Türkiye’s Akinci Drone Shifts to Electronic Warfare Role With Aselsan’s New Pod Suite
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Türkiye’s Bayraktar Akıncı UCAV is flying with Aselsan’s new Electronic Support and Electronic Attack pods, the companies and recent coverage confirm. This shifts a high-altitude, long-endurance combat drone from pure ISR and strike work into emitter discovery, jamming and deception roles that reduce reliance on scarce crewed EW aircraft, changing how strike packages will be planned.
On 24 October 2025, Türkiye’s unmanned airpower took a substantive step toward electronic-warfare led air campaigns as announced by Baykar and further detailed by Aselsan, with fresh evidence that the Bayraktar Akinci is flying with a dedicated Electronic Support pod and an Electronic Attack pod. The pairing shifts a HALE-class UCAV from ISR and strike into emitter discovery, jamming and deception roles that traditionally depended on scarce crewed aircraft. The development is timely as integrated air defenses harden across multiple theaters, making EW the entry ticket for any strike package.
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Bayraktar Akinci equipped with Aselsan ANTIDOT 2-U/ES and 2-U/EA pods during a recent exercise signaling Türkiye’s shift toward unmanned SEAD and stand-off jamming capabilities (Picture Source: Army Recognition and Baykar)
At the core of the configuration are Aselsan’s ANTIDOT 2-U/S Electronic Support pod and ANTIDOT 2-U/EA Electronic Attack pod. The ES pod is designed to detect, classify, record and precisely geolocate hostile radar emissions, streaming all required data to the ground control station in real time. The EA counterpart adds high-power jamming and deception techniques to disrupt or mislead threat radars, giving mission planners a single unmanned node that can both build an emitter picture and impose effects. This closes the reconnaissance-to-effects loop in one orbiting asset and extends protection to accompanying aircraft or missiles moving along the same corridor.
Recent footage released by Baykar showed the seventh and tenth Akinci prototypes carrying the new pods during an exercise, while Aselsan identified the exact types as ANTIDOT 2-U/ES and ANTIDOT 2-U/EA. Reporting underscores that these systems deliver far greater output than the compact ANTIDOT 2-U LB/MB/HB units sized for the lighter Bayraktar TB2, reflecting Akinci’s higher electrical power and payload capacity. In practical terms, TB2-class drones gain local protection and limited escort jamming, whereas Akinci moves into wide-area emitter hunting, deception and route sanitization for strike packages across far greater distances.
Akinci’s path to this role has been incremental. The type entered service with the Turkish Armed Forces on August 29, 2021, and has since evolved from a precision-strike platform into a multi-sensor node with SATCOM, AESA/SAR options and reserved growth space for SIGINT/EW payloads, traits that make it a natural host for modular pods. As these avionics matured, industry roadmaps increasingly emphasized heavier stores, more electrical power and long-endurance mission profiles tailored to electronic warfare, setting conditions for the current ES/EA pairing.
The technical logic behind the two-pod approach is straightforward. ANTIDOT 2-U/S builds the electromagnetic order of battle by finding and fixing radar emitters with angular accuracy, then cueing either onboard EA or cooperative assets; ANTIDOT 2-U/EA executes noise and technique-based jamming or spoofing to suppress acquisition, tracking and engagement chains. Because all telemetry and recordings flow live to the ground control station, operators can re-task the aircraft in flight, adapt jamming techniques to frequency-agile threats and feed mission data for follow-on strikes. This compresses find-fix-finish timelines and pushes shaping operations closer to defended airspace without exposing aircrews.
Importantly, the ES/EA pairing appears to be a waypoint rather than an end state. Aselsan is developing the larger ASOJ-234U stand-off jamming pod for Akinci’s centerline station under the UAV-SOJ effort, unifying radar and communications ES/EA with higher output to degrade air defenses from safer ranges. When combined with Akinci’s endurance, a centerline SOJ store would move the platform from escort jamming into true stand-off roles that pre-condition the battlespace before strike ingress, while retaining the attritability and cost advantages of an unmanned system.
From an operational and procurement perspective, the advantages are tangible. Uncrewed EW allows planners to accept risk in dense threat rings, sustain persistent orbits measured in tens of hours and re-roll a single aircraft between emitter hunting and deception as the tactical picture evolves. For countries priced out of dedicated manned EW fleets, a HALE-class drone carrying modern pods offers a lower-cost, exportable path to generate SEAD/DEAD effects, escort jamming for cruise-missile salvos and electromagnetic shield corridors for strike packages. For Türkiye specifically, the maturation of ANTIDOT on Akinci complements land-based KORAL-type capabilities and future airborne SOJ platforms, tightening national control over the full electronic-warfare kill chain.
The strategic implications are clear. Regionally, persistent unmanned jamming from Akinci alters deterrence and denial dynamics over maritime chokepoints and contested borders by forcing adversaries to expend more interceptors, reveal more emitters and accept higher uncertainty about their radar picture. Militarily, a doctrine that puts EW first and leverages attritable carriers to open air corridors is now within reach, and it is being demonstrated in public rather than implied. Aselsan’s statement that “the national forces of electronic warfare are in the sky” reads less like a slogan and more like a capability baseline that partners and competitors will have to factor into their planning.
Equipped with Aselsan’s ANTIDOT 2-U/S and 2-U/EA pods, the Akinci has transitioned from a promising demonstration to a fully credible enabler of electronic warfare operations. The upcoming ASOJ-234U pod is expected to extend these capabilities to true stand-off ranges, reinforcing the platform’s strategic value. With visual confirmation from Baykar and detailed disclosures from Aselsan, it is clear that unmanned systems are no longer peripheral players in the electromagnetic battlespace; they are increasingly the ones shaping it, clearing the way for broader air campaigns and redefining the role of endurance drones in modern warfare.
Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.
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Türkiye’s Bayraktar Akıncı UCAV is flying with Aselsan’s new Electronic Support and Electronic Attack pods, the companies and recent coverage confirm. This shifts a high-altitude, long-endurance combat drone from pure ISR and strike work into emitter discovery, jamming and deception roles that reduce reliance on scarce crewed EW aircraft, changing how strike packages will be planned.
On 24 October 2025, Türkiye’s unmanned airpower took a substantive step toward electronic-warfare led air campaigns as announced by Baykar and further detailed by Aselsan, with fresh evidence that the Bayraktar Akinci is flying with a dedicated Electronic Support pod and an Electronic Attack pod. The pairing shifts a HALE-class UCAV from ISR and strike into emitter discovery, jamming and deception roles that traditionally depended on scarce crewed aircraft. The development is timely as integrated air defenses harden across multiple theaters, making EW the entry ticket for any strike package.
Bayraktar Akinci equipped with Aselsan ANTIDOT 2-U/ES and 2-U/EA pods during a recent exercise signaling Türkiye’s shift toward unmanned SEAD and stand-off jamming capabilities (Picture Source: Army Recognition and Baykar)
At the core of the configuration are Aselsan’s ANTIDOT 2-U/S Electronic Support pod and ANTIDOT 2-U/EA Electronic Attack pod. The ES pod is designed to detect, classify, record and precisely geolocate hostile radar emissions, streaming all required data to the ground control station in real time. The EA counterpart adds high-power jamming and deception techniques to disrupt or mislead threat radars, giving mission planners a single unmanned node that can both build an emitter picture and impose effects. This closes the reconnaissance-to-effects loop in one orbiting asset and extends protection to accompanying aircraft or missiles moving along the same corridor.
Recent footage released by Baykar showed the seventh and tenth Akinci prototypes carrying the new pods during an exercise, while Aselsan identified the exact types as ANTIDOT 2-U/ES and ANTIDOT 2-U/EA. Reporting underscores that these systems deliver far greater output than the compact ANTIDOT 2-U LB/MB/HB units sized for the lighter Bayraktar TB2, reflecting Akinci’s higher electrical power and payload capacity. In practical terms, TB2-class drones gain local protection and limited escort jamming, whereas Akinci moves into wide-area emitter hunting, deception and route sanitization for strike packages across far greater distances.
Akinci’s path to this role has been incremental. The type entered service with the Turkish Armed Forces on August 29, 2021, and has since evolved from a precision-strike platform into a multi-sensor node with SATCOM, AESA/SAR options and reserved growth space for SIGINT/EW payloads, traits that make it a natural host for modular pods. As these avionics matured, industry roadmaps increasingly emphasized heavier stores, more electrical power and long-endurance mission profiles tailored to electronic warfare, setting conditions for the current ES/EA pairing.
The technical logic behind the two-pod approach is straightforward. ANTIDOT 2-U/S builds the electromagnetic order of battle by finding and fixing radar emitters with angular accuracy, then cueing either onboard EA or cooperative assets; ANTIDOT 2-U/EA executes noise and technique-based jamming or spoofing to suppress acquisition, tracking and engagement chains. Because all telemetry and recordings flow live to the ground control station, operators can re-task the aircraft in flight, adapt jamming techniques to frequency-agile threats and feed mission data for follow-on strikes. This compresses find-fix-finish timelines and pushes shaping operations closer to defended airspace without exposing aircrews.
Importantly, the ES/EA pairing appears to be a waypoint rather than an end state. Aselsan is developing the larger ASOJ-234U stand-off jamming pod for Akinci’s centerline station under the UAV-SOJ effort, unifying radar and communications ES/EA with higher output to degrade air defenses from safer ranges. When combined with Akinci’s endurance, a centerline SOJ store would move the platform from escort jamming into true stand-off roles that pre-condition the battlespace before strike ingress, while retaining the attritability and cost advantages of an unmanned system.
From an operational and procurement perspective, the advantages are tangible. Uncrewed EW allows planners to accept risk in dense threat rings, sustain persistent orbits measured in tens of hours and re-roll a single aircraft between emitter hunting and deception as the tactical picture evolves. For countries priced out of dedicated manned EW fleets, a HALE-class drone carrying modern pods offers a lower-cost, exportable path to generate SEAD/DEAD effects, escort jamming for cruise-missile salvos and electromagnetic shield corridors for strike packages. For Türkiye specifically, the maturation of ANTIDOT on Akinci complements land-based KORAL-type capabilities and future airborne SOJ platforms, tightening national control over the full electronic-warfare kill chain.
The strategic implications are clear. Regionally, persistent unmanned jamming from Akinci alters deterrence and denial dynamics over maritime chokepoints and contested borders by forcing adversaries to expend more interceptors, reveal more emitters and accept higher uncertainty about their radar picture. Militarily, a doctrine that puts EW first and leverages attritable carriers to open air corridors is now within reach, and it is being demonstrated in public rather than implied. Aselsan’s statement that “the national forces of electronic warfare are in the sky” reads less like a slogan and more like a capability baseline that partners and competitors will have to factor into their planning.
Equipped with Aselsan’s ANTIDOT 2-U/S and 2-U/EA pods, the Akinci has transitioned from a promising demonstration to a fully credible enabler of electronic warfare operations. The upcoming ASOJ-234U pod is expected to extend these capabilities to true stand-off ranges, reinforcing the platform’s strategic value. With visual confirmation from Baykar and detailed disclosures from Aselsan, it is clear that unmanned systems are no longer peripheral players in the electromagnetic battlespace; they are increasingly the ones shaping it, clearing the way for broader air campaigns and redefining the role of endurance drones in modern warfare.
Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.
