Chinese Navy Intensifies J-11BSH Naval Fighter Training for Long-Range Maritime Operations
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China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy released imagery on 13 February 2026 showing J-11BSH twin-seat fighters from the Southern Theater Command conducting intensive maritime flight training. The drills highlight Beijing’s push to expand long-range airpower integration into routine South China Sea operations amid sustained regional air and naval activity.
On 13 February 2026, China’s official military media released new imagery of J-11BSH fighter jets from a naval aviation unit under the Southern Theater Command conducting intensive flight training. The photo report, carried by China Military Online, offers a rare window into how the People’s Liberation Army Navy is sharpening the maritime employment of its long-range, twin-seat Flanker derivatives. At a time of sustained air and naval activity over the South China Sea, the appearance of these aircraft in publicly distributed training footage signals growing emphasis on over-water combat readiness. The sortie series, reported by China Military Online and relayed by state outlets such as People’s Daily Online, underlines the navy’s intent to integrate heavy fighters more closely into routine maritime operations.
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China’s PLA Navy has released new imagery showing J-11BSH twin-seat fighters conducting intensive long-range maritime training under the Southern Theater Command in the South China Sea (Picture Source: China Military Online)
The newly released images show J-11BSH jets taxiing, taking off and climbing out in formation from a coastal base, indicating a full mission sequence rather than a simple currency flight. The aircraft are depicted rotating with both WS-10-series engines in full afterburner and with the main landing gear still extended, highlighting maximum-power departures typical of long-range training profiles. Close-up frontal shots make the wing store configuration clearly visible: two underwing stations per wing are clearly visible from this angle. The outermost visible underwing station carries a short-range air-to-air missile, and the outer wingtip rail station itself appears empty. The absence of external fuel tanks, targeting pods or heavy anti-ship weapons suggests that these sorties are focused on handling, formation work and tactical procedures over water rather than full-up strike rehearsals. The focus on the navalised J-11BSH is notable, as this variant is rarely highlighted in open sources compared with the more frequently discussed J-15 and J-16 families. By publicising these drills, the navy signals that land-based heavy fighters will continue to play a central role in theater-level maritime air operations, alongside carrier aviation and long-range bombers.
The J-11BSH is a naval version of the twin-seat J-11BS, itself an extensively localised development of the Russian Su-27UB airframe produced by Shenyang Aircraft Corporation for Chinese forces. The type features tandem cockpits, a reinforced structure and Chinese-made avionics, including a multi-mode fire-control radar with dedicated air-to-surface and maritime search modes, as well as a digital glass cockpit and hands-on-throttle-and-stick (HOTAS) controls optimised for high workload missions. Open-source assessments indicate that, like the J-11B/BS baseline, the aircraft is powered by the WS-10 series turbofan, providing high thrust-to-weight performance, good climb rate and sustained supersonic cruise at altitude. The J-11BSH is believed to employ the same family of air-to-air missiles as its air force counterparts, including the PL-8 short-range infrared missile and the PL-12 medium-range active radar-guided weapon, with later blocks likely incorporating newer long-range beyond-visual-range (BVR) missiles such as the PL-15. For anti-surface warfare, Chinese sources widely expect integration with guided bombs and anti-ship missiles from the YJ series, giving the platform a credible stand-off maritime strike capability consistent with its radar and payload capacity.
Within the broader J-11 family, the J-11BSH fills a niche role in the People’s Liberation Army Navy as a land-based, navalised fighter optimised for operations over saltwater but not configured for carrier recovery, unlike the related J-15. Corrosion-resistant treatments, modified avionics suites and tailored communication systems allow the aircraft to integrate with shipborne command and control networks and maritime surveillance assets. As of 2018, open-source compilations suggested that around three dozen J-11BSH aircraft were in naval service, operating alongside single-seat J-11BH fighters in coastal brigades. These units provide high-end air-defence and escort coverage for naval task groups and critical coastal infrastructure, while also serving as an advanced lead-in platform for pilots transitioning to more complex multirole types. The twin-seat configuration makes the J-11BSH particularly suitable for missions where a dedicated weapon systems officer in the rear cockpit can manage radar modes, electronic warfare functions and complex weapon employment while the front pilot focuses on flying and tactical manoeuvre.
