Russian Delivery of Six Mi-28NE Helicopters Elevates Iran’s Rotary Strike Capabilities and Tactical Reach
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Iran has reportedly begun receiving up to six Russian Mi-28NE Night Hunter attack helicopters under a €500 million arms package with Moscow, according to leaked documents cited by the Financial Times and Iran International. The move signals Tehran’s effort to rebuild rotary wing strike and low-altitude defense capabilities after last year’s conflict with Israel, with implications for U.S. force planning in the region.
On February 23, 2026, new reporting based on leaked Russian documents indicates that Iran has quietly begun receiving Russian Mi-28NE “Night Hunter” attack helicopters as part of a wider, €500 million arms package with Moscow. According to the Financial Times and Iran International, Tehran is assessed to have taken delivery of up to six Mi-28s in January, with at least one aircraft reportedly operated over the capital this month, alongside a large order for Verba man-portable air-defense systems. This development comes less than a year after Iran’s air defenses were severely degraded during a 12-day conflict with Israel in which U.S. forces briefly intervened, and it signals a renewed effort to rebuild low-altitude and rotary-wing strike capabilities under Russian tutelage.
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Iran has reportedly received up to six Russian Mi-28NE Night Hunter attack helicopters as part of a €500 million arms package, marking a significant step in rebuilding its rotary wing strike and low altitude defense capabilities after last year’s conflict with Israel (Picture Source: Rosoboronexport)
Current indications from Western and regional media, corroborated by flight-tracking of Il-76 cargo aircraft between Mineralnye Vody and Iranian bases, suggest that Russia has begun delivering Mi-28NEs as part of an evolving package that also includes Verba MANPADS and associated night-vision equipment. The Financial Times reports that up to six Mi-28s arrived in January 2026, and that at least one airframe has already flown over Tehran, while Iran International cites the same leaked documentation to describe repeated heavy-lift sorties into Karaj in late December and early January. No official confirmation has yet been issued by Tehran or Moscow, but imagery circulating on open sources and corroborating reports point toward an initial batch sufficient to form a small detachment or nucleus of a future squadron. For now, this remains an “assessed” capability rather than a formally declared one, but the pattern is consistent with Russia’s broader practice of front-loading key platforms to close partners ahead of the main schedule of contracted deliveries.
The Mi-28NE is the export derivative of Russia’s dedicated Night Hunter attack helicopter, designed from the outset as a two-seat, tandem-cockpit gunship optimized for low-altitude, day-night operations rather than troop transport. Powered by twin turboshaft engines in the 2,200 hp class, the aircraft has a maximum take-off weight of around 11.7–12.1 tonnes, a top speed in the 280–320 km/h range and a ferry range of roughly 1,000 km, with a practical combat radius far shorter but adequate for regional missions over western Iran, the Gulf littoral and border regions. Survivability is built around a heavily armored cockpit and protected fuel tanks, crashworthy landing gear, redundancy in key hydraulic and flight-control systems and an integrated countermeasures suite with chaff, flares and infrared jamming. The Night Hunter’s avionics architecture, typically including an over-rotor or mast-mounted radar, electro-optical turrets, laser rangefinders and helmet-slaved sights, is designed to allow the crew to detect, classify and engage armored vehicles, fortifications and low-flying aircraft in poor weather and at night, a qualitative leap over Iran’s aging AH-1J/T Cobra fleet.
Armament is centered on the chin-mounted 30 mm 2A42 autocannon with roughly 250 ready rounds, slaved to the gunner’s sight or to helmet cueing, and on four underwing hardpoints capable of carrying up to 2,300 kg of ordnance. Typical load-outs include up to 16 laser-beam-riding Ataka or Vikhr anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) capable of penetrating on the order of 1,000 mm of armor with explosive reactive armor (ERA), mixed pods of 80 mm and 122 mm unguided rockets for area suppression, and Igla-V short-range air-to-air missiles for self-defense against helicopters, drones and low-flying fixed-wing aircraft. In operational terms, this gives Iran, for the first time, a modern rotary-wing platform combining precision anti-armor fires, organic counter-UAV potential via the 30 mm gun and short-range air-to-air capability on a single airframe. If, as some Russian reporting suggests, the Night Hunter export standard is progressively aligned with the latest Mi-28NM avionics and weapons suite, the Iranian aircraft could eventually integrate more advanced missiles and sensor packages than currently announced.
