Germany considers joining Edgewing’s GCAP fighter program as FCAS tensions grow
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Germany is assessing potential entry options into the Edgewing Global Combat Air Program (GCAP), according to Italian Defense Minister Guido Crosetto, as the FCAS program continues to contend with disputes over leadership and access to sensitive technology.
As reported by Reuters on December 4, 2025, Germany may consider joining Edgewing’s Global Combat Air Program (GCAP) in the coming years, Italian Defense Minister Guido Crosetto told lawmakers during a parliamentary hearing. His remarks, which also cited inquiries from Australia, Saudi Arabia, and Canada, suggest that the trilateral fighter jet program led by Italy, the United Kingdom, and Japan is drawing wider international attention at a moment when Germany’s own FCAS partnership continues to face political and industrial strain.Follow Army Recognition on Google News at this link
The Global Combat Air Program (GCAP) unites Italy, the UK, and Japan in the joint development of a sixth-generation stealth fighter to replace the Eurofighter Typhoon in Italian and British service and the Mitsubishi F-2 in Japan by 2035. (Picture source: Edgewing)
Crosetto explained that Germany could probably join the Global Combat Air Program, now called Edgewing, at a later stage and stressed that work is ongoing to ensure that any state wishing to participate has a clearly defined route for accession. He identified Australia as another potential partner and confirmed that Saudi Arabia and Canada have formally expressed interest, which indicates that multiple governments are seeking information on timelines, industrial frameworks, and expected obligations about a project intended to deliver a next-generation fighter jet by 2035. He stated that the founding nations have agreed to operate on equal terms and that their fighter is planned to function alongside drones in a combined system intended to broaden operational options. He added that expanding the number of participants increases investment potential, enlarges the technological workforce, improves economic return, and can reduce costs for existing partners. He also pointed out that Germany is currently engaged in the Future Combat Air System project but may evaluate alternatives as industrial and political dynamics evolve, which places both programs within the same strategic horizon.
The Global Combat Air Program (GCAP) unites Italy, the United Kingdom, and Japan in the joint development of a sixth-generation stealth fighter to replace the Eurofighter Typhoon in Italian and British service and the Mitsubishi F-2 in Japan. The program emerged from the convergence of the United Kingdom’s Tempest effort and Japan’s F-X initiative, which shared similar objectives regarding industrial continuity and next-generation capability. The Edgewing project is based on an equal partnership model in which Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, BAE Systems, and Leonardo serve as the principal industrial leaders for airframe work, while Rolls-Royce, Avio Aero, and IHI cooperate in the power and propulsion domain. Approximately 9,000 personnel across the partner nations support the program and are connected to over 1,000 suppliers, of which around 600 are based in the United Kingdom and roughly 400 in Italy and Japan. A trilateral treaty signed in December 2023 established a formal governance body known as the GCAP International Government Organisation (GIGO), located in the United Kingdom, which coordinates requirements and program oversight. Development is planned to begin in 2025, with a demonstrator aircraft expected before the end of the decade and an in-service date targeted for 2035.
A principal feature of the GCAP is its integration of the fighter with uncrewed adjunct platforms and wider networks, forming a connected architecture intended to function across multiple domains. Conceptual models presented by the partners feature a large delta wing, expanded fuel volume, and an internal weapons bay designed to preserve low observability while supporting significant payload capacity. Officials have discussed expectations for increased range, potentially allowing transatlantic crossing on internal fuel, and the ability to carry internal weapon loads greater than those of current fifth-generation aircraft. The program’s approach to mission systems centers on data processing capacity needed to coordinate several uncrewed systems and sustain operations deep inside contested areas where communication with support aircraft may be restricted. Technology maturation is already occurring through platforms such as the Excalibur flight test aircraft and the Tempest Combat Air Demonstrator, which will assess sensor integration, aerodynamic shaping, weapons bay operation, and the Pyramid open mission system architecture intended to simplify upgrades across the aircraft’s life cycle. Together, these efforts form a technological foundation designed to reduce risk ahead of full-scale development.
