China deploys Z-10 attack helicopter to intercept US Navy’s MH-60R Seahawk near Taiwan Strait
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As reported by the Global Times on August 1, 2025, Chinese state broadcaster CCTV aired footage of an aerial encounter between a Changhe Z-10 attack helicopter belonging to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and a foreign military aircraft identified as a U.S. Navy MH-60R Seahawk. The footage was released on the 98th anniversary of the PLA’s founding and showed the Z-10 intercepting the Seahawk in airspace over the Taiwan Strait.Follow Army Recognition on Google News at this link
The strategic rationale behind the use of attack helicopters such as the Z-10 in maritime interceptions appears linked to Beijing’s efforts to project an all-domain posture in key areas like the Taiwan Strait and East China Sea. (Picture source: Chinese MoD)
According to the PLA pilot, Kong Xianghui, the foreign aircraft came within approximately three miles of what China considers its territorial waters. The Z-10 issued several radio warnings before engaging in an aerial encounter that reportedly lasted over an hour. At one point, the Seahawk reportedly entered cloud cover and then emerged approaching from the left, closing to an estimated distance of 500 meters before reversing course. No collision occurred, and the foreign aircraft ultimately left the area. The U.S. Department of Defense and the U.S. Navy’s Japan-based Seventh Fleet, which oversees operations in the Western Pacific, did not provide any public response at the time of publication.
This encounter is consistent with an observable pattern of increased Chinese helicopter interceptions in areas near China’s eastern maritime boundaries. In May 2025, Chinese state television reported that army aviation units carried out 11 separate interceptions over a 10-day period in the East China Sea. The encounters were attributed to foreign aircraft approaching China’s coastline, prompting PLA helicopters, primarily Z-10 and Z-19 platforms, from the Eastern Theater Command’s ground aviation corps to scramble. These events were described by the Chinese side as defensive missions intended to prevent surveillance or proximity flights by foreign forces. In one incident, pilot Wang Ling recounted that he approached a shipborne foreign helicopter in low-visibility weather and circled its vessel of origin. The foreign aircraft responded by making a sharp bank and retreating after closing to within 10 meters. The following day, the same aircraft returned and was intercepted again above the clouds, where it was reportedly forced to turn away.
A separate incident occurred in February 2025 over the South China Sea near Scarborough Shoal, where a Chinese Navy Z-9 helicopter intercepted a Philippine fisheries surveillance Cessna aircraft. According to the Philippine Coast Guard, the Chinese helicopter approached to within three meters of the aircraft, which was conducting a routine patrol flight with journalists on board. The Philippine government issued a formal protest, labeling the incident hazardous. The United States ambassador to the Philippines also issued a statement criticizing the maneuver and calling for adherence to international norms. The PLA did not confirm the specific details of that encounter but has, in multiple instances, defended such close approaches as protective actions within its claimed jurisdiction. In subsequent state media reports, these types of incidents have been categorized under increasing aerial enforcement operations in waters considered sensitive by Beijing, especially around Taiwan and disputed zones in the South China Sea.
Tensions further increased in July 2025 following a series of encounters between Chinese and Japanese military aircraft over the East China Sea. Japan reported that Chinese JH-7 fighter-bombers approached its YS-11EB electronic surveillance planes on multiple consecutive days. China, in turn, accused Japanese aircraft of entering its air defense identification zone and engaging in provocative actions. These incidents followed extensive PLA exercises held in April 2025 under the codename “Strait Thunder–2025A,” during which the PLA deployed over 70 aircraft and 19 naval vessels in operations around Taiwan. According to Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense, 37 of these aircraft crossed the Taiwan Strait’s median line, an unofficial boundary long used as a de facto buffer. China does not recognize the legitimacy of that boundary. Both of China’s aircraft carriers, the Liaoning and the Shandong, were confirmed to have taken part in maneuvers that extended into the Second Island Chain. The exercises were interpreted as demonstrations of regional force posture and took place in the broader context of increased PLA naval and aerial activity in areas close to Taiwan and Japan.
The legal framework surrounding these incidents is contested. Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), states have sovereignty up to 12 nautical miles from their coastlines and exclusive economic rights up to 200 nautical miles. The convention permits innocent passage through territorial seas, including by military vessels, provided they refrain from launching aircraft, conducting surveillance, or engaging in other non-peaceful activities. The United States views the Taiwan Strait as international waters and frequently conducts freedom of navigation and overflight operations in the area. China asserts jurisdiction over the Strait and objects to such operations, although it has not formally declared the Strait as internal waters. These differing interpretations have resulted in a number of confrontations, with China viewing U.S. Navy ship or aircraft activity in the Strait as encroachment and the United States asserting legal passage under international law. Between 2020 and 2024, U.S. Navy ships and aircraft conducted regular transits of the Strait, including nine in 2024 and eleven in 2023. In April 2025, the Arleigh Burke-class destroyer USS William P. Lawrence, capable of operating two MH-60R helicopters, was the last U.S. warship publicly known to transit the Strait before the August helicopter encounter.