In Iranian service, the Mi-28NE detachment is likely to be tasked with a mix of close air support, anti-armor ambush, and point defense missions around high-value assets. Basing the helicopters near key nuclear sites, strategic air-defense nodes or coastal areas along the Persian Gulf would allow Iran to generate responsive rotary-wing fires against ground incursions, special operations forces, or amphibious movements by regional adversaries. The platform’s night-attack profile, flying nap-of-the-earth using terrain-following tactics, then “popping up” for brief engagement windows, could also be adapted to defend critical infrastructure against small raiding parties or to escort Iranian transport helicopters during cross-border operations into Iraqi or Syrian airspace. For U.S. and partner land forces, this means a more credible threat of low-altitude, stand-off ATGM engagements out to several kilometers from Iranian positions, especially if the Mi-28s are integrated into Iran’s emerging unmanned reconnaissance architecture, which already includes a large inventory of reconnaissance and loitering drones.
Army Recognition has recently underlined how Russian industry is transforming the Mi-28 family’s weapons ecosystem with longer-range, higher-speed guided munitions. In a detailed analysis of the upgraded Khrizantema-M missile, it has been reported that the latest 9M123M/VM family now combines an extended engagement range of around 10 km with sustained supersonic flight, supported by dual guidance channels in millimeter-wave radar beam-riding and laser beam-riding modes. Crucially, Army Recognition noted that this modernised missile is already being integrated on Russian Mi-28NM and Ka-52M attack helicopters and employed not only as an anti-tank weapon but also as a very-short-range air-defense asset against slow helicopters and larger unmanned aerial vehicles in Ukraine.
For Iran, any future package that includes Khrizantema-class missiles would allow Mi-28 crews to prosecute armored columns, artillery positions or logistics hubs from outside the typical 5–6 km kinematic envelope of modern MANPADS, while retaining the option to engage medium-sized drones and rotary-wing intruders as part of a layered low-altitude defense. From a U.S. perspective, that combination, stand-off ATGMs plus limited VSHORAD functionality on a maneuvering helicopter platform, complicates the planning of low-level ingress routes for special operations aircraft and attack aviation in a contingency involving Iranian forces.
A second strand of Russian modernization highlighted by Army Recognition relates directly to the Mi-28’s 30 mm gun. On 5 February 2026, Rostec unveiled a new 30×165 mm programmable airburst cartridge for the 2A42 cannon, explicitly designed to defeat small UAVs and loitering munitions by detonating at a calculated point along the target’s trajectory and creating a dense fragmentation cloud. Army Recognition’s reporting emphasizes that the round is intended for both ground platforms, such as BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicles and BMPT tank-support vehicles and for attack helicopters including the Mi-28NM and Ka-52M, turning legacy cannons into distributed counter-drone tools. If a similar capability is eventually fielded on Iranian Mi-28NEs, each helicopter could generate a localized anti-UAV “bubble” out to roughly 2–4 km, using short, precisely programmed bursts instead of expending expensive surface-to-air missiles on small quadcopters or FPV drones.
In practice, that would enhance the survivability of the helicopters themselves against hostile drones and allow them to escort Iranian troop transports, protect landing zones or cover armored formations moving through drone-saturated terrain. For U.S. forces accustomed to exploiting small UAVs for real-time targeting and battle damage assessment, the proliferation of gun-based airburst counter-drone capabilities on adversary attack helicopters would require adjustments in TTPs, including greater emphasis on low-probability-of-intercept links and standoff ISR.
The appearance of Mi-28NEs in Iranian colors, even in small numbers, underscores the deepening alignment between Moscow and Tehran at a time when Russia continues to rely on Iranian drones and missiles for its war in Ukraine. Army Recognition has already framed the upgraded Khrizantema-M and the 30 mm airburst round as export-oriented, combat-validated products being showcased at global events such as World Defense Show 2026, alongside Russian attack helicopters and BMP-3-based vehicles. Iran, as a partner that has supplied Russia with Fath-360 ballistic missiles and Shahed-type UAVs, is well placed to benefit from that export push.
