Saab and CAE partner for potential Canadian Gripen fighter fleet support and pilot training
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Saab and CAE signed a Memorandum of Understanding on July 17, 2026, to establish a Canadian-based pilot training, simulator operation, and mission systems engineering framework for the Gripen E fighter jet. The agreement is designed to provide sovereign software management, maintenance, and flight instruction if the Government of Canada selects the aircraft for the Royal Canadian Air Force. Assigning classified mission-data updates, software integration, and synthetic training to domestic facilities mitigates logistics burdens and reduces long-term reliance on foreign engineering support.
The agreement positions CAE to operate full-mission simulators, train aircrews and maintainers, and perform domestic systems integration if Ottawa incorporates up to 72 Gripen Es alongside its F-35A fleet. In a potential mixed-fleet architecture, the Gripen E offers an estimated operating cost of $7,000 to $10,000 per flight hour, multi-role mission flexibility, and a ten-minute turnaround time for dispersed Arctic operations.
Related topic: Canada considers purchasing 72 Swedish Gripen fighters alongside U.S. F-35s in 140-fighter mixed fleet
Beyond the Gripen E, Saab’s Canadian proposal now incorporates GlobalEye airborne surveillance, domestic assembly, mission software engineering, pilot and technician training, long-term sustainment, and a wide industrial participation. (Picture source: Saab)
On July 17, 2026, Saab and CAE signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that would make the Canadian company responsible for Gripen E pilot training, technician qualification, simulator operation, mission systems engineering and long-term support if Ottawa selects the Swedish fighter for the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF). The agreement moves CAE beyond its traditional role as a training supplier by assigning it work on classified software, systems integration, verification, mission-data management and future upgrades. It also adds a concrete support structure to Saab’s broader Canadian proposal, which now combines as many as 72 Gripen Es, five to six GlobalEye airborne early warning aircraft, domestic assembly, Canadian-controlled sustainment, local software engineering and potential export production.
Ottawa is examining this package while reviewing whether to complete the original 88-aircraft F-35A acquisition or create a mixed force in which F-35As conduct missions requiring low observability and deeper integration with U.S. forces, Gripen Es provide daily air defence and Arctic operations, and GlobalEye aircraft supply airborne surveillance and command-and-control coverage over the next 30 to 40 years. Canada signed its F-35A agreement in January 2023 after selecting the American jet through an 88-fighter competition that had also included the Gripen, Rafale, Eurofighter Typhoon and F/A-18E/F Super Hornet. The acquisition was valued at C$19 billion, while total programme costs, including infrastructure, training, support and sustainment, were estimated above C$27 billion.
Ottawa is committed to the first 16 F-35As and has funded long-lead items connected to another 14 aircraft, but the remaining production quantity has not been fixed through a complete set of final contracts. Therefore, Prime Minister Mark Carney ordered a review on March 15, 2025, and stated ten days later that Canada could retain the initial 16 F-35As while examining another fighter for part of the requirement. Defence Minister David McGuinty confirmed on April 27, 2026, that the review remained active and that an additional foreign fighter could be purchased alongside a reduced F-35 fleet. One option has paired 30 F-35As with 60 Gripen Es, while another has combined 72 to 88 F-35As with as many as 72 Gripen Es, producing a fighter inventory close to 140 aircraft.
That upper figure would approach the 138 CF-18s originally acquired during the 1980s and would give the RCAF more fighters for NORAD alert duties, Arctic patrols, NATO deployments, training, maintenance rotation and attrition reserve. It would also require a major expansion in pilot production, technician numbers, simulator capacity, weapons inventories, spare engines, deployable maintenance units and northern operating infrastructure. The F-35A would remain Canada’s higher-end fighter in any mixed force because it offers low observability, extensive sensor fusion, passive electronic intelligence collection, secure datalinks and direct compatibility with U.S.-led air operations. A fleet of only 30 F-35As would preserve those capabilities but would provide limited depth once aircraft were divided among operational squadrons, training, scheduled maintenance, NORAD alert commitments and possible NATO deployments.