The Z-10 helicopter used in the interception is a tandem-seat, attack platform developed by Changhe Aircraft Industries Corporation. It is operated primarily by the PLA Ground Force and features a narrow fuselage, five-blade main rotor, and nose-mounted electro-optical targeting system. The Z-10 is armed with a 30mm autocannon and can carry guided air-to-ground missiles, air-to-air missiles, and unguided rockets. Designed for battlefield support missions, it is capable of low-altitude, high-speed flight and has been used increasingly for intercept missions near China’s coastal regions, particularly under the Eastern Theater Command. The choice to deploy a Z-10 in the Taiwan Strait incident suggests the encounter occurred close enough to shore for a land-based helicopter to reach the site, and that command authority resided with PLA Army aviation units rather than naval forces.
The MH-60R Seahawk is a multi-role naval helicopter derived from the UH-60 Black Hawk and configured for shipborne operations. It is equipped with sensors for anti-submarine warfare (ASW), anti-surface warfare (ASuW), and maritime surveillance, including radar, sonar, and electro-optical systems. The helicopter can deploy Mk 54 torpedoes, AGM-114 Hellfire missiles, and sonobuoys, and it supports missions such as search and rescue, communications relay, and logistics. The MH-60R is deployed from a variety of U.S. Navy vessels, including destroyers, cruisers, and aircraft carriers. In the August 2025 incident, the Seahawk in question likely launched from the USS William P. Lawrence, which had previously sailed through the Taiwan Strait. Only the United States and South Korea operate the MH-60R in Northeast Asia, and South Korea’s helicopters are not scheduled to become operational until 2026, making a U.S. origin the most probable.
The Z-10 and MH-60R differ significantly in function, deployment, and mission profile. The Z-10 is optimized for land-based attack missions, focusing on close air support and anti-armor operations. It lacks the extended range, endurance, and sea-based integration required for sustained maritime operations. Its systems are designed for visual-range targeting and short-duration engagements. The MH-60R, in contrast, is a long-range naval platform designed for persistent operations in open waters, with advanced sensors and weapons suited for undersea and surface threat detection. In a close-range encounter, the Z-10 holds advantages in direct-fire weaponry and maneuverability, particularly with its nose-mounted cannon and air-to-air missile capability. However, the Seahawk’s broader suite of sensors, its ability to operate from mobile sea platforms, and its wider mission range make it a fundamentally different asset with strategic utility in multi-domain naval operations. Each platform reflects the respective priorities of its armed forces: the Z-10 supports near-coastline defense and enforcement tasks, while the MH-60R provides extended reach and surveillance capabilities within U.S. naval task groups.
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As reported by the Global Times on August 1, 2025, Chinese state broadcaster CCTV aired footage of an aerial encounter between a Changhe Z-10 attack helicopter belonging to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and a foreign military aircraft identified as a U.S. Navy MH-60R Seahawk. The footage was released on the 98th anniversary of the PLA’s founding and showed the Z-10 intercepting the Seahawk in airspace over the Taiwan Strait.
Follow Army Recognition on Google News at this link
The strategic rationale behind the use of attack helicopters such as the Z-10 in maritime interceptions appears linked to Beijing’s efforts to project an all-domain posture in key areas like the Taiwan Strait and East China Sea. (Picture source: Chinese MoD)
According to the PLA pilot, Kong Xianghui, the foreign aircraft came within approximately three miles of what China considers its territorial waters. The Z-10 issued several radio warnings before engaging in an aerial encounter that reportedly lasted over an hour. At one point, the Seahawk reportedly entered cloud cover and then emerged approaching from the left, closing to an estimated distance of 500 meters before reversing course. No collision occurred, and the foreign aircraft ultimately left the area. The U.S. Department of Defense and the U.S. Navy’s Japan-based Seventh Fleet, which oversees operations in the Western Pacific, did not provide any public response at the time of publication.
This encounter is consistent with an observable pattern of increased Chinese helicopter interceptions in areas near China’s eastern maritime boundaries. In May 2025, Chinese state television reported that army aviation units carried out 11 separate interceptions over a 10-day period in the East China Sea. The encounters were attributed to foreign aircraft approaching China’s coastline, prompting PLA helicopters, primarily Z-10 and Z-19 platforms, from the Eastern Theater Command’s ground aviation corps to scramble. These events were described by the Chinese side as defensive missions intended to prevent surveillance or proximity flights by foreign forces. In one incident, pilot Wang Ling recounted that he approached a shipborne foreign helicopter in low-visibility weather and circled its vessel of origin. The foreign aircraft responded by making a sharp bank and retreating after closing to within 10 meters. The following day, the same aircraft returned and was intercepted again above the clouds, where it was reportedly forced to turn away.