The Mi-28NEs are also reported to be the first post-Soviet Russian combat aircraft actually delivered to Iran, a symbolic threshold that moves the bilateral relationship beyond air defense systems and drones into the domain of modern combat aviation. For U.S. defense planners focused on the CENTCOM theater, this trend points to a gradual thickening of Iran’s integrated air defense and strike complex at low and medium altitudes: Verba MANPADS on dispersed teams, Mi-28s with precision ATGMs and potential counter-UAV ammunition, and an expanding inventory of drones and cruise missiles, all benefiting from Russian combat experience and fire-control software.
At the same time, the scale and readiness of this new rotary-wing capability should not be overstated. A force of six attack helicopters, assuming all aircraft are delivered, assembled, and brought to operational status, is sufficient to defend a handful of critical areas or to support limited expeditionary operations, but not to sustain large-scale deep-attack campaigns. Iran will need time to build aircrew proficiency, integrate Russian mission systems into its command-and-control architecture, and establish a robust maintenance and logistics pipeline under sanctions. Given the lack of official confirmation and the likelihood that these airframes will initially be concentrated at a small number of bases, U.S. and allied forces will retain substantial scope to map their operating patterns, signatures and vulnerabilities through ISR, electronic intelligence and open-source analysis. From a U.S. vantage point, the more Iran leans on Russian platforms and munitions, the more its order of battle also inherits the known limitations and exploitable patterns of Russian rotary-wing doctrine as observed over Ukraine.
The reported delivery of Mi-28NE Night Hunters to Iran does not in itself redefine the regional balance of power, but it does alter the geometry of risk at low altitude around critical infrastructure and along potential avenues of approach. A modern Russian attack helicopter armed with long-range anti-tank guided missiles and potentially equipped with airburst counter-drone munitions reflects lessons drawn from recent high-intensity operations, lessons that could now shape Iranian concepts of employment in the Gulf, the Levant and adjacent theaters.
Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.
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Iran has reportedly begun receiving up to six Russian Mi-28NE Night Hunter attack helicopters under a €500 million arms package with Moscow, according to leaked documents cited by the Financial Times and Iran International. The move signals Tehran’s effort to rebuild rotary wing strike and low-altitude defense capabilities after last year’s conflict with Israel, with implications for U.S. force planning in the region.
On February 23, 2026, new reporting based on leaked Russian documents indicates that Iran has quietly begun receiving Russian Mi-28NE “Night Hunter” attack helicopters as part of a wider, €500 million arms package with Moscow. According to the Financial Times and Iran International, Tehran is assessed to have taken delivery of up to six Mi-28s in January, with at least one aircraft reportedly operated over the capital this month, alongside a large order for Verba man-portable air-defense systems. This development comes less than a year after Iran’s air defenses were severely degraded during a 12-day conflict with Israel in which U.S. forces briefly intervened, and it signals a renewed effort to rebuild low-altitude and rotary-wing strike capabilities under Russian tutelage.
Iran has reportedly received up to six Russian Mi-28NE Night Hunter attack helicopters as part of a €500 million arms package, marking a significant step in rebuilding its rotary wing strike and low altitude defense capabilities after last year’s conflict with Israel (Picture Source: Rosoboronexport)
Current indications from Western and regional media, corroborated by flight-tracking of Il-76 cargo aircraft between Mineralnye Vody and Iranian bases, suggest that Russia has begun delivering Mi-28NEs as part of an evolving package that also includes Verba MANPADS and associated night-vision equipment. The Financial Times reports that up to six Mi-28s arrived in January 2026, and that at least one airframe has already flown over Tehran, while Iran International cites the same leaked documentation to describe repeated heavy-lift sorties into Karaj in late December and early January. No official confirmation has yet been issued by Tehran or Moscow, but imagery circulating on open sources and corroborating reports point toward an initial batch sufficient to form a small detachment or nucleus of a future squadron. For now, this remains an “assessed” capability rather than a formally declared one, but the pattern is consistent with Russia’s broader practice of front-loading key platforms to close partners ahead of the main schedule of contracted deliveries.
