Japan condemns China’s dangerous interceptions of YS-11EB electronic warfare aircraft in international waters
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On July 9 and 10, 2025, two Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) YS-11EB electronic intelligence aircraft were subjected to unusually close intercepts by People’s Liberation Army (PLA) JH-7 fighter-bombers over international waters of the East China Sea. On July 9, a JH-7 closed in to within approximately 30 meters horizontally and 60 meters vertically from the YS-11EB during a surveillance flight that lasted around 15 minutes.Follow Army Recognition on Google News at this link
The YS-11EB involved in the July 2025 incidents is a military variant of the YS-11A-400 cargo aircraft, which itself was derived from Japan’s first postwar airliner developed by the Nihon Aircraft Manufacturing Corporation (NAMC) and introduced in the 1960s. (Picture source: Toshi Aoki – JP Spotters via Airliners.net)
The following day, another JH-7 reversed the flight pattern with an approach of 60 meters horizontally and 30 meters vertically for approximately 10 minutes. Both events were officially acknowledged by Japan’s Ministry of Defense, which released imagery of the July 9 incident. In response, Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs Funakoshi Takehiro conveyed Japan’s concerns to Chinese Ambassador Wu Jianghao, warning that such actions could result in accidental collisions and requesting that the Chinese government take preventive measures. According to the Ministry, no damage or injuries occurred during either incident. The aircraft involved are part of the Electronic Intelligence Squadron stationed at Iruma Air Base.
The July events follow similar intercepts reported by Japan in June 2025 involving J-15 fighters from the aircraft carrier CNS Shandong. These aircraft conducted close approaches to Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) P-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft over the Pacific Ocean, reportedly maintaining distances of around 45 meters and, in one instance, crossing 900 meters in front of a Japanese patrol flight path. Japan responded with a formal protest and reiterated that its Self-Defense Force aircraft do not approach within 45 meters of foreign aircraft in international airspace. Defense Minister Gen Nakatani rejected claims from Beijing suggesting Japan was responsible for escalating these encounters and stated that Tokyo had communicated its position clearly. Beijing has maintained that Japanese flights near Chinese military activities are provocative, while Japan has emphasized its operations are lawful and conducted in international zones, often in support of United Nations Security Council resolutions.
Chinese intercept activity has also targeted aircraft operated by other nations. On April 3, 2025, a U.S. Air Force RC-135W Rivet Joint was intercepted near Taiwan by a Chinese J-10C fighter during the PLA’s Strait Thunder-2025A exercise. The Chinese pilot issued a radio message alleging incursion into a self-declared 24-nautical-mile zone, to which the U.S. pilot responded that the mission was taking place in international airspace. The aircraft continued its mission without further incident. During the same period, Taiwan reported increased PLA activity, including 59 aircraft and 23 naval vessels detected within 24 hours, with 31 aircraft crossing the median line of the Taiwan Strait. These movements coincided with live-fire exercises by the PLA and further contributed to the operational pressures on Taiwan’s air defense and reconnaissance units. Similar patterns of close monitoring and radio challenges have been observed during U.S. flights over strategic maritime corridors such as the Bashi Channel and the South China Sea.
In February 2025, Australia reported that a PLA Air Force J-16 released flares within 30 meters of a Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) P-8A Poseidon over the South China Sea. That same month, a Chinese Navy Z-9 helicopter approached a Philippine Cessna 208B Grand Caravan operated by the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources to within 3 meters near Scarborough Shoal. The Philippine government characterized the maneuver as a “blatantly hazardous action.” Similar incidents have involved Canadian CP-140 aircraft participating in UN sanctions monitoring flights, during which Chinese interceptors conducted close approaches. According to U.S. Department of Defense data, approximately 300 coercive or unsafe intercepts occurred over the previous two years, including 180 involving U.S. aircraft. The Pentagon described these actions as part of a coordinated PLA campaign to deter reconnaissance and surveillance operations near China’s maritime periphery. Japan has not disclosed the specific mission profile of the YS-11EB flights, but its surveillance operations are generally associated with monitoring activities near Chinese and North Korean military deployments.
