China and Thailand deepen military ties with Falcon Strike 2025 joint air force exercise
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China’s Ministry of National Defense told state media that the PLA Air Force and the Royal Thai Air Force will run the Falcon Strike 2025 joint training in Thailand in mid to late September. Global Times carried the announcement on September 15, 2025, crediting a defense ministry statement that China will send multiple aircraft types and ground-based air defense units. That is the formal cue for another round of air-to-air workups with Thai Gripens and supporting assets. Falcon Strike has become the annual venue where Chinese and Thai crews practice dissimilar air combat and command and control, with one side bringing J-10C fighters, transports and airborne early warning aircraft, and the other side flying Swedish-built Gripen C and D models supported by Thailand’s own Erieye early warning planes. The mix lets both air forces test sensors, tactics and weapons in ways they cannot do with only like-for-like opponents.Follow Army Recognition on Google News at this link
China and Thailand are preparing for Falcon Strike 2025, a joint air exercise bringing together Chinese J-10C fighters and Thai Gripens with airborne early warning aircraft and ground-based defenses, highlighting growing multi-domain military cooperation between the two countries (Picture source: China Military TV 81).
The exercise tends to revolve around three pillars. First, the fighter matchup. On the Chinese side, the J-10C is a late model variant with an active electronically scanned array radar and a modern mission computer. It typically carries the PL 15 beyond visual range air-to-air missile and the PL 10 high off boresight short-range weapon, which together frame the long and short ends of the air combat envelope. Thailand’s Gripen-C and D bring their own networked playbook. They plug into a national data link that ties fighters to Saab 340 Erieye early warning aircraft, a system Thailand has operated for more than a decade. Gripens are usually seen with AIM-120 AMRAAM for beyond visual range shots and IRIS-T for close-in work, along with the sort of targeting and jamming pods that let crews practice strike and suppression tasks when the scenario calls for it.
Second, the enablers. Past Falcon Strike editions featured the KJ-500 airborne early warning platform to manage the air picture for PLA fighters, plus Y-20 airlifters and JH 7A strike aircraft to stand in as heavy lifters and strike packages. On the Thai side, the two Erieye-equipped Saab 340s act as the airborne quarterback, feeding targets to Gripens through a secure national data link. When both sides bring their own early warning aircraft, the scenario becomes less about one plane beating another and more about two networks competing under stress. Ground-based air defense units that China plans to send this year add another layer, because they force attacking packages to fly suppression profiles, practice decoying and time-sensitive targeting, and then get out without losing mass.
Third, the playbook has expanded beyond classic fighter merges. In recent years, the training syllabus included early warning detection, dissimilar air combat, close air support and penetration assault, essentially a crawl through the spectrum from air policing to strike. That is why both air forces find high value in the joint exercise: it is less about a winner and more about learning where crews, sensors and procedures need work. Earlier editions ran out of Udorn Royal Thai Air Force Base in the northeast, which gives air space and range access to stack realistic scenarios without bumping into commercial traffic.
Looking back helps explain the trajectory. Falcon Strike began in 2015 and, after the pandemic pause, returned with larger packages. In 2022, the Chinese side sent J-10C fighters, JH-7A fighter bombers and a KJ-500 AEW aircraft, a combination that signaled ambitions beyond simple fighter training. The 2024 edition ran in August and closed with a ministry note pointing to a 19-day syllabus that covered early warning, dissimilar combat and close air support. Air drills are now one leg of a three-legged stool that also includes the Blue Strike naval training series and the Strike joint army counterterrorism drills. Blue Strike 2025 wrapped up in April around Zhanjiang with maritime counterterrorism, mine countermeasures and search and rescue work. The Strike 2024 ground exercise in Kunming ran 11 days and leaned into unmanned systems and urban scenarios. These three exercises suggest both sides are building a playbook that spans air, sea and land and can be recombined for contingencies.
Falcon Strike’s value flows from repetition and friction. Dissimilar air combat is where crews learn how to break their habits. The J-10C and Gripen families carry broadly comparable radar and electronic warfare suites in their latest forms, but they present very different signatures and cockpit workflows. Add airborne early warning on both sides and the fight becomes a contest of timelines. This is the laboratory where weapons like PL-15 and AIM-120 are not fired for real yet dictate how both sides build their intercept geometry and manage emissions. It is also where pilots practice losing well, meaning they learn how to disengage, refuel, rejoin and come back in with a different plan.
If Beijing and Bangkok ever needed to put a joint package in the air for a real-world problem, the notional stack is becoming obvious. Chinese J-10CS and Thai Gripens could share tracks via their respective command and control chains, with KJ-500 and Saab 340 Erieye deconflicting lanes. At sea, the Blue Strike drill points toward surface combatants escorting amphibious ships with a focus on interdiction and maritime search and rescue, a practical fit for the Gulf of Thailand and approaches to the South China Sea. Thailand’s decision this summer to proceed with its long-delayed S26T submarine program adds another underwater tool for future drills. On land, the Strike series shows both armies experimenting with small unmanned systems and special operations forces for counterterrorism tasks. None of this means a standing combined task force is in the making.
Thailand keeps one foot in each camp. It hosts Cobra Gold with the United States every year at large scale, while also expanding technical ties with China. Its decision this year to sign for new Gripen-E and F aircraft, after Washington declined a Thai request for F-35S in 2023, will deepen the Swedish architecture that already links Gripens and Erieye across Thailand’s airspace. At the same time, cooperation with China has broadened, from air and naval drills to the submarine program now back on track with a non-German engine solution. For Beijing, Falcon Strike sits inside a wider effort to normalize and professionalize military ties with Southeast Asian partners. For Thailand, it is a hedge and a skill builder. The signal from running Falcon Strike again is simple. Both sides want the habits of operating together, and they are building them a sortie at a time.
