Turkish Akinci drone shoots down Chinese CH-95 drone in Sudan in historic air-to-air interception
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On July 13, 2026, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) utilized a Turkish-made Bayraktar Akinci unmanned combat aerial vehicle to intercept and destroy an RSF-operated Chinese-made drone northwest of El Obeid in North Kordofan, according to Clash Report. This aerial engagement represents a critical tactical shift, utilizing air-to-air guided munitions deployed from a medium-altitude, long-endurance (MALE) platform rather than relying on ground-based surface-to-air defense systems. The tactical interception establishes a protective perimeter over the strategic transportation junction of El Obeid, contesting long-range hostile reconnaissance and strike capabilities before they can threaten key government-controlled logistics hubs in central Sudan.
The interception of the Chinese-manufactured drone northwest of El Obeid represents the latest in a documented series of at least five Chinese-built drone losses, specifically FH-95 and CH-95 models, sustained by the Rapid Support Forces between June 23 and July 14, 2026. This trend demonstrates the increasing deployment of Turkish Bayraktar Akinci drones, equipped with advanced active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar and Roketsan Sungur missiles, to enforce localized denial of airspace against the paramilitary group’s long-range surveillance assets.
Related topic: Turkish AKINCI Drone Achieves First Air-to-Air Kill Using EREN Loitering Munition Against Shahed-Type UAV
The Akinci’s higher altitude allows it to search a wider area and maintain a more favorable position against slower CH-95 and FH-95 drones. (Picture source: Azeri MoD and X/Clash Report)
On July 13, 2026, according to Clash Report, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) used a Turkish-made Bayraktar Akinci unmanned combat aerial vehicle to intercept and destroy an RSF-operated Chinese CH-95 northwest of El Obeid in North Kordofan, firing an air-to-air missile in the process. The engagement followed a series of FH-95 interceptions earlier in the month in the central Sudan corridor, near Tendelti in White Nile State, and along the Khartoum-North Kordofan axis. It was also a rare operational case of a high-altitude, long-endurance UCAV conducting an air interception against another large fixed-wing UAV, rather than striking a ground target or providing surveillance.
The event shows that both belligerents are now using heavier unmanned aircraft equipped with radar, satellite communications, precision weapons, electronic warfare payloads, and flight endurance measured in dozens of hours. The tactical result was the destruction of one RSF aircraft, but the operational significance was the SAF’s demonstrated ability to contest RSF reconnaissance and strike missions before they reached El Obeid, White Nile State, or infrastructure deeper inside government-controlled Sudan. The El Obeid engagement formed part of a concentrated sequence of losses affecting the Rapid Support Forces (RSF)’s Chinese UAV fleet. On July 2, the SAF intercepted an FH-95 near Tendelti, a town in White Nile State located on the principal route between Kosti and western Sudan.
A second drone was destroyed during the following week along the highway linking Khartoum with North Kordofan, while the July 13 interception occurred northwest of El Obeid. A separate FH-95 had already been destroyed north of Tawila in North Darfur on June 23, and another was lost north of Al-Andaraba in North Kordofan on July 7. This produces a sequence of at least four FH-95 losses between June 23 and July 14, in addition to at least one CH-95 destroyed in flight and another CH-95 reportedly struck on the ground. The relevant pattern is geographical as well as numerical. Tawila lies inside the Darfur theater, Tendelti protects the White Nile approach, Al-Andaraba sits on the North Kordofan front, and El Obeid controls the main east-west junction toward Darfur.
The interceptions therefore correspond to the routes over which the RSF must fly to observe SAF concentrations, relay communications, and conduct attacks against logistics installations in central Sudan. Losing several aircraft in less than one month indicates that the SAF has established overlapping air defense coverage across separate sectors rather than concentrating all of its defenses around Khartoum. It also shows that the RSF has continued accepting drone losses to preserve surveillance over the Kordofan front, where the outcome will influence whether the SAF can extend its 2025 territorial gains toward Darfur. The CH-95 and FH-95 give the RSF two different long-range unmanned capabilities.