Industrial consolidation inside GCAP/Edgewing took a significant step with the creation of the Edgewing joint venture, formally named in June 2025, which assigns BAE Systems, Japan Aircraft Industrial Enhancement Co Ltd, and Leonardo equal shares of 33.3 percent. Edgewing will manage design, development, and delivery of the aircraft and associated systems while operating in coordination with the governmental oversight provided by GIGO. The joint venture will include multiple development hubs in the partner nations, such as the headquarters in the United Kingdom and the main Italian facility at Torino Caselle, already home to Eurofighter assembly activities, as well as Japanese sites for airframe, propulsion, and electronics integration. Italy has allocated €8.8 billion to the program, and Leonardo has awarded around €100 million in GCAP-related research and development contracts to national suppliers. Japan has also restructured its defence export regulations to permit transfers of the jointly developed fighter to countries meeting specific conditions, including the absence of active conflict and the presence of a defence cooperation agreement. The formation of the Electronics Evolution consortium by Mitsubishi Electric, ELT Group, Leonardo, and Leonardo UK has established a coordinated industrial structure to produce the ISANKE and ICS sensor and communication suite. These mechanisms define how participation must be organized, which would frame any potential German entry.
On the other hand, the FCAS (Future Combat Air System) is a separate European initiative involving France, Germany, and Spain, with Belgium first acting as an observer and then joining as a partner. The program is built around a Next Generation Weapon System that includes a sixth-generation crewed fighter, remote carriers, and a combat cloud intended to integrate manned and unmanned systems across air and space domains. Originally, the FCAS project was planned to deliver a prototype around 2028 or 2029 and aims for an entry into service around 2040 to replace Rafale in France and Eurofighter in Germany and Spain. Industrial responsibility is shared among Dassault Aviation, Airbus, and Indra, while Safran and MTU Aero Engines cooperate on engine development within the EUMET structure. FCAS traces its origins to earlier Franco-British and European studies and has grown into a large European program expected to cost tens of billions of euros, with some national estimates reaching €100 billion when considering the full system. Despite this scale, the program continued to move through its phased development approach, including concept definition, technology maturation, and planned demonstrator activities.
However, the FCAS has been affected by recurring disagreements concerning leadership, workshare distribution, and the protection of sensitive industrial knowledge, which have created friction between the partners and slowed any progress. France’s Dassault Aviation has insisted on acting as prime contractor and architect for the New Generation Fighter and has expressed concern that sharing too much responsibility with Airbus would dilute its ability to manage the design and protect sensitive intellectual property. Airbus, for its part, has argued that the scale and complexity of the programme require a more distributed approach and has warned against a governance model that would leave large parts of German industry in a subordinate position. Debates over intellectual property rights, proprietary know-how, and which technologies developed by Dassault could be accessed or reused by German and Spanish firms have been particularly contentious, raising questions about the degree of access each industry will have during development. These tensions have periodically led to delays in moving from the initial concept phases into more advanced stages, such as Phase 1B and the planned Phase 2, which is meant to cover demonstrator assembly and flight testing. Industry leaders have at times spoken publicly about the risk of failure if compromises cannot be reached, which has contributed to ongoing uncertainty surrounding the FCAS program.
During 2025, the program’s internal tensions became more visible as political leaders in France and Germany commented on industrial capacities and workshare expectations. Reports indicated that Dassault’s reported push for an 80% workshare on the New Generation Fighter produced concerns in Germany about the balance of industrial benefits and access to key technologies. French Defence Minister Catherine Vautrin stated that Germany did not currently have the capacity to build a fighter aircraft on its own and that such expertise could not be acquired quickly, a remark that was interpreted by some in Berlin as a sign of French reluctance to accept a more equal role for German industry. German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius publicly mentioned the possibility of ending FCAS if unresolved challenges persisted and said he would address the issue with his French and Spanish counterparts once the new French government settled. At the same time, discussions emerged in Germany about potential alternatives, including continuing FCAS without France, exploring closer cooperation with Sweden or the United Kingdom, or examining participation in GCAP, which some officials viewed as more advanced and more structured. Belgium’s progression from observer to partner and its subsequent review of its position, which led to the purchase of more U.S.-made F-35s, also illustrates how all these factors have shaped an environment in which Germany may feel compelled to reassess its participation in the FCAS program.
