Bulgaria eyes second-hand Gripen as US F-16 delays force urgent fighter jet choice
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On July 28, 2026, the Ministry of Defence of Bulgaria officially requested inquiries from international partners regarding available second-hand Saab JAS 39 Gripen and Lockheed Martin F-16 fighters, along with spare parts for Mikoyan MiG-29 aircraft. The official assessment was initiated to address operational capability gaps caused by delivery delays of Bulgaria’s second batch of eight F-16 Block 70 aircraft. This interim procurement strategy aims to ensure continuous coverage for national airspace defense and NATO Air Policing commitments until the full F-16 fleet achieves operational readiness in 2028.
Bulgaria received its first eight F-16 Block 70 fighters by late 2025 under a $1.2 billion contract, but operational deployment remains constrained until 2028 due to pilot qualification requirements and infrastructure readiness. The defense ministry’s market evaluation focuses on acquiring interim flight hours or spare components from Poland, Hungary, Sweden, and the United States to sustain a four-to-six aircraft quick reaction alert capability.
Related topic: Lockheed Martin delivers first F-16 Block 70 fighter to Bulgaria as the country replaces aging Russian-made jets
A leased or second-hand Gripen force could provide a relatively rapid NATO-compatible air-policing capability, but it would create a third fighter ecosystem during the most demanding phase of Bulgaria’s F-16 transition. (Picture source: Swedish MoD)
On July 28, 2026, Bulgaria’s Ministry of Defence confirmed that it had opened a new assessment of second-hand fighters, engines and spare parts because the second batch of eight F-16 Block 70s is delayed beyond the schedule originally used to plan the retirement of the MiG-29. Sofia has sent inquiries to Poland and Hungary concerning available aircraft and components, while also requesting information on used F-16s and Gripens. The immediate trigger seems to have been the Polish Defence Minister Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz’s statement on July 27 that Poland could sell MiG-29s to Bulgaria if Warsaw and Kyiv failed to agree on their transfer to Ukraine. The purpose of the review is narrower than a new fighter competition: it is intended to keep at least one national fighter force capable of conducting quick reaction alerts and NATO air policing until the entire F-16 Block 70 fleet reaches operational readiness.
Bulgaria had received the first eight F-16s by December 2025, but the Air Force continued to assign the MiG-29 to air policing as it expects the F-16 to enter active operational service only in 2028. The delay affects Bulgaria more severely than it would affect an air force already operating a large F-16 fleet because Sofia is simultaneously replacing its MiG-29s and Su-25s, as well as its pilot training system, maintenance organization, weapons inventory and air base infrastructure used for fighter operations. Delivering eight F-16s does not create an operational squadron if only a limited number of pilots are qualified, instructor capacity remains insufficient, and several aircraft must be reserved for training, inspections and rectification work.
A permanent alert commitment normally requires two armed fighters ready to launch, another pair available as backup, and additional jets for training and maintenance. In an eight-aircraft fleet, two aircraft undergoing scheduled work and one or two affected by faults can reduce the usable force to four or five, leaving little margin between operational alert and pilot continuation training. Bulgaria’s problem is therefore one of force generation rather than simple ownership. Atanas Zapryanov, then defence minister, said at the end of 2025 that the F-16 force was expected to achieve operational readiness in 2028 and that the MiG-29 would have to remain available until then, even though Poland, Bulgaria’s principal regional source of MiG-29 support, was encountering its own maintenance difficulties.
The Bulgarian MiG-29 force has operated for years with a narrow margin between the number of aircraft held in the inventory and the number that can actually fly. In 2022, no more than seven or eight MiG-29s were assessed as simultaneously usable, a figure that still included the jets needed for pilot training, maintenance test flights and reserve duties. The fleet’s availability depends heavily on the condition of its RD-33 engines, each of which requires periodic overhaul, as well as access to radar modules, hydraulic equipment, landing gear parts, fuel system components and Soviet-era ground equipment. Bulgaria previously attempted to contract the overhaul of up to ten MiG-29 engines, but the effort produced no bidder within the required period, illustrating how rapidly the European support base for the Soviet fighter has contracted since 2022.
