Qatar reportedly restarts F-35 fighter jet talks with the U.S. after 2020 rejection
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Qatar might have quietly resumed negotiations with Washington over a potential purchase of the F-35 stealth fighter, according to a report from Israel’s Channel 12.
According to Channel 12 on December 15, 2025, Qatar has reopened discussions with the United States over a potential acquisition of the F-35 stealth fighter jet, reviving a bid that was rejected roughly five years ago and signaling a possible shift in U.S. policy toward fighter jet sales in the Middle East. The talks are described as already underway and more advanced than in earlier attempts, taking place at a time when the United States is also potentially considering F-35 sales to other countries in the region, including Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey.Follow Army Recognition on Google News at this link
For Qatar, the F-35 would represent an additional qualitative layer on top of an already large modern fleet, while in Israel, it raises questions about the potential impact on the country’s qualitative military edge. (Picture source: US Air Force)
Qatar’s current push follows an earlier formal attempt around 2020 to purchase the F-35, when Doha reached the letter-of-request stage in the U.S. foreign military sales process, marking a serious but ultimately unsuccessful step toward acquiring the aircraft. That effort stalled amid political and regional sensitivities, but the present discussions are portrayed as more concrete and taking place in a more permissive strategic environment. At the same time, Qatar’s bid is being considered alongside other high-profile cases, including a potential stealth-fighter track with Saudi Arabia, a possible revival of approval for the United Arab Emirates after a previously blocked deal, and discussions involving Turkey that are framed as conditional on Ankara no longer possessing or operating the S-400 system. From Israel’s perspective, the concern lies in the cumulative effect of these scenarios rather than in any single country, because multiple outcomes together could narrow Israel’s qualitative military edge in the air.
What is known as Israel’s qualitative military edge is a long-standing element of U.S. policy in the Middle East, originally intended to ensure that Israel maintains a measurable technological and operational advantage over other military forces in the region. Israel is currently the only regional operator of the F-35, with 45 F-35Is in service and 30 additional jets on order, and it has accumulated nearly a decade of operational experience with the F-35 across a range of mission profiles. Potential F-35 sales to countries such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar, or Morocco would not, in themselves, negate this advantage, particularly if export configurations differ from those of Israel, but they could reduce Israel’s exclusivity in fifth-generation capabilities. The wider distribution of stealth aircraft, advanced sensors, and networked air combat systems would likely complicate regional airspace management, increase the number of actors capable of conducting low-observable operations, and shorten the relative technological gap that has traditionally shaped Israel’s air superiority for years.
Israel’s response is centered on preparing a compensatory package to be sought from Washington if regional F-35 sales move forward. This package is described as including two additional fighter squadrons, one equipped with F-35s and another based on an advanced F-15I-family configuration tailored to Israeli requirements and referred to as F-15IA, along with expanded access to advanced munitions in especially large quantities. Timing is emphasized as critical, with Israeli officials pointing to a narrow decision window in which delays could translate into lost priority in U.S. production scheduling, affecting delivery timelines and long-term force planning. Israel is currently the only Middle Eastern operator of the F-35, flying 45 aircraft with another 30 on order, and has operated the type for nearly a decade, a status closely tied to the U.S. policy commitment to preserve Israel’s qualitative military edge.
The political and security environment surrounding Qatar adds further sensitivity to the fighter question. Qatar and Turkey are both described as hosting Hamas leaders and offices and as being openly opposed to Israel’s war in Gaza, with Israel accusing both states of supporting terrorism. The narrative includes Israeli airstrikes in Qatar in September that unsuccessfully targeted senior Hamas leaders in Doha, an episode that reportedly angered Qatari authorities and heightened bilateral tensions. This was followed by an executive order issued by President Trump declaring that any armed attack on Qatar would be considered a threat to the peace and security of the United States and warning of a harsh response to any future attack. These dynamics intersect with Qatar’s role as host of Al-Udeid Air Base, described as the largest U.S. military facility in the region with around 8,000 U.S. personnel, which was attacked by Iran earlier in the year in retaliation for U.S. strikes on Iran’s nuclear program.
