Pentagon Fears China Could Exploit Saudi F-35 Deal To Learn U.S. Stealth Fighter Secrets
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Saudi Arabia’s request to buy up to 48 F-35A fighters has passed a major Pentagon review, moving the potential multibillion-dollar sale toward Congress. U.S. officials now face a sharp debate over technology security, Israel’s edge and how China’s footprint in the kingdom could shape the final decision.
The New York Times, on November 13, 2025, analyzes what could be the consequences of Saudi Arabia’s request to purchase up to 48 F-35 Lightning II stealth fighters. The Pentagon clearance would open the door to a multibillion-dollar deal that would make the kingdom the first Arab state to operate America’s premier fifth-generation combat aircraft. But days later, a Pentagon intelligence report flagged an uncomfortable scenario: if the sale goes ahead, China could try to mine Saudi territory, networks and defense partnerships for clues to the F-35’s most sensitive technologies.
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Saudi Arabia’s push to acquire the F-35 faces intensifying U.S. scrutiny as Washington fears China could exploit the kingdom’s growing defense and technology ties to access sensitive stealth and electronic-warfare systems, placing a major Gulf arms deal at the center of great-power rivalry (Picture source: U.S. DoW).
What is at stake is far more than another large Foreign Military Sales case. Riyadh has already signed an arms package worth roughly $142 billion with Washington in 2025, and adding the F-35 would crown that relationship by anchoring Saudi airpower in U.S. technology for decades. At the same time, U.S. law obliges any administration to preserve Israel’s qualitative military edge, a principle detailed in Congressional Research Service reporting that has framed every F-35 export to the Middle East. Israel is today the only regional operator of the jet, and a Saudi acquisition would inevitably force a renegotiation of that balance.
From a technical standpoint, the aircraft on the table is almost certainly the F-35A, the conventional take-off variant already in service with the U.S. Air Force and multiple NATO and Indo-Pacific allies. The jet combines radar-evading shaping and advanced composites with the AN/APG-81 active electronically scanned array radar, a distributed aperture system of infrared sensors providing 360-degree coverage, and an electro-optical targeting system integrated into the fuselage. A powerful onboard computer fuses this sensor data into a single tactical picture, reducing pilot workload and allowing the F-35 to act as both shooter and high-end airborne sensor node.
The F-35A’s two internal weapon bays allow it to carry air-to-air missiles and precision-guided bombs in a low-observable configuration, while external pylons can be added when stealth is less critical, pushing total payload beyond eight tons. Its Pratt & Whitney F135 engine produces over 40,000 pounds of thrust, giving the jet the range and persistence to patrol deep over the Gulf and northern Arabian Sea while maintaining a low infrared and radar signature. For the Royal Saudi Air Force, whose current backbone consists of advanced F-15SA strike fighters and Eurofighter Typhoons, the F-35 would add a true first-night-of-war platform designed to survive against modern Russian or Chinese-made surface-to-air missile systems.
In operational terms, Saudi F-35s would transform how Riyadh could fight Iran or deter regional rivals. Stealthy strike packages could penetrate Iranian airspace to hit ballistic-missile launch complexes, nuclear-related infrastructure, command nodes and IRGC naval facilities around the Gulf without telegraphing their approach on legacy radar networks. The jet’s ability to detect low-flying cruise missiles and drones, and then share tracks via secure datalinks, would significantly strengthen Saudi defenses against the kind of UAV and missile attacks launched from Yemen and Iraq in recent years. Mission data files tailored to the Iranian order of battle would allow the aircraft’s radar and electronic warfare suite to recognize and prioritize local threats in seconds, turning each F-35 into an intelligent sensor hub for the rest of the Saudi fleet.
Those same capabilities explain why U.S. intelligence agencies are so uneasy. According to reporting on a classified Defense Intelligence Agency assessment, the core fear is not that Saudi Arabia would roll an F-35 into a Chinese hangar and hand Beijing the keys, but that China could slowly siphon technology through embedded technicians, joint industrial projects and vulnerable digital infrastructure. The jet’s stealth coatings, electronic warfare architecture, mission-data libraries and secure Multifunction Advanced Datalink are exactly the elements Chinese engineers need to refine their J-20 and J-35 programs and the long-range PL-15 and PL-17 air-to-air missiles built to challenge U.S. and allied forces in the Indo-Pacific.
