Russia’s Orion Drone Seen Carrying Kh-BPLA Missiles Signaling Expanded Precision Strike Capability
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Fresh images circulating on Russian social media appear to show the Orion MALE drone equipped with two Kh-BPLA laser-guided missiles. The loadout suggests Russia is moving to give its unmanned fleet more persistent, lower signature precision strike options near Ukraine’s front line.
On 18 November 2025, new images of Russia’s Orion reconnaissance and strike UAV armed with two Kh-BPLA laser-guided missiles began circulating on Russian social media, as reported by Russian social media channels and reposted by OSINT accounts on X. These photos appear to show a fully weaponized configuration of the medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) drone that until now had mainly been associated with light guided bombs and test articles for the Kh-BPLA. Emerging in the context of Russia’s intensive drone and missile campaign against Ukraine, and just as the Kh-BPLA is being promoted at international venues such as the Dubai Airshow, the imagery suggests a new step in integrating precision air-to-surface weapons on Russian MALE UAVs. If confirmed as operational rather than purely demonstrative, this pairing could modestly expand Russia’s capacity for persistent, low-signature precision strikes near the front line.
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The Orion drone carries the Kh-BPLA missile, allowing it to strike targets accurately from a safe distance, expanding its role beyond just reconnaissance (Picture Source: Russian Social Media)
The images show an Orion UAV on a dimly lit airstrip with a Kh-BPLA missile carried under each wing, identifiable by the compact cylindrical launch canisters and control surfaces that match missiles previously displayed under the export name Kh-UAV or X-UAV. Developed by KBP (Instrument Design Bureau) under the Rostec High-Precision Systems holding, the Kh-BPLA is a short-range guided missile intended for UAVs and helicopters. It reuses the propulsion and warhead architecture of the 9M133 Kornet family while adopting the semi-active laser guidance approach previously fielded on the Krasnopol artillery shell, bringing those components into a 32 kg air-launched round (42 kg in its launch container). With a stated engagement envelope of roughly 2 to 8 km from a launch altitude of up to 4,000 m and a 6 kg high-explosive fragmentation warhead containing about 3.2 kg of explosive, the missile is designed for soft and lightly armored targets such as vehicles, artillery positions, small boats and troop concentrations rather than modern main battle tanks. Russian sources have also floated the idea of salvo-firing two missiles along the same laser line of sight to complicate active protection systems, a tactic that fits with the twin-missile load visible on the Orion.
The Orion itself, developed by Russia’s Kronstadt Group, is Russia’s first domestically produced MALE strike and reconnaissance UAV to enter series production. In its export-oriented Orion-E configuration, the aircraft has a wingspan of 16 m, a length of 8 m and a maximum take-off weight of around 1,150 kg, with a payload capacity of up to 250 kg distributed over three hardpoints (two underwing, one under the fuselage). Its aerodynamic layout, a slender, elongated fuselage, straight mid-mounted wings with clipped tips, V-tail and fixed tricycle landing gear, is optimised for endurance and stable sensor operation rather than high manoeuvrability. Official data places its endurance at up to 24–30 hours and its radius of action at 250 km on line-of-sight datalink, extendable via satellite communications, while open sources note carriage of small guided bombs such as the 20 kg KAB-20 and light missiles like the Kh-50 and S8000 “Banderol” cruise missile. This positions Orion in the same functional category as the U.S. MQ-1 Predator or Turkish Bayraktar TB2, a platform combining persistent surveillance with limited strike capacity.
Orion UAVs have seen combat in Syria and in several phases of the war in Ukraine, though in far smaller numbers and with less visibility than cheaper loitering munitions like Lancet or mass-produced FPV drones. Reports from Ukraine and Western sources note Orion’s reconnaissance-strike role as well as its vulnerability to air defenses, with downed airframes showing Kh-BPLA or similar guided munitions, evidence of ongoing missile integration trials. Ukrainian intelligence has also mapped the program’s supply chain, identifying 43 Russian firms and warning that access to foreign components could sustain production despite sanctions. In this context, recent social-media images suggest not a sudden breakthrough but the gradual maturation of an integration effort now approaching regular operational use or demonstration.