The Mi-28NE is the export derivative of Russia’s dedicated Night Hunter attack helicopter, designed from the outset as a two-seat, tandem-cockpit gunship optimized for low-altitude, day-night operations rather than troop transport. Powered by twin turboshaft engines in the 2,200 hp class, the aircraft has a maximum take-off weight of around 11.7–12.1 tonnes, a top speed in the 280–320 km/h range and a ferry range of roughly 1,000 km, with a practical combat radius far shorter but adequate for regional missions over western Iran, the Gulf littoral and border regions. Survivability is built around a heavily armored cockpit and protected fuel tanks, crashworthy landing gear, redundancy in key hydraulic and flight-control systems and an integrated countermeasures suite with chaff, flares and infrared jamming. The Night Hunter’s avionics architecture, typically including an over-rotor or mast-mounted radar, electro-optical turrets, laser rangefinders and helmet-slaved sights, is designed to allow the crew to detect, classify and engage armored vehicles, fortifications and low-flying aircraft in poor weather and at night, a qualitative leap over Iran’s aging AH-1J/T Cobra fleet.
Armament is centered on the chin-mounted 30 mm 2A42 autocannon with roughly 250 ready rounds, slaved to the gunner’s sight or to helmet cueing, and on four underwing hardpoints capable of carrying up to 2,300 kg of ordnance. Typical load-outs include up to 16 laser-beam-riding Ataka or Vikhr anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) capable of penetrating on the order of 1,000 mm of armor with explosive reactive armor (ERA), mixed pods of 80 mm and 122 mm unguided rockets for area suppression, and Igla-V short-range air-to-air missiles for self-defense against helicopters, drones and low-flying fixed-wing aircraft. In operational terms, this gives Iran, for the first time, a modern rotary-wing platform combining precision anti-armor fires, organic counter-UAV potential via the 30 mm gun and short-range air-to-air capability on a single airframe. If, as some Russian reporting suggests, the Night Hunter export standard is progressively aligned with the latest Mi-28NM avionics and weapons suite, the Iranian aircraft could eventually integrate more advanced missiles and sensor packages than currently announced.
In Iranian service, the Mi-28NE detachment is likely to be tasked with a mix of close air support, anti-armor ambush, and point defense missions around high-value assets. Basing the helicopters near key nuclear sites, strategic air-defense nodes or coastal areas along the Persian Gulf would allow Iran to generate responsive rotary-wing fires against ground incursions, special operations forces, or amphibious movements by regional adversaries. The platform’s night-attack profile, flying nap-of-the-earth using terrain-following tactics, then “popping up” for brief engagement windows, could also be adapted to defend critical infrastructure against small raiding parties or to escort Iranian transport helicopters during cross-border operations into Iraqi or Syrian airspace. For U.S. and partner land forces, this means a more credible threat of low-altitude, stand-off ATGM engagements out to several kilometers from Iranian positions, especially if the Mi-28s are integrated into Iran’s emerging unmanned reconnaissance architecture, which already includes a large inventory of reconnaissance and loitering drones.
Army Recognition has recently underlined how Russian industry is transforming the Mi-28 family’s weapons ecosystem with longer-range, higher-speed guided munitions. In a detailed analysis of the upgraded Khrizantema-M missile, it has been reported that the latest 9M123M/VM family now combines an extended engagement range of around 10 km with sustained supersonic flight, supported by dual guidance channels in millimeter-wave radar beam-riding and laser beam-riding modes. Crucially, Army Recognition noted that this modernised missile is already being integrated on Russian Mi-28NM and Ka-52M attack helicopters and employed not only as an anti-tank weapon but also as a very-short-range air-defense asset against slow helicopters and larger unmanned aerial vehicles in Ukraine.
