Iran’s Shahed 161 Stealth Drone Engine Test Signals Shift to Drone‑Centric Deterrence Doctrine
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Iran’s IRGC Aerospace Force publicly tested the jet engine of the Shahed 161 stealth UAV during an exhibition in Tehran. The event points to a doctrine that puts unmanned systems at the center of Iran’s deterrence strategy after the June conflict with Israel.
On 11 November 2025, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Force publicly ran the engine of its Shahed 161 stealth drone during an achievements exhibition at the National Aerospace Park in Tehran, as reported by Mehr News Agency and Tehran Times. The demonstration turned an usually closed test procedure into a live showpiece, highlighting how Tehran increasingly uses public displays to signal progress in its unmanned systems. Coming just months after Iran’s extensive use of drones alongside ballistic missiles in the June Israel–Iran war, the test underlines the place of UAVs at the core of the country’s deterrence posture. For regional militaries and external observers, the event offers a rare window into the maturation of a stealthy, jet-powered drone family that has moved from reverse-engineering to serial production under sanctions.
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Iran showcased its Shahed 161 stealth drone with a public engine test, underscoring its growing drone‑centric deterrence strategy (Picture Source: Iranian MoD)
The Shahed 161 is a compact, flying-wing unmanned aircraft derived from the American RQ-170 Sentinel captured by Iran in 2011. Iranian sources describe it as a 40 percent scale version of the Shahed 171 “Simorgh”, itself a full-size analogue of the RQ-170. The airframe follows the same low-observable philosophy: blended wing-body, smooth contours and absence of vertical tail surfaces to reduce radar and infrared signatures. According to technical banners and local media, the drone is about 1.9 meters long with a wingspan of roughly 5.1 meters, and is powered by an HKS micro-jet engine delivering around 40 kilograms of thrust. This configuration gives it a top speed in the region of 300–350 km/h and a service ceiling of around 7,600–8,000 meters, putting it above many short-range air-defense envelopes while remaining significantly smaller than conventional MALE drones.
The performance figures published around the exhibition point to a combat radius of about 150 km and a maximum range near 300 km, with endurance varying between two and three hours depending on payload and mission profile. With a maximum take-off weight of around 170 kg and roughly 40–50 kg available for mission payloads, the Shahed 161 appears optimised for short-to-medium-range tactical tasks rather than long-duration patrols. Iranian banners and media indicate that it can carry either two precision-guided bombs of up to 50 kg each or a seeker-warhead package, as well as electro-optical and infrared sensor turrets for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR). In operational terms, this gives the platform a dual identity: it can act as a stealthy ISR asset, but also as a loitering munition against high-value targets if configured with a dedicated warhead.
Launch and recovery rely on a vehicle-mounted catapult and skid or parachute recovery, reflecting a doctrine of mobile, hard-to-locate drone units. The public engine run at the Aerospace Achievements Exhibition showcased both the growing maturity of the Shahed-161’s micro-jet propulsion and the broader evolution of the stealth Shahed line from RQ-170-derived scale testbeds into a layered family of systems (141, 161, 181, 191, and 171) covering increasingly long-range and heavier-payload missions while preserving low-observable characteristics across the fleet.
Within this layered architecture, the Shahed 161 occupies a niche between expendable loitering munitions and higher-end reconnaissance platforms. Its small size and stealth-optimized shape make it harder to detect than larger, propeller-driven drones, while its micro-jet engine offers higher dash speeds for penetration and terminal attack. At the same time, its relatively limited range and payload compared to the Shahed 171 or 191 suggest that it is intended for high-value tactical tasks, for example, engaging forward air-defense radars, static command posts or critical infrastructure relatively close to Iranian or allied territory. Islamic World News’ technical assessment has even suggested that the combination of seeker and warhead points to a role as an expensive, precision “suicide” drone for use against defended, high-priority targets.