The concern is rooted in a web of Saudi-Chinese ties that has deepened steadily over the past decade. Riyadh bought Chinese DF-3 ballistic missiles in the 1980s and is now believed to be producing solid-fuel missiles at a facility near al-Dawadmi with Chinese assistance, as indicated by commercial satellite imagery of test burn pits and local infrastructure. Chinese-built Wing Loong and CH-4 armed drones already serve in Saudi operations, filling gaps that Washington would not. Meanwhile, Beijing and Riyadh have formalized a comprehensive strategic partnership and held multiple joint exercises, including increasingly sophisticated naval and special-forces drills that introduce Chinese personnel into Saudi bases and training areas.
Economics and technology overlay this security cooperation. China is one of the largest buyers of Saudi crude, and Xi Jinping’s 2022 visit to Riyadh produced 34 agreements worth an estimated $30 billion in sectors ranging from cloud services and digital infrastructure to transport and construction. Among them was a high-visibility deal with Huawei on cloud computing and data-center projects, part of a pattern that has already triggered U.S. pushback elsewhere in the Gulf. In the UAE, American concerns that Huawei-run 5G networks near F-35 bases could be exploited for passive collection contributed directly to Abu Dhabi suspending its own F-35 purchase talks in 2021. More recently, U.S. intelligence has alleged that an Emirati AI firm’s cooperation with Huawei helped China improve the range of its PL-15 and PL-17 missiles, a case now cited in Washington as a real-world example of how dual-use technology partnerships can bleed into hard military advantage.
If a close Gulf partner like the UAE can unwittingly feed cutting-edge technology into Chinese weapons programs, the risk will be at least as great in Saudi Arabia, where Vision 2030 explicitly seeks to localize 50% of defense spending through joint ventures, missile and UAV factories, and advanced munitions plants. Any F-35 sale would therefore come with extreme conditions on Chinese presence in Saudi telecommunications, data centers, industrial zones and air bases. Officials who worked the Emirati case expect demands for physical segregation of Chinese equipment, intrusive end-use monitoring and perhaps even explicit limits on where Saudi F-35s can be based and maintained.
At the same time, it would be difficult in practical terms for Riyadh to simply hand a flyable F-35 over to China. The aircraft is embedded in a tightly controlled U.S. ecosystem of mission-data labs, encrypted software loads and a global maintenance and logistics network. Cutting a foreign user off from that ecosystem would quickly degrade readiness and could, over time, reduce the fleet to an expensive static display. Export licenses, end-use agreements and the threat of U.S. sanctions provide additional legal and political deterrents against any attempt to invite Chinese engineers into secure F-35 facilities. Washington’s handling of the UAE’s bid, which effectively stalled over data-security concerns, is a clear precedent for how far the United States is prepared to go to protect the crown jewel of its combat aviation.
Israel’s position is another major obstacle. Congressional analysis on Israel’s qualitative military edge has already framed the UAE debate by warning that any Arab F-35 sale must either be qualitatively inferior or compensated by additional Israeli advantages. Jerusalem today fields several squadrons of F-35I Adir fighters with unique Israeli avionics and weapons, and Israeli officials are unlikely to welcome the arrival of a larger Saudi fleet, even if export controls strip out some sensitive features. Riyadh’s deepening partnership with Beijing only sharpens those worries, and Congress, already skeptical because of Yemen and the Khashoggi killing, will treat the latest Pentagon assessment on China as political ammunition to scrutinize or even block the deal.
Behind the scenes, U.S. industry and Saudi officials are also wrestling with industrial offsets and production realities. Lockheed Martin’s F-35 lines are heavily booked with U.S., European and Indo-Pacific orders, leaving only limited capacity for a Gulf customer unless other buyers accept delays. Saudi Arabia, for its part, is unlikely to accept a clean off-the-shelf purchase without significant local participation, which runs directly into U.S. fears of Chinese or other third-country engineers gaining access to highly classified subsystems. A fallback package built around additional F-15EX aircraft, advanced munitions and missile defense systems, with fewer technology-transfer sensitivities, remains a live option if the F-35 proves politically unmanageable.
Written by Evan Lerouvillois, Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group.
Evan studied International Relations, and quickly specialized in defense and security. He is particularly interested in the influence of the defense sector on global geopolitics, and analyzes how technological innovations in defense, arms export contracts, and military strategies influence the international geopolitical scene.
