The USAF’s 10-year fighter plan defines a 1,558 low-risk fleet
The Air Force submitted a 10-year fighter force structure plan to Congress that pins the “low-risk” requirement at 1,558 manned, combat-coded fighters. The document places today’s combat-coded inventory at about 1,271 jets for fiscal 2026. It also lays out the threshold for “medium risk” at roughly 1,367. Defense officials confirm the figures were developed to align force capacity with the mission set assigned in current guidance and contingency plans.
An official who briefed reporters acknowledged funding is the constraint. “There is insufficient top line, currently, to cover everything that we want to do,” the official said, adding later, “We need more Air Force.” According to industry sources, the intent isn’t just to seek a bigger budget but to give lawmakers an explicit yardstick for risk if inventories fall below these marks.
To close the gap, the service would buy more F-35A and F-15EX, retire A-10s and older F-15 variants on schedule, and field uncrewed Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) alongside fifth-generation and, later, sixth-generation fighters. The report calls the F-35A the “foundation of the USAF fighter force structure,” with a long-stated objective of 1,763 aircraft.
Risk thresholds and how many fighters USAF says it needs
The plan counts only “combat-coded” aircraft – jets ready for combatant command tasking without stripping training or maintenance – and sets two thresholds:
1,558 combat-coded fighters for low risk, with depth to absorb losses and sustain prolonged operations.
about 1,370 combat-coded fighters for medium risk.
At 1,271 combat-coded aircraft today, the service faces a delta of nearly 300 fighters to reach the low-risk mark. Defense officials confirm this is before factoring divestments already programmed, including the remaining A-10s and aging F-15C/Ds headed for retirement. The plan’s “low-risk” definition means missions are very likely to succeed, the force can meet global sourcing without hollowing training units, and there is enough depth to surge.
Counts tie to an interim posture around 2030 near 1,369 fighters, then a 2035 objective of 1,558, assuming industry output and funding hold. External reviews say the goals are doable only with sustained procurement above recent rates. According to officials, the service does not have the “total obligation authority” today to buy at the maximum rate outlined.
Industrial capacity targets F-35A 100 per year and F-15EX 24 per year
Unclassified material sketches production goals: up to 100 F-35As per year by 2030 if capacity and budget align; up to 24 F-15EX per year by fiscal 2027, with a potential rise to 36 if facilities and workforce expand. The F-15EX program of record stands at 129 aircraft, with deliveries running through the decade.
Those targets collide with near-term realities. The fiscal 2026 request cut the Air Force’s F-35 buy roughly in half pending completion of Technology Refresh 3 and progress on the larger Block 4 upgrade. GAO’s September assessment says Block 4 remains years late and trimmed in scope, with several elements deferred into the 2030s to keep schedule risk in check. USAF leaders told reporters they will ramp F-35 purchases when Block 4 stabilizes.
TR-3 knock-on effects hit deliveries across 2024–2025, and although acceptance resumed, jets arrived with provisional software baselines while the government withheld a portion of payments. The mismatch between near-term buys and long-term targets underscores why the service calls the 1,558 figure a low-risk goal, not a forecast.
Retirements A-10 drawdown and F-15E engine split
The plan completes the A-10 retirement by the end of fiscal 2026, two years faster than earlier schedules. Lawmakers were told the portfolio divestments include A-10s, nearly all remaining F-15C/D airframes, and a subset of early-engine F-15E Strike Eagles. Officials said sustainment and upgrades will focus on F-15Es with F100-PW-229 engines, trimming airframes with older F100-PW-220s. The Air Force lists 25,000 pounds of thrust for the 220 and 29,000 for the 229.
Pilot shortages persist. Independent reporting counted more than a thousand fighter pilot billets unfilled in 2024, and the training pipeline still falls short of the roughly 1,500-per-year throughput goal. The document to Congress acknowledges manpower and training bottlenecks limit any surge even if aircraft arrive faster.
Aging depots and shrinking parts suppliers weigh on availability as legacy fleets stay in service until replacements arrive. That spending competes with new procurement and slows transitions in units slated to re-equip with F-35As or F-15EXs.
CCA prototypes YFQ-42A and YFQ-44A enter flight test and could reduce manned demand
Two production-representative CCAs are now flying: General Atomics’ YFQ-42A, which first flew on August 27, and Anduril’s YFQ-44A, which recorded its first flight on October 31. USAF plans to pair early CCAs with F-22s and F-35As, then with the sixth-generation fighter as it enters service. Defense officials confirm the service seeks at least 1,000 CCAs over time, but the report does not credit them as replacements for manned fighters in the 1,558 math. They are described as force multipliers that can offset some demand for manned sorties, mission dependent.
The CCA test pace is relevant to the risk calculus. If CCAs prove out weapons carriage, sensing, and electronic attack with sufficient autonomy and reliability, planners could meet parts of the tasking with fewer crewed jets on station, especially in high-threat areas. If performance lags, the burden remains on the manned fleet through at least the early 2030s, increasing the importance of meeting F-35A and F-15EX production targets.
The two CCAs also anchor the teaming concept for the next-generation crewed platform. USAF has publicly identified the sixth-generation fighter as the F-47, with a contract in place and first flight forecast late in the decade. Program officials have said the manned aircraft and CCAs form a “family,” with the pilot directing uncrewed shooters and sensors as needed. The force-planning document highlights the F-47 and CCA as top modernization priorities in the classified annex.