The Gripen E would not replace those functions on equal terms. Saab instead positions it as the higher-availability element of the force for routine air defence, Arctic sovereignty patrols, domestic quick reaction alert, pilot training and operations from dispersed locations. The fighter is powered by an F414-GE-39E turbofan producing 98 kN of thrust with afterburner, reaches Mach 2 and has a maximum take-off weight of 16,500 kg. Internal fuel capacity is 5.4 tonnes, compared with 3.4 tonnes in the Gripen C/D, and external payload reaches 7.2 tonnes across ten weapon stations. Its weapons options include Meteor, AIM-120 AMRAAM and IRIS-T air-to-air missiles, Taurus KEPD-350 stand-off missiles, guided bombs, anti-ship missiles, reconnaissance pods, electronic warfare payloads and external tanks.
The fighter can operate from runways measuring 800 metres and complete an air-to-air refuelling and rearming cycle in ten minutes with a small ground crew, giving it a practical role at dispersed sites where larger support footprints would be harder to sustain. The Gripen E’s sensor and electronic warfare architecture would also shape its role. The Raven ES-05 AESA radar is mounted on a mechanically repositioned swashplate, allowing the antenna to scan farther away from the aircraft’s centreline than a fixed-array radar and helping the pilot maintain target coverage while turning away from a threat. The Skyward-G infrared search and track sensor provides passive detection of airborne targets without requiring radar emissions, while the Arexis electronic warfare suite combines radar warning, emitter geolocation, digital jamming, missile-warning sensors and automated countermeasure management.
These systems are relevant to northern operations where Canadian fighters could face long-range bombers, cruise missiles, electronic surveillance aircraft and maritime targets across large distances. Analysis has placed Gripen operating costs at US$7,000 to US$10,000 per flight hour, compared with estimates commonly ranging from US$30,000 to US$40,000 for the F-35A, but those figures should not be treated as fixed Canadian costs. Actual expenditure would depend on the number of aircraft purchased, annual flying hours, local wage rates, fuel prices, spare engine holdings, simulator use, weapons integration, infrastructure and the degree to which Canada establishes its own maintenance and software support capacity. A mixed fleet could therefore reduce the cost of routine flying, but it would also create two separate logistics systems, two different diagnostic equipment, separate conversion courses and distinct software upgrade processes.
The July 17 agreement addresses that second-fleet burden by assigning CAE responsibility for the Canadian Gripen training and support structure. CAE would develop and operate full-mission simulators reproducing the Gripen E cockpit, radar, infrared sensor, electronic warfare functions, datalinks, weapons, emergency procedures and tactical employment. It would train pilots, instructors, maintainers, avionics specialists, engine technicians and weapons personnel using Canadian staff and Canadian-specific courseware. The company would also sustain and modernize the simulators as aircraft software and weapons configurations changed, preventing the training equipment from falling behind the operational fleet.
More importantly, Canadian engineers would conduct software development, systems integration, verification and validation work connected to classified mission systems. This would allow Canada to assess future software releases, test national modifications and manage sensitive NORAD information inside the country instead of transferring routine work to overseas facilities. Saab would still retain design authority over proprietary elements, and Canada would remain dependent on foreign suppliers for the F414 engine, Raven radar, Skyward-G sensor, Arexis components and imported weapons, but CAE’s role would reduce dependence on external engineering support for every software or configuration change.
CAE already has an industrial base large enough to perform much of this work without creating a new organisation from the ground up. Founded in 1947 as Canadian Aviation Electronics and headquartered in the Montreal area, the company employs 13,000 people worldwide, including more than 4,800 in Canada. Its Defence and Security division employs more than 5,000 personnel, operates at over 120 sites, supports customers in more than 60 countries and maintains an installed base exceeding 1,000 military simulators. Inside Canada, CAE operates across 13 locations, supports more than 30 simulators and training devices, and works with more than 425 Canadian suppliers. Its acquisition of L3Harris Technologies’ Military Training business, including Link Simulation & Training, expanded its activities into mission systems engineering, operational software, intelligence support, digital mission planning and AI-enabled decision assistance.