The operational history of the Shahed stealth family remains partially classified, but Iranian and independent sources converge on several key episodes. Shahed 181 and 191 drones were used in June 2017 during Operation Laylat al-Qadr against Islamic State targets in Syria, in what is often cited as one of the first documented swarm-style drone strikes by a state actor. Local media reports the Shahed 161 saw reconnaissance and strike use in Syria and frequent exhibition displays. During the June 2025 Israel–Iran war, Iran launched hundreds of drones and missiles over a 12-day period, testing the limits of regional air- and missile-defense systems; while public reporting has focused largely on Shahed-136-type loitering munitions, the exhibition in Tehran now suggests that higher-end platforms such as the stealth Shahed family are being kept operational and upgraded for future contingencies.
Compared with other Iranian UAVs that have dominated headlines, notably the Shahed-131 and Shahed-136 one-way attack drones used by Russia in Ukraine and by Iran and its partners in the Middle East, the Shahed 161 represents a different design philosophy. The 131/136 series favours simplicity, low cost and mass use at the expense of signature management and reusability; they are effectively long-range guided missiles. The 161, by contrast, is a stealthy, reusable system whose smaller numbers are compensated by the ability to carry sensors and precision munitions in contested airspace. In that sense, it is closer to Western tactical stealth UAVs or high-end loitering munitions designed to survive in defended environments rather than saturate them.
From an engineering standpoint, the engine test underscores progress in domestic micro-jet technology, an area where Iran has historically depended on imported or modified commercial engines. Demonstrating a reliable run in public suggests that Tehran is confident in its ability to serially manufacture and support such power plants, which could have implications beyond the Shahed 161. Micro-jet engines of this class can be adapted to loitering munitions, cruise missiles and other unmanned platforms, providing the IRGC with a more diversified propulsion portfolio and reducing exposure to sanctions on foreign components.
Strategically, the timing of the exhibition is significant. Tehran Times framed the event as part of a wider narrative in which Iran, excluded from Western arms markets since the revolution, has built an indigenous drone industry under pressure. The article links the current Shahed family to long-term policies such as the Comprehensive Aerospace Development Program and successive Five-Year Development Plans, which have made technological self-reliance an explicit objective. In this view, drones address several of Iran’s structural defense challenges: they provide ISR at relatively low cost, project force without exposing pilots, and are produced domestically, insulating supply chains from external leverage.
The geopolitical context gives this technological path a particular resonance. Iran is surrounded by US and allied military facilities, and faces regional rivals, notably Israel and Saudi Arabia, equipped with advanced Western aircraft and integrated air-defense networks. Analytical work on the June 2025 war has highlighted how both sides used long-range missiles and drones over distances exceeding 2,000 km, making survivability and numbers critical variables. Within such a threat environment, platforms like the Shahed 161 provide Iran with additional options for reconnaissance and precision strikes against high-value targets, complementing its ballistic-missile arsenal and more numerous one-way attack drones.
For Iran’s own military planning, the Shahed 161 engine test signals continuity rather than rupture. It confirms that the stealth drone family initiated more than a decade ago is not a static showcase but an evolving ecosystem, incorporating incremental improvements in propulsion, sensors, weapons integration and launch methods. In the wake of the June war, when Iran’s reliance on missiles and drones was on full display and its air-defense weaknesses were scrutinized by analysts, continued investment in survivable unmanned platforms serves both deterrence and domestic messaging purposes.
The public run of the Shahed 161’s engine at the National Aerospace Park therefore acts as more than a technical milestone. It encapsulates Iran’s trajectory from reverse-engineering a captured foreign drone to fielding an indigenous family of stealth UAVs with distinct tactical roles. For regional militaries, it is a reminder that beneath the high-volume use of simpler loitering munitions lies a smaller but increasingly capable fleet of stealth drones designed to operate in contested skies. For policymakers watching proliferation trends, it underscores that Iran’s UAV portfolio now spans the full spectrum from expendable systems to reusable, low-observable platforms, and that engine tests conducted on exhibition grounds can foreshadow capabilities that may shape future crises well beyond Iran’s borders.
Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.
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Iran’s IRGC Aerospace Force publicly tested the jet engine of the Shahed 161 stealth UAV during an exhibition in Tehran. The event points to a doctrine that puts unmanned systems at the center of Iran’s deterrence strategy after the June conflict with Israel.
On 11 November 2025, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Force publicly ran the engine of its Shahed 161 stealth drone during an achievements exhibition at the National Aerospace Park in Tehran, as reported by Mehr News Agency and Tehran Times. The demonstration turned an usually closed test procedure into a live showpiece, highlighting how Tehran increasingly uses public displays to signal progress in its unmanned systems. Coming just months after Iran’s extensive use of drones alongside ballistic missiles in the June Israel–Iran war, the test underlines the place of UAVs at the core of the country’s deterrence posture. For regional militaries and external observers, the event offers a rare window into the maturation of a stealthy, jet-powered drone family that has moved from reverse-engineering to serial production under sanctions.
Iran showcased its Shahed 161 stealth drone with a public engine test, underscoring its growing drone‑centric deterrence strategy (Picture Source: Iranian MoD)
The Shahed 161 is a compact, flying-wing unmanned aircraft derived from the American RQ-170 Sentinel captured by Iran in 2011. Iranian sources describe it as a 40 percent scale version of the Shahed 171 “Simorgh”, itself a full-size analogue of the RQ-170. The airframe follows the same low-observable philosophy: blended wing-body, smooth contours and absence of vertical tail surfaces to reduce radar and infrared signatures. According to technical banners and local media, the drone is about 1.9 meters long with a wingspan of roughly 5.1 meters, and is powered by an HKS micro-jet engine delivering around 40 kilograms of thrust. This configuration gives it a top speed in the region of 300–350 km/h and a service ceiling of around 7,600–8,000 meters, putting it above many short-range air-defense envelopes while remaining significantly smaller than conventional MALE drones.
The performance figures published around the exhibition point to a combat radius of about 150 km and a maximum range near 300 km, with endurance varying between two and three hours depending on payload and mission profile. With a maximum take-off weight of around 170 kg and roughly 40–50 kg available for mission payloads, the Shahed 161 appears optimised for short-to-medium-range tactical tasks rather than long-duration patrols. Iranian banners and media indicate that it can carry either two precision-guided bombs of up to 50 kg each or a seeker-warhead package, as well as electro-optical and infrared sensor turrets for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR). In operational terms, this gives the platform a dual identity: it can act as a stealthy ISR asset, but also as a loitering munition against high-value targets if configured with a dedicated warhead.
Launch and recovery rely on a vehicle-mounted catapult and skid or parachute recovery, reflecting a doctrine of mobile, hard-to-locate drone units. The public engine run at the Aerospace Achievements Exhibition showcased both the growing maturity of the Shahed-161’s micro-jet propulsion and the broader evolution of the stealth Shahed line from RQ-170-derived scale testbeds into a layered family of systems (141, 161, 181, 191, and 171) covering increasingly long-range and heavier-payload missions while preserving low-observable characteristics across the fleet.
Within this layered architecture, the Shahed 161 occupies a niche between expendable loitering munitions and higher-end reconnaissance platforms. Its small size and stealth-optimized shape make it harder to detect than larger, propeller-driven drones, while its micro-jet engine offers higher dash speeds for penetration and terminal attack. At the same time, its relatively limited range and payload compared to the Shahed 171 or 191 suggest that it is intended for high-value tactical tasks, for example, engaging forward air-defense radars, static command posts or critical infrastructure relatively close to Iranian or allied territory. Islamic World News’ technical assessment has even suggested that the combination of seeker and warhead points to a role as an expensive, precision “suicide” drone for use against defended, high-priority targets.
