Taiwan’s Upgraded F-16V Jets Set for Key Test Flights to Close Air Power Gap with China
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Taiwan’s air force says long-delayed test flights for its new F-16V fighters will begin this month, a key move in an $8 billion program with Lockheed Martin. The trials matter because the upgraded fleet is central to Taiwan’s plan to narrow its air power gap with China as PLA activity intensifies.
On December 1, 2025, Taiwan’s air force confirmed that long-delayed test flights of its new F-16V fighter jets will start this month, marking a critical step in an $8 billion acquisition that has repeatedly slipped because of production and software issues, as reported by Reuters. The announcement by Air Force Chief of Staff Lee Ching-jan in parliament comes as 54 of the 66 U.S.-built aircraft are now on Lockheed Martin’s assembly lines, up from 50 in October, signalling that industrial output is finally catching up with Taiwan’s operational timelines. Approved by Washington in 2019, the deal will expand Taiwan’s F-16 inventory to more than 200 aircraft and complement the recent modernization of 141 older F-16A/Bs to the Viper configuration, turning the type into the backbone of the island’s combat aviation. The move is unfolding amid sustained People’s Liberation Army (PLA) air and naval activity around Taiwan and the steady expansion of China’s J-20 stealth fighter fleet, giving these test flights implications that go far beyond a routine certification campaign.
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Taiwan’s upgraded F-16V fighter is a modernized multirole jet with an AESA radar, improved computers and enhanced weapons options that Taipei views as the core of its future air defense. (Picture Source: Lockheed Martin)
The F-16V that Taiwan is preparing to test is a thoroughly reworked version of the classic F-16, configured in Block 70/72 standard for new-build jets and broadly aligned with the upgraded “Phoenix Rising” fleet. At the core of the aircraft is Northrop Grumman’s AN/APG-83 SABR active electronically scanned array radar, which provides longer-range detection, better resistance to jamming and improved tracking of low-flying or low-observable targets, a key factor in countering cruise missiles and modern strike aircraft. The cockpit has been digitised around a large central display that fuses radar, targeting pod and datalink information, while a modern mission computer and Link-16 connectivity tie the jet into Taiwan’s broader air-defence network. This avionics suite is paired with structural reinforcements that extend airframe life and allow heavier fuel and weapons loads, supporting roles from air superiority and close air support to maritime strike and suppression of enemy air defences. In practical terms, the new F-16Vs will operate alongside the already-modernised 141 aircraft to create a largely homogeneous Viper fleet, simplifying training and logistics for the Republic of China Air Force (RoCAF).
Behind this capability lies a lengthy and sometimes difficult development and production path. Taiwan’s Phoenix Rising upgrade programme began in 2016 and culminated in late 2023, when the last of 141 legacy F-16A/Bs completed flight testing in the F-16V standard, making Taiwan the first operator to field a fully combat-capable Viper fleet derived from older airframes. In parallel, Taipei pressed Washington for additional new-build aircraft, eventually securing approval in 2019 for 66 Block 70 F-16C/Ds intended to begin arriving from 2023 onward. That schedule has slipped repeatedly, however, as the production line was relocated and then hit by supply-chain constraints and software integration issues, prompting Taiwan’s defence ministry to warn lawmakers that the original goal of completing deliveries by the end of 2026 was no longer realistic. Lockheed Martin has responded by moving to extended work shifts and ramped-up throughput, and Taiwanese officials now describe test flights beginning “earlier” than initially expected in December 2025 as a sign that the recovery plan is taking effect, even as they acknowledge that the backlog remains significant.
The upgraded and newly acquired F‑16V aircraft materially enhance the RoCAF’s capacity to conduct high‑tempo, multi‑axis operations across the island. Equipped with AESA radar and secure datalinks, these fighters can detect and track multiple targets at extended ranges, fuse and share sensor data with ground systems and SAM batteries, and prosecute adversary aircraft with beyond‑visual‑range missiles while remaining integrated into Taiwan’s layered air‑defence network. Their existing armament, anti‑ship Harpoon missiles, stand‑off precision munitions such as JSOW and SLAM‑ER, and dedicated anti‑radiation weapons, provides Taipei with flexible means to contest PLA air operations, threaten amphibious taskings at sea, and strike critical infrastructure that would support a blockade or invasion. Planned acquisition of infrared search‑and‑track pods will improve detection and engagement of low‑observable platforms without sole reliance on radar, and measures such as hardened shelters and highway‑strip dispersal are intended to preserve a substantial portion of the F‑16V force after an initial missile strike so it can continue to operate.