Qatar’s broader relationship with the United States is described as having strengthened since President Trump began his second term in January, reinforcing Doha’s perception that political conditions may now be more favorable for advancing sensitive defense requests. Qatar has also donated a Boeing 747-8 VIP jet to the United States, which Washington is planning to convert for use as a temporary Air Force One until the new presidential aircraft are ready, reflecting an unusual element in bilateral military and diplomatic ties. At the same time, concerns in Washington linked to Qatar’s regional relationships and political positions continue to factor into deliberations over advanced arms transfers. Qatar’s case is contrasted with that of the United Arab Emirates, where in August 2020, the United States agreed to consider approving F-35s as part of a normalization framework with Israel, a path Qatar has not pursued and shows no indication of pursuing. A reference price of around $80 million for an F-35A is cited, alongside the understanding that any potential sale would require congressional approval and could take years to negotiate and deliver.
Qatar’s persistence in seeking the F-35 is rooted in the scale of its air force expansion over the past decade. The Qatar Emiri Air Force, formally established in 1974 with origins in a 1967 air wing that initially operated helicopters, evolved from a small force into one of the most heavily equipped air arms in the Gulf. Key milestones include the acquisition of ex-RAF Hawker Hunter jets in 1971, the absorption of the Qatar Police Air Wing in 1983, participation on the allied side in the 1991 Gulf War, and involvement in Exercise Eagle Resolve in 2005 with medical and emergency teams alongside U.S. Marine forces. By 2010, personnel strength was about 2,100, with an inventory that included Mirage 2000-3EDA fighters, SA 342L Gazelle helicopters, and C-17A transport aircraft. In January 2011, Qatar evaluated multiple fighter candidates, including the Typhoon, F-35, F/A-18E-F, F-15E, and Rafale, to replace its Mirage 2000-5 fleet.
That evaluation led to a sequence of major procurement decisions that now define Qatar’s air force structure. In May 2015, Qatar awarded a contract for 24 Rafale fighters valued at €6.3 billion, or about $7 billion. In September 2016, a potential sale of up to 72 F-15QA aircraft was submitted to the U.S. Congress, followed in November 2016 by the signing of a $21.1 billion deal for 36 aircraft with an option for 36 more. Qatar ordered 24 Eurofighter Typhoons in September 2017 and 12 additional Rafales in December 2017 with an option for 36 more, while also expanding its training system with 24 PC-21 aircraft and increasing its C-17 fleet to eight. Current inventories are listed as 36 Rafale, 24 Typhoon with 12 more on order, and 37 F-15QA out of 48 ordered, as well as attack helicopters such as the AH-64E Apache.
Written by Jérôme Brahy
Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
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Qatar might have quietly resumed negotiations with Washington over a potential purchase of the F-35 stealth fighter, according to a report from Israel’s Channel 12.
According to Channel 12 on December 15, 2025, Qatar has reopened discussions with the United States over a potential acquisition of the F-35 stealth fighter jet, reviving a bid that was rejected roughly five years ago and signaling a possible shift in U.S. policy toward fighter jet sales in the Middle East. The talks are described as already underway and more advanced than in earlier attempts, taking place at a time when the United States is also potentially considering F-35 sales to other countries in the region, including Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey.
Follow Army Recognition on Google News at this link
For Qatar, the F-35 would represent an additional qualitative layer on top of an already large modern fleet, while in Israel, it raises questions about the potential impact on the country’s qualitative military edge. (Picture source: US Air Force)
Qatar’s current push follows an earlier formal attempt around 2020 to purchase the F-35, when Doha reached the letter-of-request stage in the U.S. foreign military sales process, marking a serious but ultimately unsuccessful step toward acquiring the aircraft. That effort stalled amid political and regional sensitivities, but the present discussions are portrayed as more concrete and taking place in a more permissive strategic environment. At the same time, Qatar’s bid is being considered alongside other high-profile cases, including a potential stealth-fighter track with Saudi Arabia, a possible revival of approval for the United Arab Emirates after a previously blocked deal, and discussions involving Turkey that are framed as conditional on Ankara no longer possessing or operating the S-400 system. From Israel’s perspective, the concern lies in the cumulative effect of these scenarios rather than in any single country, because multiple outcomes together could narrow Israel’s qualitative military edge in the air.
What is known as Israel’s qualitative military edge is a long-standing element of U.S. policy in the Middle East, originally intended to ensure that Israel maintains a measurable technological and operational advantage over other military forces in the region. Israel is currently the only regional operator of the F-35, with 45 F-35Is in service and 30 additional jets on order, and it has accumulated nearly a decade of operational experience with the F-35 across a range of mission profiles. Potential F-35 sales to countries such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar, or Morocco would not, in themselves, negate this advantage, particularly if export configurations differ from those of Israel, but they could reduce Israel’s exclusivity in fifth-generation capabilities. The wider distribution of stealth aircraft, advanced sensors, and networked air combat systems would likely complicate regional airspace management, increase the number of actors capable of conducting low-observable operations, and shorten the relative technological gap that has traditionally shaped Israel’s air superiority for years.