Inventory accounting is central to the numbers. The “combat-coded” subset excludes backup and test aircraft and the attrition reserve. The plan’s risk labels tie to how often USAF would meet combatant commander demands with ready aircraft while preserving training and maintenance, and how much surge depth remains for a second contingency. That framing is why the same document sets an interim “medium risk” milestone in the 1,36x range about 2030, then climbs toward 1,558 by mid-decade, assuming procurement rates scale and retirements stay on plan.
Outside analysis flags the gap between aspiration and funding. One review calls the 10-year fighter plan “ambitious” and notes it omits detailed bill-payers to hit the targets inside the topline. Another reads the plan as candid about production constraints on both the F-35A and F-15EX, even if money appears. The document itself says maximum fighter procurement would require industry to expand output and deliver on schedule-points that have proven difficult during TR-3 and Block 4 delays.
Even if Congress restores F-35 quantities after Block 4 stabilizes, sustainment costs for legacy fleets keep rising while depots work off backlogs. The plan anticipates paying for modernization and sustainment at the same time, which typically slows replacement. According to industry sources, the annex’s production-rate assumptions reflect no fiscal constraints, a premise appropriators rarely accept without offsets.
Aging airframes and declining availability form the other half of the risk story. The fighter force is older than peer services, and some types fly beyond original design life with structural upgrades. The plan’s bet is that replacing those tails with fewer, more capable aircraft-supplemented by CCAs-lets USAF carry the same workload with a different mix. That bet will only work if mission-capable rates on new types exceed today’s baselines and if munitions output keeps pace, both outside the scope of the fighter-count math but critical in practice.
Fighter pilot shortfalls measured in the thousands last year, according to USAF reporting and independent coverage. The training goal of about 1,500 pilots per year is reached only intermittently. Without crews, extra airframes don’t translate into combat power at the scale implied. Officials said manning and training limits informed the risk labels.
The NGAD centerpiece, publicly labeled the F-47, is in engineering and manufacturing with first flight planned around 2028. The service hasn’t released its quantity objective but lists the aircraft and CCAs as the fighter portfolio’s top modernization priorities. Any F-47 slip would keep pressure on the fifth-generation fleet into the 2030s, reinforcing why the plan calls the F-35A its foundation.
Our analysis shows the 1,558 figure is less a prediction than a risk statement. It tells Congress and the industrial base what “low risk” looks like in hard inventory terms, then points to the production and retirement levers that could get there. The math relies on higher annual F-35A and F-15EX buys after software and test bottlenecks ease, steady retirements of A-10s and early-model F-15s, incremental fleetwide availability gains, and a timely CCA fielding path that begins to absorb tasking late this decade.
REFERENCE SOURCES
https://www.flightglobal.com/fixed-wing/usaf-seeks-22-fighter-fleet-expansion-to-1558-jets-by-2035/165101.article
https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2025/10/air-forces-10-year-fighter-jet-report-missing-key-details-experts-say/409168/
https://www.congress.gov/committee-report/118th-congress/senate-report/188/1
https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-25-107632
https://www.reuters.com/world/us/pentagon-withholds-5-mln-per-f-35-jet-deliveries-resume-2024-08-29/
https://www.flightglobal.com/fixed-wing/pentagon-reduces-withholding-on-f-35-payments-citing-lockheeds-progress-on-tr-3-development/161562.article
https://breakingdefense.com/2025/10/air-force-needs-hundreds-more-fighters-service-says/
https://www.defensenews.com/air/2025/10/31/us-air-force-wants-1558-fighters-for-low-risk-wars-can-it-get-there/
https://www.defensenews.com/air/2025/09/03/pentagon-cuts-back-f-35-upgrades-to-slow-schedule-slips-auditors/
https://www.defensenews.com/air/2025/06/27/us-air-force-to-retire-all-a-10s-cancel-e-7-under-2026-spending-plan/
https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/4092641/air-force-designates-two-mission-design-series-for-collaborative-combat-aircraft/
https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/4287627/collaborative-combat-aircraft-yfq-42a-takes-to-the-air-for-flight-testing/
https://www.ga-asi.com/ga-asi-marks-another-aviation-first-with-yfq-42a-cca-flight-testing
https://www.anduril.com/article/anduril-yfq-44a-begins-flight-testing-for-the-collaborative-combat-aircraft-program/
The post The USAF’s 10-year fighter plan defines a 1,558 low-risk fleet appeared first on DEFENSE-AEROSPACE.
The Air Force submitted a 10-year fighter force structure plan to Congress that pins the “low-risk” requirement at 1,558 manned, combat-coded fighters. The document places today’s combat-coded inventory at about 1,271 jets for fiscal 2026. It also lays out the threshold for “medium risk” at roughly 1,367. Defense officials confirm the figures were developed to align force capacity with the mission set assigned in current guidance and contingency plans. An official who briefed reporters acknowledged funding is the constraint. “There is insufficient top line, currently, to cover everything that we want to do,” the official said, adding later, “We need
The post The USAF’s 10-year fighter plan defines a 1,558 low-risk fleet appeared first on DEFENSE-AEROSPACE.