The CH-95 is a 650 kg drone with a maximum mission payload of 170 kg, an endurance of 6 to 12 hours, a service ceiling of 7,000 m and a line-of-sight combat radius of 250 km. Its payload options include day and night electro-optical sensors, synthetic aperture radar, ground moving target indication (GMTI) radar, precision-guided bombs, communications relay equipment and electronic warfare systems. A 170 kg payload is sufficient to combine a sensor package with guided weapons or communications equipment, although the actual combination depends on mission configuration.
The FH-95 is larger, with a maximum takeoff weight of 1,000 kg, a payload of up to 250 kg, and a service ceiling near 7,000 to 8,000 m. Its endurance reaches 30 to 35 hours in the longer-range configuration, and it incorporates satellite communications for operations beyond direct line-of-sight control. The FH-95 was designed primarily for electronic warfare, signals collection, reconnaissance and command support missions, while retaining the ability to carry precision-guided weapons. Its electronic support equipment can detect and classify radar or communications emissions, support electromagnetic mapping and assist strike aircraft or other UAVs in locating active transmitters. A CH-95 carrying electro-optical and SAR/GMTI sensors can search road networks, follow convoys, locate artillery, detect temporary fuel storage and monitor the construction of defensive positions.
A ground moving target indication radar can identify vehicle movement at night or through dust and smoke, conditions that frequently limit visual sensors in Kordofan and Darfur. A communications relay payload can connect widely separated RSF columns over distances exceeding the range of vehicle-mounted radios, supporting a command structure based on dispersed mobile formations rather than fixed brigade headquarters. An FH-95 can remain airborne for more than a full day, allowing one sortie to cover several SAF movement cycles and reducing the number of launches needed to maintain surveillance. Its electronic warfare payload can locate active air defense radars, communications nodes and command posts, while its satellite link allows it to transmit intelligence without remaining within 250 km of a ground station.
These capabilities support the RSF’s deep strike campaign against air bases, fuel depots, power facilities, airports and transport nodes. During 2025 and 2026, RSF UAVs reached Khartoum, Bahri, Kosti, Merowe, North Kordofan and the Port Sudan logistics network, in some cases striking targets 700 to more than 1,000 km from RSF-controlled territory. The loss of several CH-95 and FH-95 aircraft reduces the RSF’s ability to maintain continuous surveillance over more than one front, forces longer gaps between missions and creates competition between electronic warfare, reconnaissance and strike requirements for a smaller surviving fleet. On the other side, the Akinci has a maximum takeoff weight of 6,000 kg, a length of 12.3 m, a wingspan of 20 m and a height of 4.1 m. Its payload capacity reaches 1,350 kg in combat configuration, divided between an internal payload allowance of 400 kg and up to 950 kg on external stations.
The drone has eight hardpoints, remains airborne for more than 24 hours, cruises near 280 km/h, reaches 361 km/h, and has demonstrated flight above 13,700 m. This gives it an altitude advantage of 5,700 to 6,700 m over China’s CH-95 and FH-95 and a speed advantage sufficient to overtake these slower MALE UAVs during an interception. Its sensor suite can include the Aselsan Murad 100-A active electronically scanned array radar, SAR/GMTI radar, Aselflir-500 or Aselflir-600 electro-optical systems, SATCOM, electronic support measures, a national SIGINT module, and an electronic warfare pod. The AESA radar is the critical system for air interception because it allows the Akinci to search for, track, and classify airborne targets independently of electro-optical visibility.
The eight hardpoints allow a mixed load of air-to-air missiles and air-to-ground weapons, so an Akinci assigned to counter-drone patrol can retain the capacity to attack launch sites, command vehicles, or ground-control stations. Sudan has not released its Akinci delivery dates, but the Turkish drone entered SAF operations during 2025 after the army had already introduced Iranian Mohajer-6 UAVs and Turkish Bayraktar TB2s. The July 13 engagement changes the geometry of SAF air defense because a surface-to-air system defending El Obeid must wait until a hostile UAV enters its radar and missile engagement zone, which may allow the Chinese drone to collect imagery, identify emitters, or release a stand-off weapon before interception. An Akinci flying a combat air patrol can place the interception line farther west, north, or south of the city and engage an RSF UAV while it is still transiting toward the target area.