Although detailed operational histories remain classified, the type has already appeared in several high-profile incidents. In late 2022, a PLAN J-11BSH conducted a close intercept of a U.S. Air Force RC-135 electronic intelligence aircraft over the South China Sea during a naval exercise, an event publicised by the U.S. Department of Defense as an unsafe manoeuvre. Such intercepts illustrate one core mission of the aircraft: defensive counter-air and identification of foreign maritime patrol, surveillance and strike platforms approaching Chinese-claimed airspace and sea areas. On a day-to-day basis, J-11BSH units are believed to fly combat air patrols (CAP), quick-reaction alert sorties and escort missions for high-value assets such as KJ-500 airborne early warning aircraft and Y-8 or Y-9 maritime patrol and anti-submarine variants. Their endurance, radar reach and twin-seat crew concept are well-suited to managing complex intercept geometries and maintaining persistent presence along key air corridors.
The latest training activity captured by China Military Online suggests a focus on long-range maritime strike and integrated air-sea operations rather than simple air policing. The sequence of images, from taxi to multi-ship departure and climb-out, implies a composite training syllabus: formation take-off, over-water navigation at medium and low altitude, radar search and tracking of simulated surface targets, and possibly air-to-air refuelling profiles, although no tankers are shown. The clean external configuration seen in the photos, hardpoints largely unused except for light training missiles on the outer rails, indicates that the emphasis is on mastering over-water flight profiles, crew coordination and tactical procedures before layering in complex weapons loads. In a typical scenario, a pair or flight of J-11BSH fighters would operate in conjunction with surface combatants and shore-based radar sites via secure datalink, receiving cueing from long-range sensors before prosecuting BVR engagements or delivering precision-guided munitions against designated maritime targets. Crew coordination in the two-seat cockpit is essential in these profiles: while one pilot maintains situational awareness and deconflicts with friendly traffic, the other can manage multi-target track files, electronic support measures and weapon release sequencing, greatly increasing mission effectiveness in a congested maritime environment.
Strengthening the over-water proficiency of land-based fighters such as the J-11BSH is central to China’s evolving anti-access/area-denial posture in its near seas. From coastal bases in the Southern Theater Command, these aircraft can provide a fighter umbrella over Chinese outposts and surface task groups across much of the northern and central South China Sea, extending air-defence coverage far beyond shore-based surface-to-air missile envelopes. Combined with long-range bombers such as the H-6J, maritime strike-optimised J-16 variants and a growing inventory of surface ships armed with long-range air-defence and anti-ship missiles, the J-11BSH helps form an integrated kill chain designed to detect, track and, if ordered, engage hostile surface formations approaching China’s claimed maritime zones. For regional navies and extra-regional forces operating in these waters, the growing competence and visibility of such aircraft complicates mission planning, as they must now assume that heavy fighters with substantial BVR reach and stand-off strike options can be committed to a crisis with relatively short warning.
From an operational planning perspective, the J-11BSH’s training for maritime operations points to a wide mission set extending well beyond classic air-superiority tasks. In a crisis scenario, these jets could take on long-range CAP to shield surface action groups, provide close escort for H-6 bombers executing anti-ship cruise-missile launches, or conduct offensive counter-air strikes against forward bases and tankers supporting an adversary’s carrier air wing within the first island chain. They are also likely candidates for interdiction missions against military shipping, logistics convoys or amphibious forces, using stand-off precision weapons launched from outside the densest layers of opposing air defences. In the competition short of armed conflict, the same aircraft can perform presence missions, shadowing foreign surface task groups and intelligence-collection platforms while relaying targeting-quality data back to command nodes. The February 2026 training series serves not only to maintain pilot currency but to refine the procedures that would underpin these diverse mission profiles in real operations.
The latest public glimpse of J-11BSH activity underscores how land-based naval fighters are becoming an increasingly important pillar of China’s maritime air power, complementing rather than merely supporting the country’s growing carrier aviation arm. By investing in demanding over-water training for a relatively small but capable fleet of twin-seat heavy fighters, the Chinese navy is signalling that it intends to field aircrews who can exploit the full range of the platform’s sensors, weapons and range in complex joint scenarios at sea. For regional actors and external powers alike, the message is clear: any assessment of the balance of air power over contested waters must now factor in not only the headline platforms that capture public attention but also specialised assets like the J-11BSH, whose quiet, incremental improvements in training and integration can have a decisive impact on the outcome of maritime operations.
Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.
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China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy released imagery on 13 February 2026 showing J-11BSH twin-seat fighters from the Southern Theater Command conducting intensive maritime flight training. The drills highlight Beijing’s push to expand long-range airpower integration into routine South China Sea operations amid sustained regional air and naval activity.
On 13 February 2026, China’s official military media released new imagery of J-11BSH fighter jets from a naval aviation unit under the Southern Theater Command conducting intensive flight training. The photo report, carried by China Military Online, offers a rare window into how the People’s Liberation Army Navy is sharpening the maritime employment of its long-range, twin-seat Flanker derivatives. At a time of sustained air and naval activity over the South China Sea, the appearance of these aircraft in publicly distributed training footage signals growing emphasis on over-water combat readiness. The sortie series, reported by China Military Online and relayed by state outlets such as People’s Daily Online, underlines the navy’s intent to integrate heavy fighters more closely into routine maritime operations.
China’s PLA Navy has released new imagery showing J-11BSH twin-seat fighters conducting intensive long-range maritime training under the Southern Theater Command in the South China Sea (Picture Source: China Military Online)
The newly released images show J-11BSH jets taxiing, taking off and climbing out in formation from a coastal base, indicating a full mission sequence rather than a simple currency flight. The aircraft are depicted rotating with both WS-10-series engines in full afterburner and with the main landing gear still extended, highlighting maximum-power departures typical of long-range training profiles. Close-up frontal shots make the wing store configuration clearly visible: two underwing stations per wing are clearly visible from this angle. The outermost visible underwing station carries a short-range air-to-air missile, and the outer wingtip rail station itself appears empty. The absence of external fuel tanks, targeting pods or heavy anti-ship weapons suggests that these sorties are focused on handling, formation work and tactical procedures over water rather than full-up strike rehearsals. The focus on the navalised J-11BSH is notable, as this variant is rarely highlighted in open sources compared with the more frequently discussed J-15 and J-16 families. By publicising these drills, the navy signals that land-based heavy fighters will continue to play a central role in theater-level maritime air operations, alongside carrier aviation and long-range bombers.
The J-11BSH is a naval version of the twin-seat J-11BS, itself an extensively localised development of the Russian Su-27UB airframe produced by Shenyang Aircraft Corporation for Chinese forces. The type features tandem cockpits, a reinforced structure and Chinese-made avionics, including a multi-mode fire-control radar with dedicated air-to-surface and maritime search modes, as well as a digital glass cockpit and hands-on-throttle-and-stick (HOTAS) controls optimised for high workload missions. Open-source assessments indicate that, like the J-11B/BS baseline, the aircraft is powered by the WS-10 series turbofan, providing high thrust-to-weight performance, good climb rate and sustained supersonic cruise at altitude. The J-11BSH is believed to employ the same family of air-to-air missiles as its air force counterparts, including the PL-8 short-range infrared missile and the PL-12 medium-range active radar-guided weapon, with later blocks likely incorporating newer long-range beyond-visual-range (BVR) missiles such as the PL-15. For anti-surface warfare, Chinese sources widely expect integration with guided bombs and anti-ship missiles from the YJ series, giving the platform a credible stand-off maritime strike capability consistent with its radar and payload capacity.
Within the broader J-11 family, the J-11BSH fills a niche role in the People’s Liberation Army Navy as a land-based, navalised fighter optimised for operations over saltwater but not configured for carrier recovery, unlike the related J-15. Corrosion-resistant treatments, modified avionics suites and tailored communication systems allow the aircraft to integrate with shipborne command and control networks and maritime surveillance assets. As of 2018, open-source compilations suggested that around three dozen J-11BSH aircraft were in naval service, operating alongside single-seat J-11BH fighters in coastal brigades. These units provide high-end air-defence and escort coverage for naval task groups and critical coastal infrastructure, while also serving as an advanced lead-in platform for pilots transitioning to more complex multirole types. The twin-seat configuration makes the J-11BSH particularly suitable for missions where a dedicated weapon systems officer in the rear cockpit can manage radar modes, electronic warfare functions and complex weapon employment while the front pilot focuses on flying and tactical manoeuvre.
