Su-57 Fifth-Gen Stealth Fighter To Field UMPK Glide Bombs Sharpening Russia’s Deep Strike Threat
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Rostec chief Sergey Chemezov confirmed the Su‑57 will employ UMPK‑equipped bombs, extending a system already used by Su‑34, Su‑30SM, and Su‑35 aircraft in Ukraine. Coupled with a stealth platform, these mass‑produced munitions enhance Russia’s deep‑strike capability and complicate NATO defense planning on the eastern flank.
On 26 November 2025, Sergey Chemezov, CEO of Russia’s Rostec State Corporation, confirmed that the Su-57 fifth-generation fighter will be able to employ aerial bombs equipped with the UMPK universal glide and correction module, as reported by the Russian Tass News Agency. In a broader interview on Russia’s accelerated weapons programs, Chemezov stressed that these kits are now compatible not only with Su-34 frontline bombers, but also with Su-30SM/SM2, Su-35S and “any fourth- or fifth-generation aircraft”, opening the way for their integration on the Su-57. This development comes against the backdrop of Russia’s massive use of UMPK-equipped bombs in Ukraine and reflects a shift toward scalable, low-cost precision strike. For operators and planners, the ability to combine a stealth platform with mass-produced glide kits signals a qualitatively different threat profile for front-line air defences.
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The integration of UMPK munitions on the Su‑57 signals a broader evolution in Russia’s strike doctrine, blending fifth‑generation platforms with mass‑produced precision weapons designed for sustained, high‑intensity operations (Picture Source: Rostec / Russian MoD)
The UMPK module is a bolt-on glide and guidance kit that turns legacy Soviet FAB-series and other general-purpose bombs into precision-guided munitions capable of striking from tens of kilometres away. Structurally, it consists of a welded frame with deployable wings and tail control surfaces mated to a navigation unit using inertial sensors and satellite guidance, allowing aircraft to release the bomb outside the densest air-defence zones. Chemezov underlined that the kit has been engineered as a “universal” solution: with appropriate avionics interfaces, Su-30SM/SM2, Su-35S, and even upgraded Su-27 or MiG-29 variants can carry the same UMPK-equipped bombs, while the Su-34 remains the main carrier today. The extension of this concept to the Su-57 is logically the next step, enabling Russia’s only operational stealth fighter to launch UMPK bombs either from its internal bays in lower-observable configurations or from external stations when stealth is less critical. In practical mission terms, this would allow Su-57s to fly at high altitude and speed, release multiple glide bombs from well behind the front line, and then either withdraw or transition to air-superiority tasks using their long-range air-to-air missile load.
The UMPK itself has a relatively long gestation. A family of glide kits for Soviet bombs was first proposed in the early 2000s but only entered large-scale operational use from 2023 onwards in Ukraine, where Russian Su-34s and other platforms have used FAB-250, FAB-500, FAB-1500 and even FAB-3000 bombs fitted with UMPK to attack Ukrainian positions from 40 to 70 km away, depending on release altitude and bomb weight. Reports from NATO and Ukrainian sources describe these weapons as inexpensive, relatively crude but highly destructive, with a single heavy bomb often sufficient to devastate fortified positions even when accuracy is degraded by jamming. In parallel, the Su-57 has followed a more conventional high-end development path: conceived as Russia’s first stealth multirole fighter with internal bays, advanced sensor fusion and supercruise capability, it has seen limited combat evaluation in Syria and has reportedly been employed in Ukraine primarily as a standoff missile carrier launching weapons such as the Kh-69 from Russian airspace. By pairing this platform with UMPK bombs, Russia is effectively merging a premium fifth-generation sensor and delivery system with a mass-producible, low-unit-cost munition family.
From a capability perspective, the integration of UMPK-equipped munitions on the Su-57 represents a convergence of historical and modern precision-strike paradigms. As Chemezov noted, the concept of universal glide and correction modules traces a lineage to the early guided bombs of the Second World War, such as Germany’s Fritz X and Hs 293, which demonstrated that modest guidance enhancements to conventional bombs could produce disproportionate effects across naval and land theaters. The contemporary UMPK system occupies a similar conceptual niche to Western JDAM-ER and Chinese LS-6 kits, augmenting standard bomb casings with lift surfaces and satellite-based guidance. This approach sacrifices the pinpoint precision of advanced stand-off missiles in exchange for markedly lower cost and rapid scalability. Public estimates place the unit cost of a UMPK kit at approximately $20,000, compared to about $36,000 for a JDAM-ER. This cost differential helps account for the reported expansion of Russian production from roughly 40,000 units in 2024 to a projected 70,000 in 2025. When deployed from platforms such as the Su-34 or Su-35, these weapons already afford Russia a robust capability to execute area strikes from beyond many front-line air-defense envelopes. Integrated with the stealthier Su-57, which can carry a greater internal payload, UMPK-configured munitions could enable more complex operational profiles, such as precision strikes on air-defense nodes and logistics centers, to create corridors through heavily defended sectors with minimal warning.