CAE is already involved in several Canadian programs, including the Future Fighter Lead-In Training, NATO Flying Training in Canada, Canadian Multi-Mission Aircraft training, Canadian Surface Combatant training and remotely piloted aircraft instruction. Through the SkyAlyne joint venture with KF Aerospace, it is also part of the C$11.2 billion, 25-year Future Aircrew Training programme, which will train RCAF pilots, air combat systems officers and airborne electronic sensor operators. This existing workforce and infrastructure would reduce the cost and time required to establish a national Gripen training system, although additional secure laboratories, Gripen-specific simulators and qualified engineering personnel would still be required.
The most consequential transfer would concern mission data and software rather than aircraft assembly. Gripen’s radar, warning receivers, electronic support measures and jamming equipment depend on classified files containing the characteristics of foreign radars, missile seekers, communications emitters and identification signals. A Canadian Mission Data Laboratory, for instance, would allow national specialists to produce, validate and update those files without routinely sending Canadian or NORAD electronic intelligence abroad. CAE engineers could also conduct integration testing and configuration management when Saab introduced new software baselines, sensors, weapons or electronic warfare functions.
That capability would give Canada a national route for integrating secure radios, datalinks, targeting pods, electronic warfare databases and future weapons. The value of this work would continue throughout the aircraft’s service life because mission files and electronic warfare libraries require repeated updates as new Russian and other foreign radars, missiles and jamming systems enter service. It would also create permanent Canadian positions in software testing, systems integration, threat-library management and configuration control, rather than concentrating industrial benefits in a limited aircraft-assembly period. The main constraint would be the degree of access Canada receives to source code, interface standards, encryption systems and proprietary sensor functions, because sovereign maintenance does not automatically equal unrestricted authority over every component.
CAE’s proposed synthetic training environment would connect individual qualification directly to force readiness. Gripen simulators could be networked with F-35A crews, GlobalEye mission operators, ground controllers, maritime patrol aircraft, air defence units and U.S. NORAD participants through Live-Virtual-Constructive exercises. Canadian crews could rehearse Arctic interceptions, low-altitude cruise-missile defence, NATO air policing, maritime surveillance and long-range deployments without assembling every aircraft and command unit at the same base. Mission planning systems could incorporate terrain, weather, tanker availability, radar coverage, fuel limits, weapons restrictions and friendly and hostile orders of battle.
Digital debrief systems could reconstruct radar modes, infrared sensor use, electronic warfare activity, datalink traffic, missile employment and tactical decisions for each participant. Maintainers could train on fault isolation, component replacement, weapons loading and emergency procedures without removing an operational aircraft from the flight line. This would reduce fuel consumption and engine-hour use, but the more important effect would be increased training density and the ability to repeat complex electronic warfare and missile scenarios that would be expensive or unsafe to conduct live.
Canada would need this capacity if it introduced F-35A, Gripen E and GlobalEye fleets while retiring the CF-18, because aircraft deliveries would have limited operational value unless enough pilots, technicians and mission operators were trained to generate sustained sorties. Saab’s Canadian offer has consequently developed into a combined fighter, surveillance, training and industrial package, following the industrial model Saab has applied in Brazil. The proposed industrial footprint includes a Gripen Centre in Montreal, a Cyber Resilience Centre in Toronto, a Sensor Centre in Vancouver and an Aerospace Research and Development Centre in Montreal, with CAE, IMP Aerospace and Defence, Arcfield Canada and GE Aviation among the named partners.
Saab has associated a 72-aircraft Gripen purchase with as many as 9,000 Canadian jobs and a combined package of 72 Gripen Es and six GlobalEyes with as many as 12,600 positions, although those totals depend on production volume, export orders and the duration of Canadian manufacturing work. The GlobalEye already uses a Canadian Bombardier Global 6000/Global 6500 airframe and will soon integrate advanced artificial intelligence (AI) capabilities from the Canadian company Cohere. In the proposed force structure, the GlobalEye would provide early detection and battle management over Canada’s Arctic, Atlantic and Pacific approaches, the Gripen E would provide larger fighter numbers and routine alert capacity, and the F-35A would retain the low-observable role.