With an endurance exceeding 24 hours, one Akinci can cover several likely launch windows and patrol a much larger area than an air defense battery. Its service ceiling also permits it to remain above the CH-95 or FH-95, preserving sensor line of sight and creating a favorable missile launch position. MALE UAVs normally follow fuel-efficient routes, make gradual turns and operate at stable altitudes, which reduces their ability to evade once detected. Airborne interception also conserves scarce surface-to-air missiles for cruise missiles, one-way attack drones or manned aircraft and avoids assigning Sudanese MiG-29 fighters to prolonged patrols against low-speed targets. The effect is not complete air superiority, because the RSF can alter routes, reduce radar emissions, use smaller one-way drones or saturate defenses.
It nevertheless raises the cost of operating scarce CH-95s and FH-95s and forces the RSF to consider escort, deception, electronic protection and route planning for missions that previously depended mainly on altitude and distance for survival. El Obeid is the focal point of this contest because the city controls the main road and logistics network between the Nile Valley and western Sudan. It lies roughly 350 km southwest of Khartoum and functions as the principal junction for movement toward North Kordofan, West Kordofan and Darfur. Roads from Khartoum and White Nile State converge in the El Obeid area before extending west toward En Nahud, El Fasher and other Darfur routes, while southern connections lead toward Dilling, Kadugli and South Kordofan.
The SAF requires these routes to move artillery, armored vehicles, engineering equipment, fuel and replacement personnel from central Sudan toward the western front. Subsequently, the RSF requires surveillance of the same network to identify offensive preparations, attack convoys and prevent the army from converting control of Khartoum into a sustained campaign toward Darfur. During June and July 2026, the RSF concentrated forces around El Obeid while increasing drone activity, artillery attacks and interdiction operations. This was not an attempt to retake Khartoum. It was an operational blocking effort intended to fix SAF units in North Kordofan, disrupt the east-west corridor and preserve the RSF’s territorial depth in Darfur. A CH-95 or FH-95 orbiting west of El Obeid can monitor convoy departure times, artillery deployment, airfield activity and the movement of reserves.
It can also relay coordinates to strike UAVs or mobile ground units and assess whether attacks have closed a road or damaged a depot. Repeated interceptions therefore reduce the RSF’s ability to maintain a continuous picture of SAF preparations. For the army, denying this surveillance shortens the period during which force concentrations are exposed and improves its ability to move heavy formations before the RSF can disperse, reinforce, or strike the route. By mid-July 2026, the SAF holds the operational advantage, but its advantage is regional rather than decisive. The army recaptured Khartoum during 2025, restoring control over the Presidential Palace, national ministries, Khartoum International Airport, the Blue Nile-White Nile junction, and most central government institutions.
It controls River Nile State, Northern State, Red Sea State, Kassala, Gedaref, most of Khartoum State, White Nile, Sennar, Blue Nile, large parts of Gezira and eastern North Kordofan. During the first half of 2026, SAF forces reopened the Kadugli-Dalang road after lifting the siege of Dalang, recovered Kurmuk in Blue Nile State, and improved the internal corridor connecting Port Sudan, Khartoum, White Nile, and El Obeid. These gains allow the army to move larger formations supported by artillery, armor, combat aviation, and engineering units instead of sustaining isolated garrisons through vulnerable routes.
The RSF nevertheless retains most of West Darfur, Central Darfur and East Darfur, significant areas of South and North Darfur, much of West Kordofan and cross-border access toward Chad, Libya and the Central African Republic. Its capture of El Fasher in late 2025 expanded its territorial depth in North Darfur and removed the principal SAF position inside the Darfur region. The SAF possesses the national capital, Red Sea access, the principal ports, most operational air bases, conventional aviation, heavy artillery, armored units and the stronger state logistics system. The RSF retains mobile manpower, rear areas, cross-border supply routes and the ability to strike hundreds of kilometers behind the front with UAVs.
The current balance therefore favors the SAF in conventional maneuver, logistics and control of state infrastructure, while favoring the RSF in territorial depth, dispersal and the ability to prolong the war from western Sudan. The loss of multiple CH-95 and FH-95 drones weakens the RSF’s reconnaissance-strike network at the point where it is trying to stop an SAF advance, but it does not remove the RSF’s ground forces or external supply corridors. The decisive test will be whether the SAF can secure the El Obeid axis, sustain forces west of the city, and penetrate toward Darfur faster than the RSF can replace UAV losses, reinforce Kordofan, and impose attrition on the army’s extended supply lines.