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China’s Ministry of National Defense told state media that the PLA Air Force and the Royal Thai Air Force will run the Falcon Strike 2025 joint training in Thailand in mid to late September. Global Times carried the announcement on September 15, 2025, crediting a defense ministry statement that China will send multiple aircraft types and ground-based air defense units. That is the formal cue for another round of air-to-air workups with Thai Gripens and supporting assets. Falcon Strike has become the annual venue where Chinese and Thai crews practice dissimilar air combat and command and control, with one side bringing J-10C fighters, transports and airborne early warning aircraft, and the other side flying Swedish-built Gripen C and D models supported by Thailand’s own Erieye early warning planes. The mix lets both air forces test sensors, tactics and weapons in ways they cannot do with only like-for-like opponents.
Follow Army Recognition on Google News at this link
China and Thailand are preparing for Falcon Strike 2025, a joint air exercise bringing together Chinese J-10C fighters and Thai Gripens with airborne early warning aircraft and ground-based defenses, highlighting growing multi-domain military cooperation between the two countries (Picture source: China Military TV 81).
The exercise tends to revolve around three pillars. First, the fighter matchup. On the Chinese side, the J-10C is a late model variant with an active electronically scanned array radar and a modern mission computer. It typically carries the PL 15 beyond visual range air-to-air missile and the PL 10 high off boresight short-range weapon, which together frame the long and short ends of the air combat envelope. Thailand’s Gripen-C and D bring their own networked playbook. They plug into a national data link that ties fighters to Saab 340 Erieye early warning aircraft, a system Thailand has operated for more than a decade. Gripens are usually seen with AIM-120 AMRAAM for beyond visual range shots and IRIS-T for close-in work, along with the sort of targeting and jamming pods that let crews practice strike and suppression tasks when the scenario calls for it.
Second, the enablers. Past Falcon Strike editions featured the KJ-500 airborne early warning platform to manage the air picture for PLA fighters, plus Y-20 airlifters and JH 7A strike aircraft to stand in as heavy lifters and strike packages. On the Thai side, the two Erieye-equipped Saab 340s act as the airborne quarterback, feeding targets to Gripens through a secure national data link. When both sides bring their own early warning aircraft, the scenario becomes less about one plane beating another and more about two networks competing under stress. Ground-based air defense units that China plans to send this year add another layer, because they force attacking packages to fly suppression profiles, practice decoying and time-sensitive targeting, and then get out without losing mass.
Third, the playbook has expanded beyond classic fighter merges. In recent years, the training syllabus included early warning detection, dissimilar air combat, close air support and penetration assault, essentially a crawl through the spectrum from air policing to strike. That is why both air forces find high value in the joint exercise: it is less about a winner and more about learning where crews, sensors and procedures need work. Earlier editions ran out of Udorn Royal Thai Air Force Base in the northeast, which gives air space and range access to stack realistic scenarios without bumping into commercial traffic.
Looking back helps explain the trajectory. Falcon Strike began in 2015 and, after the pandemic pause, returned with larger packages. In 2022, the Chinese side sent J-10C fighters, JH-7A fighter bombers and a KJ-500 AEW aircraft, a combination that signaled ambitions beyond simple fighter training. The 2024 edition ran in August and closed with a ministry note pointing to a 19-day syllabus that covered early warning, dissimilar combat and close air support. Air drills are now one leg of a three-legged stool that also includes the Blue Strike naval training series and the Strike joint army counterterrorism drills. Blue Strike 2025 wrapped up in April around Zhanjiang with maritime counterterrorism, mine countermeasures and search and rescue work. The Strike 2024 ground exercise in Kunming ran 11 days and leaned into unmanned systems and urban scenarios. These three exercises suggest both sides are building a playbook that spans air, sea and land and can be recombined for contingencies.
Falcon Strike’s value flows from repetition and friction. Dissimilar air combat is where crews learn how to break their habits. The J-10C and Gripen families carry broadly comparable radar and electronic warfare suites in their latest forms, but they present very different signatures and cockpit workflows. Add airborne early warning on both sides and the fight becomes a contest of timelines. This is the laboratory where weapons like PL-15 and AIM-120 are not fired for real yet dictate how both sides build their intercept geometry and manage emissions. It is also where pilots practice losing well, meaning they learn how to disengage, refuel, rejoin and come back in with a different plan.
If Beijing and Bangkok ever needed to put a joint package in the air for a real-world problem, the notional stack is becoming obvious. Chinese J-10CS and Thai Gripens could share tracks via their respective command and control chains, with KJ-500 and Saab 340 Erieye deconflicting lanes. At sea, the Blue Strike drill points toward surface combatants escorting amphibious ships with a focus on interdiction and maritime search and rescue, a practical fit for the Gulf of Thailand and approaches to the South China Sea. Thailand’s decision this summer to proceed with its long-delayed S26T submarine program adds another underwater tool for future drills. On land, the Strike series shows both armies experimenting with small unmanned systems and special operations forces for counterterrorism tasks. None of this means a standing combined task force is in the making.
Thailand keeps one foot in each camp. It hosts Cobra Gold with the United States every year at large scale, while also expanding technical ties with China. Its decision this year to sign for new Gripen-E and F aircraft, after Washington declined a Thai request for F-35S in 2023, will deepen the Swedish architecture that already links Gripens and Erieye across Thailand’s airspace. At the same time, cooperation with China has broadened, from air and naval drills to the submarine program now back on track with a non-German engine solution. For Beijing, Falcon Strike sits inside a wider effort to normalize and professionalize military ties with Southeast Asian partners. For Thailand, it is a hedge and a skill builder. The signal from running Falcon Strike again is simple. Both sides want the habits of operating together, and they are building them a sortie at a time.
