NATO Moves to Field Counter-Drone Systems Within Months to Oppose Russian Airspace Incursions

Gen. Ingo Gerhartz urged deployment timelines counted in months for counter-drone units across allied territory, using public remarks at the Warsaw Security Forum on Sept 29-30 to press the point. He now commands NATO’s Joint Force Command Brunssum and paired the schedule with a demand for cheaper defeat options to match the economics of hostile drones priced in the low thousands. He described a multi-domain setup that ties sensors, jammers and short-range effectors into existing air and missile defense command systems.

Poland’s airspace violation on the night of Sept 9-10 set the operational background. Polish forces, supported by allied aircraft, shot down several drones and restricted airspace while warnings remained active. The response marked a rare case of kinetic action inside NATO territory during Russia’s war on Ukraine.

The Alliance moved two days later. “Eastern Sentry” began on Sept 12 as a standing activity to reinforce the eastern flank with added air and ground assets and tighter command-and-control across nations. The same week, NATO’s council recorded a separate breach when three MiG-31s crossed Estonian airspace for minutes near Vaindloo Island, with allied jets scrambled in response.

Denmark handled a surge of drone sightings over military sites and major airports in late September, shut down civilian drone flying for several days and requested allied help to secure European meetings in Copenhagen. Sweden sent counter-UAS and radar detachments and Germany berthed an air-defense frigate in the harbor to support surveillance. National authorities kept attribution open while describing a capable operator.

In June, the Secretary General argued for a five-fold increase in allied air and missile defense inventory and repeated the appeal in early September. Those texts give political top cover to accelerated buys of low-cost effectors and short-range air defense that can handle daily drone traffic without burning through million-dollar missiles.

Warsaw Security Forum Remarks on Counter-Drone Fielding

Gerhartz placed cost and time at the center of his case. Drones priced at two to three thousand dollars force defenders into poor trades when they rely first on long-range interceptors. He called for a layered setup where the lowest layer handles the bulk of engagements near bases, ports, airfields, power nodes and border sectors. The layer above reserves higher-end missiles for cruise-missile tracks and fast movers. He added a procurement point, saying institutions and buyers need to move “a bit faster” on counter-UAS lots and associated command links.

Brunssum covers the Alliance’s northeast area of responsibility, where decision windows are short and low-altitude detection gaps matter most. That geography explains his stress on ready-to-field kits that slot into existing radars and command posts.

Defense officials confirm that the ambition is not to force a single vendor or design across the Alliance. The requirement is to pass tracks and tasks across national systems without delay or data loss and to assign defeat options based on rules pre-agreed by civil and military authorities. That implies standard interfaces at the point where counter-UAS data meets air-defense command systems.

His remarks leave three immediate tasks for capitals:

First, buy low-cost defeat options in volume and pre-position them at the sites most likely to see nightly traffic. 

Second, wire the data paths so that a drone plot from a civil sensor can reach a military operator with a clear authority to act. 

Third, produce crews who can operate the equipment effectively under stress and in accordance with the flight rules that govern national airspace.
Eastern Sentry Deployments and Airspace Incidents

The Sept 12 launch of Eastern Sentry laid out a flexible package. Air policing sorties surged over Poland with tankers on the loop, ground units adjusted alert levels across the Baltics and maritime sensors contributed to a cleaner picture in the Baltic Sea. National statements in allied capitals outlined fighter rotations and ground-based systems moving east.

Estonia’s report on Sept 19 described three high-speed aircraft inside its airspace for about a dozen minutes. The absence of flight plans and identification codes was noted. Allied fighters responded while national authorities published more detail. The council’s formal text and later United Nations briefings recorded the episode.

Poland returned to heightened readiness early on Oct 5 during another regional alert cycle. National and allied aircraft patrolled while air-defense radars shifted to high alert as Ukraine issued nationwide warnings about incoming missiles and drones. The scene came less than a month after the earlier shootdowns and kept Eastern Sentry running in a live alert posture.

Denmark faced a different kind of stress test in late September. Drones were seen over multiple military facilities and near major airports, with Copenhagen Airport among those disrupted. Authorities imposed a weekday ban on civilian drone flying as European summits drew near, and penalties for violations were raised. Sweden dispatched counter-UAS teams and radars. A German air-defense frigate took station in Copenhagen to add sensor coverage. The operator remained unidentified in public reporting through the summit window.

