Russia Strengthens Ka‑52 Attack Helicopter Arsenal With Updated Vikhr‑1 Missile Integration
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Kalashnikov Concern has completed its 2025 contract to deliver upgraded Vikhr‑1 missiles for Ka‑52 helicopters. Informed by combat use in Ukraine and supported by a 2026 export deal, the modernization strengthens Russia’s anti‑armour capabilities and global market presence.
On 14 November 2025, Russia’s Kalashnikov Concern announced that it had completed its 2025 state contract for the delivery of upgraded Vikhr-1 air-launched guided missiles for frontline aviation. The missiles, designed primarily for the Ka-52 Alligator attack helicopter, have been modernised using lessons drawn from intensive combat employment in the war in Ukraine. The announcement highlights both sustained demand from the Russian Ministry of Defence and the signing of a significant export contract scheduled for 2026. At a time when helicopter operations and anti-armour warfare remain central to the conflict, this development sheds light on the trajectory of Russia’s precision-guided missile portfolio and its ambitions on the international arms market.
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The upgraded Vikhr-1 and the completion of the 2025 government contract confirm that this missile will remain a central element of the Ka-52’s armament (Picture Source: Kalashnikov)
The Vikhr-1 is a high-precision, laser beam-riding guided missile developed to engage a wide spectrum of ground targets, from main battle tanks equipped with explosive reactive armour to fortified positions and soft targets. In its current configuration, the missile offers a range of up to 10 km and is credited with armour penetration around 750–800 mm behind reactive armour, giving it the ability to defeat most legacy and many modern armoured vehicles when properly employed. Mounted on the Ka-52, which can typically carry up to twelve Vikhr missiles on its wing pylons, the system is intended to deliver rapid, multiple engagements from stand-off distance while the helicopter uses its Shkval-type electro-optical sight and laser designator to guide the weapons. According to Kalashnikov, the latest upgrade cycle over the past two years drew heavily on after-action feedback from helicopter crews and on operational data from combat missions, while retaining the missile’s core characteristics: supersonic speed, compact dimensions and all-day capability in moderately adverse weather. In Russian service, the Ka-52/Vikhr combination is used not only against moving armoured columns but also against entrenched defensive lines, strongpoints and firing positions, reflecting the increasingly multirole use of anti-tank missiles in high-intensity conflict.
Developed in the late Soviet era as the 9K121 Vikhr system and adopted in the 1990s, the Vikhr family was initially designed to give attack helicopters a longer-range, more accurate alternative to earlier radio-guided missiles. The later Vikhr‑1 variant, created with the KBP design bureau, was integrated into Ka‑50 and Ka‑52 helicopters and, to a lesser extent, Su‑25T aircraft. Over the past decade, Kalashnikov has pursued several modernization programs, testing improved versions on upgraded helicopters and unmanned platforms. State contracts fulfilled in 2023–2024 included a new variant described as having “expanded combat capabilities.” Since 2022, the Vikhr‑1 has seen extensive use in Ukraine, primarily by Ka‑52 helicopters engaging Ukrainian armour and fortifications. In one instance, it even downed an unmanned aerial vehicle, highlighting its growing versatility in drone-heavy environments. The latest upgrade, though undisclosed in detail, appears to continue this combat‑driven process of refinement rather than represent a completely new system.
Compared with other guided weapons carried by Russian attack helicopters, the modernised Vikhr-1 occupies a specific niche that balances range, lethality and loadout. The 9M120 Ataka, still widely used on Mi-28 and some Ka-52 variants, typically offers a shorter maximum range of around 6–8 km depending on the version and similar or slightly higher nominal penetration, but relies on a radio command guidance link that is more exposed to interference and generally requires the helicopter to remain closer to enemy air defences. The heavier 9M123 Khrizantema family, which has been proposed in airborne variants, can reach up to 10 km with significantly higher penetration figures reportedly exceeding 1,000 mm behind reactive armour, but its size and weight make it less suitable for large salvo loads and it is more commonly associated with specialised ground platforms. At the other end of the spectrum, the newer LMUR (Izdeliye 305) missile carried by Ka-52M and Mi-28NM helicopters provides a substantially longer range of around 14–15 km and a 25 kg high-explosive warhead, combined with an imaging seeker and two-way datalink that enables “man-in-the-loop” guidance and engagement of non-line-of-sight targets. However, LMUR’s weight limits the number of missiles a helicopter can carry, and the system is more akin to a precision strike weapon for high-value, point targets than a mass anti-armour solution. In this context, Vikhr-1 stands out as a workhorse missile: lighter and more numerous per sortie than LMUR, faster and longer-ranged than standard Ataka, and optimised for rapid salvo fire against multiple armoured targets. Its laser beam-riding guidance offers good resistance to many common jamming techniques, but still requires the helicopter to maintain line-of-sight and stable tracking until impact, which exposes it to modern short-range air defence systems and man-portable missiles.
