Finland Authorizes AIM-120D-3 Air-to-Air Missile Order from U.S. for Incoming F-35A Aircraft Fleet
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Finland, on December 12, 2025, authorized the purchase of AIM-120D-3 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles from the United States for its incoming F-35A fleet. The move ensures Helsinki fields a fully credible air combat capability as it retires the F/A-18 Hornet and deepens operational alignment with allied air forces.
On December 12, 2025, Finland confirmed a key step in arming its incoming F-35A force, authorising the purchase of AIM-120D-3 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles from the United States. The decision lands as Helsinki accelerates its transition away from the F/A-18 Hornet era and tightens its operational integration with allied air forces. In a security environment shaped by Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine and heightened military signalling across Northern Europe, missile choice matters as much as aircraft choice. As reported by the Finnish MoD, the AIM-120D-3 package is designed to arrive arly enough to support the initial deployment phase of Finland’s F-35 fleet.
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Finland authorized the purchase of AIM-120D-3 air-to-air missiles from the United States to equip its incoming F-35A fleet, as Helsinki prepares to retire its F/A-18 Hornets and ensure a seamless transition to a modern air combat capability (Picture Source: NATO AIRCOM / U.S. Air Force)
The Finnish Ministry of Defence states that Minister Antti Häkkänen has authorised the Finnish Defence Forces to procure the AIM-120D-3 AMRAAM via the US Foreign Military Sales channel, after the US Congress approved the sale in September 2025, with Raytheon identified as the manufacturer. Beyond the missiles themselves, the Letter of Offer and Acceptance covers manuals and documentation, spares and supplies, transport, and manufacturer and supplier training, repair, and support services, alongside services provided by the US administration. In practical terms, this frames the acquisition as an end-to-end sustainment package rather than a simple munition buy, reducing risk as Finland brings a new fighter system into frontline service.
While Finland’s release describes the D-3 as the latest AMRAAM variant, the operational meaning is a refresh aimed at keeping the missile’s seeker-and-guidance “brain” relevant against modern countermeasures and fast-evolving threat sets. Public U.S. test reporting describes the AIM-120D3 as the newest AMRAAM variant and highlights a form-fit-function hardware refresh intended to replace obsolete components, building a foundation for iterative software improvement. Raytheon has also described the D-3 as incorporating modernised internal electronics and a software baseline structured to accept future upgrades, reflecting a wider shift in Western air combat toward rapid refresh cycles rather than long, infrequent block changes.
For Finland, the decisive operational point is that AIM-120D-3 will be dedicated to the F-35 fleet, while existing AMRAAM stocks remain a central element of the Finnish Air Force’s medium-range air-to-air armament for the F/A-18 Hornet. The same family of missiles is also used on the ground: Finland’s Army employs AMRAAM in its NASAMS-based Surface-to-Air Missile 12 (ITO12) system, underscoring how a single missile lineage supports both airborne and surface-based air defence concepts. By separating the F-35’s D-3 inventory from legacy users, Helsinki is signalling that the F-35 force is being configured from the outset around contemporary beyond-visual-range engagement requirements, while protecting continuity for Hornet operations and the Army’s air-defence mission.
The strategic message is directed eastward. Finland shares a 1,340-kilometre border with Russia, and since joining NATO in 2023 has treated credible air deterrence as a first-order requirement on the Alliance’s northeastern flank. In that context, pairing F-35A aircraft with the AIM-120D-3 strengthens Finland’s ability to contest airspace at extended distances, complicate an opponent’s planning timelines, and contribute to NATO’s broader integrated air posture in Northern Europe. The key point is that the missile does not translate into a static “shield” drawn on a map; it extends Finland’s options to establish mobile engagement zones based on where F-35s are positioned and how they are tasked, potentially influencing air approaches over the Gulf of Finland and parts of the northern Baltic when required.
This reinforces a deterrence logic increasingly shaped by networked operations rather than platform performance in isolation. F-35 sensor fusion, connectivity, and allied data-sharing can shorten the sequence from detection to engagement, while a modern AMRAAM variant provides a credible beyond-visual-range effect at the end of that chain, particularly in scenarios complicated by electronic warfare and rapidly changing air pictures. In practical terms, the D-3’s value is best understood as additional decision space and flexibility, allowing Finland to shift intercept geometries quickly and sustain credible air-policing and air-defence postures during transition to the F-35, rather than as blanket theatre-wide coverage from the Finnish mainland.
Procurement timing adds another layer of geopolitical relevance. Finland’s F-35A programme is structured around deliveries in the 2026–2030 window, with the Hornet replacement in Finland planned for the 2028–2030 period; the missile deliveries are explicitly framed by Helsinki as supporting early F-35 deployment. That sequencing matters because it reduces the gap between aircraft arrival and credible warload availability, a vulnerability that adversaries can exploit during force transitions. The result is not just a new missile for a new fighter, but an attempt to make Finland’s transition into an F-35-equipped NATO air power as operationally “continuous” as possible in a period where Russia is openly contesting the regional security order.
Finland’s choice to acquire the AIM-120D-3 AMRAAM for its F-35A fleet underscores that effective deterrence depends on concrete factors: weapon compatibility, reliable sustainment packages, and delivery schedules that match operational timelines. By allocating the D-3 variant to its F-35s while maintaining AMRAAM capability for Hornet and NASAMS platforms, Helsinki is building a layered air defense architecture suited for a prolonged period of regional uncertainty along its eastern border. The message is clear, Finland aims to field the F-35 with credible beyond-visual-range capabilities from the outset, strengthening interoperability with the United States and allied partners when it carries the greatest strategic weight.
Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.
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Finland, on December 12, 2025, authorized the purchase of AIM-120D-3 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles from the United States for its incoming F-35A fleet. The move ensures Helsinki fields a fully credible air combat capability as it retires the F/A-18 Hornet and deepens operational alignment with allied air forces.
On December 12, 2025, Finland confirmed a key step in arming its incoming F-35A force, authorising the purchase of AIM-120D-3 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles from the United States. The decision lands as Helsinki accelerates its transition away from the F/A-18 Hornet era and tightens its operational integration with allied air forces. In a security environment shaped by Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine and heightened military signalling across Northern Europe, missile choice matters as much as aircraft choice. As reported by the Finnish MoD, the AIM-120D-3 package is designed to arrive arly enough to support the initial deployment phase of Finland’s F-35 fleet.
Finland authorized the purchase of AIM-120D-3 air-to-air missiles from the United States to equip its incoming F-35A fleet, as Helsinki prepares to retire its F/A-18 Hornets and ensure a seamless transition to a modern air combat capability (Picture Source: NATO AIRCOM / U.S. Air Force)
The Finnish Ministry of Defence states that Minister Antti Häkkänen has authorised the Finnish Defence Forces to procure the AIM-120D-3 AMRAAM via the US Foreign Military Sales channel, after the US Congress approved the sale in September 2025, with Raytheon identified as the manufacturer. Beyond the missiles themselves, the Letter of Offer and Acceptance covers manuals and documentation, spares and supplies, transport, and manufacturer and supplier training, repair, and support services, alongside services provided by the US administration. In practical terms, this frames the acquisition as an end-to-end sustainment package rather than a simple munition buy, reducing risk as Finland brings a new fighter system into frontline service.
While Finland’s release describes the D-3 as the latest AMRAAM variant, the operational meaning is a refresh aimed at keeping the missile’s seeker-and-guidance “brain” relevant against modern countermeasures and fast-evolving threat sets. Public U.S. test reporting describes the AIM-120D3 as the newest AMRAAM variant and highlights a form-fit-function hardware refresh intended to replace obsolete components, building a foundation for iterative software improvement. Raytheon has also described the D-3 as incorporating modernised internal electronics and a software baseline structured to accept future upgrades, reflecting a wider shift in Western air combat toward rapid refresh cycles rather than long, infrequent block changes.
For Finland, the decisive operational point is that AIM-120D-3 will be dedicated to the F-35 fleet, while existing AMRAAM stocks remain a central element of the Finnish Air Force’s medium-range air-to-air armament for the F/A-18 Hornet. The same family of missiles is also used on the ground: Finland’s Army employs AMRAAM in its NASAMS-based Surface-to-Air Missile 12 (ITO12) system, underscoring how a single missile lineage supports both airborne and surface-based air defence concepts. By separating the F-35’s D-3 inventory from legacy users, Helsinki is signalling that the F-35 force is being configured from the outset around contemporary beyond-visual-range engagement requirements, while protecting continuity for Hornet operations and the Army’s air-defence mission.
The strategic message is directed eastward. Finland shares a 1,340-kilometre border with Russia, and since joining NATO in 2023 has treated credible air deterrence as a first-order requirement on the Alliance’s northeastern flank. In that context, pairing F-35A aircraft with the AIM-120D-3 strengthens Finland’s ability to contest airspace at extended distances, complicate an opponent’s planning timelines, and contribute to NATO’s broader integrated air posture in Northern Europe. The key point is that the missile does not translate into a static “shield” drawn on a map; it extends Finland’s options to establish mobile engagement zones based on where F-35s are positioned and how they are tasked, potentially influencing air approaches over the Gulf of Finland and parts of the northern Baltic when required.
This reinforces a deterrence logic increasingly shaped by networked operations rather than platform performance in isolation. F-35 sensor fusion, connectivity, and allied data-sharing can shorten the sequence from detection to engagement, while a modern AMRAAM variant provides a credible beyond-visual-range effect at the end of that chain, particularly in scenarios complicated by electronic warfare and rapidly changing air pictures. In practical terms, the D-3’s value is best understood as additional decision space and flexibility, allowing Finland to shift intercept geometries quickly and sustain credible air-policing and air-defence postures during transition to the F-35, rather than as blanket theatre-wide coverage from the Finnish mainland.
Procurement timing adds another layer of geopolitical relevance. Finland’s F-35A programme is structured around deliveries in the 2026–2030 window, with the Hornet replacement in Finland planned for the 2028–2030 period; the missile deliveries are explicitly framed by Helsinki as supporting early F-35 deployment. That sequencing matters because it reduces the gap between aircraft arrival and credible warload availability, a vulnerability that adversaries can exploit during force transitions. The result is not just a new missile for a new fighter, but an attempt to make Finland’s transition into an F-35-equipped NATO air power as operationally “continuous” as possible in a period where Russia is openly contesting the regional security order.
Finland’s choice to acquire the AIM-120D-3 AMRAAM for its F-35A fleet underscores that effective deterrence depends on concrete factors: weapon compatibility, reliable sustainment packages, and delivery schedules that match operational timelines. By allocating the D-3 variant to its F-35s while maintaining AMRAAM capability for Hornet and NASAMS platforms, Helsinki is building a layered air defense architecture suited for a prolonged period of regional uncertainty along its eastern border. The message is clear, Finland aims to field the F-35 with credible beyond-visual-range capabilities from the outset, strengthening interoperability with the United States and allied partners when it carries the greatest strategic weight.
Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.