Civil aviation concerns grew in parallel. Industry and insurers flagged risk calculations for airspace near Poland and Denmark after the September events and reviewed diversion plans. Airport operators in several countries updated notice-to-airmen procedures for drone alerts that intersect with controlled airspace.

Counter-Drone Sensors, Effectors and NATO Interoperability Exercises

Allied technical work on counter-UAS interoperability has run for years. The NATO Communications and Information Agency’s technical interoperability exercises brought dozens of sensors, effectors and command systems into live trials, verifying message formats and hand-offs. The 2024 iteration drew 450 participants from 19 nations and set the pattern for later training sprints in 2025 aimed at operator skills and integration with national air-defense networks.

According to industry sources, the vendors now filling European orders emphasize three things. Low-unit-cost kinetic rounds that function inside 100 meters of a protected site. Directional RF defeat with better emission control and faster retuning. Compact command nodes that live inside existing air-defense batteries and pull in civil sensor feeds when that is allowed by national law.

Training pipelines broadened this year. NATO schools added counter-UAS modules to base-defense and air-defense courses, with national air forces pairing more often with army site-protection units. Exercises on the eastern flank incorporated drone swarms and decoys into air-defense drills. The civil side did not sit it out. Airports, grid operators and port authorities worked out contacts with national air-defense centers to push detections and request action during restricted airspace periods.

Ukraine’s daily experience against drones also fed the conversation in Warsaw. Speakers argued for dense low-altitude detection near critical nodes, permissive rules for jamming and spoofing within risk bounds, and husbanding of expensive interceptors for threats that cannot be handled cheaply.

Infrastructure protection on the eastern flank received its own push. Grid operators’ advanced plans to bunker substations, install anti-drone nets at critical yards and stock long-lead transformers and switchgear where supply chains remain thin. These measures mirror what Ukraine learned and now bring utilities into joint drills with defense staffs.

The tests and training sprints give capitals a base they can buy against. TIE-validated interfaces reduce integration risk and speed how new kits join national air-defense networks. National labs and procurement offices still have to vet emissions control, safety cases for kinetic effectors and software assurance on command systems.

Procurement Tempo and Readiness Targets

Rutte’s call in June for a 400 percent increase in allied air and missile defense made headlines. The numbers implied thousands of launchers and missiles across the Alliance, more batteries under national colors and better readiness for rapid rotation east when alerts spike. Public speeches in September kept the same message and linked it to the need to integrate counter-UAS units into the shared air picture.

Procurement offices across Europe opened faster tracks for counter-UAS orders this fall. Some used urgent operational needs authorities. Others leaned on framework contracts with option lots to add quantity after initial deliveries. Deliveries of RF defeat, acoustic arrays and passive radars can move on shorter cycles than kinetic launchers because of certification steps around explosives. Defense officials confirm that ministries are setting aside funding to pre-position stocks at priority bases and civil sites.

NATO’s technical bodies are pushing common data interfaces so that national systems can track, engage remotely and avoid blue-on-blue incidents when low-altitude, slow-speed targets clutter the picture. The same standards must support the quick integration of new vendors as governments diversify suppliers for resilience.

September’s incidents produced another immediate change in practice. Capitals tightened lines between civil aviation authorities, air-defense operations centers and base-defense units. Procedures to close small-drone airspace over cities during high-level events were written in clearer language. Denmark’s summit week served as a live test of de-confliction in a dense urban environment where national police, military operators and civil controllers share the same air.

Eastern Sentry remains active. Nations continue rotating fighters, refueling aircraft, ground-based systems and maritime sensors. Poland kept aircraft on patrol early on Oct 5 while Ukraine reported incoming missiles and drones.

REFERENCE SOURCES

https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-de

https://breakingdefense.com/2025/09/nato-needs-accelerated-counter-drone-tech-to-fend-off-russian-incursions-official/

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https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_237601.htm

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https://www.reuters.com/world/denmark-bans-drone-flights-after-fresh-drone-sightings-military-bases-2025-09-28/

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/sweden-sends-military-anti-drone-capabilities-denmark-support-summit-security-2025-09-29/

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https://www.ncia.nato.int/about-us/newsroom/nato-tests-counter-drone-technology-during-interoperability-exercise

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https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_235867.htm

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_237377.htm
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