French Rafale Jet virtually downs US F-35 Fighter in dogfight yet modern warfare is fought beyond visual range
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In June 2025, Finland hosted for the first time the multinational exercise Atlantic Trident, bringing together the air forces of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. Conducted under NATO’s framework, this training aimed to strengthen interoperability among allies in high-intensity scenarios. The edition was marked by a symbolic episode: during a simulated aerial engagement, a French Rafale succeeded in virtually “downing” an American F-35 in close combat. While this duel attracted attention, it mainly illustrates two different philosophies of contemporary air combat.Follow Army Recognition on Google News at this link
The Rafale has the advantage in a close-range confrontation due to its agility and maneuvering ability, while the F-35 is designed to avoid such situations (Picture source: French MoD)
The Rafale, designed by Dassault Aviation, is a 4.5-generation multirole fighter. Equipped with a delta wing and canards, it emphasizes maneuverability and versatility. It can carry up to 9 tons of armament, ranging from MICA and METEOR air-to-air missiles to SCALP cruise missiles, Exocet anti-ship missiles, and laser-guided bombs. Powered by two M88-2 engines, it can reach 1,800 km/h with a range of 3,700 km. Its SPECTRA electronic warfare system, combined with the RBE2 AESA radar and the OSF frontal optronics, provides strong survivability against aerial and ground-based threats. Nicknamed “omnirole,” it can perform interception, strike, and reconnaissance within the same mission.
The F-35A Lightning II, developed by Lockheed Martin, is a fifth-generation stealth fighter centered on information dominance. Single-engined, it is optimized to reduce radar signature thanks to its dedicated airframe design and internal weapons bay. Its Pratt & Whitney F135 engine produces 43,000 pounds of thrust with afterburner, enabling speeds of Mach 1.6 and a range of 2,220 km. For armament, it carries the M61A2 20 mm cannon and can deploy AIM-120 AMRAAM, AIM-9X, JDAM, SDB, or AGM-88 HARM. Its main strengths lie in integrated sensors: the AN/APG-81 AESA radar, the EOTS electro-optical system, the DAS camera network providing 360-degree coverage, and the HMDS helmet-mounted display projecting all tactical data in real time. The aircraft is designed to strike before being detected and to coordinate allied forces through secure data links.
The dogfight episode in Finland must be understood within this context: the Rafale has the advantage in a close-range confrontation due to agility and maneuvering ability, while the F-35 is designed to avoid such situations. Close-range combat remains striking in training, but in modern wars it has become rare.
Dogfight refers to visual, close-range combat, where pilots maneuver to gain a firing position. This is where agility and responsiveness matter, as the Rafale demonstrated in Finland. In contrast, BVR (Beyond Visual Range) engagements are now the norm: with long-range radars, advanced sensors, and data links, modern fighters aim to detect and neutralize opponents at tens or even hundreds of kilometers. The latest-generation missiles, such as the AIM-120D AMRAAM, Europe’s Meteor, China’s PL-15, or Russia’s R-37M, represent this evolution, with ranges between 160 and over 200 km.
Recent conflicts confirm this trend. In Ukraine, aerial engagements are limited to long-range strikes and precision attacks, with dense air defenses making close combat too risky. The brief war between India and Pakistan was fought exclusively in BVR, with no dogfights despite the deployment of numerous fighters. In the Middle East, Israel’s air force also relies primarily on electronic superiority and long-range strikes, while during tensions between Thailand and Cambodia, the absence of a credible Cambodian air force prevented any genuine aerial duels.
Thus, even though dogfight training is still taught and regularly simulated, it has become a marginal option. Current doctrines prioritize stealth, advanced detection, and allied interoperability. In a realistic scenario, an F-35 would fire before a Rafale could close within maneuvering range, making a duel highly unlikely. Yet the Finnish episode underlines that visual combat training retains value, as wars are never entirely predictable and pilots must remain prepared for all contingencies.
Ultimately, Atlantic Trident 25 illustrates the complementarity of approaches: the Rafale maintains relevance through versatility and agility, while the F-35 establishes superiority through stealth and BVR combat. Current conflicts confirm that control of the skies is increasingly decided at long range, but they also remind that dogfights, though improbable, cannot be fully excluded from preparation scenarios.