Russian support became politically and practically inaccessible after the invasion of Ukraine, Ukraine’s industrial capacity came under wartime pressure, and Poland began reducing its own MiG-29 fleet while transferring them to Kyiv. Sofia can still obtain short-term value from donor aircraft or engines, but every additional year of MiG-29 service requires investment in a fighter jet that Bulgaria has already decided to replace and for which regional stocks of serviceable components are shrinking rapidly. Polish MiG-29s would nevertheless be the least disruptive interim option if they can be delivered quickly and with enough remaining service life. Bulgarian pilots already know the aircraft, technicians already possess the experience, and the Graf Ignatievo Air Base already has compatible maintenance facilities, ground support equipment and weapons-handling procedures.
MiG-29s that are not economical to restore could be dismantled for engines, landing gear, radar components and other assemblies, potentially increasing the availability of the existing Bulgarian fleet without creating a new training ecosystem. Still, the decisive issue would be the condition of the Polish airframes rather than their nominal number. Jets approaching fatigue limits, requiring engine overhaul or carrying national modifications incompatible with Bulgarian communications and identification equipment could generate more maintenance work than operational flying. Poland has also used its MiG-29s intensively since February 2022 to reinforce air policing on NATO’s eastern flank, while transferring part of the fleet to Ukraine. A package of ten MiG-29s might therefore yield substantially fewer than ten operational fighters once inspections, cannibalization and overhaul requirements are taken into account.
A second-hand F-16 package would align Bulgaria with the new fighter jet it has already selected, but the commonality advantage could be overstated if the available aircraft are older F-16A/B or F-16C/D variants. Bulgaria’s new Block 70 fleet belongs to the latest production standard, while most F-16s becoming available in Europe were built during the 1980s or 1990s and later modernized through separate national programs. Older F-16s may use different engines, radar sets, cockpit displays, electronic warfare equipment, mission software, wiring, and maintenance procedures. They could also require a separate stock of spare parts and different conversion training for pilots and technicians. The value of a used F-16 offer would therefore depend on the complete package, including remaining airframe hours, spare engines, simulator access, instructor support, ground equipment, weapons compatibility, and delivery speed.
Bare aircraft arriving without spares or training would not solve the Bulgarian readiness problem. The most useful offer would involve F-16s that can be released within months, retain several thousand flight hours and share enough procedures with the Block 70 to reduce rather than expand the transition burden. Nevertheless, the Swedish Gripen has now once again returned to the Bulgarian debate because Sweden has repeatedly offered combinations of aircraft, financing, leasing and accelerated delivery. Bulgaria selected the Swedish proposal for eight new Gripen C/D fighters in April 2017 ahead of second-hand Portuguese F-16s and Italian Eurofighters. That package was valued at approximately BGN 1.5 billion, then equivalent to about $836 million, but the procedure was halted after disputes over whether the competitors had received equal treatment.
Saab submitted a revised proposal in December 2018 for ten new Gripen C/Ds within Bulgaria’s BGN 1.8 billion budget, rather than the eight originally requested, with the first aircraft planned within 24 months of contract signature, all ten within three years of the first delivery and payments spread over nine years. Bulgaria chose the F-16 Block 70 instead. The Gripen returned in October 2022 when Defence Minister Dimitar Stoyanov requested a formal Swedish offer for ten aircraft that could be produced and delivered within two years, together with a lease proposal intended to cover the period before a complete F-16 squadron became available. The 2026 Gripen option differs from the earlier competition because Bulgaria no longer needs to select its permanent fighter. It needs a temporary force that can generate aircraft availability before 2028 without consuming the personnel and funding required to bring the F-16 into service.
The Gripen C/D is operated by Hungary and the Czech Republic, both NATO members, and Hungary’s participation in the Bulgarian inquiry could provide information on regional maintenance, spare parts and training capacity. Even so, a Bulgarian Gripen fleet would require a separate conversion pipeline, maintenance organization, simulator system, mission planning capability, engine support agreement and weapons package. Bulgaria would then operate MiG-29s, Gripens and F-16s simultaneously during at least part of the transition, dividing an already small pool of pilots, technicians and infrastructure among three types. The arrangement would be more credible as a comprehensive lease in which Sweden guarantees a defined number of available aircraft, instructors, technicians and spares than as a conventional purchase of used airframes.