A separate incident occurred in February 2025 over the South China Sea near Scarborough Shoal, where a Chinese Navy Z-9 helicopter intercepted a Philippine fisheries surveillance Cessna aircraft. According to the Philippine Coast Guard, the Chinese helicopter approached to within three meters of the aircraft, which was conducting a routine patrol flight with journalists on board. The Philippine government issued a formal protest, labeling the incident hazardous. The United States ambassador to the Philippines also issued a statement criticizing the maneuver and calling for adherence to international norms. The PLA did not confirm the specific details of that encounter but has, in multiple instances, defended such close approaches as protective actions within its claimed jurisdiction. In subsequent state media reports, these types of incidents have been categorized under increasing aerial enforcement operations in waters considered sensitive by Beijing, especially around Taiwan and disputed zones in the South China Sea.
Tensions further increased in July 2025 following a series of encounters between Chinese and Japanese military aircraft over the East China Sea. Japan reported that Chinese JH-7 fighter-bombers approached its YS-11EB electronic surveillance planes on multiple consecutive days. China, in turn, accused Japanese aircraft of entering its air defense identification zone and engaging in provocative actions. These incidents followed extensive PLA exercises held in April 2025 under the codename “Strait Thunder–2025A,” during which the PLA deployed over 70 aircraft and 19 naval vessels in operations around Taiwan. According to Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense, 37 of these aircraft crossed the Taiwan Strait’s median line, an unofficial boundary long used as a de facto buffer. China does not recognize the legitimacy of that boundary. Both of China’s aircraft carriers, the Liaoning and the Shandong, were confirmed to have taken part in maneuvers that extended into the Second Island Chain. The exercises were interpreted as demonstrations of regional force posture and took place in the broader context of increased PLA naval and aerial activity in areas close to Taiwan and Japan.
The legal framework surrounding these incidents is contested. Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), states have sovereignty up to 12 nautical miles from their coastlines and exclusive economic rights up to 200 nautical miles. The convention permits innocent passage through territorial seas, including by military vessels, provided they refrain from launching aircraft, conducting surveillance, or engaging in other non-peaceful activities. The United States views the Taiwan Strait as international waters and frequently conducts freedom of navigation and overflight operations in the area. China asserts jurisdiction over the Strait and objects to such operations, although it has not formally declared the Strait as internal waters. These differing interpretations have resulted in a number of confrontations, with China viewing U.S. Navy ship or aircraft activity in the Strait as encroachment and the United States asserting legal passage under international law. Between 2020 and 2024, U.S. Navy ships and aircraft conducted regular transits of the Strait, including nine in 2024 and eleven in 2023. In April 2025, the Arleigh Burke-class destroyer USS William P. Lawrence, capable of operating two MH-60R helicopters, was the last U.S. warship publicly known to transit the Strait before the August helicopter encounter.
The Z-10 helicopter used in the interception is a tandem-seat, attack platform developed by Changhe Aircraft Industries Corporation. It is operated primarily by the PLA Ground Force and features a narrow fuselage, five-blade main rotor, and nose-mounted electro-optical targeting system. The Z-10 is armed with a 30mm autocannon and can carry guided air-to-ground missiles, air-to-air missiles, and unguided rockets. Designed for battlefield support missions, it is capable of low-altitude, high-speed flight and has been used increasingly for intercept missions near China’s coastal regions, particularly under the Eastern Theater Command. The choice to deploy a Z-10 in the Taiwan Strait incident suggests the encounter occurred close enough to shore for a land-based helicopter to reach the site, and that command authority resided with PLA Army aviation units rather than naval forces.
The MH-60R Seahawk is a multi-role naval helicopter derived from the UH-60 Black Hawk and configured for shipborne operations. It is equipped with sensors for anti-submarine warfare (ASW), anti-surface warfare (ASuW), and maritime surveillance, including radar, sonar, and electro-optical systems. The helicopter can deploy Mk 54 torpedoes, AGM-114 Hellfire missiles, and sonobuoys, and it supports missions such as search and rescue, communications relay, and logistics. The MH-60R is deployed from a variety of U.S. Navy vessels, including destroyers, cruisers, and aircraft carriers. In the August 2025 incident, the Seahawk in question likely launched from the USS William P. Lawrence, which had previously sailed through the Taiwan Strait. Only the United States and South Korea operate the MH-60R in Northeast Asia, and South Korea’s helicopters are not scheduled to become operational until 2026, making a U.S. origin the most probable.
The Z-10 and MH-60R differ significantly in function, deployment, and mission profile. The Z-10 is optimized for land-based attack missions, focusing on close air support and anti-armor operations. It lacks the extended range, endurance, and sea-based integration required for sustained maritime operations. Its systems are designed for visual-range targeting and short-duration engagements. The MH-60R, in contrast, is a long-range naval platform designed for persistent operations in open waters, with advanced sensors and weapons suited for undersea and surface threat detection. In a close-range encounter, the Z-10 holds advantages in direct-fire weaponry and maneuverability, particularly with its nose-mounted cannon and air-to-air missile capability. However, the Seahawk’s broader suite of sensors, its ability to operate from mobile sea platforms, and its wider mission range make it a fundamentally different asset with strategic utility in multi-domain naval operations. Each platform reflects the respective priorities of its armed forces: the Z-10 supports near-coastline defense and enforcement tasks, while the MH-60R provides extended reach and surveillance capabilities within U.S. naval task groups.