Strategically, the start of test flights marks a visible benchmark in Taiwan’s effort to narrow, rather than reverse, the widening qualitative and quantitative gap with China’s air forces. Beijing is fielding several hundred J-20 fighters and investing in a second fifth-generation platform, the J-35, alongside large inventories of fourth-generation aircraft and long-range missiles, meaning that even a fully delivered F-16V fleet will operate in a heavily contested environment where numerical superiority lies with the PLA. Yet the F-16V programme still matters for deterrence: by raising the cost and uncertainty of any air campaign against Taiwan and integrating closely with U.S.-supplied systems such as Patriot and prospective IRST pods, it underpins a “porcupine” strategy aimed at making rapid coercion or a short, decisive strike far less plausible. The difficulties that have delayed deliveries also highlight broader stresses in U.S. defence supply chains and their implications for alliance credibility: countries such as Bahrain, Slovakia and Bulgaria are facing comparable waits for their own F-16Vs, and Washington’s ability to support multiple partners simultaneously is now part of the strategic message sent by every milestone in Taiwan’s programme. For China, the arrival of each additional Viper complicates operational planning for any campaign in the Taiwan Strait; for the United States, keeping the programme on track is increasingly tied to signalling resolve under the Taiwan Relations Act and to maintaining a coalition of regional air forces oriented around U.S. technology.
The launch of December test flights marks a turning point in Taiwan’s F-16V program, shifting the narrative from one of delays and technical obstacles to tangible progress toward operational combat capability, even as the regional balance remains unfavourable to Taipei. Each sortie advances the island’s move toward a cohesive, standardised fighter fleet that can serve as the core of its air deterrence posture and integrate effectively with U.S. and allied support in times of crisis. However, the compressed schedule between initial testing, first deliveries expected in 2026, and full operational integration will challenge both Taiwan’s capacity to absorb new systems and the endurance of U.S. production lines. Whether these efforts meaningfully alter Beijing’s strategic calculus remains uncertain, but the onset of flight trials underscores that Taipei and Washington are determined to turn planning documents into fully armed aircraft on the tarmac before the decade’s end.
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Taiwan’s air force says long-delayed test flights for its new F-16V fighters will begin this month, a key move in an $8 billion program with Lockheed Martin. The trials matter because the upgraded fleet is central to Taiwan’s plan to narrow its air power gap with China as PLA activity intensifies.
On December 1, 2025, Taiwan’s air force confirmed that long-delayed test flights of its new F-16V fighter jets will start this month, marking a critical step in an $8 billion acquisition that has repeatedly slipped because of production and software issues, as reported by Reuters. The announcement by Air Force Chief of Staff Lee Ching-jan in parliament comes as 54 of the 66 U.S.-built aircraft are now on Lockheed Martin’s assembly lines, up from 50 in October, signalling that industrial output is finally catching up with Taiwan’s operational timelines. Approved by Washington in 2019, the deal will expand Taiwan’s F-16 inventory to more than 200 aircraft and complement the recent modernization of 141 older F-16A/Bs to the Viper configuration, turning the type into the backbone of the island’s combat aviation. The move is unfolding amid sustained People’s Liberation Army (PLA) air and naval activity around Taiwan and the steady expansion of China’s J-20 stealth fighter fleet, giving these test flights implications that go far beyond a routine certification campaign.
Taiwan’s upgraded F-16V fighter is a modernized multirole jet with an AESA radar, improved computers and enhanced weapons options that Taipei views as the core of its future air defense. (Picture Source: Lockheed Martin)
The F-16V that Taiwan is preparing to test is a thoroughly reworked version of the classic F-16, configured in Block 70/72 standard for new-build jets and broadly aligned with the upgraded “Phoenix Rising” fleet. At the core of the aircraft is Northrop Grumman’s AN/APG-83 SABR active electronically scanned array radar, which provides longer-range detection, better resistance to jamming and improved tracking of low-flying or low-observable targets, a key factor in countering cruise missiles and modern strike aircraft. The cockpit has been digitised around a large central display that fuses radar, targeting pod and datalink information, while a modern mission computer and Link-16 connectivity tie the jet into Taiwan’s broader air-defence network. This avionics suite is paired with structural reinforcements that extend airframe life and allow heavier fuel and weapons loads, supporting roles from air superiority and close air support to maritime strike and suppression of enemy air defences. In practical terms, the new F-16Vs will operate alongside the already-modernised 141 aircraft to create a largely homogeneous Viper fleet, simplifying training and logistics for the Republic of China Air Force (RoCAF).