Without that support, from Bulgaria’s point of view, introducing the Gripen for only several years could cost hundreds of millions of euros while producing limited flying hours before withdrawal. Also, the current fighter gap results from a procurement process that began in 2011 and repeatedly changed direction before Bulgaria signed its first F-16 contract. Sofia initially sought eight new or used fighters with training, logistics and financing, then evaluated Swedish Gripens, Portuguese F-16s, Italian Eurofighters, Greek F-16s, Israeli F-16C/Ds, newly manufactured F-16 Block 70s and, briefly, Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornets. After the 2017 Gripen decision was suspended, Bulgaria reopened the competition and selected eight F-16 Block 70s in December 2018.
Bulgarian Parliament authorized negotiations in January 2019, the U.S. State Department approved a possible sale on June 3, 2019, and Parliament overrode President Rumen Radev’s veto on July 26. The first package was valued at about $1.2 billion to $1.25 billion, depending on whether the figure refers to the approved ceiling or the final agreement. Parliament approved eight additional F-16s, weapons, spare parts and support systems in November 2022 for almost $1.3 billion, bringing the planned force to sixteen. The second package also included more weapons, additional spare engines and two-seat aircraft and could be paid in instalments, whereas the first package had required advance payment.
Bulgaria’s decision about this fighter gap will likely be driven by the number of operational aircraft that each option can provide before 2028, not only by headline fleet size or maximum aircraft performance. A MiG-29 package would probably enter service fastest but could produce only one or two additional years of useful flying and would remain dependent on a declining stock of engines and components. Used F-16s could reduce the transition burden only if their configuration, remaining life and support package are compatible with Bulgaria’s Block 70 fleet. The Gripen could offer a more self-contained temporary capability, particularly under a lease, but would impose the highest requirement for a separate training and logistics structure.
Sofia may also avoid acquiring a complete interim squadron and instead combine several narrower measures: purchase the Polish MiG-29s for flight and cannibalization, acquire engines and components from Hungary or other holders, accelerate F-16 pilot conversion, and request periodic NATO assistance if national aircraft availability falls below the level required for uninterrupted alert duty. The central calculation is whether Bulgaria can generate approximately four to six consistently available fighters from the existing MiG-29 force until the Block 70 assumes the mission, or whether maintaining that minimum will require introducing an additional fighter jet for a service period that may last only two to four years.
Written by Jérôme Brahy
Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
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On July 28, 2026, the Ministry of Defence of Bulgaria officially requested inquiries from international partners regarding available second-hand Saab JAS 39 Gripen and Lockheed Martin F-16 fighters, along with spare parts for Mikoyan MiG-29 aircraft. The official assessment was initiated to address operational capability gaps caused by delivery delays of Bulgaria’s second batch of eight F-16 Block 70 aircraft. This interim procurement strategy aims to ensure continuous coverage for national airspace defense and NATO Air Policing commitments until the full F-16 fleet achieves operational readiness in 2028.
Bulgaria received its first eight F-16 Block 70 fighters by late 2025 under a $1.2 billion contract, but operational deployment remains constrained until 2028 due to pilot qualification requirements and infrastructure readiness. The defense ministry’s market evaluation focuses on acquiring interim flight hours or spare components from Poland, Hungary, Sweden, and the United States to sustain a four-to-six aircraft quick reaction alert capability.
Related topic: Lockheed Martin delivers first F-16 Block 70 fighter to Bulgaria as the country replaces aging Russian-made jets
A leased or second-hand Gripen force could provide a relatively rapid NATO-compatible air-policing capability, but it would create a third fighter ecosystem during the most demanding phase of Bulgaria’s F-16 transition. (Picture source: Swedish MoD)
On July 28, 2026, Bulgaria’s Ministry of Defence confirmed that it had opened a new assessment of second-hand fighters, engines and spare parts because the second batch of eight F-16 Block 70s is delayed beyond the schedule originally used to plan the retirement of the MiG-29. Sofia has sent inquiries to Poland and Hungary concerning available aircraft and components, while also requesting information on used F-16s and Gripens. The immediate trigger seems to have been the Polish Defence Minister Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz’s statement on July 27 that Poland could sell MiG-29s to Bulgaria if Warsaw and Kyiv failed to agree on their transfer to Ukraine. The purpose of the review is narrower than a new fighter competition: it is intended to keep at least one national fighter force capable of conducting quick reaction alerts and NATO air policing until the entire F-16 Block 70 fleet reaches operational readiness.