Beyond its technical aspects, the completion of the 2025 state order and a reported large export contract for 2026 carry clear strategic and geopolitical consequences. Militarily, assured supplies of upgraded Vikhr‑1 missiles strengthen Russia’s ability to conduct stand‑off anti‑armour strikes with Ka‑52 helicopters across extended fronts, partially offsetting helicopter losses and denser ground‑based air-defence networks. For Ukraine and partners, this reinforces the need for dispersal, camouflage, electronic‑warfare measures and layered air defences to counter low‑altitude precision strikes. Regionally, the export deal suggests Russian industry remains capable of marketing advanced guided weapons despite sanctions, which could bolster the strike capabilities of states operating Ka‑52s or compatible platforms and prompt increased demand for modern armour, active protection systems and counter‑UAS measures. Geostrategically, the move reflects a broader pattern: upgrading proven missile families with battlefield feedback to preserve their relevance against evolving Western armour and air‑defence technologies.
The upgraded Vikhr-1 and the completion of the 2025 government contract confirm that this missile will remain a central element of the Ka-52’s armament and, by extension, of Russia’s helicopter-borne anti-armour toolkit for the foreseeable future. The decision to refine an existing design based on real combat experience, rather than replace it outright, reflects both industrial pragmatism and the intensity of operational feedback generated by the war in Ukraine. The evolution of Vikhr-1 is a useful indicator of how Russia is adapting its precision-guided munitions to modern high-intensity warfare and of how it intends to position its attack helicopter offering on the export market. As deliveries of the modernised missiles continue and the export contract moves towards execution in 2026, close observation of their employment, performance and countermeasures will be essential to understanding the next phase of the competition between attack helicopters, armoured vehicles and air defence systems on contemporary battlefields.
Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.
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Kalashnikov Concern has completed its 2025 contract to deliver upgraded Vikhr‑1 missiles for Ka‑52 helicopters. Informed by combat use in Ukraine and supported by a 2026 export deal, the modernization strengthens Russia’s anti‑armour capabilities and global market presence.
On 14 November 2025, Russia’s Kalashnikov Concern announced that it had completed its 2025 state contract for the delivery of upgraded Vikhr-1 air-launched guided missiles for frontline aviation. The missiles, designed primarily for the Ka-52 Alligator attack helicopter, have been modernised using lessons drawn from intensive combat employment in the war in Ukraine. The announcement highlights both sustained demand from the Russian Ministry of Defence and the signing of a significant export contract scheduled for 2026. At a time when helicopter operations and anti-armour warfare remain central to the conflict, this development sheds light on the trajectory of Russia’s precision-guided missile portfolio and its ambitions on the international arms market.
The upgraded Vikhr-1 and the completion of the 2025 government contract confirm that this missile will remain a central element of the Ka-52’s armament (Picture Source: Kalashnikov)
The Vikhr-1 is a high-precision, laser beam-riding guided missile developed to engage a wide spectrum of ground targets, from main battle tanks equipped with explosive reactive armour to fortified positions and soft targets. In its current configuration, the missile offers a range of up to 10 km and is credited with armour penetration around 750–800 mm behind reactive armour, giving it the ability to defeat most legacy and many modern armoured vehicles when properly employed. Mounted on the Ka-52, which can typically carry up to twelve Vikhr missiles on its wing pylons, the system is intended to deliver rapid, multiple engagements from stand-off distance while the helicopter uses its Shkval-type electro-optical sight and laser designator to guide the weapons. According to Kalashnikov, the latest upgrade cycle over the past two years drew heavily on after-action feedback from helicopter crews and on operational data from combat missions, while retaining the missile’s core characteristics: supersonic speed, compact dimensions and all-day capability in moderately adverse weather. In Russian service, the Ka-52/Vikhr combination is used not only against moving armoured columns but also against entrenched defensive lines, strongpoints and firing positions, reflecting the increasingly multirole use of anti-tank missiles in high-intensity conflict.
