Saab wants to double Gripen jet production to 30 annually as global demand surges
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During its Q2 2026 earnings presentation in Linköping, Swedish defense manufacturer Saab announced plans to double its annual Gripen fighter jet production capacity from 15 to between 25 and 30 aircraft. This manufacturing expansion is structured to accommodate growing international order backlogs, including Ukraine’s initial contract for 16 Gripen E fighters alongside existing commitments for Sweden, Brazil, Colombia, Thailand, and Hungary. The elevated rate decreases final assembly cycle intervals from 24 days to approximately 12 days per aircraft, allowing Saab to meet multinational delivery schedules without creating extended order queues.
Saab reported a Q2 2026 order backlog of SEK 318 billion, supported by a 31% year-on-year sales increase in its aeronautics division driven by Gripen manufacturing and capability development. To maintain this higher output across its primary assembly line in Linköping and Embraer’s co-production facility in Brazil, Saab is expanding raw material inventories and qualifying redundant suppliers for key components, including engines, radars, and flight control systems.
Related topic: Canada could assemble Swedish Gripen jets for Ukraine’s Air Force
Johansson identified the supply chain as Saab’s main constraint, specifically pointing to the need to secure strategic materials, increase inventories, qualify additional suppliers, and selectively bring work back in-house. (Picture source: Norwegian MoD)
During its Q2 2026 earnings call on July 17, 2026, Saab’s President and CEO Micael Johansson announced that Saab is now aiming to produce 25 to 30 Gripen fighter jets per year. Saab assesses its current effective production capacity at close to 15 aircraft per year, meaning the upper end of the new objective would double output, and this is not a marginal adjustment. At 15 aircraft annually, one fighter leaves the production system every 24 days on average; at 25 units, the interval falls to 14.6 days; at 30 aircraft, it falls to 12.2 days. Saab has not announced the year in which the full 25-30 rate will be reached, but what has changed is the workload supporting such an expansion.
Saab’s overall order backlog reached SEK 318 billion in Q2 2026; aeronautics sales increased 31% year-on-year as Gripen production and capability development activity increased, group organic sales rose close to 30% in the quarter and more than 26% during the first half, while roughly 60% of Saab’s backlog is scheduled for delivery within two and a half years. The Gripen is therefore entering its higher-rate production phase while Saab is simultaneously preparing to deliver more radars, missiles, submarines and airborne surveillance aircraft than ever. The most important new production commitment is Ukraine’s first batch of 16 Gripen E/F fighters, valued at SEK 24.6 billion, with deliveries planned for 2029-2030. Johansson explicitly called the 16 aircraft the first batch and said Saab would continue working toward subsequent batches.
President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has referred to a long-term Ukrainian ambition reaching 100 to 150 Gripens, which changes the industrial calculation substantially. If Ukraine ultimately acquired 100 newly produced aircraft, that quantity alone would equal 6.7 years of production at 15 Gripens per year, four years at 25 and 3.3 years at 30, assuming Saab produced no aircraft for any other customer during that period. A 150-aircraft programme would represent ten years of output at 15 annually, six years at 25 and five years at 30. Those are theoretical calculations rather than delivery schedules, but they show why Saab cannot accommodate a Ukrainian programme of that size with the industrial capacity used for the earlier Gripen export market.
Ukraine’s requirement would have to run concurrently with Sweden, Brazil, Colombia, Hungary, Thailand and any additional export customer, making a 25-30-aircraft rate a capacity requirement rather than simply an efficiency target if even part of Kyiv’s long-term ambition becomes contractual. Sweden adds another production requirement because its support for Ukraine is beginning to feed back into its own Gripen E procurement. Stockholm originally ordered 60 Gripen E/Fs in 2013, but Swedish Air Force Chief Maj. Gen. Jonas Wikman has said another 12 are to be introduced into a future procurement cycle, taking the planned Swedish Gripen E fleet to 72 aircraft to compensate for older Gripen C/Ds transferred to Ukraine. The industrial effect is therefore two-sided.