Written by Jérôme Brahy
Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
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On July 13, 2026, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) utilized a Turkish-made Bayraktar Akinci unmanned combat aerial vehicle to intercept and destroy an RSF-operated Chinese-made drone northwest of El Obeid in North Kordofan, according to Clash Report. This aerial engagement represents a critical tactical shift, utilizing air-to-air guided munitions deployed from a medium-altitude, long-endurance (MALE) platform rather than relying on ground-based surface-to-air defense systems. The tactical interception establishes a protective perimeter over the strategic transportation junction of El Obeid, contesting long-range hostile reconnaissance and strike capabilities before they can threaten key government-controlled logistics hubs in central Sudan.
The interception of the Chinese-manufactured drone northwest of El Obeid represents the latest in a documented series of at least five Chinese-built drone losses, specifically FH-95 and CH-95 models, sustained by the Rapid Support Forces between June 23 and July 14, 2026. This trend demonstrates the increasing deployment of Turkish Bayraktar Akinci drones, equipped with advanced active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar and Roketsan Sungur missiles, to enforce localized denial of airspace against the paramilitary group’s long-range surveillance assets.
Related topic: Turkish AKINCI Drone Achieves First Air-to-Air Kill Using EREN Loitering Munition Against Shahed-Type UAV
The Akinci’s higher altitude allows it to search a wider area and maintain a more favorable position against slower CH-95 and FH-95 drones. (Picture source: Azeri MoD and X/Clash Report)
On July 13, 2026, according to Clash Report, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) used a Turkish-made Bayraktar Akinci unmanned combat aerial vehicle to intercept and destroy an RSF-operated Chinese CH-95 northwest of El Obeid in North Kordofan, firing an air-to-air missile in the process. The engagement followed a series of FH-95 interceptions earlier in the month in the central Sudan corridor, near Tendelti in White Nile State, and along the Khartoum-North Kordofan axis. It was also a rare operational case of a high-altitude, long-endurance UCAV conducting an air interception against another large fixed-wing UAV, rather than striking a ground target or providing surveillance.
The event shows that both belligerents are now using heavier unmanned aircraft equipped with radar, satellite communications, precision weapons, electronic warfare payloads, and flight endurance measured in dozens of hours. The tactical result was the destruction of one RSF aircraft, but the operational significance was the SAF’s demonstrated ability to contest RSF reconnaissance and strike missions before they reached El Obeid, White Nile State, or infrastructure deeper inside government-controlled Sudan. The El Obeid engagement formed part of a concentrated sequence of losses affecting the Rapid Support Forces (RSF)’s Chinese UAV fleet. On July 2, the SAF intercepted an FH-95 near Tendelti, a town in White Nile State located on the principal route between Kosti and western Sudan.
A second drone was destroyed during the following week along the highway linking Khartoum with North Kordofan, while the July 13 interception occurred northwest of El Obeid. A separate FH-95 had already been destroyed north of Tawila in North Darfur on June 23, and another was lost north of Al-Andaraba in North Kordofan on July 7. This produces a sequence of at least four FH-95 losses between June 23 and July 14, in addition to at least one CH-95 destroyed in flight and another CH-95 reportedly struck on the ground. The relevant pattern is geographical as well as numerical. Tawila lies inside the Darfur theater, Tendelti protects the White Nile approach, Al-Andaraba sits on the North Kordofan front, and El Obeid controls the main east-west junction toward Darfur.
The interceptions therefore correspond to the routes over which the RSF must fly to observe SAF concentrations, relay communications, and conduct attacks against logistics installations in central Sudan. Losing several aircraft in less than one month indicates that the SAF has established overlapping air defense coverage across separate sectors rather than concentrating all of its defenses around Khartoum. It also shows that the RSF has continued accepting drone losses to preserve surveillance over the Kordofan front, where the outcome will influence whether the SAF can extend its 2025 territorial gains toward Darfur. The CH-95 and FH-95 give the RSF two different long-range unmanned capabilities.
The CH-95 is a 650 kg drone with a maximum mission payload of 170 kg, an endurance of 6 to 12 hours, a service ceiling of 7,000 m and a line-of-sight combat radius of 250 km. Its payload options include day and night electro-optical sensors, synthetic aperture radar, ground moving target indication (GMTI) radar, precision-guided bombs, communications relay equipment and electronic warfare systems. A 170 kg payload is sufficient to combine a sensor package with guided weapons or communications equipment, although the actual combination depends on mission configuration.