Written by Jérôme Brahy
Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
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Saab and CAE signed a Memorandum of Understanding on July 17, 2026, to establish a Canadian-based pilot training, simulator operation, and mission systems engineering framework for the Gripen E fighter jet. The agreement is designed to provide sovereign software management, maintenance, and flight instruction if the Government of Canada selects the aircraft for the Royal Canadian Air Force. Assigning classified mission-data updates, software integration, and synthetic training to domestic facilities mitigates logistics burdens and reduces long-term reliance on foreign engineering support.
The agreement positions CAE to operate full-mission simulators, train aircrews and maintainers, and perform domestic systems integration if Ottawa incorporates up to 72 Gripen Es alongside its F-35A fleet. In a potential mixed-fleet architecture, the Gripen E offers an estimated operating cost of $7,000 to $10,000 per flight hour, multi-role mission flexibility, and a ten-minute turnaround time for dispersed Arctic operations.
Related topic: Canada considers purchasing 72 Swedish Gripen fighters alongside U.S. F-35s in 140-fighter mixed fleet
Beyond the Gripen E, Saab’s Canadian proposal now incorporates GlobalEye airborne surveillance, domestic assembly, mission software engineering, pilot and technician training, long-term sustainment, and a wide industrial participation. (Picture source: Saab)
On July 17, 2026, Saab and CAE signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that would make the Canadian company responsible for Gripen E pilot training, technician qualification, simulator operation, mission systems engineering and long-term support if Ottawa selects the Swedish fighter for the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF). The agreement moves CAE beyond its traditional role as a training supplier by assigning it work on classified software, systems integration, verification, mission-data management and future upgrades. It also adds a concrete support structure to Saab’s broader Canadian proposal, which now combines as many as 72 Gripen Es, five to six GlobalEye airborne early warning aircraft, domestic assembly, Canadian-controlled sustainment, local software engineering and potential export production.
Ottawa is examining this package while reviewing whether to complete the original 88-aircraft F-35A acquisition or create a mixed force in which F-35As conduct missions requiring low observability and deeper integration with U.S. forces, Gripen Es provide daily air defence and Arctic operations, and GlobalEye aircraft supply airborne surveillance and command-and-control coverage over the next 30 to 40 years. Canada signed its F-35A agreement in January 2023 after selecting the American jet through an 88-fighter competition that had also included the Gripen, Rafale, Eurofighter Typhoon and F/A-18E/F Super Hornet. The acquisition was valued at C$19 billion, while total programme costs, including infrastructure, training, support and sustainment, were estimated above C$27 billion.
Ottawa is committed to the first 16 F-35As and has funded long-lead items connected to another 14 aircraft, but the remaining production quantity has not been fixed through a complete set of final contracts. Therefore, Prime Minister Mark Carney ordered a review on March 15, 2025, and stated ten days later that Canada could retain the initial 16 F-35As while examining another fighter for part of the requirement. Defence Minister David McGuinty confirmed on April 27, 2026, that the review remained active and that an additional foreign fighter could be purchased alongside a reduced F-35 fleet. One option has paired 30 F-35As with 60 Gripen Es, while another has combined 72 to 88 F-35As with as many as 72 Gripen Es, producing a fighter inventory close to 140 aircraft.
That upper figure would approach the 138 CF-18s originally acquired during the 1980s and would give the RCAF more fighters for NORAD alert duties, Arctic patrols, NATO deployments, training, maintenance rotation and attrition reserve. It would also require a major expansion in pilot production, technician numbers, simulator capacity, weapons inventories, spare engines, deployable maintenance units and northern operating infrastructure. The F-35A would remain Canada’s higher-end fighter in any mixed force because it offers low observability, extensive sensor fusion, passive electronic intelligence collection, secure datalinks and direct compatibility with U.S.-led air operations. A fleet of only 30 F-35As would preserve those capabilities but would provide limited depth once aircraft were divided among operational squadrons, training, scheduled maintenance, NORAD alert commitments and possible NATO deployments.