Existing Gripen C/Ds can be released from Swedish service without occupying a new-build position at Saab, but replacing part of that transferred capacity with Gripen E creates fresh manufacturing work in Linköping. Hungary has also added near-term workload, receiving four additional Gripen C fighters in June 2026 and increasing its fleet from 14 to 18 aircraft under the 2024 agreement. Thailand represents another production stream, having selected 12 Gripen E/F aircraft and ordered the first batch of three Gripen E and one Gripen F in August 2025. Colombia adds a larger new export programme after signing for 17 aircraft, comprising 15 Gripen E and two Gripen F, with deliveries scheduled to begin in 2028. These customers matter because Saab is not expanding from a dormant production line waiting for Ukraine. It is increasing output while Swedish, Brazilian, Hungarian, Colombian and Thai requirements already consume part of its capacity. Brazil is particularly important because the Gripen no longer depends exclusively on Swedish final assembly.
Brazil’s original contract covers 36 Gripen E/Fs, and Saab has now established a complete final assembly capability at Embraer’s Gavião Peixoto facility. Saab Aeronáutica Montagens in São Bernardo do Campo produces major structural elements including forward and rear fuselage sections, the wing box, air brakes and empennage. That division of work is materially different from an export customer receiving finished fighters from Sweden because Brazilian capacity can absorb part of the production and assembly workload created by higher global demand. The first Gripen F two-seat aircraft was rolled out during Q2 2026 after development involving Brazilian engineers, adding another configuration to the production system beyond the single-seat Gripen E. Saab and Embraer also agreed in July 2026 on additional Brazilian production capacity for as many as 20 aircraft beyond the original programme if required.
If Brazil proceeded with a 20-aircraft follow-on, its programme would increase from 36 to 56 fighters, a 55.6% increase over the original quantity. At Saab’s current 15-aircraft annual rate, 20 additional Brazilian fighters would mathematically equal 1.33 years of total Gripen production; at 30 per year, they would still consume eight months of worldwide output if produced sequentially. In reality, Brazilian and Swedish manufacturing can operate in parallel, which is precisely why the Brazilian industrial base becomes increasingly valuable as Saab attempts to move beyond the production volumes for which Linköping alone was originally configured. The harder part of doubling production is upstream of final assembly.
The Gripen E uses the General Electric F414G engine, Leonardo Raven ES-05 AESA radar, Skyward-G infrared search-and-track sensor, Saab electronic warfare equipment, flight-control electronics, hydraulic and electrical equipment, composite and metallic structures, landing gear and thousands of lower-tier components whose production schedules must increase at the same time. An assembly facility capable of completing 30 aircraft is of little operational value if one critical supplier can provide only 18 engines, 20 radars or 22 sets of actuators during the same year. Therefore, Johansson identified supply chain capacity as Saab’s main constraint on faster growth, explicitly ranking it above recruitment and factory availability.
Saab is responding by carrying larger inventories of titanium, aluminium alloys, special steels and selected components, qualifying alternative suppliers to create redundancy and insourcing some work where dependence on external suppliers creates excessive risk. This shifts the problem from simple factory expansion to synchronization across the production network. Saab must also manage different customer configurations, national communications equipment, electronic warfare software, weapons interfaces, and acceptance requirements rather than just producing 30 completely identical fighters. A 25-30-aircraft annual rate consequently requires sufficient capacity not only for airframes but for systems integration, software loading, ground testing, engine runs, flight testing, correction of deficiencies and customer acceptance, each of which can become the rate-limiting step even after physical assembly capacity has been increased.
However, Saab now has sufficient financial scale to undertake the expansion, but the investment burden extends well beyond the Gripen. The company is spending roughly SEK 10 billion per year on capacity, compared with SEK 17 billion in cash and liquid investments and SEK 2.5 billion in net liquidity at the end of Q2 2026. Internally funded R&D reached SEK 4.4 billion on a rolling 12-month basis, more than twice the level recorded three years earlier, while Saab is adding roughly 3,000 net employees annually and has increased its workforce beyond 29,000. The financial trend is also important because production expansion is occurring while profitability improves. EBIT margin reached 11% in Q2, the company’s sales CAGR over the current target period reached 24%, and EBIT CAGR reached 34%, while first-half cash flow improved to more than SEK 1 billion from negative SEK 1.1 billion one year earlier.