The FH-95 is larger, with a maximum takeoff weight of 1,000 kg, a payload of up to 250 kg, and a service ceiling near 7,000 to 8,000 m. Its endurance reaches 30 to 35 hours in the longer-range configuration, and it incorporates satellite communications for operations beyond direct line-of-sight control. The FH-95 was designed primarily for electronic warfare, signals collection, reconnaissance and command support missions, while retaining the ability to carry precision-guided weapons. Its electronic support equipment can detect and classify radar or communications emissions, support electromagnetic mapping and assist strike aircraft or other UAVs in locating active transmitters. A CH-95 carrying electro-optical and SAR/GMTI sensors can search road networks, follow convoys, locate artillery, detect temporary fuel storage and monitor the construction of defensive positions.
A ground moving target indication radar can identify vehicle movement at night or through dust and smoke, conditions that frequently limit visual sensors in Kordofan and Darfur. A communications relay payload can connect widely separated RSF columns over distances exceeding the range of vehicle-mounted radios, supporting a command structure based on dispersed mobile formations rather than fixed brigade headquarters. An FH-95 can remain airborne for more than a full day, allowing one sortie to cover several SAF movement cycles and reducing the number of launches needed to maintain surveillance. Its electronic warfare payload can locate active air defense radars, communications nodes and command posts, while its satellite link allows it to transmit intelligence without remaining within 250 km of a ground station.
These capabilities support the RSF’s deep strike campaign against air bases, fuel depots, power facilities, airports and transport nodes. During 2025 and 2026, RSF UAVs reached Khartoum, Bahri, Kosti, Merowe, North Kordofan and the Port Sudan logistics network, in some cases striking targets 700 to more than 1,000 km from RSF-controlled territory. The loss of several CH-95 and FH-95 aircraft reduces the RSF’s ability to maintain continuous surveillance over more than one front, forces longer gaps between missions and creates competition between electronic warfare, reconnaissance and strike requirements for a smaller surviving fleet. On the other side, the Akinci has a maximum takeoff weight of 6,000 kg, a length of 12.3 m, a wingspan of 20 m and a height of 4.1 m. Its payload capacity reaches 1,350 kg in combat configuration, divided between an internal payload allowance of 400 kg and up to 950 kg on external stations.
The drone has eight hardpoints, remains airborne for more than 24 hours, cruises near 280 km/h, reaches 361 km/h, and has demonstrated flight above 13,700 m. This gives it an altitude advantage of 5,700 to 6,700 m over China’s CH-95 and FH-95 and a speed advantage sufficient to overtake these slower MALE UAVs during an interception. Its sensor suite can include the Aselsan Murad 100-A active electronically scanned array radar, SAR/GMTI radar, Aselflir-500 or Aselflir-600 electro-optical systems, SATCOM, electronic support measures, a national SIGINT module, and an electronic warfare pod. The AESA radar is the critical system for air interception because it allows the Akinci to search for, track, and classify airborne targets independently of electro-optical visibility.
The eight hardpoints allow a mixed load of air-to-air missiles and air-to-ground weapons, so an Akinci assigned to counter-drone patrol can retain the capacity to attack launch sites, command vehicles, or ground-control stations. Sudan has not released its Akinci delivery dates, but the Turkish drone entered SAF operations during 2025 after the army had already introduced Iranian Mohajer-6 UAVs and Turkish Bayraktar TB2s. The July 13 engagement changes the geometry of SAF air defense because a surface-to-air system defending El Obeid must wait until a hostile UAV enters its radar and missile engagement zone, which may allow the Chinese drone to collect imagery, identify emitters, or release a stand-off weapon before interception. An Akinci flying a combat air patrol can place the interception line farther west, north, or south of the city and engage an RSF UAV while it is still transiting toward the target area.
With an endurance exceeding 24 hours, one Akinci can cover several likely launch windows and patrol a much larger area than an air defense battery. Its service ceiling also permits it to remain above the CH-95 or FH-95, preserving sensor line of sight and creating a favorable missile launch position. MALE UAVs normally follow fuel-efficient routes, make gradual turns and operate at stable altitudes, which reduces their ability to evade once detected. Airborne interception also conserves scarce surface-to-air missiles for cruise missiles, one-way attack drones or manned aircraft and avoids assigning Sudanese MiG-29 fighters to prolonged patrols against low-speed targets. The effect is not complete air superiority, because the RSF can alter routes, reduce radar emissions, use smaller one-way drones or saturate defenses.