The Gripen E would not replace those functions on equal terms. Saab instead positions it as the higher-availability element of the force for routine air defence, Arctic sovereignty patrols, domestic quick reaction alert, pilot training and operations from dispersed locations. The fighter is powered by an F414-GE-39E turbofan producing 98 kN of thrust with afterburner, reaches Mach 2 and has a maximum take-off weight of 16,500 kg. Internal fuel capacity is 5.4 tonnes, compared with 3.4 tonnes in the Gripen C/D, and external payload reaches 7.2 tonnes across ten weapon stations. Its weapons options include Meteor, AIM-120 AMRAAM and IRIS-T air-to-air missiles, Taurus KEPD-350 stand-off missiles, guided bombs, anti-ship missiles, reconnaissance pods, electronic warfare payloads and external tanks.
The fighter can operate from runways measuring 800 metres and complete an air-to-air refuelling and rearming cycle in ten minutes with a small ground crew, giving it a practical role at dispersed sites where larger support footprints would be harder to sustain. The Gripen E’s sensor and electronic warfare architecture would also shape its role. The Raven ES-05 AESA radar is mounted on a mechanically repositioned swashplate, allowing the antenna to scan farther away from the aircraft’s centreline than a fixed-array radar and helping the pilot maintain target coverage while turning away from a threat. The Skyward-G infrared search and track sensor provides passive detection of airborne targets without requiring radar emissions, while the Arexis electronic warfare suite combines radar warning, emitter geolocation, digital jamming, missile-warning sensors and automated countermeasure management.
These systems are relevant to northern operations where Canadian fighters could face long-range bombers, cruise missiles, electronic surveillance aircraft and maritime targets across large distances. Analysis has placed Gripen operating costs at US$7,000 to US$10,000 per flight hour, compared with estimates commonly ranging from US$30,000 to US$40,000 for the F-35A, but those figures should not be treated as fixed Canadian costs. Actual expenditure would depend on the number of aircraft purchased, annual flying hours, local wage rates, fuel prices, spare engine holdings, simulator use, weapons integration, infrastructure and the degree to which Canada establishes its own maintenance and software support capacity. A mixed fleet could therefore reduce the cost of routine flying, but it would also create two separate logistics systems, two different diagnostic equipment, separate conversion courses and distinct software upgrade processes.
The July 17 agreement addresses that second-fleet burden by assigning CAE responsibility for the Canadian Gripen training and support structure. CAE would develop and operate full-mission simulators reproducing the Gripen E cockpit, radar, infrared sensor, electronic warfare functions, datalinks, weapons, emergency procedures and tactical employment. It would train pilots, instructors, maintainers, avionics specialists, engine technicians and weapons personnel using Canadian staff and Canadian-specific courseware. The company would also sustain and modernize the simulators as aircraft software and weapons configurations changed, preventing the training equipment from falling behind the operational fleet.
More importantly, Canadian engineers would conduct software development, systems integration, verification and validation work connected to classified mission systems. This would allow Canada to assess future software releases, test national modifications and manage sensitive NORAD information inside the country instead of transferring routine work to overseas facilities. Saab would still retain design authority over proprietary elements, and Canada would remain dependent on foreign suppliers for the F414 engine, Raven radar, Skyward-G sensor, Arexis components and imported weapons, but CAE’s role would reduce dependence on external engineering support for every software or configuration change.
CAE already has an industrial base large enough to perform much of this work without creating a new organisation from the ground up. Founded in 1947 as Canadian Aviation Electronics and headquartered in the Montreal area, the company employs 13,000 people worldwide, including more than 4,800 in Canada. Its Defence and Security division employs more than 5,000 personnel, operates at over 120 sites, supports customers in more than 60 countries and maintains an installed base exceeding 1,000 military simulators. Inside Canada, CAE operates across 13 locations, supports more than 30 simulators and training devices, and works with more than 425 Canadian suppliers. Its acquisition of L3Harris Technologies’ Military Training business, including Link Simulation & Training, expanded its activities into mission systems engineering, operational software, intelligence support, digital mission planning and AI-enabled decision assistance.