Bulgaria had received the first eight F-16s by December 2025, but the Air Force continued to assign the MiG-29 to air policing as it expects the F-16 to enter active operational service only in 2028. The delay affects Bulgaria more severely than it would affect an air force already operating a large F-16 fleet because Sofia is simultaneously replacing its MiG-29s and Su-25s, as well as its pilot training system, maintenance organization, weapons inventory and air base infrastructure used for fighter operations. Delivering eight F-16s does not create an operational squadron if only a limited number of pilots are qualified, instructor capacity remains insufficient, and several aircraft must be reserved for training, inspections and rectification work.
A permanent alert commitment normally requires two armed fighters ready to launch, another pair available as backup, and additional jets for training and maintenance. In an eight-aircraft fleet, two aircraft undergoing scheduled work and one or two affected by faults can reduce the usable force to four or five, leaving little margin between operational alert and pilot continuation training. Bulgaria’s problem is therefore one of force generation rather than simple ownership. Atanas Zapryanov, then defence minister, said at the end of 2025 that the F-16 force was expected to achieve operational readiness in 2028 and that the MiG-29 would have to remain available until then, even though Poland, Bulgaria’s principal regional source of MiG-29 support, was encountering its own maintenance difficulties.
The Bulgarian MiG-29 force has operated for years with a narrow margin between the number of aircraft held in the inventory and the number that can actually fly. In 2022, no more than seven or eight MiG-29s were assessed as simultaneously usable, a figure that still included the jets needed for pilot training, maintenance test flights and reserve duties. The fleet’s availability depends heavily on the condition of its RD-33 engines, each of which requires periodic overhaul, as well as access to radar modules, hydraulic equipment, landing gear parts, fuel system components and Soviet-era ground equipment. Bulgaria previously attempted to contract the overhaul of up to ten MiG-29 engines, but the effort produced no bidder within the required period, illustrating how rapidly the European support base for the Soviet fighter has contracted since 2022.
Russian support became politically and practically inaccessible after the invasion of Ukraine, Ukraine’s industrial capacity came under wartime pressure, and Poland began reducing its own MiG-29 fleet while transferring them to Kyiv. Sofia can still obtain short-term value from donor aircraft or engines, but every additional year of MiG-29 service requires investment in a fighter jet that Bulgaria has already decided to replace and for which regional stocks of serviceable components are shrinking rapidly. Polish MiG-29s would nevertheless be the least disruptive interim option if they can be delivered quickly and with enough remaining service life. Bulgarian pilots already know the aircraft, technicians already possess the experience, and the Graf Ignatievo Air Base already has compatible maintenance facilities, ground support equipment and weapons-handling procedures.
MiG-29s that are not economical to restore could be dismantled for engines, landing gear, radar components and other assemblies, potentially increasing the availability of the existing Bulgarian fleet without creating a new training ecosystem. Still, the decisive issue would be the condition of the Polish airframes rather than their nominal number. Jets approaching fatigue limits, requiring engine overhaul or carrying national modifications incompatible with Bulgarian communications and identification equipment could generate more maintenance work than operational flying. Poland has also used its MiG-29s intensively since February 2022 to reinforce air policing on NATO’s eastern flank, while transferring part of the fleet to Ukraine. A package of ten MiG-29s might therefore yield substantially fewer than ten operational fighters once inspections, cannibalization and overhaul requirements are taken into account.
A second-hand F-16 package would align Bulgaria with the new fighter jet it has already selected, but the commonality advantage could be overstated if the available aircraft are older F-16A/B or F-16C/D variants. Bulgaria’s new Block 70 fleet belongs to the latest production standard, while most F-16s becoming available in Europe were built during the 1980s or 1990s and later modernized through separate national programs. Older F-16s may use different engines, radar sets, cockpit displays, electronic warfare equipment, mission software, wiring, and maintenance procedures. They could also require a separate stock of spare parts and different conversion training for pilots and technicians. The value of a used F-16 offer would therefore depend on the complete package, including remaining airframe hours, spare engines, simulator access, instructor support, ground equipment, weapons compatibility, and delivery speed.