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In June 2025, Finland hosted for the first time the multinational exercise Atlantic Trident, bringing together the air forces of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. Conducted under NATO’s framework, this training aimed to strengthen interoperability among allies in high-intensity scenarios. The edition was marked by a symbolic episode: during a simulated aerial engagement, a French Rafale succeeded in virtually “downing” an American F-35 in close combat. While this duel attracted attention, it mainly illustrates two different philosophies of contemporary air combat.
Follow Army Recognition on Google News at this link
The Rafale has the advantage in a close-range confrontation due to its agility and maneuvering ability, while the F-35 is designed to avoid such situations (Picture source: French MoD)
The Rafale, designed by Dassault Aviation, is a 4.5-generation multirole fighter. Equipped with a delta wing and canards, it emphasizes maneuverability and versatility. It can carry up to 9 tons of armament, ranging from MICA and METEOR air-to-air missiles to SCALP cruise missiles, Exocet anti-ship missiles, and laser-guided bombs. Powered by two M88-2 engines, it can reach 1,800 km/h with a range of 3,700 km. Its SPECTRA electronic warfare system, combined with the RBE2 AESA radar and the OSF frontal optronics, provides strong survivability against aerial and ground-based threats. Nicknamed “omnirole,” it can perform interception, strike, and reconnaissance within the same mission.
The F-35A Lightning II, developed by Lockheed Martin, is a fifth-generation stealth fighter centered on information dominance. Single-engined, it is optimized to reduce radar signature thanks to its dedicated airframe design and internal weapons bay. Its Pratt & Whitney F135 engine produces 43,000 pounds of thrust with afterburner, enabling speeds of Mach 1.6 and a range of 2,220 km. For armament, it carries the M61A2 20 mm cannon and can deploy AIM-120 AMRAAM, AIM-9X, JDAM, SDB, or AGM-88 HARM. Its main strengths lie in integrated sensors: the AN/APG-81 AESA radar, the EOTS electro-optical system, the DAS camera network providing 360-degree coverage, and the HMDS helmet-mounted display projecting all tactical data in real time. The aircraft is designed to strike before being detected and to coordinate allied forces through secure data links.
The dogfight episode in Finland must be understood within this context: the Rafale has the advantage in a close-range confrontation due to agility and maneuvering ability, while the F-35 is designed to avoid such situations. Close-range combat remains striking in training, but in modern wars it has become rare.
Dogfight refers to visual, close-range combat, where pilots maneuver to gain a firing position. This is where agility and responsiveness matter, as the Rafale demonstrated in Finland. In contrast, BVR (Beyond Visual Range) engagements are now the norm: with long-range radars, advanced sensors, and data links, modern fighters aim to detect and neutralize opponents at tens or even hundreds of kilometers. The latest-generation missiles, such as the AIM-120D AMRAAM, Europe’s Meteor, China’s PL-15, or Russia’s R-37M, represent this evolution, with ranges between 160 and over 200 km.
Recent conflicts confirm this trend. In Ukraine, aerial engagements are limited to long-range strikes and precision attacks, with dense air defenses making close combat too risky. The brief war between India and Pakistan was fought exclusively in BVR, with no dogfights despite the deployment of numerous fighters. In the Middle East, Israel’s air force also relies primarily on electronic superiority and long-range strikes, while during tensions between Thailand and Cambodia, the absence of a credible Cambodian air force prevented any genuine aerial duels.
Thus, even though dogfight training is still taught and regularly simulated, it has become a marginal option. Current doctrines prioritize stealth, advanced detection, and allied interoperability. In a realistic scenario, an F-35 would fire before a Rafale could close within maneuvering range, making a duel highly unlikely. Yet the Finnish episode underlines that visual combat training retains value, as wars are never entirely predictable and pilots must remain prepared for all contingencies.
Ultimately, Atlantic Trident 25 illustrates the complementarity of approaches: the Rafale maintains relevance through versatility and agility, while the F-35 establishes superiority through stealth and BVR combat. Current conflicts confirm that control of the skies is increasingly decided at long range, but they also remind that dogfights, though improbable, cannot be fully excluded from preparation scenarios.