It nevertheless raises the cost of operating scarce CH-95s and FH-95s and forces the RSF to consider escort, deception, electronic protection and route planning for missions that previously depended mainly on altitude and distance for survival. El Obeid is the focal point of this contest because the city controls the main road and logistics network between the Nile Valley and western Sudan. It lies roughly 350 km southwest of Khartoum and functions as the principal junction for movement toward North Kordofan, West Kordofan and Darfur. Roads from Khartoum and White Nile State converge in the El Obeid area before extending west toward En Nahud, El Fasher and other Darfur routes, while southern connections lead toward Dilling, Kadugli and South Kordofan.
The SAF requires these routes to move artillery, armored vehicles, engineering equipment, fuel and replacement personnel from central Sudan toward the western front. Subsequently, the RSF requires surveillance of the same network to identify offensive preparations, attack convoys and prevent the army from converting control of Khartoum into a sustained campaign toward Darfur. During June and July 2026, the RSF concentrated forces around El Obeid while increasing drone activity, artillery attacks and interdiction operations. This was not an attempt to retake Khartoum. It was an operational blocking effort intended to fix SAF units in North Kordofan, disrupt the east-west corridor and preserve the RSF’s territorial depth in Darfur. A CH-95 or FH-95 orbiting west of El Obeid can monitor convoy departure times, artillery deployment, airfield activity and the movement of reserves.
It can also relay coordinates to strike UAVs or mobile ground units and assess whether attacks have closed a road or damaged a depot. Repeated interceptions therefore reduce the RSF’s ability to maintain a continuous picture of SAF preparations. For the army, denying this surveillance shortens the period during which force concentrations are exposed and improves its ability to move heavy formations before the RSF can disperse, reinforce, or strike the route. By mid-July 2026, the SAF holds the operational advantage, but its advantage is regional rather than decisive. The army recaptured Khartoum during 2025, restoring control over the Presidential Palace, national ministries, Khartoum International Airport, the Blue Nile-White Nile junction, and most central government institutions.
It controls River Nile State, Northern State, Red Sea State, Kassala, Gedaref, most of Khartoum State, White Nile, Sennar, Blue Nile, large parts of Gezira and eastern North Kordofan. During the first half of 2026, SAF forces reopened the Kadugli-Dalang road after lifting the siege of Dalang, recovered Kurmuk in Blue Nile State, and improved the internal corridor connecting Port Sudan, Khartoum, White Nile, and El Obeid. These gains allow the army to move larger formations supported by artillery, armor, combat aviation, and engineering units instead of sustaining isolated garrisons through vulnerable routes.
The RSF nevertheless retains most of West Darfur, Central Darfur and East Darfur, significant areas of South and North Darfur, much of West Kordofan and cross-border access toward Chad, Libya and the Central African Republic. Its capture of El Fasher in late 2025 expanded its territorial depth in North Darfur and removed the principal SAF position inside the Darfur region. The SAF possesses the national capital, Red Sea access, the principal ports, most operational air bases, conventional aviation, heavy artillery, armored units and the stronger state logistics system. The RSF retains mobile manpower, rear areas, cross-border supply routes and the ability to strike hundreds of kilometers behind the front with UAVs.
The current balance therefore favors the SAF in conventional maneuver, logistics and control of state infrastructure, while favoring the RSF in territorial depth, dispersal and the ability to prolong the war from western Sudan. The loss of multiple CH-95 and FH-95 drones weakens the RSF’s reconnaissance-strike network at the point where it is trying to stop an SAF advance, but it does not remove the RSF’s ground forces or external supply corridors. The decisive test will be whether the SAF can secure the El Obeid axis, sustain forces west of the city, and penetrate toward Darfur faster than the RSF can replace UAV losses, reinforce Kordofan, and impose attrition on the army’s extended supply lines.
Written by Jérôme Brahy
Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
Explore More Defense News
• Land Defense News
• Naval Defense News
• Defense Aerospace News