Management continues to target cash conversion above 60% over 2023-2027 and organic sales growth of 22% CAGR, despite actual sales growth currently running above that level. The Gripen also competes internally for investment because Saab is simultaneously moving Giraffe 1X production beyond 300 radars per year, increasing GlobalEye output from two aircraft per year toward as many as six by 2030, automating weapons production and commissioning additional manufacturing facilities in the United States and India. The Gripen ramp-up therefore can be financed, staffed and supplied inside a group already undergoing a broad increase in output rather than benefiting from idle industrial capacity elsewhere in Saab. The production arithmetic explains why Saab is moving before all potential Gripen orders have become firm contracts.
The existing programmes already include Sweden’s 60 Gripen E order, Brazil’s 36 E/Fs, four additional aircraft for Hungary, 17 aircraft for Colombia, the first four of Thailand’s planned 12 and 16 Gripen E for Ukraine, although Swedish and Brazilian deliveries are already underway and these gross programme quantities therefore cannot simply be treated as Saab’s remaining backlog. Beyond those commitments sit Sweden’s planned 12 additional Gripen E, Brazil’s potential 20-aircraft follow-on, Thailand’s remaining planned batches and the much larger Ukrainian ambition of 100-150 fighters.
The effect on capacity becomes clear with relatively small additions. A combined 12 Swedish and 20 Brazilian follow-on aircraft would add 32 fighters, equivalent to 2.13 years of production at 15 aircraft annually, 1.28 years at 25, or 1.07 years at 30 before counting a single additional Ukrainian fighter. If Ukraine subsequently expanded from its first 16 aircraft to 100 in total, the additional 84 fighters would represent another 5.6 years of production at today’s 15-aircraft rate, 3.36 years at 25, or 2.8 years at 30. Saab therefore cannot base investment decisions only on its currently booked aircraft.
Waiting for every follow-on contract would risk creating delivery queues extending many years beyond customer requirements. Canada’s potential Gripen procurement and industrial participation could also be a key factor in determining whether Saab can scale production toward the 25–30 aircraft level. If those elements scale together, the company can support several concurrent Gripen programmes; if supplier output remains closer to the current 15-aircraft ecosystem, the production target will exist on paper while delivery lead times continue to expand.
Written by Jérôme Brahy
Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
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During its Q2 2026 earnings presentation in Linköping, Swedish defense manufacturer Saab announced plans to double its annual Gripen fighter jet production capacity from 15 to between 25 and 30 aircraft. This manufacturing expansion is structured to accommodate growing international order backlogs, including Ukraine’s initial contract for 16 Gripen E fighters alongside existing commitments for Sweden, Brazil, Colombia, Thailand, and Hungary. The elevated rate decreases final assembly cycle intervals from 24 days to approximately 12 days per aircraft, allowing Saab to meet multinational delivery schedules without creating extended order queues.
Saab reported a Q2 2026 order backlog of SEK 318 billion, supported by a 31% year-on-year sales increase in its aeronautics division driven by Gripen manufacturing and capability development. To maintain this higher output across its primary assembly line in Linköping and Embraer’s co-production facility in Brazil, Saab is expanding raw material inventories and qualifying redundant suppliers for key components, including engines, radars, and flight control systems.
Related topic: Canada could assemble Swedish Gripen jets for Ukraine’s Air Force
Johansson identified the supply chain as Saab’s main constraint, specifically pointing to the need to secure strategic materials, increase inventories, qualify additional suppliers, and selectively bring work back in-house. (Picture source: Norwegian MoD)
During its Q2 2026 earnings call on July 17, 2026, Saab’s President and CEO Micael Johansson announced that Saab is now aiming to produce 25 to 30 Gripen fighter jets per year. Saab assesses its current effective production capacity at close to 15 aircraft per year, meaning the upper end of the new objective would double output, and this is not a marginal adjustment. At 15 aircraft annually, one fighter leaves the production system every 24 days on average; at 25 units, the interval falls to 14.6 days; at 30 aircraft, it falls to 12.2 days. Saab has not announced the year in which the full 25-30 rate will be reached, but what has changed is the workload supporting such an expansion.