And finally, what about Vautrin’s remarks about the German capacities? Let’s have a look: Germany currently retains a comprehensive industrial base for fighter aircraft that covers final assembly, airframe production, propulsion systems, subsystem integration and full life cycle support, centered on Airbus Defence and Space in Manching where new Eurofighter Typhoons are assembled, tested, upgraded and maintained, including the recently contracted Tranche 5 aircraft that will keep the production line active into the 2030s. Structural manufacturing capacity is anchored by Premium AEROTEC’s sites in Augsburg and Varel, which produce major fuselage sections, composite assemblies, machined metal structures, air intake components, and other load-bearing parts used in fighter airframes, ensuring that Germany contributes to several core structural elements of the Eurofighter. Propulsion capability is maintained through EuroJet Turbo GmbH in Hallbergmoos and MTU Aero Engines in Munich, which together deliver EJ200 turbofan components, digital engine control units, compressors, maintenance functions, and long-term support needed for the Eurofighter fleet, preserving national competence in military jet engine manufacturing.
Germany also contributes to fighter production beyond domestic programs, by manufacturing center fuselage components and other structures for the F-35A supply chain, while remaining fully embedded in Eurofighter Jagdflugzeug GmbH for program coordination, system integration, upgrade planning, and technology evolution. Within this ecosystem, the German aerospace industry also supports integration of new AESA radar systems, electronic warfare equipment, and long-term modernization packages, reflecting a combined military-industrial approach to sustaining and upgrading a fighter fleet. Germany’s production capabilities are supplemented by a distributed network of subsystem suppliers providing avionics, flight control equipment, landing gear, weapons integration and maintenance services, giving the country a complete set of competencies required to sustain modern fighter operations. At the same time, long-term industrial planning could now be influenced by uncertainty surrounding the FCAS, since these tensions create a strategic dependency on either stabilizing FCAS, adjusting its scope, or identifying alternative cooperation frameworks, since the continuation or collapse of that programme will directly shape Germany’s ability to maintain a sovereign fighter jet industrial capability beyond the Eurofighter era.
Written by Jérôme Brahy
Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.

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Germany is assessing potential entry options into the Edgewing Global Combat Air Program (GCAP), according to Italian Defense Minister Guido Crosetto, as the FCAS program continues to contend with disputes over leadership and access to sensitive technology.
As reported by Reuters on December 4, 2025, Germany may consider joining Edgewing’s Global Combat Air Program (GCAP) in the coming years, Italian Defense Minister Guido Crosetto told lawmakers during a parliamentary hearing. His remarks, which also cited inquiries from Australia, Saudi Arabia, and Canada, suggest that the trilateral fighter jet program led by Italy, the United Kingdom, and Japan is drawing wider international attention at a moment when Germany’s own FCAS partnership continues to face political and industrial strain.
Follow Army Recognition on Google News at this link
The Global Combat Air Program (GCAP) unites Italy, the UK, and Japan in the joint development of a sixth-generation stealth fighter to replace the Eurofighter Typhoon in Italian and British service and the Mitsubishi F-2 in Japan by 2035. (Picture source: Edgewing)
Crosetto explained that Germany could probably join the Global Combat Air Program, now called Edgewing, at a later stage and stressed that work is ongoing to ensure that any state wishing to participate has a clearly defined route for accession. He identified Australia as another potential partner and confirmed that Saudi Arabia and Canada have formally expressed interest, which indicates that multiple governments are seeking information on timelines, industrial frameworks, and expected obligations about a project intended to deliver a next-generation fighter jet by 2035. He stated that the founding nations have agreed to operate on equal terms and that their fighter is planned to function alongside drones in a combined system intended to broaden operational options. He added that expanding the number of participants increases investment potential, enlarges the technological workforce, improves economic return, and can reduce costs for existing partners. He also pointed out that Germany is currently engaged in the Future Combat Air System project but may evaluate alternatives as industrial and political dynamics evolve, which places both programs within the same strategic horizon.
