated on various UMPK-equipped munitions, potentially extending its use beyond the Su-34 to Su-30SM and Su-35S strike aircraft.
As reported by Defence Express and confirmed by Russian sources, the new module is designed to sharpen the bomb’s accuracy while retaining its low-cost and mass-production character. Russian engineers claim the Kometa-M24 uses an updated domestic base of microelectronics to reduce dependence on foreign GNSS components. It also integrates a new inertial backup mode to maintain trajectory if satellite lock is temporarily lost — a feature that has been a critical vulnerability for Russia’s glide bombs in the face of Ukraine’s robust electronic warfare defenses.
The UMPK-PD remains an extended-range variant of Russia’s standard UMPK glide bomb, adapted to be fitted on Su-34 bombers with enlarged wing kits, reinforced mounts, and upgraded guidance. The “PD” (meaning “extended range”) variant was first acknowledged by Russian sources in September 2024, with operational images emerging in March 2025. The weapon has been confirmed through debris analysis after strikes on Vasyshcheve and Bezliudivka in late May, proving its use against targets in the Kharkiv and Sumy regions. With a reach of up to 95 km, the UMPK-PD allows Russian bombers to launch strikes while remaining beyond the effective envelope of many Ukrainian air defense systems.
A key vulnerability of these satellite-guided munitions has been Ukraine’s ability to jam or spoof the guidance link. Moscow’s bet on the Kometa-M24 shows an urgent effort to keep its stand-off strike capability viable. Compared to Western precision munitions like the JDAM-ER, which also face electronic countermeasures, the Russian UMPK-PD prioritizes cost-effective saturation strikes on urban areas and energy infrastructure, perpetuating its psychological and terror effect rather than precision elimination of hardened military targets.
The 1RU report also hints at plans to further modularize the Kometa series for other air-launched munitions, potentially including heavier FAB-1500 variants. Strategically, the Kometa-M24 could help Russia maintain pressure on Ukraine’s rear areas even as its strategic bomber fleet suffers losses from long-range Ukrainian drone strikes, such as those seen during operations like Spider’s Web. The ongoing upgrades are described as a budget-friendly alternative to new cruise missiles, allowing Russian air units to extend the life of their Soviet-era FAB stocks.
If mass production of the new module succeeds, the stand-off threat posed by Russian glide bombs will likely grow, forcing Ukraine to adapt its jamming and air defense tactics yet again. This technological back-and-forth underscores that the battle for the electromagnetic spectrum over Ukraine is becoming just as critical as the ground fighting. With each new Kometa version, Moscow signals its intent to keep its aerial strike arsenal relevant, but Ukraine’s continued success in countering them illustrates that electronic warfare supremacy remains a moving target. The next phase in this cat-and-mouse game will shape the effectiveness of Russia’s stand-off strikes deep into Ukrainian territory over the coming months.
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On July 8, 2025, Russian sources revealed that a next-generation Kometa module could allow UMPK-PD glide bombs to strike deeper into Ukraine with greater resistance to electronic warfare. The claim comes as Moscow’s air force increasingly relies on its modernized UMPK-PD glide bombs to conduct stand-off strikes up to 95 km into Ukrainian territory. This technological push to integrate a next-generation Kometa module, now officially revealed in Russian state media, features a newly developed 24-element phased Controlled Reception Pattern Antenna (CRPA) array. According to 1RU, the module is internally designated as Kometa-M24 and is intended to make the FAB-250 and FAB-500 bombs with UMPK kits significantly more resilient to Ukrainian jamming attempts.
Follow Army Recognition on Google News at this link
A key vulnerability of these satellite-guided munitions has been Ukraine’s ability to jam or spoof the guidance link. Moscow’s bet on the Kometa-M24 shows an urgent effort to keep its stand-off strike capability viable (Picture source: Ukrainian Air Force)
The Kometa-M24 is described as a new standard for Russian stand-off bombs, marking a transition from older modules that used 8- or 12-element arrays. The new 24-element CRPA is designed to provide fully adaptive anti-jam capabilities by dynamically filtering and reconfiguring its antenna pattern, making it more difficult for Ukrainian electronic warfare units to spoof or degrade satellite signals. The Russian report emphasizes that this module is not only more robust against jamming but also modular: it can be integrated on various UMPK-equipped munitions, potentially extending its use beyond the Su-34 to Su-30SM and Su-35S strike aircraft.
As reported by Defence Express and confirmed by Russian sources, the new module is designed to sharpen the bomb’s accuracy while retaining its low-cost and mass-production character. Russian engineers claim the Kometa-M24 uses an updated domestic base of microelectronics to reduce dependence on foreign GNSS components. It also integrates a new inertial backup mode to maintain trajectory if satellite lock is temporarily lost — a feature that has been a critical vulnerability for Russia’s glide bombs in the face of Ukraine’s robust electronic warfare defenses.
The UMPK-PD remains an extended-range variant of Russia’s standard UMPK glide bomb, adapted to be fitted on Su-34 bombers with enlarged wing kits, reinforced mounts, and upgraded guidance. The “PD” (meaning “extended range”) variant was first acknowledged by Russian sources in September 2024, with operational images emerging in March 2025. The weapon has been confirmed through debris analysis after strikes on Vasyshcheve and Bezliudivka in late May, proving its use against targets in the Kharkiv and Sumy regions. With a reach of up to 95 km, the UMPK-PD allows Russian bombers to launch strikes while remaining beyond the effective envelope of many Ukrainian air defense systems.
A key vulnerability of these satellite-guided munitions has been Ukraine’s ability to jam or spoof the guidance link. Moscow’s bet on the Kometa-M24 shows an urgent effort to keep its stand-off strike capability viable. Compared to Western precision munitions like the JDAM-ER, which also face electronic countermeasures, the Russian UMPK-PD prioritizes cost-effective saturation strikes on urban areas and energy infrastructure, perpetuating its psychological and terror effect rather than precision elimination of hardened military targets.
The 1RU report also hints at plans to further modularize the Kometa series for other air-launched munitions, potentially including heavier FAB-1500 variants. Strategically, the Kometa-M24 could help Russia maintain pressure on Ukraine’s rear areas even as its strategic bomber fleet suffers losses from long-range Ukrainian drone strikes, such as those seen during operations like Spider’s Web. The ongoing upgrades are described as a budget-friendly alternative to new cruise missiles, allowing Russian air units to extend the life of their Soviet-era FAB stocks.
If mass production of the new module succeeds, the stand-off threat posed by Russian glide bombs will likely grow, forcing Ukraine to adapt its jamming and air defense tactics yet again. This technological back-and-forth underscores that the battle for the electromagnetic spectrum over Ukraine is becoming just as critical as the ground fighting. With each new Kometa version, Moscow signals its intent to keep its aerial strike arsenal relevant, but Ukraine’s continued success in countering them illustrates that electronic warfare supremacy remains a moving target. The next phase in this cat-and-mouse game will shape the effectiveness of Russia’s stand-off strikes deep into Ukrainian territory over the coming months.