Strategically, the integration of UMPK kits with the Su‑57 reinforces several trends evident both in the war in Ukraine and in Rostec’s broader messaging. First, it consolidates a doctrine centered on mass, reflecting Chemezov’s repeated assertion that modern conflicts continue to depend on large munitions stockpiles and resilient, straightforward systems rather than a limited arsenal of highly sophisticated weapons alone. Universal kits that can be mounted on aircraft ranging from the Su‑27 to the Su‑57 embody this logic, streamlining logistics and enabling common production lines to sustain both legacy formations and next‑generation squadrons. Second, coupling a stealth platform with glide bombs adds depth to Russia’s evolving “triangle” of infantry, drones, and precision strike systems, complicating Ukrainian and NATO efforts to anticipate strike patterns and to design layered defenses for air bases and critical infrastructure. Finally, if the Su‑57 secures export customers, its demonstrated ability to employ UMPK‑type munitions provides Moscow with a relatively low‑cost precision‑strike option for partners unable to procure large inventories of cruise missiles but possessing Soviet‑standard bomb stockpiles and willing to adopt the associated operational doctrine.
Chemezov’s confirmation that the Su-57 will employ UMPK-equipped munitions represents more than a mere technical enhancement; it marks the maturation of a distinct Russian strike doctrine that integrates fifth-generation delivery platforms with mass-produced, cost-effective precision weapons optimized for sustained, high-intensity conflict. For Ukraine and NATO planners alike, this development underscores the imperative to regard Russia’s glide-bomb capability not as an ad hoc innovation, but as an institutionalized and scalable component of its evolving airpower architecture, one now reinforced by stealth integration and designed to endure over the long term.
Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.
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Rostec chief Sergey Chemezov confirmed the Su‑57 will employ UMPK‑equipped bombs, extending a system already used by Su‑34, Su‑30SM, and Su‑35 aircraft in Ukraine. Coupled with a stealth platform, these mass‑produced munitions enhance Russia’s deep‑strike capability and complicate NATO defense planning on the eastern flank.
On 26 November 2025, Sergey Chemezov, CEO of Russia’s Rostec State Corporation, confirmed that the Su-57 fifth-generation fighter will be able to employ aerial bombs equipped with the UMPK universal glide and correction module, as reported by the Russian Tass News Agency. In a broader interview on Russia’s accelerated weapons programs, Chemezov stressed that these kits are now compatible not only with Su-34 frontline bombers, but also with Su-30SM/SM2, Su-35S and “any fourth- or fifth-generation aircraft”, opening the way for their integration on the Su-57. This development comes against the backdrop of Russia’s massive use of UMPK-equipped bombs in Ukraine and reflects a shift toward scalable, low-cost precision strike. For operators and planners, the ability to combine a stealth platform with mass-produced glide kits signals a qualitatively different threat profile for front-line air defences.
The integration of UMPK munitions on the Su‑57 signals a broader evolution in Russia’s strike doctrine, blending fifth‑generation platforms with mass‑produced precision weapons designed for sustained, high‑intensity operations (Picture Source: Rostec / Russian MoD)
The UMPK module is a bolt-on glide and guidance kit that turns legacy Soviet FAB-series and other general-purpose bombs into precision-guided munitions capable of striking from tens of kilometres away. Structurally, it consists of a welded frame with deployable wings and tail control surfaces mated to a navigation unit using inertial sensors and satellite guidance, allowing aircraft to release the bomb outside the densest air-defence zones. Chemezov underlined that the kit has been engineered as a “universal” solution: with appropriate avionics interfaces, Su-30SM/SM2, Su-35S, and even upgraded Su-27 or MiG-29 variants can carry the same UMPK-equipped bombs, while the Su-34 remains the main carrier today. The extension of this concept to the Su-57 is logically the next step, enabling Russia’s only operational stealth fighter to launch UMPK bombs either from its internal bays in lower-observable configurations or from external stations when stealth is less critical. In practical mission terms, this would allow Su-57s to fly at high altitude and speed, release multiple glide bombs from well behind the front line, and then either withdraw or transition to air-superiority tasks using their long-range air-to-air missile load.