Although detailed operational histories remain classified, the type has already appeared in several high-profile incidents. In late 2022, a PLAN J-11BSH conducted a close intercept of a U.S. Air Force RC-135 electronic intelligence aircraft over the South China Sea during a naval exercise, an event publicised by the U.S. Department of Defense as an unsafe manoeuvre. Such intercepts illustrate one core mission of the aircraft: defensive counter-air and identification of foreign maritime patrol, surveillance and strike platforms approaching Chinese-claimed airspace and sea areas. On a day-to-day basis, J-11BSH units are believed to fly combat air patrols (CAP), quick-reaction alert sorties and escort missions for high-value assets such as KJ-500 airborne early warning aircraft and Y-8 or Y-9 maritime patrol and anti-submarine variants. Their endurance, radar reach and twin-seat crew concept are well-suited to managing complex intercept geometries and maintaining persistent presence along key air corridors.
The latest training activity captured by China Military Online suggests a focus on long-range maritime strike and integrated air-sea operations rather than simple air policing. The sequence of images, from taxi to multi-ship departure and climb-out, implies a composite training syllabus: formation take-off, over-water navigation at medium and low altitude, radar search and tracking of simulated surface targets, and possibly air-to-air refuelling profiles, although no tankers are shown. The clean external configuration seen in the photos, hardpoints largely unused except for light training missiles on the outer rails, indicates that the emphasis is on mastering over-water flight profiles, crew coordination and tactical procedures before layering in complex weapons loads. In a typical scenario, a pair or flight of J-11BSH fighters would operate in conjunction with surface combatants and shore-based radar sites via secure datalink, receiving cueing from long-range sensors before prosecuting BVR engagements or delivering precision-guided munitions against designated maritime targets. Crew coordination in the two-seat cockpit is essential in these profiles: while one pilot maintains situational awareness and deconflicts with friendly traffic, the other can manage multi-target track files, electronic support measures and weapon release sequencing, greatly increasing mission effectiveness in a congested maritime environment.
Strengthening the over-water proficiency of land-based fighters such as the J-11BSH is central to China’s evolving anti-access/area-denial posture in its near seas. From coastal bases in the Southern Theater Command, these aircraft can provide a fighter umbrella over Chinese outposts and surface task groups across much of the northern and central South China Sea, extending air-defence coverage far beyond shore-based surface-to-air missile envelopes. Combined with long-range bombers such as the H-6J, maritime strike-optimised J-16 variants and a growing inventory of surface ships armed with long-range air-defence and anti-ship missiles, the J-11BSH helps form an integrated kill chain designed to detect, track and, if ordered, engage hostile surface formations approaching China’s claimed maritime zones. For regional navies and extra-regional forces operating in these waters, the growing competence and visibility of such aircraft complicates mission planning, as they must now assume that heavy fighters with substantial BVR reach and stand-off strike options can be committed to a crisis with relatively short warning.
From an operational planning perspective, the J-11BSH’s training for maritime operations points to a wide mission set extending well beyond classic air-superiority tasks. In a crisis scenario, these jets could take on long-range CAP to shield surface action groups, provide close escort for H-6 bombers executing anti-ship cruise-missile launches, or conduct offensive counter-air strikes against forward bases and tankers supporting an adversary’s carrier air wing within the first island chain. They are also likely candidates for interdiction missions against military shipping, logistics convoys or amphibious forces, using stand-off precision weapons launched from outside the densest layers of opposing air defences. In the competition short of armed conflict, the same aircraft can perform presence missions, shadowing foreign surface task groups and intelligence-collection platforms while relaying targeting-quality data back to command nodes. The February 2026 training series serves not only to maintain pilot currency but to refine the procedures that would underpin these diverse mission profiles in real operations.
The latest public glimpse of J-11BSH activity underscores how land-based naval fighters are becoming an increasingly important pillar of China’s maritime air power, complementing rather than merely supporting the country’s growing carrier aviation arm. By investing in demanding over-water training for a relatively small but capable fleet of twin-seat heavy fighters, the Chinese navy is signalling that it intends to field aircrews who can exploit the full range of the platform’s sensors, weapons and range in complex joint scenarios at sea. For regional actors and external powers alike, the message is clear: any assessment of the balance of air power over contested waters must now factor in not only the headline platforms that capture public attention but also specialised assets like the J-11BSH, whose quiet, incremental improvements in training and integration can have a decisive impact on the outcome of maritime operations.
Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.