Saab’s overall order backlog reached SEK 318 billion in Q2 2026; aeronautics sales increased 31% year-on-year as Gripen production and capability development activity increased, group organic sales rose close to 30% in the quarter and more than 26% during the first half, while roughly 60% of Saab’s backlog is scheduled for delivery within two and a half years. The Gripen is therefore entering its higher-rate production phase while Saab is simultaneously preparing to deliver more radars, missiles, submarines and airborne surveillance aircraft than ever. The most important new production commitment is Ukraine’s first batch of 16 Gripen E/F fighters, valued at SEK 24.6 billion, with deliveries planned for 2029-2030. Johansson explicitly called the 16 aircraft the first batch and said Saab would continue working toward subsequent batches.
President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has referred to a long-term Ukrainian ambition reaching 100 to 150 Gripens, which changes the industrial calculation substantially. If Ukraine ultimately acquired 100 newly produced aircraft, that quantity alone would equal 6.7 years of production at 15 Gripens per year, four years at 25 and 3.3 years at 30, assuming Saab produced no aircraft for any other customer during that period. A 150-aircraft programme would represent ten years of output at 15 annually, six years at 25 and five years at 30. Those are theoretical calculations rather than delivery schedules, but they show why Saab cannot accommodate a Ukrainian programme of that size with the industrial capacity used for the earlier Gripen export market.
Ukraine’s requirement would have to run concurrently with Sweden, Brazil, Colombia, Hungary, Thailand and any additional export customer, making a 25-30-aircraft rate a capacity requirement rather than simply an efficiency target if even part of Kyiv’s long-term ambition becomes contractual. Sweden adds another production requirement because its support for Ukraine is beginning to feed back into its own Gripen E procurement. Stockholm originally ordered 60 Gripen E/Fs in 2013, but Swedish Air Force Chief Maj. Gen. Jonas Wikman has said another 12 are to be introduced into a future procurement cycle, taking the planned Swedish Gripen E fleet to 72 aircraft to compensate for older Gripen C/Ds transferred to Ukraine. The industrial effect is therefore two-sided.
Existing Gripen C/Ds can be released from Swedish service without occupying a new-build position at Saab, but replacing part of that transferred capacity with Gripen E creates fresh manufacturing work in Linköping. Hungary has also added near-term workload, receiving four additional Gripen C fighters in June 2026 and increasing its fleet from 14 to 18 aircraft under the 2024 agreement. Thailand represents another production stream, having selected 12 Gripen E/F aircraft and ordered the first batch of three Gripen E and one Gripen F in August 2025. Colombia adds a larger new export programme after signing for 17 aircraft, comprising 15 Gripen E and two Gripen F, with deliveries scheduled to begin in 2028. These customers matter because Saab is not expanding from a dormant production line waiting for Ukraine. It is increasing output while Swedish, Brazilian, Hungarian, Colombian and Thai requirements already consume part of its capacity. Brazil is particularly important because the Gripen no longer depends exclusively on Swedish final assembly.
Brazil’s original contract covers 36 Gripen E/Fs, and Saab has now established a complete final assembly capability at Embraer’s Gavião Peixoto facility. Saab Aeronáutica Montagens in São Bernardo do Campo produces major structural elements including forward and rear fuselage sections, the wing box, air brakes and empennage. That division of work is materially different from an export customer receiving finished fighters from Sweden because Brazilian capacity can absorb part of the production and assembly workload created by higher global demand. The first Gripen F two-seat aircraft was rolled out during Q2 2026 after development involving Brazilian engineers, adding another configuration to the production system beyond the single-seat Gripen E. Saab and Embraer also agreed in July 2026 on additional Brazilian production capacity for as many as 20 aircraft beyond the original programme if required.
If Brazil proceeded with a 20-aircraft follow-on, its programme would increase from 36 to 56 fighters, a 55.6% increase over the original quantity. At Saab’s current 15-aircraft annual rate, 20 additional Brazilian fighters would mathematically equal 1.33 years of total Gripen production; at 30 per year, they would still consume eight months of worldwide output if produced sequentially. In reality, Brazilian and Swedish manufacturing can operate in parallel, which is precisely why the Brazilian industrial base becomes increasingly valuable as Saab attempts to move beyond the production volumes for which Linköping alone was originally configured. The harder part of doubling production is upstream of final assembly.