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Saudi Arabia’s request to buy up to 48 F-35A fighters has passed a major Pentagon review, moving the potential multibillion-dollar sale toward Congress. U.S. officials now face a sharp debate over technology security, Israel’s edge and how China’s footprint in the kingdom could shape the final decision.
The New York Times, on November 13, 2025, analyzes what could be the consequences of Saudi Arabia’s request to purchase up to 48 F-35 Lightning II stealth fighters. The Pentagon clearance would open the door to a multibillion-dollar deal that would make the kingdom the first Arab state to operate America’s premier fifth-generation combat aircraft. But days later, a Pentagon intelligence report flagged an uncomfortable scenario: if the sale goes ahead, China could try to mine Saudi territory, networks and defense partnerships for clues to the F-35’s most sensitive technologies.
Saudi Arabia’s push to acquire the F-35 faces intensifying U.S. scrutiny as Washington fears China could exploit the kingdom’s growing defense and technology ties to access sensitive stealth and electronic-warfare systems, placing a major Gulf arms deal at the center of great-power rivalry (Picture source: U.S. DoW).
What is at stake is far more than another large Foreign Military Sales case. Riyadh has already signed an arms package worth roughly $142 billion with Washington in 2025, and adding the F-35 would crown that relationship by anchoring Saudi airpower in U.S. technology for decades. At the same time, U.S. law obliges any administration to preserve Israel’s qualitative military edge, a principle detailed in Congressional Research Service reporting that has framed every F-35 export to the Middle East. Israel is today the only regional operator of the jet, and a Saudi acquisition would inevitably force a renegotiation of that balance.
From a technical standpoint, the aircraft on the table is almost certainly the F-35A, the conventional take-off variant already in service with the U.S. Air Force and multiple NATO and Indo-Pacific allies. The jet combines radar-evading shaping and advanced composites with the AN/APG-81 active electronically scanned array radar, a distributed aperture system of infrared sensors providing 360-degree coverage, and an electro-optical targeting system integrated into the fuselage. A powerful onboard computer fuses this sensor data into a single tactical picture, reducing pilot workload and allowing the F-35 to act as both shooter and high-end airborne sensor node.
The F-35A’s two internal weapon bays allow it to carry air-to-air missiles and precision-guided bombs in a low-observable configuration, while external pylons can be added when stealth is less critical, pushing total payload beyond eight tons. Its Pratt & Whitney F135 engine produces over 40,000 pounds of thrust, giving the jet the range and persistence to patrol deep over the Gulf and northern Arabian Sea while maintaining a low infrared and radar signature. For the Royal Saudi Air Force, whose current backbone consists of advanced F-15SA strike fighters and Eurofighter Typhoons, the F-35 would add a true first-night-of-war platform designed to survive against modern Russian or Chinese-made surface-to-air missile systems.
In operational terms, Saudi F-35s would transform how Riyadh could fight Iran or deter regional rivals. Stealthy strike packages could penetrate Iranian airspace to hit ballistic-missile launch complexes, nuclear-related infrastructure, command nodes and IRGC naval facilities around the Gulf without telegraphing their approach on legacy radar networks. The jet’s ability to detect low-flying cruise missiles and drones, and then share tracks via secure datalinks, would significantly strengthen Saudi defenses against the kind of UAV and missile attacks launched from Yemen and Iraq in recent years. Mission data files tailored to the Iranian order of battle would allow the aircraft’s radar and electronic warfare suite to recognize and prioritize local threats in seconds, turning each F-35 into an intelligent sensor hub for the rest of the Saudi fleet.
Those same capabilities explain why U.S. intelligence agencies are so uneasy. According to reporting on a classified Defense Intelligence Agency assessment, the core fear is not that Saudi Arabia would roll an F-35 into a Chinese hangar and hand Beijing the keys, but that China could slowly siphon technology through embedded technicians, joint industrial projects and vulnerable digital infrastructure. The jet’s stealth coatings, electronic warfare architecture, mission-data libraries and secure Multifunction Advanced Datalink are exactly the elements Chinese engineers need to refine their J-20 and J-35 programs and the long-range PL-15 and PL-17 air-to-air missiles built to challenge U.S. and allied forces in the Indo-Pacific.