From a tactical perspective, integrating Kh-BPLA missiles on Orion shifts the drone from a primarily bomb-carrying platform to a more flexible guided-missile carrier. Compared with small glide bombs such as KAB-20, a laser-guided missile offers faster time-to-target, better trajectory control and the possibility of firing from slightly greater stand-off distance and less predictable headings, especially when engaging moving targets. With each Kh-BPLA adding about 42 kg with container, a twin-missile load remains well within the 250 kg payload envelope and preserves endurance, but gives the operator at least two precision engagements per sortie against vehicles, artillery or air-defence radars exposed near the front. This architecture loosely parallels other MALE-missile pairings, for example, the Predator armed with Hellfire or the Bayraktar TB2 carrying MAM-L glide munitions, but on a smaller scale. Hellfire-class missiles weigh roughly 45–49 kg with warheads around 8–9 kg, whereas MAM-L weighs about 22 kg with a 10 kg warhead and an advertised range of up to 15 km; Kh-BPLA, at 32/42 kg with a 6 kg warhead and an 8 km range, sits in between, favouring compactness and reuse of existing components over maximum penetration or reach. The need for continuous laser designation, by the UAV’s own sensor turret or a separate ground or aerial designator, does expose the system to jamming, obscurants and counter-battery response, but also enables relatively precise, low-collateral strikes when designation can be maintained.
In the current phase of the war, both Russia and Ukraine rely heavily on UAVs for artillery spotting, strike coordination, and direct attacks. The Orion-Kh-BPLA combination could allow Russian forces to engage time-sensitive or fleeting targets quickly, particularly in areas with limited Ukrainian medium- and long-range air defenses. Russian sources present the missile as a way to strike ground and small surface targets while keeping the UAV outside the reach of most short-range systems, including MANPADS and gun-based SHORAD. However, with a 2–8 km range, Orion still needs to operate near the front line, leaving it vulnerable to radar-guided weapons and fighter aircraft. This limits its role to that of a reusable precision platform for high-value targets close to Russian-controlled airspace, rather than a deep-strike or disposable system.
Strategically, the release of verified imagery of an Orion carrying Kh-BPLA missiles supports several narratives. For Russia’s domestic audience and potential export customers, it demonstrates that Moscow is fielding a complete ecosystem of unmanned strike capabilities, from small FPVs to loitering munitions and MALE drones with guided missiles, many of which are being showcased together at international events such as Army-2024 in Moscow and the Dubai Airshow 2025, where the X-UAV/Kh-UAV missile has been displayed alongside the Pantsir SMD-E air-defence system. At the geopolitical level, there is a significant probability that technologies embedded in Orion and Kh‑BPLA could remain exportable. Should sanctions enforcement weaken, the likelihood increases that such systems may proliferate to partners such as Iran or North Korea, extending MALE‑drone and precision‑strike expertise beyond the Ukrainian theatre. The need to publicize these systems on social media highlights Russia’s competition with Western and Turkish drone suppliers for political influence and defense contracts, especially in regions like the Middle East. Demonstrations at events such as the Dubai Airshow aim to leverage battlefield experience to secure export deals.
The new social-media images of an Orion UAV armed with two Kh-BPLA missiles are less a surprise revelation than a visual confirmation of trends already underway: Russia is trying to push its first-generation MALE drones from experimental and limited combat use toward more systematic integration with short-range guided munitions, and to advertise that progress abroad. Whether this tandem becomes a significant battlefield factor will depend on how many airframes and missiles Russia can actually field under sanctions, and how effectively Ukraine can continue to contest the airspace where Orion must operate. What is clear is that every new appearance of the drone-and-missile combination, even in carefully curated photographs on Russian social media, signals an ongoing race to adapt unmanned systems for precision warfare, a race in which imagery has become both a tool of communication and an early indicator of capabilities moving from exhibition stands to operational units.
Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.
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Fresh images circulating on Russian social media appear to show the Orion MALE drone equipped with two Kh-BPLA laser-guided missiles. The loadout suggests Russia is moving to give its unmanned fleet more persistent, lower signature precision strike options near Ukraine’s front line.
On 18 November 2025, new images of Russia’s Orion reconnaissance and strike UAV armed with two Kh-BPLA laser-guided missiles began circulating on Russian social media, as reported by Russian social media channels and reposted by OSINT accounts on X. These photos appear to show a fully weaponized configuration of the medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) drone that until now had mainly been associated with light guided bombs and test articles for the Kh-BPLA. Emerging in the context of Russia’s intensive drone and missile campaign against Ukraine, and just as the Kh-BPLA is being promoted at international venues such as the Dubai Airshow, the imagery suggests a new step in integrating precision air-to-surface weapons on Russian MALE UAVs. If confirmed as operational rather than purely demonstrative, this pairing could modestly expand Russia’s capacity for persistent, low-signature precision strikes near the front line.
The Orion drone carries the Kh-BPLA missile, allowing it to strike targets accurately from a safe distance, expanding its role beyond just reconnaissance (Picture Source: Russian Social Media)
The images show an Orion UAV on a dimly lit airstrip with a Kh-BPLA missile carried under each wing, identifiable by the compact cylindrical launch canisters and control surfaces that match missiles previously displayed under the export name Kh-UAV or X-UAV. Developed by KBP (Instrument Design Bureau) under the Rostec High-Precision Systems holding, the Kh-BPLA is a short-range guided missile intended for UAVs and helicopters. It reuses the propulsion and warhead architecture of the 9M133 Kornet family while adopting the semi-active laser guidance approach previously fielded on the Krasnopol artillery shell, bringing those components into a 32 kg air-launched round (42 kg in its launch container). With a stated engagement envelope of roughly 2 to 8 km from a launch altitude of up to 4,000 m and a 6 kg high-explosive fragmentation warhead containing about 3.2 kg of explosive, the missile is designed for soft and lightly armored targets such as vehicles, artillery positions, small boats and troop concentrations rather than modern main battle tanks. Russian sources have also floated the idea of salvo-firing two missiles along the same laser line of sight to complicate active protection systems, a tactic that fits with the twin-missile load visible on the Orion.
The Orion itself, developed by Russia’s Kronstadt Group, is Russia’s first domestically produced MALE strike and reconnaissance UAV to enter series production. In its export-oriented Orion-E configuration, the aircraft has a wingspan of 16 m, a length of 8 m and a maximum take-off weight of around 1,150 kg, with a payload capacity of up to 250 kg distributed over three hardpoints (two underwing, one under the fuselage). Its aerodynamic layout, a slender, elongated fuselage, straight mid-mounted wings with clipped tips, V-tail and fixed tricycle landing gear, is optimised for endurance and stable sensor operation rather than high manoeuvrability. Official data places its endurance at up to 24–30 hours and its radius of action at 250 km on line-of-sight datalink, extendable via satellite communications, while open sources note carriage of small guided bombs such as the 20 kg KAB-20 and light missiles like the Kh-50 and S8000 “Banderol” cruise missile. This positions Orion in the same functional category as the U.S. MQ-1 Predator or Turkish Bayraktar TB2, a platform combining persistent surveillance with limited strike capacity.
Orion UAVs have seen combat in Syria and in several phases of the war in Ukraine, though in far smaller numbers and with less visibility than cheaper loitering munitions like Lancet or mass-produced FPV drones. Reports from Ukraine and Western sources note Orion’s reconnaissance-strike role as well as its vulnerability to air defenses, with downed airframes showing Kh-BPLA or similar guided munitions, evidence of ongoing missile integration trials. Ukrainian intelligence has also mapped the program’s supply chain, identifying 43 Russian firms and warning that access to foreign components could sustain production despite sanctions. In this context, recent social-media images suggest not a sudden breakthrough but the gradual maturation of an integration effort now approaching regular operational use or demonstration.