The UMPK itself has a relatively long gestation. A family of glide kits for Soviet bombs was first proposed in the early 2000s but only entered large-scale operational use from 2023 onwards in Ukraine, where Russian Su-34s and other platforms have used FAB-250, FAB-500, FAB-1500 and even FAB-3000 bombs fitted with UMPK to attack Ukrainian positions from 40 to 70 km away, depending on release altitude and bomb weight. Reports from NATO and Ukrainian sources describe these weapons as inexpensive, relatively crude but highly destructive, with a single heavy bomb often sufficient to devastate fortified positions even when accuracy is degraded by jamming. In parallel, the Su-57 has followed a more conventional high-end development path: conceived as Russia’s first stealth multirole fighter with internal bays, advanced sensor fusion and supercruise capability, it has seen limited combat evaluation in Syria and has reportedly been employed in Ukraine primarily as a standoff missile carrier launching weapons such as the Kh-69 from Russian airspace. By pairing this platform with UMPK bombs, Russia is effectively merging a premium fifth-generation sensor and delivery system with a mass-producible, low-unit-cost munition family.
From a capability perspective, the integration of UMPK-equipped munitions on the Su-57 represents a convergence of historical and modern precision-strike paradigms. As Chemezov noted, the concept of universal glide and correction modules traces a lineage to the early guided bombs of the Second World War, such as Germany’s Fritz X and Hs 293, which demonstrated that modest guidance enhancements to conventional bombs could produce disproportionate effects across naval and land theaters. The contemporary UMPK system occupies a similar conceptual niche to Western JDAM-ER and Chinese LS-6 kits, augmenting standard bomb casings with lift surfaces and satellite-based guidance. This approach sacrifices the pinpoint precision of advanced stand-off missiles in exchange for markedly lower cost and rapid scalability. Public estimates place the unit cost of a UMPK kit at approximately $20,000, compared to about $36,000 for a JDAM-ER. This cost differential helps account for the reported expansion of Russian production from roughly 40,000 units in 2024 to a projected 70,000 in 2025. When deployed from platforms such as the Su-34 or Su-35, these weapons already afford Russia a robust capability to execute area strikes from beyond many front-line air-defense envelopes. Integrated with the stealthier Su-57, which can carry a greater internal payload, UMPK-configured munitions could enable more complex operational profiles, such as precision strikes on air-defense nodes and logistics centers, to create corridors through heavily defended sectors with minimal warning.
Strategically, the integration of UMPK kits with the Su‑57 reinforces several trends evident both in the war in Ukraine and in Rostec’s broader messaging. First, it consolidates a doctrine centered on mass, reflecting Chemezov’s repeated assertion that modern conflicts continue to depend on large munitions stockpiles and resilient, straightforward systems rather than a limited arsenal of highly sophisticated weapons alone. Universal kits that can be mounted on aircraft ranging from the Su‑27 to the Su‑57 embody this logic, streamlining logistics and enabling common production lines to sustain both legacy formations and next‑generation squadrons. Second, coupling a stealth platform with glide bombs adds depth to Russia’s evolving “triangle” of infantry, drones, and precision strike systems, complicating Ukrainian and NATO efforts to anticipate strike patterns and to design layered defenses for air bases and critical infrastructure. Finally, if the Su‑57 secures export customers, its demonstrated ability to employ UMPK‑type munitions provides Moscow with a relatively low‑cost precision‑strike option for partners unable to procure large inventories of cruise missiles but possessing Soviet‑standard bomb stockpiles and willing to adopt the associated operational doctrine.
Chemezov’s confirmation that the Su-57 will employ UMPK-equipped munitions represents more than a mere technical enhancement; it marks the maturation of a distinct Russian strike doctrine that integrates fifth-generation delivery platforms with mass-produced, cost-effective precision weapons optimized for sustained, high-intensity conflict. For Ukraine and NATO planners alike, this development underscores the imperative to regard Russia’s glide-bomb capability not as an ad hoc innovation, but as an institutionalized and scalable component of its evolving airpower architecture, one now reinforced by stealth integration and designed to endure over the long term.
Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.