Israel’s response is centered on preparing a compensatory package to be sought from Washington if regional F-35 sales move forward. This package is described as including two additional fighter squadrons, one equipped with F-35s and another based on an advanced F-15I-family configuration tailored to Israeli requirements and referred to as F-15IA, along with expanded access to advanced munitions in especially large quantities. Timing is emphasized as critical, with Israeli officials pointing to a narrow decision window in which delays could translate into lost priority in U.S. production scheduling, affecting delivery timelines and long-term force planning. Israel is currently the only Middle Eastern operator of the F-35, flying 45 aircraft with another 30 on order, and has operated the type for nearly a decade, a status closely tied to the U.S. policy commitment to preserve Israel’s qualitative military edge.
The political and security environment surrounding Qatar adds further sensitivity to the fighter question. Qatar and Turkey are both described as hosting Hamas leaders and offices and as being openly opposed to Israel’s war in Gaza, with Israel accusing both states of supporting terrorism. The narrative includes Israeli airstrikes in Qatar in September that unsuccessfully targeted senior Hamas leaders in Doha, an episode that reportedly angered Qatari authorities and heightened bilateral tensions. This was followed by an executive order issued by President Trump declaring that any armed attack on Qatar would be considered a threat to the peace and security of the United States and warning of a harsh response to any future attack. These dynamics intersect with Qatar’s role as host of Al-Udeid Air Base, described as the largest U.S. military facility in the region with around 8,000 U.S. personnel, which was attacked by Iran earlier in the year in retaliation for U.S. strikes on Iran’s nuclear program.
Qatar’s broader relationship with the United States is described as having strengthened since President Trump began his second term in January, reinforcing Doha’s perception that political conditions may now be more favorable for advancing sensitive defense requests. Qatar has also donated a Boeing 747-8 VIP jet to the United States, which Washington is planning to convert for use as a temporary Air Force One until the new presidential aircraft are ready, reflecting an unusual element in bilateral military and diplomatic ties. At the same time, concerns in Washington linked to Qatar’s regional relationships and political positions continue to factor into deliberations over advanced arms transfers. Qatar’s case is contrasted with that of the United Arab Emirates, where in August 2020, the United States agreed to consider approving F-35s as part of a normalization framework with Israel, a path Qatar has not pursued and shows no indication of pursuing. A reference price of around $80 million for an F-35A is cited, alongside the understanding that any potential sale would require congressional approval and could take years to negotiate and deliver.
Qatar’s persistence in seeking the F-35 is rooted in the scale of its air force expansion over the past decade. The Qatar Emiri Air Force, formally established in 1974 with origins in a 1967 air wing that initially operated helicopters, evolved from a small force into one of the most heavily equipped air arms in the Gulf. Key milestones include the acquisition of ex-RAF Hawker Hunter jets in 1971, the absorption of the Qatar Police Air Wing in 1983, participation on the allied side in the 1991 Gulf War, and involvement in Exercise Eagle Resolve in 2005 with medical and emergency teams alongside U.S. Marine forces. By 2010, personnel strength was about 2,100, with an inventory that included Mirage 2000-3EDA fighters, SA 342L Gazelle helicopters, and C-17A transport aircraft. In January 2011, Qatar evaluated multiple fighter candidates, including the Typhoon, F-35, F/A-18E-F, F-15E, and Rafale, to replace its Mirage 2000-5 fleet.
That evaluation led to a sequence of major procurement decisions that now define Qatar’s air force structure. In May 2015, Qatar awarded a contract for 24 Rafale fighters valued at €6.3 billion, or about $7 billion. In September 2016, a potential sale of up to 72 F-15QA aircraft was submitted to the U.S. Congress, followed in November 2016 by the signing of a $21.1 billion deal for 36 aircraft with an option for 36 more. Qatar ordered 24 Eurofighter Typhoons in September 2017 and 12 additional Rafales in December 2017 with an option for 36 more, while also expanding its training system with 24 PC-21 aircraft and increasing its C-17 fleet to eight. Current inventories are listed as 36 Rafale, 24 Typhoon with 12 more on order, and 37 F-15QA out of 48 ordered, as well as attack helicopters such as the AH-64E Apache.
Written by Jérôme Brahy
Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
