India Eyes 140 Russian Su-57 Fighters Buy with Local Production Path
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India is evaluating a plan to acquire two squadrons of Russian Su-57 fighters and license-produce up to five more squadrons at HAL’s Nashik facility, according to ThePrint.The move would help close IAF fighter gaps and reshape great-power defense competition with the U.S. F-35 in India’s market.
According to information published by ThePrint on September 23, 2025, India is evaluating an urgent plan to acquire two squadrons of Su-57 fifth generation fighters directly from Russia and to license-build up to five additional squadrons in country, potentially at Hindustan Aeronautics Limited’s Nashik complex. The report, which echoes Indian press coverage indicating New Delhi is re-examining the Su-57 after shelving the older FGFA effort, sketches a pathway to roughly 140 aircraft for seven Indian Air Force squadrons. Indian business media traced the story to reporting by The Print, which said at least two squadrons are under active consideration and that a local production option has been placed on the table. New Delhi has not issued an official confirmation.Follow Army Recognition on Google News at this link
The Russian Su-57 Fighter at the International Aviation and Space Salon MAKS in 2015 (Picture source: Vitaly V. Kuzmin)
India’s reassessment follows May’s Operation Sindoor, the short and bruising exchange with Pakistan, when New Delhi used stand-off weapons to hit air bases and other targets across the border before a ceasefire took hold. Analysts inside India have argued the Air Force needs longer-reach weapons, deeper penetration options, and a survivable platform to carry them, particularly for early-hours strikes when dense Pakistani air defenses are awake and looking. Several mainstream outlets, think-tank notes, and government releases since May have treated Sindoor as a watershed, not because the IAF lacked skill, but because it had to work around platform and payload limits. That experience is driving the Su-57 conversation as much as raw capability charts.
The Su-57 provides India with a sensor and signature-management mix that the Rafale and Su-30MKI do not offer in a single airframe. Its Sh-121 backbone fuses the N036 Byelka X-band AESA with L-band arrays in the wing roots to improve detection and identification of hard targets. At the same time, the 101KS electro-optical suite provides passive search, missile warning, and laser DIRCM. Weapons ride inside two longitudinal bays and two smaller cheek bays to keep the radar return low. Current production aircraft use AL-41F1 vectoring engines; the Izdeliye 30 remains in trials, so any Indian plan would be built around the delivered powerplant. The Himalayas electronic warfare fit, directional infrared countermeasures, secure datalinks, and helmet display are arranged to find emitters, fix ground radars, and build shots from stand-off ranges without excessive emissions.
Armament is organized around internal carriage first. For air combat, the jet can field R-77M beyond-visual-range missiles, R-74M2 for close-in work, and very long-reach R-37 family shots. For strikes, the menu includes low-observable cruise options such as Kh-59MK2 and Kh-38M, the precision-focused Kh-69, the Kh-58UShK for SEAD, and anti-ship choices like Kh-35U or Kh-31, plus KAB-series guided bombs and a 30 mm GSh-30-1. Preferred tactics keep the bays closed on ingress; total payload can approach 10,000 kg when external stations are used, accepting a signature trade.
What anchors the Indian debate is access to munitions and certification, not brochure claims. The airframe is sized for very long-range AAMs such as R-37M or the izdeliye 810 derivative and for SEAD and strike weapons like Kh-69 and Kh-58UShK from inside the bays. Reports of compact hypersonic options exist, but any agreement would need explicit terms on what is cleared for export, in what quantities, and on what schedule.
The Su-57 has accumulated more real combat employment than most fifth-generation peers outside the United States, though much of it has been at arm’s length. Russia has used the type in Ukraine primarily to launch stand-off munitions from sanctuary airspace and to probe Ukrainian air defenses with networked tactics, rather than to loiter over heavily defended zones. That is still useful to India. A survivable shooter that can loft low-observable cruise missiles or anti-radiation weapons from well outside a SAM belt and then egress at speed fits the exact “first night” problem set that Sindoor exposed. If India buys the jet, it would likely pair it with Su-30MKI escorts, airborne early warning coverage, and decoy drones, tasking the Su-57 to kick doors and blind radars so conventional packages can follow.