Bare aircraft arriving without spares or training would not solve the Bulgarian readiness problem. The most useful offer would involve F-16s that can be released within months, retain several thousand flight hours and share enough procedures with the Block 70 to reduce rather than expand the transition burden. Nevertheless, the Swedish Gripen has now once again returned to the Bulgarian debate because Sweden has repeatedly offered combinations of aircraft, financing, leasing and accelerated delivery. Bulgaria selected the Swedish proposal for eight new Gripen C/D fighters in April 2017 ahead of second-hand Portuguese F-16s and Italian Eurofighters. That package was valued at approximately BGN 1.5 billion, then equivalent to about $836 million, but the procedure was halted after disputes over whether the competitors had received equal treatment.
Saab submitted a revised proposal in December 2018 for ten new Gripen C/Ds within Bulgaria’s BGN 1.8 billion budget, rather than the eight originally requested, with the first aircraft planned within 24 months of contract signature, all ten within three years of the first delivery and payments spread over nine years. Bulgaria chose the F-16 Block 70 instead. The Gripen returned in October 2022 when Defence Minister Dimitar Stoyanov requested a formal Swedish offer for ten aircraft that could be produced and delivered within two years, together with a lease proposal intended to cover the period before a complete F-16 squadron became available. The 2026 Gripen option differs from the earlier competition because Bulgaria no longer needs to select its permanent fighter. It needs a temporary force that can generate aircraft availability before 2028 without consuming the personnel and funding required to bring the F-16 into service.
The Gripen C/D is operated by Hungary and the Czech Republic, both NATO members, and Hungary’s participation in the Bulgarian inquiry could provide information on regional maintenance, spare parts and training capacity. Even so, a Bulgarian Gripen fleet would require a separate conversion pipeline, maintenance organization, simulator system, mission planning capability, engine support agreement and weapons package. Bulgaria would then operate MiG-29s, Gripens and F-16s simultaneously during at least part of the transition, dividing an already small pool of pilots, technicians and infrastructure among three types. The arrangement would be more credible as a comprehensive lease in which Sweden guarantees a defined number of available aircraft, instructors, technicians and spares than as a conventional purchase of used airframes.
Without that support, from Bulgaria’s point of view, introducing the Gripen for only several years could cost hundreds of millions of euros while producing limited flying hours before withdrawal. Also, the current fighter gap results from a procurement process that began in 2011 and repeatedly changed direction before Bulgaria signed its first F-16 contract. Sofia initially sought eight new or used fighters with training, logistics and financing, then evaluated Swedish Gripens, Portuguese F-16s, Italian Eurofighters, Greek F-16s, Israeli F-16C/Ds, newly manufactured F-16 Block 70s and, briefly, Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornets. After the 2017 Gripen decision was suspended, Bulgaria reopened the competition and selected eight F-16 Block 70s in December 2018.
Bulgarian Parliament authorized negotiations in January 2019, the U.S. State Department approved a possible sale on June 3, 2019, and Parliament overrode President Rumen Radev’s veto on July 26. The first package was valued at about $1.2 billion to $1.25 billion, depending on whether the figure refers to the approved ceiling or the final agreement. Parliament approved eight additional F-16s, weapons, spare parts and support systems in November 2022 for almost $1.3 billion, bringing the planned force to sixteen. The second package also included more weapons, additional spare engines and two-seat aircraft and could be paid in instalments, whereas the first package had required advance payment.
Bulgaria’s decision about this fighter gap will likely be driven by the number of operational aircraft that each option can provide before 2028, not only by headline fleet size or maximum aircraft performance. A MiG-29 package would probably enter service fastest but could produce only one or two additional years of useful flying and would remain dependent on a declining stock of engines and components. Used F-16s could reduce the transition burden only if their configuration, remaining life and support package are compatible with Bulgaria’s Block 70 fleet. The Gripen could offer a more self-contained temporary capability, particularly under a lease, but would impose the highest requirement for a separate training and logistics structure.
Sofia may also avoid acquiring a complete interim squadron and instead combine several narrower measures: purchase the Polish MiG-29s for flight and cannibalization, acquire engines and components from Hungary or other holders, accelerate F-16 pilot conversion, and request periodic NATO assistance if national aircraft availability falls below the level required for uninterrupted alert duty. The central calculation is whether Bulgaria can generate approximately four to six consistently available fighters from the existing MiG-29 force until the Block 70 assumes the mission, or whether maintaining that minimum will require introducing an additional fighter jet for a service period that may last only two to four years.
Written by Jérôme Brahy
Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
Explore More Defense News
• Land Defense News
• Naval Defense News
• Defense Aerospace News