The operational history of the Shahed stealth family remains partially classified, but Iranian and independent sources converge on several key episodes. Shahed 181 and 191 drones were used in June 2017 during Operation Laylat al-Qadr against Islamic State targets in Syria, in what is often cited as one of the first documented swarm-style drone strikes by a state actor. Local media reports the Shahed 161 saw reconnaissance and strike use in Syria and frequent exhibition displays. During the June 2025 Israel–Iran war, Iran launched hundreds of drones and missiles over a 12-day period, testing the limits of regional air- and missile-defense systems; while public reporting has focused largely on Shahed-136-type loitering munitions, the exhibition in Tehran now suggests that higher-end platforms such as the stealth Shahed family are being kept operational and upgraded for future contingencies.
Compared with other Iranian UAVs that have dominated headlines, notably the Shahed-131 and Shahed-136 one-way attack drones used by Russia in Ukraine and by Iran and its partners in the Middle East, the Shahed 161 represents a different design philosophy. The 131/136 series favours simplicity, low cost and mass use at the expense of signature management and reusability; they are effectively long-range guided missiles. The 161, by contrast, is a stealthy, reusable system whose smaller numbers are compensated by the ability to carry sensors and precision munitions in contested airspace. In that sense, it is closer to Western tactical stealth UAVs or high-end loitering munitions designed to survive in defended environments rather than saturate them.
From an engineering standpoint, the engine test underscores progress in domestic micro-jet technology, an area where Iran has historically depended on imported or modified commercial engines. Demonstrating a reliable run in public suggests that Tehran is confident in its ability to serially manufacture and support such power plants, which could have implications beyond the Shahed 161. Micro-jet engines of this class can be adapted to loitering munitions, cruise missiles and other unmanned platforms, providing the IRGC with a more diversified propulsion portfolio and reducing exposure to sanctions on foreign components.
Strategically, the timing of the exhibition is significant. Tehran Times framed the event as part of a wider narrative in which Iran, excluded from Western arms markets since the revolution, has built an indigenous drone industry under pressure. The article links the current Shahed family to long-term policies such as the Comprehensive Aerospace Development Program and successive Five-Year Development Plans, which have made technological self-reliance an explicit objective. In this view, drones address several of Iran’s structural defense challenges: they provide ISR at relatively low cost, project force without exposing pilots, and are produced domestically, insulating supply chains from external leverage.
The geopolitical context gives this technological path a particular resonance. Iran is surrounded by US and allied military facilities, and faces regional rivals, notably Israel and Saudi Arabia, equipped with advanced Western aircraft and integrated air-defense networks. Analytical work on the June 2025 war has highlighted how both sides used long-range missiles and drones over distances exceeding 2,000 km, making survivability and numbers critical variables. Within such a threat environment, platforms like the Shahed 161 provide Iran with additional options for reconnaissance and precision strikes against high-value targets, complementing its ballistic-missile arsenal and more numerous one-way attack drones.
For Iran’s own military planning, the Shahed 161 engine test signals continuity rather than rupture. It confirms that the stealth drone family initiated more than a decade ago is not a static showcase but an evolving ecosystem, incorporating incremental improvements in propulsion, sensors, weapons integration and launch methods. In the wake of the June war, when Iran’s reliance on missiles and drones was on full display and its air-defense weaknesses were scrutinized by analysts, continued investment in survivable unmanned platforms serves both deterrence and domestic messaging purposes.
The public run of the Shahed 161’s engine at the National Aerospace Park therefore acts as more than a technical milestone. It encapsulates Iran’s trajectory from reverse-engineering a captured foreign drone to fielding an indigenous family of stealth UAVs with distinct tactical roles. For regional militaries, it is a reminder that beneath the high-volume use of simpler loitering munitions lies a smaller but increasingly capable fleet of stealth drones designed to operate in contested skies. For policymakers watching proliferation trends, it underscores that Iran’s UAV portfolio now spans the full spectrum from expendable systems to reusable, low-observable platforms, and that engine tests conducted on exhibition grounds can foreshadow capabilities that may shape future crises well beyond Iran’s borders.
Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.