Behind this capability lies a lengthy and sometimes difficult development and production path. Taiwan’s Phoenix Rising upgrade programme began in 2016 and culminated in late 2023, when the last of 141 legacy F-16A/Bs completed flight testing in the F-16V standard, making Taiwan the first operator to field a fully combat-capable Viper fleet derived from older airframes. In parallel, Taipei pressed Washington for additional new-build aircraft, eventually securing approval in 2019 for 66 Block 70 F-16C/Ds intended to begin arriving from 2023 onward. That schedule has slipped repeatedly, however, as the production line was relocated and then hit by supply-chain constraints and software integration issues, prompting Taiwan’s defence ministry to warn lawmakers that the original goal of completing deliveries by the end of 2026 was no longer realistic. Lockheed Martin has responded by moving to extended work shifts and ramped-up throughput, and Taiwanese officials now describe test flights beginning “earlier” than initially expected in December 2025 as a sign that the recovery plan is taking effect, even as they acknowledge that the backlog remains significant.
The upgraded and newly acquired F‑16V aircraft materially enhance the RoCAF’s capacity to conduct high‑tempo, multi‑axis operations across the island. Equipped with AESA radar and secure datalinks, these fighters can detect and track multiple targets at extended ranges, fuse and share sensor data with ground systems and SAM batteries, and prosecute adversary aircraft with beyond‑visual‑range missiles while remaining integrated into Taiwan’s layered air‑defence network. Their existing armament, anti‑ship Harpoon missiles, stand‑off precision munitions such as JSOW and SLAM‑ER, and dedicated anti‑radiation weapons, provides Taipei with flexible means to contest PLA air operations, threaten amphibious taskings at sea, and strike critical infrastructure that would support a blockade or invasion. Planned acquisition of infrared search‑and‑track pods will improve detection and engagement of low‑observable platforms without sole reliance on radar, and measures such as hardened shelters and highway‑strip dispersal are intended to preserve a substantial portion of the F‑16V force after an initial missile strike so it can continue to operate.
Strategically, the start of test flights marks a visible benchmark in Taiwan’s effort to narrow, rather than reverse, the widening qualitative and quantitative gap with China’s air forces. Beijing is fielding several hundred J-20 fighters and investing in a second fifth-generation platform, the J-35, alongside large inventories of fourth-generation aircraft and long-range missiles, meaning that even a fully delivered F-16V fleet will operate in a heavily contested environment where numerical superiority lies with the PLA. Yet the F-16V programme still matters for deterrence: by raising the cost and uncertainty of any air campaign against Taiwan and integrating closely with U.S.-supplied systems such as Patriot and prospective IRST pods, it underpins a “porcupine” strategy aimed at making rapid coercion or a short, decisive strike far less plausible. The difficulties that have delayed deliveries also highlight broader stresses in U.S. defence supply chains and their implications for alliance credibility: countries such as Bahrain, Slovakia and Bulgaria are facing comparable waits for their own F-16Vs, and Washington’s ability to support multiple partners simultaneously is now part of the strategic message sent by every milestone in Taiwan’s programme. For China, the arrival of each additional Viper complicates operational planning for any campaign in the Taiwan Strait; for the United States, keeping the programme on track is increasingly tied to signalling resolve under the Taiwan Relations Act and to maintaining a coalition of regional air forces oriented around U.S. technology.
The launch of December test flights marks a turning point in Taiwan’s F-16V program, shifting the narrative from one of delays and technical obstacles to tangible progress toward operational combat capability, even as the regional balance remains unfavourable to Taipei. Each sortie advances the island’s move toward a cohesive, standardised fighter fleet that can serve as the core of its air deterrence posture and integrate effectively with U.S. and allied support in times of crisis. However, the compressed schedule between initial testing, first deliveries expected in 2026, and full operational integration will challenge both Taiwan’s capacity to absorb new systems and the endurance of U.S. production lines. Whether these efforts meaningfully alter Beijing’s strategic calculus remains uncertain, but the onset of flight trials underscores that Taipei and Washington are determined to turn planning documents into fully armed aircraft on the tarmac before the decade’s end.