From a tactical perspective, integrating Kh-BPLA missiles on Orion shifts the drone from a primarily bomb-carrying platform to a more flexible guided-missile carrier. Compared with small glide bombs such as KAB-20, a laser-guided missile offers faster time-to-target, better trajectory control and the possibility of firing from slightly greater stand-off distance and less predictable headings, especially when engaging moving targets. With each Kh-BPLA adding about 42 kg with container, a twin-missile load remains well within the 250 kg payload envelope and preserves endurance, but gives the operator at least two precision engagements per sortie against vehicles, artillery or air-defence radars exposed near the front. This architecture loosely parallels other MALE-missile pairings, for example, the Predator armed with Hellfire or the Bayraktar TB2 carrying MAM-L glide munitions, but on a smaller scale. Hellfire-class missiles weigh roughly 45–49 kg with warheads around 8–9 kg, whereas MAM-L weighs about 22 kg with a 10 kg warhead and an advertised range of up to 15 km; Kh-BPLA, at 32/42 kg with a 6 kg warhead and an 8 km range, sits in between, favouring compactness and reuse of existing components over maximum penetration or reach. The need for continuous laser designation, by the UAV’s own sensor turret or a separate ground or aerial designator, does expose the system to jamming, obscurants and counter-battery response, but also enables relatively precise, low-collateral strikes when designation can be maintained.
In the current phase of the war, both Russia and Ukraine rely heavily on UAVs for artillery spotting, strike coordination, and direct attacks. The Orion-Kh-BPLA combination could allow Russian forces to engage time-sensitive or fleeting targets quickly, particularly in areas with limited Ukrainian medium- and long-range air defenses. Russian sources present the missile as a way to strike ground and small surface targets while keeping the UAV outside the reach of most short-range systems, including MANPADS and gun-based SHORAD. However, with a 2–8 km range, Orion still needs to operate near the front line, leaving it vulnerable to radar-guided weapons and fighter aircraft. This limits its role to that of a reusable precision platform for high-value targets close to Russian-controlled airspace, rather than a deep-strike or disposable system.
Strategically, the release of verified imagery of an Orion carrying Kh-BPLA missiles supports several narratives. For Russia’s domestic audience and potential export customers, it demonstrates that Moscow is fielding a complete ecosystem of unmanned strike capabilities, from small FPVs to loitering munitions and MALE drones with guided missiles, many of which are being showcased together at international events such as Army-2024 in Moscow and the Dubai Airshow 2025, where the X-UAV/Kh-UAV missile has been displayed alongside the Pantsir SMD-E air-defence system. At the geopolitical level, there is a significant probability that technologies embedded in Orion and Kh‑BPLA could remain exportable. Should sanctions enforcement weaken, the likelihood increases that such systems may proliferate to partners such as Iran or North Korea, extending MALE‑drone and precision‑strike expertise beyond the Ukrainian theatre. The need to publicize these systems on social media highlights Russia’s competition with Western and Turkish drone suppliers for political influence and defense contracts, especially in regions like the Middle East. Demonstrations at events such as the Dubai Airshow aim to leverage battlefield experience to secure export deals.
The new social-media images of an Orion UAV armed with two Kh-BPLA missiles are less a surprise revelation than a visual confirmation of trends already underway: Russia is trying to push its first-generation MALE drones from experimental and limited combat use toward more systematic integration with short-range guided munitions, and to advertise that progress abroad. Whether this tandem becomes a significant battlefield factor will depend on how many airframes and missiles Russia can actually field under sanctions, and how effectively Ukraine can continue to contest the airspace where Orion must operate. What is clear is that every new appearance of the drone-and-missile combination, even in carefully curated photographs on Russian social media, signals an ongoing race to adapt unmanned systems for precision warfare, a race in which imagery has become both a tool of communication and an early indicator of capabilities moving from exhibition stands to operational units.
Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.