For Iran, any future package that includes Khrizantema-class missiles would allow Mi-28 crews to prosecute armored columns, artillery positions or logistics hubs from outside the typical 5–6 km kinematic envelope of modern MANPADS, while retaining the option to engage medium-sized drones and rotary-wing intruders as part of a layered low-altitude defense. From a U.S. perspective, that combination, stand-off ATGMs plus limited VSHORAD functionality on a maneuvering helicopter platform, complicates the planning of low-level ingress routes for special operations aircraft and attack aviation in a contingency involving Iranian forces.
A second strand of Russian modernization highlighted by Army Recognition relates directly to the Mi-28’s 30 mm gun. On 5 February 2026, Rostec unveiled a new 30×165 mm programmable airburst cartridge for the 2A42 cannon, explicitly designed to defeat small UAVs and loitering munitions by detonating at a calculated point along the target’s trajectory and creating a dense fragmentation cloud. Army Recognition’s reporting emphasizes that the round is intended for both ground platforms, such as BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicles and BMPT tank-support vehicles and for attack helicopters including the Mi-28NM and Ka-52M, turning legacy cannons into distributed counter-drone tools. If a similar capability is eventually fielded on Iranian Mi-28NEs, each helicopter could generate a localized anti-UAV “bubble” out to roughly 2–4 km, using short, precisely programmed bursts instead of expending expensive surface-to-air missiles on small quadcopters or FPV drones.
In practice, that would enhance the survivability of the helicopters themselves against hostile drones and allow them to escort Iranian troop transports, protect landing zones or cover armored formations moving through drone-saturated terrain. For U.S. forces accustomed to exploiting small UAVs for real-time targeting and battle damage assessment, the proliferation of gun-based airburst counter-drone capabilities on adversary attack helicopters would require adjustments in TTPs, including greater emphasis on low-probability-of-intercept links and standoff ISR.
The appearance of Mi-28NEs in Iranian colors, even in small numbers, underscores the deepening alignment between Moscow and Tehran at a time when Russia continues to rely on Iranian drones and missiles for its war in Ukraine. Army Recognition has already framed the upgraded Khrizantema-M and the 30 mm airburst round as export-oriented, combat-validated products being showcased at global events such as World Defense Show 2026, alongside Russian attack helicopters and BMP-3-based vehicles. Iran, as a partner that has supplied Russia with Fath-360 ballistic missiles and Shahed-type UAVs, is well placed to benefit from that export push.
The Mi-28NEs are also reported to be the first post-Soviet Russian combat aircraft actually delivered to Iran, a symbolic threshold that moves the bilateral relationship beyond air defense systems and drones into the domain of modern combat aviation. For U.S. defense planners focused on the CENTCOM theater, this trend points to a gradual thickening of Iran’s integrated air defense and strike complex at low and medium altitudes: Verba MANPADS on dispersed teams, Mi-28s with precision ATGMs and potential counter-UAV ammunition, and an expanding inventory of drones and cruise missiles, all benefiting from Russian combat experience and fire-control software.
At the same time, the scale and readiness of this new rotary-wing capability should not be overstated. A force of six attack helicopters, assuming all aircraft are delivered, assembled, and brought to operational status, is sufficient to defend a handful of critical areas or to support limited expeditionary operations, but not to sustain large-scale deep-attack campaigns. Iran will need time to build aircrew proficiency, integrate Russian mission systems into its command-and-control architecture, and establish a robust maintenance and logistics pipeline under sanctions. Given the lack of official confirmation and the likelihood that these airframes will initially be concentrated at a small number of bases, U.S. and allied forces will retain substantial scope to map their operating patterns, signatures and vulnerabilities through ISR, electronic intelligence and open-source analysis. From a U.S. vantage point, the more Iran leans on Russian platforms and munitions, the more its order of battle also inherits the known limitations and exploitable patterns of Russian rotary-wing doctrine as observed over Ukraine.
The reported delivery of Mi-28NE Night Hunters to Iran does not in itself redefine the regional balance of power, but it does alter the geometry of risk at low altitude around critical infrastructure and along potential avenues of approach. A modern Russian attack helicopter armed with long-range anti-tank guided missiles and potentially equipped with airburst counter-drone munitions reflects lessons drawn from recent high-intensity operations, lessons that could now shape Iranian concepts of employment in the Gulf, the Levant and adjacent theaters.
Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.