The concern is rooted in a web of Saudi-Chinese ties that has deepened steadily over the past decade. Riyadh bought Chinese DF-3 ballistic missiles in the 1980s and is now believed to be producing solid-fuel missiles at a facility near al-Dawadmi with Chinese assistance, as indicated by commercial satellite imagery of test burn pits and local infrastructure. Chinese-built Wing Loong and CH-4 armed drones already serve in Saudi operations, filling gaps that Washington would not. Meanwhile, Beijing and Riyadh have formalized a comprehensive strategic partnership and held multiple joint exercises, including increasingly sophisticated naval and special-forces drills that introduce Chinese personnel into Saudi bases and training areas.
Economics and technology overlay this security cooperation. China is one of the largest buyers of Saudi crude, and Xi Jinping’s 2022 visit to Riyadh produced 34 agreements worth an estimated $30 billion in sectors ranging from cloud services and digital infrastructure to transport and construction. Among them was a high-visibility deal with Huawei on cloud computing and data-center projects, part of a pattern that has already triggered U.S. pushback elsewhere in the Gulf. In the UAE, American concerns that Huawei-run 5G networks near F-35 bases could be exploited for passive collection contributed directly to Abu Dhabi suspending its own F-35 purchase talks in 2021. More recently, U.S. intelligence has alleged that an Emirati AI firm’s cooperation with Huawei helped China improve the range of its PL-15 and PL-17 missiles, a case now cited in Washington as a real-world example of how dual-use technology partnerships can bleed into hard military advantage.
If a close Gulf partner like the UAE can unwittingly feed cutting-edge technology into Chinese weapons programs, the risk will be at least as great in Saudi Arabia, where Vision 2030 explicitly seeks to localize 50% of defense spending through joint ventures, missile and UAV factories, and advanced munitions plants. Any F-35 sale would therefore come with extreme conditions on Chinese presence in Saudi telecommunications, data centers, industrial zones and air bases. Officials who worked the Emirati case expect demands for physical segregation of Chinese equipment, intrusive end-use monitoring and perhaps even explicit limits on where Saudi F-35s can be based and maintained.
At the same time, it would be difficult in practical terms for Riyadh to simply hand a flyable F-35 over to China. The aircraft is embedded in a tightly controlled U.S. ecosystem of mission-data labs, encrypted software loads and a global maintenance and logistics network. Cutting a foreign user off from that ecosystem would quickly degrade readiness and could, over time, reduce the fleet to an expensive static display. Export licenses, end-use agreements and the threat of U.S. sanctions provide additional legal and political deterrents against any attempt to invite Chinese engineers into secure F-35 facilities. Washington’s handling of the UAE’s bid, which effectively stalled over data-security concerns, is a clear precedent for how far the United States is prepared to go to protect the crown jewel of its combat aviation.
Israel’s position is another major obstacle. Congressional analysis on Israel’s qualitative military edge has already framed the UAE debate by warning that any Arab F-35 sale must either be qualitatively inferior or compensated by additional Israeli advantages. Jerusalem today fields several squadrons of F-35I Adir fighters with unique Israeli avionics and weapons, and Israeli officials are unlikely to welcome the arrival of a larger Saudi fleet, even if export controls strip out some sensitive features. Riyadh’s deepening partnership with Beijing only sharpens those worries, and Congress, already skeptical because of Yemen and the Khashoggi killing, will treat the latest Pentagon assessment on China as political ammunition to scrutinize or even block the deal.
Behind the scenes, U.S. industry and Saudi officials are also wrestling with industrial offsets and production realities. Lockheed Martin’s F-35 lines are heavily booked with U.S., European and Indo-Pacific orders, leaving only limited capacity for a Gulf customer unless other buyers accept delays. Saudi Arabia, for its part, is unlikely to accept a clean off-the-shelf purchase without significant local participation, which runs directly into U.S. fears of Chinese or other third-country engineers gaining access to highly classified subsystems. A fallback package built around additional F-15EX aircraft, advanced munitions and missile defense systems, with fewer technology-transfer sensitivities, remains a live option if the F-35 proves politically unmanageable.
Written by Evan Lerouvillois, Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group.
Evan studied International Relations, and quickly specialized in defense and security. He is particularly interested in the influence of the defense sector on global geopolitics, and analyzes how technological innovations in defense, arms export contracts, and military strategies influence the international geopolitical scene.