There is a production logic here that Indian officials understand, perhaps better than anyone after two decades with the Su-30MKI. The notional split, with an initial Russian-built tranche followed by license manufacturing at Nashik, mirrors the Su-30 experience that began with about 140 aircraft on paper and grew to 270-plus as delays, upgrades, and industrial benefits reinforced each other. HAL’s Nashik line and its private-sector suppliers could pick up valuable know-how in low-observable structures, weapons bay integration, and signature management, even if the Air Force later pivots to the indigenous AMCA. But it cuts the other way too: AMCA schedules in the late 2030s or beyond cannot slip further if New Delhi wants to avoid long-term dependence on Russian sustainment in a sanctions-heavy environment.
The tactical argument in Delhi is less about stealth mystique and more about reach, payload, and survivability against Pakistan’s improving defenses. A Su-57 configured with internal Kh-69 class cruise missiles and Kh-58UShK anti-radiation rounds could start a campaign by punching holes in the radar picture, while its R-37 class missiles would complicate Pakistani fighter tactics by threatening high-value assets at range. Survivability would not come from invisibility alone but from a cocktail of lower signature, electronic attack, and the simple virtue of shooting from outside the envelope. The IAF already flies that way with Rafale and Su-30MKI; a Su-57 would extend the geometry, not replace the concept.
A Su-57 deal would broadcast two messages at once. First, that India intends to close the window exposed in May with a deep-strike and SEAD toolkit sized for the subcontinent’s geography. Second, that despite expanding ties with France and the United States, New Delhi will still buy at scale from Moscow when the offer aligns with operational needs and industrial offsets. Russia, for its part, has been signaling openness to licensed Su-57 production and has kept the S-400 pipeline alive for India, a reminder that defense ties have ballast even amid wider sanctions. The wager for India is that it can extract firm delivery schedules, munitions access, and technology transfer without locking AMCA into a corner. Until the Ministry of Defence says so on the record, this remains an evaluation, but it is one anchored in fresh combat lessons rather than nostalgia for a joint program that never delivered.
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India is evaluating a plan to acquire two squadrons of Russian Su-57 fighters and license-produce up to five more squadrons at HAL’s Nashik facility, according to ThePrint.The move would help close IAF fighter gaps and reshape great-power defense competition with the U.S. F-35 in India’s market.
According to information published by ThePrint on September 23, 2025, India is evaluating an urgent plan to acquire two squadrons of Su-57 fifth generation fighters directly from Russia and to license-build up to five additional squadrons in country, potentially at Hindustan Aeronautics Limited’s Nashik complex. The report, which echoes Indian press coverage indicating New Delhi is re-examining the Su-57 after shelving the older FGFA effort, sketches a pathway to roughly 140 aircraft for seven Indian Air Force squadrons. Indian business media traced the story to reporting by The Print, which said at least two squadrons are under active consideration and that a local production option has been placed on the table. New Delhi has not issued an official confirmation.
Follow Army Recognition on Google News at this link
The Russian Su-57 Fighter at the International Aviation and Space Salon MAKS in 2015 (Picture source: Vitaly V. Kuzmin)
India’s reassessment follows May’s Operation Sindoor, the short and bruising exchange with Pakistan, when New Delhi used stand-off weapons to hit air bases and other targets across the border before a ceasefire took hold. Analysts inside India have argued the Air Force needs longer-reach weapons, deeper penetration options, and a survivable platform to carry them, particularly for early-hours strikes when dense Pakistani air defenses are awake and looking. Several mainstream outlets, think-tank notes, and government releases since May have treated Sindoor as a watershed, not because the IAF lacked skill, but because it had to work around platform and payload limits. That experience is driving the Su-57 conversation as much as raw capability charts.