The YS-11EB involved in the July 2025 incidents is a military variant of the YS-11A-400 cargo aircraft, which itself was derived from Japan’s first postwar airliner developed by the Nihon Aircraft Manufacturing Corporation (NAMC) and introduced in the 1960s. The EB variant is modified for signals intelligence collection (ELINT/COMINT) and is operated by the JASDF’s Electronic Intelligence Squadron under the Air Tactics Development Wing. The aircraft is equipped with T64-IHI-10J turboprop engines, large dorsal and ventral antenna fairings, and a suite of electronic support and surveillance systems, including the J/ALR-2. It carries a typical crew of eight, including flight personnel and electronic warfare operators. The YS-11EB has a surveillance range of approximately 926 kilometers and cruises at speeds between 315 and 610 kilometers per hour. While some YS-11 variants served as ECM trainers or VIP transports, the EB is specifically configured for operational signal collection flights and remains active despite its age.
Three YS-11EB aircraft are currently in service with the JASDF and are among the last airworthy examples of the YS-11 platform. Originally powered by Rolls-Royce Dart engines, the aircraft were re-engined with T64-IHI-10J units derived from Japan’s P-2J maritime patrol aircraft program. The configuration includes prominent external bulges and blade-style antennas used to intercept radar and communications signals. These features distinguish it visually from other military and civilian YS-11 variants. The aircraft operates primarily from Iruma Air Base and is frequently tasked with surveillance missions over Japanese-controlled airspace and nearby international zones, especially those experiencing increased Chinese or Russian naval activity. Its collection capabilities contribute to Japan’s broader intelligence framework and allow the country to monitor radar emissions, communications traffic, and other electronic signatures relevant to regional security.
Japan has initiated a replacement program for the YS-11EB, planning to transition to the RC-2, an ELINT platform derived from the Kawasaki C-2 airlifter. The RC-2 is intended to provide enhanced signal intelligence capability, extended range, modern avionics, and increased survivability. As of 2025, funding has been allocated for procurement and testing of the new aircraft, which will eventually phase out the YS-11EB and the EC-1 electronic warfare trainer. Despite its approaching retirement, the YS-11EB remains the only dedicated airborne ELINT platform currently operational in the JASDF inventory. Its continued role underscores Japan’s requirement for persistent surveillance capability amid expanding foreign military activity in surrounding regions. The incidents of July 2025 further highlight the operational risks encountered by older intelligence-gathering platforms conducting lawful missions in contested airspace.
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On July 9 and 10, 2025, two Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) YS-11EB electronic intelligence aircraft were subjected to unusually close intercepts by People’s Liberation Army (PLA) JH-7 fighter-bombers over international waters of the East China Sea. On July 9, a JH-7 closed in to within approximately 30 meters horizontally and 60 meters vertically from the YS-11EB during a surveillance flight that lasted around 15 minutes.
Follow Army Recognition on Google News at this link
The YS-11EB involved in the July 2025 incidents is a military variant of the YS-11A-400 cargo aircraft, which itself was derived from Japan’s first postwar airliner developed by the Nihon Aircraft Manufacturing Corporation (NAMC) and introduced in the 1960s. (Picture source: Toshi Aoki – JP Spotters via Airliners.net)
The following day, another JH-7 reversed the flight pattern with an approach of 60 meters horizontally and 30 meters vertically for approximately 10 minutes. Both events were officially acknowledged by Japan’s Ministry of Defense, which released imagery of the July 9 incident. In response, Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs Funakoshi Takehiro conveyed Japan’s concerns to Chinese Ambassador Wu Jianghao, warning that such actions could result in accidental collisions and requesting that the Chinese government take preventive measures. According to the Ministry, no damage or injuries occurred during either incident. The aircraft involved are part of the Electronic Intelligence Squadron stationed at Iruma Air Base.
The July events follow similar intercepts reported by Japan in June 2025 involving J-15 fighters from the aircraft carrier CNS Shandong. These aircraft conducted close approaches to Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) P-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft over the Pacific Ocean, reportedly maintaining distances of around 45 meters and, in one instance, crossing 900 meters in front of a Japanese patrol flight path. Japan responded with a formal protest and reiterated that its Self-Defense Force aircraft do not approach within 45 meters of foreign aircraft in international airspace. Defense Minister Gen Nakatani rejected claims from Beijing suggesting Japan was responsible for escalating these encounters and stated that Tokyo had communicated its position clearly. Beijing has maintained that Japanese flights near Chinese military activities are provocative, while Japan has emphasized its operations are lawful and conducted in international zones, often in support of United Nations Security Council resolutions.