The Global Combat Air Program (GCAP) unites Italy, the United Kingdom, and Japan in the joint development of a sixth-generation stealth fighter to replace the Eurofighter Typhoon in Italian and British service and the Mitsubishi F-2 in Japan. The program emerged from the convergence of the United Kingdom’s Tempest effort and Japan’s F-X initiative, which shared similar objectives regarding industrial continuity and next-generation capability. The Edgewing project is based on an equal partnership model in which Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, BAE Systems, and Leonardo serve as the principal industrial leaders for airframe work, while Rolls-Royce, Avio Aero, and IHI cooperate in the power and propulsion domain. Approximately 9,000 personnel across the partner nations support the program and are connected to over 1,000 suppliers, of which around 600 are based in the United Kingdom and roughly 400 in Italy and Japan. A trilateral treaty signed in December 2023 established a formal governance body known as the GCAP International Government Organisation (GIGO), located in the United Kingdom, which coordinates requirements and program oversight. Development is planned to begin in 2025, with a demonstrator aircraft expected before the end of the decade and an in-service date targeted for 2035.
A principal feature of the GCAP is its integration of the fighter with uncrewed adjunct platforms and wider networks, forming a connected architecture intended to function across multiple domains. Conceptual models presented by the partners feature a large delta wing, expanded fuel volume, and an internal weapons bay designed to preserve low observability while supporting significant payload capacity. Officials have discussed expectations for increased range, potentially allowing transatlantic crossing on internal fuel, and the ability to carry internal weapon loads greater than those of current fifth-generation aircraft. The program’s approach to mission systems centers on data processing capacity needed to coordinate several uncrewed systems and sustain operations deep inside contested areas where communication with support aircraft may be restricted. Technology maturation is already occurring through platforms such as the Excalibur flight test aircraft and the Tempest Combat Air Demonstrator, which will assess sensor integration, aerodynamic shaping, weapons bay operation, and the Pyramid open mission system architecture intended to simplify upgrades across the aircraft’s life cycle. Together, these efforts form a technological foundation designed to reduce risk ahead of full-scale development.
Industrial consolidation inside GCAP/Edgewing took a significant step with the creation of the Edgewing joint venture, formally named in June 2025, which assigns BAE Systems, Japan Aircraft Industrial Enhancement Co Ltd, and Leonardo equal shares of 33.3 percent. Edgewing will manage design, development, and delivery of the aircraft and associated systems while operating in coordination with the governmental oversight provided by GIGO. The joint venture will include multiple development hubs in the partner nations, such as the headquarters in the United Kingdom and the main Italian facility at Torino Caselle, already home to Eurofighter assembly activities, as well as Japanese sites for airframe, propulsion, and electronics integration. Italy has allocated €8.8 billion to the program, and Leonardo has awarded around €100 million in GCAP-related research and development contracts to national suppliers. Japan has also restructured its defence export regulations to permit transfers of the jointly developed fighter to countries meeting specific conditions, including the absence of active conflict and the presence of a defence cooperation agreement. The formation of the Electronics Evolution consortium by Mitsubishi Electric, ELT Group, Leonardo, and Leonardo UK has established a coordinated industrial structure to produce the ISANKE and ICS sensor and communication suite. These mechanisms define how participation must be organized, which would frame any potential German entry.
On the other hand, the FCAS (Future Combat Air System) is a separate European initiative involving France, Germany, and Spain, with Belgium first acting as an observer and then joining as a partner. The program is built around a Next Generation Weapon System that includes a sixth-generation crewed fighter, remote carriers, and a combat cloud intended to integrate manned and unmanned systems across air and space domains. Originally, the FCAS project was planned to deliver a prototype around 2028 or 2029 and aims for an entry into service around 2040 to replace Rafale in France and Eurofighter in Germany and Spain. Industrial responsibility is shared among Dassault Aviation, Airbus, and Indra, while Safran and MTU Aero Engines cooperate on engine development within the EUMET structure. FCAS traces its origins to earlier Franco-British and European studies and has grown into a large European program expected to cost tens of billions of euros, with some national estimates reaching €100 billion when considering the full system. Despite this scale, the program continued to move through its phased development approach, including concept definition, technology maturation, and planned demonstrator activities.