The Su-57 provides India with a sensor and signature-management mix that the Rafale and Su-30MKI do not offer in a single airframe. Its Sh-121 backbone fuses the N036 Byelka X-band AESA with L-band arrays in the wing roots to improve detection and identification of hard targets. At the same time, the 101KS electro-optical suite provides passive search, missile warning, and laser DIRCM. Weapons ride inside two longitudinal bays and two smaller cheek bays to keep the radar return low. Current production aircraft use AL-41F1 vectoring engines; the Izdeliye 30 remains in trials, so any Indian plan would be built around the delivered powerplant. The Himalayas electronic warfare fit, directional infrared countermeasures, secure datalinks, and helmet display are arranged to find emitters, fix ground radars, and build shots from stand-off ranges without excessive emissions.
Armament is organized around internal carriage first. For air combat, the jet can field R-77M beyond-visual-range missiles, R-74M2 for close-in work, and very long-reach R-37 family shots. For strikes, the menu includes low-observable cruise options such as Kh-59MK2 and Kh-38M, the precision-focused Kh-69, the Kh-58UShK for SEAD, and anti-ship choices like Kh-35U or Kh-31, plus KAB-series guided bombs and a 30 mm GSh-30-1. Preferred tactics keep the bays closed on ingress; total payload can approach 10,000 kg when external stations are used, accepting a signature trade.
What anchors the Indian debate is access to munitions and certification, not brochure claims. The airframe is sized for very long-range AAMs such as R-37M or the izdeliye 810 derivative and for SEAD and strike weapons like Kh-69 and Kh-58UShK from inside the bays. Reports of compact hypersonic options exist, but any agreement would need explicit terms on what is cleared for export, in what quantities, and on what schedule.
The Su-57 has accumulated more real combat employment than most fifth-generation peers outside the United States, though much of it has been at arm’s length. Russia has used the type in Ukraine primarily to launch stand-off munitions from sanctuary airspace and to probe Ukrainian air defenses with networked tactics, rather than to loiter over heavily defended zones. That is still useful to India. A survivable shooter that can loft low-observable cruise missiles or anti-radiation weapons from well outside a SAM belt and then egress at speed fits the exact “first night” problem set that Sindoor exposed. If India buys the jet, it would likely pair it with Su-30MKI escorts, airborne early warning coverage, and decoy drones, tasking the Su-57 to kick doors and blind radars so conventional packages can follow.
There is a production logic here that Indian officials understand, perhaps better than anyone after two decades with the Su-30MKI. The notional split, with an initial Russian-built tranche followed by license manufacturing at Nashik, mirrors the Su-30 experience that began with about 140 aircraft on paper and grew to 270-plus as delays, upgrades, and industrial benefits reinforced each other. HAL’s Nashik line and its private-sector suppliers could pick up valuable know-how in low-observable structures, weapons bay integration, and signature management, even if the Air Force later pivots to the indigenous AMCA. But it cuts the other way too: AMCA schedules in the late 2030s or beyond cannot slip further if New Delhi wants to avoid long-term dependence on Russian sustainment in a sanctions-heavy environment.
The tactical argument in Delhi is less about stealth mystique and more about reach, payload, and survivability against Pakistan’s improving defenses. A Su-57 configured with internal Kh-69 class cruise missiles and Kh-58UShK anti-radiation rounds could start a campaign by punching holes in the radar picture, while its R-37 class missiles would complicate Pakistani fighter tactics by threatening high-value assets at range. Survivability would not come from invisibility alone but from a cocktail of lower signature, electronic attack, and the simple virtue of shooting from outside the envelope. The IAF already flies that way with Rafale and Su-30MKI; a Su-57 would extend the geometry, not replace the concept.
A Su-57 deal would broadcast two messages at once. First, that India intends to close the window exposed in May with a deep-strike and SEAD toolkit sized for the subcontinent’s geography. Second, that despite expanding ties with France and the United States, New Delhi will still buy at scale from Moscow when the offer aligns with operational needs and industrial offsets. Russia, for its part, has been signaling openness to licensed Su-57 production and has kept the S-400 pipeline alive for India, a reminder that defense ties have ballast even amid wider sanctions. The wager for India is that it can extract firm delivery schedules, munitions access, and technology transfer without locking AMCA into a corner. Until the Ministry of Defence says so on the record, this remains an evaluation, but it is one anchored in fresh combat lessons rather than nostalgia for a joint program that never delivered.