CAE is already involved in several Canadian programs, including the Future Fighter Lead-In Training, NATO Flying Training in Canada, Canadian Multi-Mission Aircraft training, Canadian Surface Combatant training and remotely piloted aircraft instruction. Through the SkyAlyne joint venture with KF Aerospace, it is also part of the C$11.2 billion, 25-year Future Aircrew Training programme, which will train RCAF pilots, air combat systems officers and airborne electronic sensor operators. This existing workforce and infrastructure would reduce the cost and time required to establish a national Gripen training system, although additional secure laboratories, Gripen-specific simulators and qualified engineering personnel would still be required.
The most consequential transfer would concern mission data and software rather than aircraft assembly. Gripen’s radar, warning receivers, electronic support measures and jamming equipment depend on classified files containing the characteristics of foreign radars, missile seekers, communications emitters and identification signals. A Canadian Mission Data Laboratory, for instance, would allow national specialists to produce, validate and update those files without routinely sending Canadian or NORAD electronic intelligence abroad. CAE engineers could also conduct integration testing and configuration management when Saab introduced new software baselines, sensors, weapons or electronic warfare functions.
That capability would give Canada a national route for integrating secure radios, datalinks, targeting pods, electronic warfare databases and future weapons. The value of this work would continue throughout the aircraft’s service life because mission files and electronic warfare libraries require repeated updates as new Russian and other foreign radars, missiles and jamming systems enter service. It would also create permanent Canadian positions in software testing, systems integration, threat-library management and configuration control, rather than concentrating industrial benefits in a limited aircraft-assembly period. The main constraint would be the degree of access Canada receives to source code, interface standards, encryption systems and proprietary sensor functions, because sovereign maintenance does not automatically equal unrestricted authority over every component.
CAE’s proposed synthetic training environment would connect individual qualification directly to force readiness. Gripen simulators could be networked with F-35A crews, GlobalEye mission operators, ground controllers, maritime patrol aircraft, air defence units and U.S. NORAD participants through Live-Virtual-Constructive exercises. Canadian crews could rehearse Arctic interceptions, low-altitude cruise-missile defence, NATO air policing, maritime surveillance and long-range deployments without assembling every aircraft and command unit at the same base. Mission planning systems could incorporate terrain, weather, tanker availability, radar coverage, fuel limits, weapons restrictions and friendly and hostile orders of battle.
Digital debrief systems could reconstruct radar modes, infrared sensor use, electronic warfare activity, datalink traffic, missile employment and tactical decisions for each participant. Maintainers could train on fault isolation, component replacement, weapons loading and emergency procedures without removing an operational aircraft from the flight line. This would reduce fuel consumption and engine-hour use, but the more important effect would be increased training density and the ability to repeat complex electronic warfare and missile scenarios that would be expensive or unsafe to conduct live.
Canada would need this capacity if it introduced F-35A, Gripen E and GlobalEye fleets while retiring the CF-18, because aircraft deliveries would have limited operational value unless enough pilots, technicians and mission operators were trained to generate sustained sorties. Saab’s Canadian offer has consequently developed into a combined fighter, surveillance, training and industrial package, following the industrial model Saab has applied in Brazil. The proposed industrial footprint includes a Gripen Centre in Montreal, a Cyber Resilience Centre in Toronto, a Sensor Centre in Vancouver and an Aerospace Research and Development Centre in Montreal, with CAE, IMP Aerospace and Defence, Arcfield Canada and GE Aviation among the named partners.
Saab has associated a 72-aircraft Gripen purchase with as many as 9,000 Canadian jobs and a combined package of 72 Gripen Es and six GlobalEyes with as many as 12,600 positions, although those totals depend on production volume, export orders and the duration of Canadian manufacturing work. The GlobalEye already uses a Canadian Bombardier Global 6000/Global 6500 airframe and will soon integrate advanced artificial intelligence (AI) capabilities from the Canadian company Cohere. In the proposed force structure, the GlobalEye would provide early detection and battle management over Canada’s Arctic, Atlantic and Pacific approaches, the Gripen E would provide larger fighter numbers and routine alert capacity, and the F-35A would retain the low-observable role.
Written by Jérôme Brahy
Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
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• Land Defense News
• Naval Defense News
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