However, the FCAS has been affected by recurring disagreements concerning leadership, workshare distribution, and the protection of sensitive industrial knowledge, which have created friction between the partners and slowed any progress. France’s Dassault Aviation has insisted on acting as prime contractor and architect for the New Generation Fighter and has expressed concern that sharing too much responsibility with Airbus would dilute its ability to manage the design and protect sensitive intellectual property. Airbus, for its part, has argued that the scale and complexity of the programme require a more distributed approach and has warned against a governance model that would leave large parts of German industry in a subordinate position. Debates over intellectual property rights, proprietary know-how, and which technologies developed by Dassault could be accessed or reused by German and Spanish firms have been particularly contentious, raising questions about the degree of access each industry will have during development. These tensions have periodically led to delays in moving from the initial concept phases into more advanced stages, such as Phase 1B and the planned Phase 2, which is meant to cover demonstrator assembly and flight testing. Industry leaders have at times spoken publicly about the risk of failure if compromises cannot be reached, which has contributed to ongoing uncertainty surrounding the FCAS program.
During 2025, the program’s internal tensions became more visible as political leaders in France and Germany commented on industrial capacities and workshare expectations. Reports indicated that Dassault’s reported push for an 80% workshare on the New Generation Fighter produced concerns in Germany about the balance of industrial benefits and access to key technologies. French Defence Minister Catherine Vautrin stated that Germany did not currently have the capacity to build a fighter aircraft on its own and that such expertise could not be acquired quickly, a remark that was interpreted by some in Berlin as a sign of French reluctance to accept a more equal role for German industry. German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius publicly mentioned the possibility of ending FCAS if unresolved challenges persisted and said he would address the issue with his French and Spanish counterparts once the new French government settled. At the same time, discussions emerged in Germany about potential alternatives, including continuing FCAS without France, exploring closer cooperation with Sweden or the United Kingdom, or examining participation in GCAP, which some officials viewed as more advanced and more structured. Belgium’s progression from observer to partner and its subsequent review of its position, which led to the purchase of more U.S.-made F-35s, also illustrates how all these factors have shaped an environment in which Germany may feel compelled to reassess its participation in the FCAS program.
And finally, what about Vautrin’s remarks about the German capacities? Let’s have a look: Germany currently retains a comprehensive industrial base for fighter aircraft that covers final assembly, airframe production, propulsion systems, subsystem integration and full life cycle support, centered on Airbus Defence and Space in Manching where new Eurofighter Typhoons are assembled, tested, upgraded and maintained, including the recently contracted Tranche 5 aircraft that will keep the production line active into the 2030s. Structural manufacturing capacity is anchored by Premium AEROTEC’s sites in Augsburg and Varel, which produce major fuselage sections, composite assemblies, machined metal structures, air intake components, and other load-bearing parts used in fighter airframes, ensuring that Germany contributes to several core structural elements of the Eurofighter. Propulsion capability is maintained through EuroJet Turbo GmbH in Hallbergmoos and MTU Aero Engines in Munich, which together deliver EJ200 turbofan components, digital engine control units, compressors, maintenance functions, and long-term support needed for the Eurofighter fleet, preserving national competence in military jet engine manufacturing.
Germany also contributes to fighter production beyond domestic programs, by manufacturing center fuselage components and other structures for the F-35A supply chain, while remaining fully embedded in Eurofighter Jagdflugzeug GmbH for program coordination, system integration, upgrade planning, and technology evolution. Within this ecosystem, the German aerospace industry also supports integration of new AESA radar systems, electronic warfare equipment, and long-term modernization packages, reflecting a combined military-industrial approach to sustaining and upgrading a fighter fleet. Germany’s production capabilities are supplemented by a distributed network of subsystem suppliers providing avionics, flight control equipment, landing gear, weapons integration and maintenance services, giving the country a complete set of competencies required to sustain modern fighter operations. At the same time, long-term industrial planning could now be influenced by uncertainty surrounding the FCAS, since these tensions create a strategic dependency on either stabilizing FCAS, adjusting its scope, or identifying alternative cooperation frameworks, since the continuation or collapse of that programme will directly shape Germany’s ability to maintain a sovereign fighter jet industrial capability beyond the Eurofighter era.
Written by Jérôme Brahy
Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