Developed in the late Soviet era as the 9K121 Vikhr system and adopted in the 1990s, the Vikhr family was initially designed to give attack helicopters a longer-range, more accurate alternative to earlier radio-guided missiles. The later Vikhr‑1 variant, created with the KBP design bureau, was integrated into Ka‑50 and Ka‑52 helicopters and, to a lesser extent, Su‑25T aircraft. Over the past decade, Kalashnikov has pursued several modernization programs, testing improved versions on upgraded helicopters and unmanned platforms. State contracts fulfilled in 2023–2024 included a new variant described as having “expanded combat capabilities.” Since 2022, the Vikhr‑1 has seen extensive use in Ukraine, primarily by Ka‑52 helicopters engaging Ukrainian armour and fortifications. In one instance, it even downed an unmanned aerial vehicle, highlighting its growing versatility in drone-heavy environments. The latest upgrade, though undisclosed in detail, appears to continue this combat‑driven process of refinement rather than represent a completely new system.
Compared with other guided weapons carried by Russian attack helicopters, the modernised Vikhr-1 occupies a specific niche that balances range, lethality and loadout. The 9M120 Ataka, still widely used on Mi-28 and some Ka-52 variants, typically offers a shorter maximum range of around 6–8 km depending on the version and similar or slightly higher nominal penetration, but relies on a radio command guidance link that is more exposed to interference and generally requires the helicopter to remain closer to enemy air defences. The heavier 9M123 Khrizantema family, which has been proposed in airborne variants, can reach up to 10 km with significantly higher penetration figures reportedly exceeding 1,000 mm behind reactive armour, but its size and weight make it less suitable for large salvo loads and it is more commonly associated with specialised ground platforms. At the other end of the spectrum, the newer LMUR (Izdeliye 305) missile carried by Ka-52M and Mi-28NM helicopters provides a substantially longer range of around 14–15 km and a 25 kg high-explosive warhead, combined with an imaging seeker and two-way datalink that enables “man-in-the-loop” guidance and engagement of non-line-of-sight targets. However, LMUR’s weight limits the number of missiles a helicopter can carry, and the system is more akin to a precision strike weapon for high-value, point targets than a mass anti-armour solution. In this context, Vikhr-1 stands out as a workhorse missile: lighter and more numerous per sortie than LMUR, faster and longer-ranged than standard Ataka, and optimised for rapid salvo fire against multiple armoured targets. Its laser beam-riding guidance offers good resistance to many common jamming techniques, but still requires the helicopter to maintain line-of-sight and stable tracking until impact, which exposes it to modern short-range air defence systems and man-portable missiles.
Beyond its technical aspects, the completion of the 2025 state order and a reported large export contract for 2026 carry clear strategic and geopolitical consequences. Militarily, assured supplies of upgraded Vikhr‑1 missiles strengthen Russia’s ability to conduct stand‑off anti‑armour strikes with Ka‑52 helicopters across extended fronts, partially offsetting helicopter losses and denser ground‑based air-defence networks. For Ukraine and partners, this reinforces the need for dispersal, camouflage, electronic‑warfare measures and layered air defences to counter low‑altitude precision strikes. Regionally, the export deal suggests Russian industry remains capable of marketing advanced guided weapons despite sanctions, which could bolster the strike capabilities of states operating Ka‑52s or compatible platforms and prompt increased demand for modern armour, active protection systems and counter‑UAS measures. Geostrategically, the move reflects a broader pattern: upgrading proven missile families with battlefield feedback to preserve their relevance against evolving Western armour and air‑defence technologies.
The upgraded Vikhr-1 and the completion of the 2025 government contract confirm that this missile will remain a central element of the Ka-52’s armament and, by extension, of Russia’s helicopter-borne anti-armour toolkit for the foreseeable future. The decision to refine an existing design based on real combat experience, rather than replace it outright, reflects both industrial pragmatism and the intensity of operational feedback generated by the war in Ukraine. The evolution of Vikhr-1 is a useful indicator of how Russia is adapting its precision-guided munitions to modern high-intensity warfare and of how it intends to position its attack helicopter offering on the export market. As deliveries of the modernised missiles continue and the export contract moves towards execution in 2026, close observation of their employment, performance and countermeasures will be essential to understanding the next phase of the competition between attack helicopters, armoured vehicles and air defence systems on contemporary battlefields.
Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.
