Swedish Fighter Jets Intercept Russian Tu-22M Bomber Escorted by Su-35S Fighters Near NATO Airspace
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Swedish Air Force quick reaction alert fighters were scrambled on 22 January 2026 to intercept Russian Su-35S fighters escorting a Tu-22M bomber over the Baltic Sea. The encounter underscores how frequent Russian long-range aviation missions now routinely trigger NATO air policing responses.
On 22 January 2026, Swedish quick reaction alert (QRA) fighters were scrambled over the Baltic Sea to identify and shadow a formation of Russian military aircraft detected near NATO airspace. According to imagery and information released by the Swedish Air Force and Försvarsmakten on their official X accounts, the intercept involved two Su-35S fighters escorting a Tu-22M bomber flying in international airspace over the Baltic. This new interaction underlines how routine long-range Russian bomber activity and NATO air policing now intersect almost daily, and why high-readiness air defence assets have become central to deterrence and situational awareness along the Alliance’s most contested frontier.
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Swedish Gripen fighters were scrambled on quick reaction alert to intercept and identify a Russian Tu-22M bomber escorted by Su-35S fighters flying in international airspace over the Baltic Sea (Picture Source: Swedish Air Force)
Swedish incident response procedures were activated when air surveillance networks detected the Russian formation over the Baltic, an area where military traffic is dense and often operates without transponder signals or filed flight plans. In line with established NATO air policing practice, Swedish fighters climbed to visually identify the aircraft, escort them at a safe distance and confirm that their trajectory remained outside Alliance airspace. Försvarsmakten later stated that Swedish QRA “marked its presence and ensured that flight movements in our immediate vicinity do not pass unnoticed,” a formula that reflects both the defensive nature of the mission and the political message of vigilance directed at Moscow. The event fits a broader pattern of Russian long-range aviation training flights, in which bomber groups periodically probe the edges of NATO-controlled skies to test reaction times and gather intelligence.
The Russian group combined two complementary capabilities. The Su-35S is a modernised derivative of the Flanker family, equipped with the N035 Irbis-E passive electronically scanned array radar, capable of detecting fighter-sized targets at ranges of up to roughly 400 km and tracking dozens of contacts simultaneously while engaging several at once. The Tu-22M, known in its Tu-22M3 variant as a long-range maritime strike and theatre bomber, is designed to carry heavy anti-ship missiles such as the Kh-22 or its upgraded Kh-32 successor, offering stand-off reach against naval and land targets in the Baltic region. When such a configuration appears over the Baltic Sea, it is read by NATO planners as more than a training profile: it is a reminder that Russian forces retain the ability to threaten sea lines of communication and critical infrastructure at significant range, even in peacetime.
Although Swedish authorities did not specify which aircraft type was launched for this particular mission, the country’s QRA posture is built around the Saab JAS 39 Gripen. The Gripen is a multirole fighter designed for dispersed operations, able to operate from short and austere airstrips and to be turned around quickly by small ground crews, a concept tailored to the Nordic theatre. Since joining NATO in March 2024, Sweden has increasingly integrated its Gripen squadrons into Alliance air policing structures, including deployments to Poland and preparations to lead the Icelandic Air Policing mission from Keflavík. In the Baltic context, the combination of robust national sensors, NATO command-and-control and a fighter optimised to counter Russian aircraft types gives Stockholm a credible capability to track and shadow complex formations such as Su-35S and Tu-22M without escalating to direct confrontation.
Behind the image published by the Swedish Air Force lies a broader European effort to modernise the weapons that underpin these intercept missions. One of the key tools in this domain is the MBDA Meteor, a ramjet-powered beyond-visual-range air-to-air missile (BVRAAM) developed jointly by several European nations, including Sweden and Germany. Meteor uses a throttleable ducted rocket to maintain high energy throughout its flight, reportedly achieving speeds around Mach 4 and a very large “no-escape zone,” supported by inertial guidance, mid-course datalink updates and an active radar seeker in the terminal phase. Germany has just placed a new order for additional Meteor stocks for the Luftwaffe, reinforcing its ability to conduct long-range engagements with Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft. For Sweden, Meteor is already integrated on the Gripen, while Germany fields it on the Eurofighter; together with other NATO users, they form a network of air forces that can rely on the same high-end missile to conduct air policing, escort and deterrence missions from the Baltic to the North Atlantic.
The tactical significance of the latest Swedish intercept lies less in any immediate risk of escalation and more in the steady normalisation of high-end air encounters over a relatively confined sea. NATO air policing is designed as a strictly defensive mission, but it must be executed with platforms and weapons capable of fighting and surviving at the top end of the spectrum if a routine identification task were ever to deteriorate into a crisis. Russian bomber flights escorted by modern fighters, European QRA forces equipped with sensors and missiles such as Gripen and Meteor, and a dense web of radar and command centres together create an environment where miscalculation would carry immediate operational consequences. By responding swiftly and visibly to the appearance of Su-35S and a Tu-22M over the Baltic Sea, Swedish forces have sent a clear signal: NATO’s newest member is fully integrated into the Alliance’s 24/7 air defence system, and activity in its vicinity will be observed, recorded and, if necessary, challenged long before it can pose a direct threat.
Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.
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Swedish Air Force quick reaction alert fighters were scrambled on 22 January 2026 to intercept Russian Su-35S fighters escorting a Tu-22M bomber over the Baltic Sea. The encounter underscores how frequent Russian long-range aviation missions now routinely trigger NATO air policing responses.
On 22 January 2026, Swedish quick reaction alert (QRA) fighters were scrambled over the Baltic Sea to identify and shadow a formation of Russian military aircraft detected near NATO airspace. According to imagery and information released by the Swedish Air Force and Försvarsmakten on their official X accounts, the intercept involved two Su-35S fighters escorting a Tu-22M bomber flying in international airspace over the Baltic. This new interaction underlines how routine long-range Russian bomber activity and NATO air policing now intersect almost daily, and why high-readiness air defence assets have become central to deterrence and situational awareness along the Alliance’s most contested frontier.
Swedish Gripen fighters were scrambled on quick reaction alert to intercept and identify a Russian Tu-22M bomber escorted by Su-35S fighters flying in international airspace over the Baltic Sea (Picture Source: Swedish Air Force)
Swedish incident response procedures were activated when air surveillance networks detected the Russian formation over the Baltic, an area where military traffic is dense and often operates without transponder signals or filed flight plans. In line with established NATO air policing practice, Swedish fighters climbed to visually identify the aircraft, escort them at a safe distance and confirm that their trajectory remained outside Alliance airspace. Försvarsmakten later stated that Swedish QRA “marked its presence and ensured that flight movements in our immediate vicinity do not pass unnoticed,” a formula that reflects both the defensive nature of the mission and the political message of vigilance directed at Moscow. The event fits a broader pattern of Russian long-range aviation training flights, in which bomber groups periodically probe the edges of NATO-controlled skies to test reaction times and gather intelligence.
The Russian group combined two complementary capabilities. The Su-35S is a modernised derivative of the Flanker family, equipped with the N035 Irbis-E passive electronically scanned array radar, capable of detecting fighter-sized targets at ranges of up to roughly 400 km and tracking dozens of contacts simultaneously while engaging several at once. The Tu-22M, known in its Tu-22M3 variant as a long-range maritime strike and theatre bomber, is designed to carry heavy anti-ship missiles such as the Kh-22 or its upgraded Kh-32 successor, offering stand-off reach against naval and land targets in the Baltic region. When such a configuration appears over the Baltic Sea, it is read by NATO planners as more than a training profile: it is a reminder that Russian forces retain the ability to threaten sea lines of communication and critical infrastructure at significant range, even in peacetime.
Although Swedish authorities did not specify which aircraft type was launched for this particular mission, the country’s QRA posture is built around the Saab JAS 39 Gripen. The Gripen is a multirole fighter designed for dispersed operations, able to operate from short and austere airstrips and to be turned around quickly by small ground crews, a concept tailored to the Nordic theatre. Since joining NATO in March 2024, Sweden has increasingly integrated its Gripen squadrons into Alliance air policing structures, including deployments to Poland and preparations to lead the Icelandic Air Policing mission from Keflavík. In the Baltic context, the combination of robust national sensors, NATO command-and-control and a fighter optimised to counter Russian aircraft types gives Stockholm a credible capability to track and shadow complex formations such as Su-35S and Tu-22M without escalating to direct confrontation.
Behind the image published by the Swedish Air Force lies a broader European effort to modernise the weapons that underpin these intercept missions. One of the key tools in this domain is the MBDA Meteor, a ramjet-powered beyond-visual-range air-to-air missile (BVRAAM) developed jointly by several European nations, including Sweden and Germany. Meteor uses a throttleable ducted rocket to maintain high energy throughout its flight, reportedly achieving speeds around Mach 4 and a very large “no-escape zone,” supported by inertial guidance, mid-course datalink updates and an active radar seeker in the terminal phase. Germany has just placed a new order for additional Meteor stocks for the Luftwaffe, reinforcing its ability to conduct long-range engagements with Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft. For Sweden, Meteor is already integrated on the Gripen, while Germany fields it on the Eurofighter; together with other NATO users, they form a network of air forces that can rely on the same high-end missile to conduct air policing, escort and deterrence missions from the Baltic to the North Atlantic.
The tactical significance of the latest Swedish intercept lies less in any immediate risk of escalation and more in the steady normalisation of high-end air encounters over a relatively confined sea. NATO air policing is designed as a strictly defensive mission, but it must be executed with platforms and weapons capable of fighting and surviving at the top end of the spectrum if a routine identification task were ever to deteriorate into a crisis. Russian bomber flights escorted by modern fighters, European QRA forces equipped with sensors and missiles such as Gripen and Meteor, and a dense web of radar and command centres together create an environment where miscalculation would carry immediate operational consequences. By responding swiftly and visibly to the appearance of Su-35S and a Tu-22M over the Baltic Sea, Swedish forces have sent a clear signal: NATO’s newest member is fully integrated into the Alliance’s 24/7 air defence system, and activity in its vicinity will be observed, recorded and, if necessary, challenged long before it can pose a direct threat.
Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.