The Gripen E uses the General Electric F414G engine, Leonardo Raven ES-05 AESA radar, Skyward-G infrared search-and-track sensor, Saab electronic warfare equipment, flight-control electronics, hydraulic and electrical equipment, composite and metallic structures, landing gear and thousands of lower-tier components whose production schedules must increase at the same time. An assembly facility capable of completing 30 aircraft is of little operational value if one critical supplier can provide only 18 engines, 20 radars or 22 sets of actuators during the same year. Therefore, Johansson identified supply chain capacity as Saab’s main constraint on faster growth, explicitly ranking it above recruitment and factory availability.
Saab is responding by carrying larger inventories of titanium, aluminium alloys, special steels and selected components, qualifying alternative suppliers to create redundancy and insourcing some work where dependence on external suppliers creates excessive risk. This shifts the problem from simple factory expansion to synchronization across the production network. Saab must also manage different customer configurations, national communications equipment, electronic warfare software, weapons interfaces, and acceptance requirements rather than just producing 30 completely identical fighters. A 25-30-aircraft annual rate consequently requires sufficient capacity not only for airframes but for systems integration, software loading, ground testing, engine runs, flight testing, correction of deficiencies and customer acceptance, each of which can become the rate-limiting step even after physical assembly capacity has been increased.
However, Saab now has sufficient financial scale to undertake the expansion, but the investment burden extends well beyond the Gripen. The company is spending roughly SEK 10 billion per year on capacity, compared with SEK 17 billion in cash and liquid investments and SEK 2.5 billion in net liquidity at the end of Q2 2026. Internally funded R&D reached SEK 4.4 billion on a rolling 12-month basis, more than twice the level recorded three years earlier, while Saab is adding roughly 3,000 net employees annually and has increased its workforce beyond 29,000. The financial trend is also important because production expansion is occurring while profitability improves. EBIT margin reached 11% in Q2, the company’s sales CAGR over the current target period reached 24%, and EBIT CAGR reached 34%, while first-half cash flow improved to more than SEK 1 billion from negative SEK 1.1 billion one year earlier.
Management continues to target cash conversion above 60% over 2023-2027 and organic sales growth of 22% CAGR, despite actual sales growth currently running above that level. The Gripen also competes internally for investment because Saab is simultaneously moving Giraffe 1X production beyond 300 radars per year, increasing GlobalEye output from two aircraft per year toward as many as six by 2030, automating weapons production and commissioning additional manufacturing facilities in the United States and India. The Gripen ramp-up therefore can be financed, staffed and supplied inside a group already undergoing a broad increase in output rather than benefiting from idle industrial capacity elsewhere in Saab. The production arithmetic explains why Saab is moving before all potential Gripen orders have become firm contracts.
The existing programmes already include Sweden’s 60 Gripen E order, Brazil’s 36 E/Fs, four additional aircraft for Hungary, 17 aircraft for Colombia, the first four of Thailand’s planned 12 and 16 Gripen E for Ukraine, although Swedish and Brazilian deliveries are already underway and these gross programme quantities therefore cannot simply be treated as Saab’s remaining backlog. Beyond those commitments sit Sweden’s planned 12 additional Gripen E, Brazil’s potential 20-aircraft follow-on, Thailand’s remaining planned batches and the much larger Ukrainian ambition of 100-150 fighters.
The effect on capacity becomes clear with relatively small additions. A combined 12 Swedish and 20 Brazilian follow-on aircraft would add 32 fighters, equivalent to 2.13 years of production at 15 aircraft annually, 1.28 years at 25, or 1.07 years at 30 before counting a single additional Ukrainian fighter. If Ukraine subsequently expanded from its first 16 aircraft to 100 in total, the additional 84 fighters would represent another 5.6 years of production at today’s 15-aircraft rate, 3.36 years at 25, or 2.8 years at 30. Saab therefore cannot base investment decisions only on its currently booked aircraft.
Waiting for every follow-on contract would risk creating delivery queues extending many years beyond customer requirements. Canada’s potential Gripen procurement and industrial participation could also be a key factor in determining whether Saab can scale production toward the 25–30 aircraft level. If those elements scale together, the company can support several concurrent Gripen programmes; if supplier output remains closer to the current 15-aircraft ecosystem, the production target will exist on paper while delivery lead times continue to expand.
Written by Jérôme Brahy
Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
Explore More Defense News
• Land Defense News
• Naval Defense News
• Defense Aerospace News