Chinese intercept activity has also targeted aircraft operated by other nations. On April 3, 2025, a U.S. Air Force RC-135W Rivet Joint was intercepted near Taiwan by a Chinese J-10C fighter during the PLA’s Strait Thunder-2025A exercise. The Chinese pilot issued a radio message alleging incursion into a self-declared 24-nautical-mile zone, to which the U.S. pilot responded that the mission was taking place in international airspace. The aircraft continued its mission without further incident. During the same period, Taiwan reported increased PLA activity, including 59 aircraft and 23 naval vessels detected within 24 hours, with 31 aircraft crossing the median line of the Taiwan Strait. These movements coincided with live-fire exercises by the PLA and further contributed to the operational pressures on Taiwan’s air defense and reconnaissance units. Similar patterns of close monitoring and radio challenges have been observed during U.S. flights over strategic maritime corridors such as the Bashi Channel and the South China Sea.
In February 2025, Australia reported that a PLA Air Force J-16 released flares within 30 meters of a Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) P-8A Poseidon over the South China Sea. That same month, a Chinese Navy Z-9 helicopter approached a Philippine Cessna 208B Grand Caravan operated by the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources to within 3 meters near Scarborough Shoal. The Philippine government characterized the maneuver as a “blatantly hazardous action.” Similar incidents have involved Canadian CP-140 aircraft participating in UN sanctions monitoring flights, during which Chinese interceptors conducted close approaches. According to U.S. Department of Defense data, approximately 300 coercive or unsafe intercepts occurred over the previous two years, including 180 involving U.S. aircraft. The Pentagon described these actions as part of a coordinated PLA campaign to deter reconnaissance and surveillance operations near China’s maritime periphery. Japan has not disclosed the specific mission profile of the YS-11EB flights, but its surveillance operations are generally associated with monitoring activities near Chinese and North Korean military deployments.
The YS-11EB involved in the July 2025 incidents is a military variant of the YS-11A-400 cargo aircraft, which itself was derived from Japan’s first postwar airliner developed by the Nihon Aircraft Manufacturing Corporation (NAMC) and introduced in the 1960s. The EB variant is modified for signals intelligence collection (ELINT/COMINT) and is operated by the JASDF’s Electronic Intelligence Squadron under the Air Tactics Development Wing. The aircraft is equipped with T64-IHI-10J turboprop engines, large dorsal and ventral antenna fairings, and a suite of electronic support and surveillance systems, including the J/ALR-2. It carries a typical crew of eight, including flight personnel and electronic warfare operators. The YS-11EB has a surveillance range of approximately 926 kilometers and cruises at speeds between 315 and 610 kilometers per hour. While some YS-11 variants served as ECM trainers or VIP transports, the EB is specifically configured for operational signal collection flights and remains active despite its age.
Three YS-11EB aircraft are currently in service with the JASDF and are among the last airworthy examples of the YS-11 platform. Originally powered by Rolls-Royce Dart engines, the aircraft were re-engined with T64-IHI-10J units derived from Japan’s P-2J maritime patrol aircraft program. The configuration includes prominent external bulges and blade-style antennas used to intercept radar and communications signals. These features distinguish it visually from other military and civilian YS-11 variants. The aircraft operates primarily from Iruma Air Base and is frequently tasked with surveillance missions over Japanese-controlled airspace and nearby international zones, especially those experiencing increased Chinese or Russian naval activity. Its collection capabilities contribute to Japan’s broader intelligence framework and allow the country to monitor radar emissions, communications traffic, and other electronic signatures relevant to regional security.
Japan has initiated a replacement program for the YS-11EB, planning to transition to the RC-2, an ELINT platform derived from the Kawasaki C-2 airlifter. The RC-2 is intended to provide enhanced signal intelligence capability, extended range, modern avionics, and increased survivability. As of 2025, funding has been allocated for procurement and testing of the new aircraft, which will eventually phase out the YS-11EB and the EC-1 electronic warfare trainer. Despite its approaching retirement, the YS-11EB remains the only dedicated airborne ELINT platform currently operational in the JASDF inventory. Its continued role underscores Japan’s requirement for persistent surveillance capability amid expanding foreign military activity in surrounding regions. The incidents of July 2025 further highlight the operational risks encountered by older intelligence-gathering platforms conducting lawful missions in contested airspace.
