U.S. Navy NAVAIR Seeks Dual-Role Anti-Radiation Missile with Air-to-Air Capability
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The U.S. Naval Air Systems Command on February 20, 2026, issued a Sources Sought notice via SAM.gov for a next-generation anti-radiation missile capable of striking both surface emitters and airborne radar platforms. The effort signals a shift toward multi-mission weapons designed to disrupt enemy sensor networks across the full electromagnetic spectrum in future high-end conflicts.
On February 20, 2026, the U.S. Naval Air Systems Command published a Sources Sought notice on SAM.gov to survey industry options for a next-generation anti-radiation weapon aimed at contested-spectrum operations. Rather than announcing an award, the notice signals an effort to shape requirements for a missile able to prosecute both surface-based emitters and airborne radar nodes. The move underscores how modern air campaigns increasingly hinge on breaking an adversary’s sensor-to-shooter chain, not only defeating individual launchers.
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An AGM-88E Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile is launched from a VX-31 F/A-18 Hornet over the Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake test range during the weapon’s Operational Assessment in August (Picture Source: NAVAIR)
The notice describes an Advanced Emission Suppression Missile intended to expand the SEAD mission set beyond classic engagements against ground radars. In practice, the dual-role concept points to a weapon that can home on emitters across domains, including airborne platforms that contribute to the air picture and battle management. Targeting those nodes would pressure the enabling layer of an integrated air defense system, potentially degrading track quality, cueing, and engagement coordination at operational ranges.
From a capability standpoint, the requirement emphasizes seeker coverage across relevant bands, resilience to countermeasures, and performance gains over current inventories. The mention of benchmarks such as AGM-88G AARGM-ER is important because that family is built to sustain effects even when an adversary employs emitter shutdown tactics and modern countermeasures, illustrating the direction of travel for contemporary anti-radiation weapons. Platform compatibility is also central, with integration expected across the Super Hornet and Growler community and relevant strike aircraft, aligning the missile with carrier air wing employment concepts in contested environments.
U.S. naval aviation has long treated anti-radiation weapons as a core tool for suppressing IADS elements, enabling strike packages to penetrate or operate from standoff distances. The problem set has evolved, however, as modern air defenses rely on mobility, frequency agility, passive detection, and layered sensor architectures that complicate classic “radar-on, missile-away” engagements. Adding an airborne-emitter target set is a logical extension of this reality: it acknowledges that modern defenses are increasingly networked, with airborne sensors and battle-management functions contributing to the broader engagement picture.
Tactically, an AESM-type capability would expand how planners open corridors through an IADS. Instead of relying solely on escort jamming or repeated ARM shots against surface search and fire-control radars, a dual-role emission-seeking missile could impose risk on the sensing and coordination layer that supports engagement timelines. In practical terms, threatening AEW&C-type emitters can reduce adversary situational awareness, disrupt cueing for long-range SAMs and fighters, and force more restrictive emissions control measures that degrade defensive efficiency.
The requirement fits a broader push to counter anti-access/area denial architectures by attacking the “eyes and ears” of the kill web. In a high-end scenario, denying an opponent the ability to generate and maintain a coherent air and maritime picture can be as decisive as destroying launchers. By exploring a weapon that can engage both terrestrial emitters and airborne radar nodes, the Navy is effectively looking to widen its options for electromagnetic and kinetic disruption while preserving the survivability and operational reach of carrier-based airpower.
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The U.S. Naval Air Systems Command on February 20, 2026, issued a Sources Sought notice via SAM.gov for a next-generation anti-radiation missile capable of striking both surface emitters and airborne radar platforms. The effort signals a shift toward multi-mission weapons designed to disrupt enemy sensor networks across the full electromagnetic spectrum in future high-end conflicts.
On February 20, 2026, the U.S. Naval Air Systems Command published a Sources Sought notice on SAM.gov to survey industry options for a next-generation anti-radiation weapon aimed at contested-spectrum operations. Rather than announcing an award, the notice signals an effort to shape requirements for a missile able to prosecute both surface-based emitters and airborne radar nodes. The move underscores how modern air campaigns increasingly hinge on breaking an adversary’s sensor-to-shooter chain, not only defeating individual launchers.
An AGM-88E Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile is launched from a VX-31 F/A-18 Hornet over the Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake test range during the weapon’s Operational Assessment in August (Picture Source: NAVAIR)
The notice describes an Advanced Emission Suppression Missile intended to expand the SEAD mission set beyond classic engagements against ground radars. In practice, the dual-role concept points to a weapon that can home on emitters across domains, including airborne platforms that contribute to the air picture and battle management. Targeting those nodes would pressure the enabling layer of an integrated air defense system, potentially degrading track quality, cueing, and engagement coordination at operational ranges.
From a capability standpoint, the requirement emphasizes seeker coverage across relevant bands, resilience to countermeasures, and performance gains over current inventories. The mention of benchmarks such as AGM-88G AARGM-ER is important because that family is built to sustain effects even when an adversary employs emitter shutdown tactics and modern countermeasures, illustrating the direction of travel for contemporary anti-radiation weapons. Platform compatibility is also central, with integration expected across the Super Hornet and Growler community and relevant strike aircraft, aligning the missile with carrier air wing employment concepts in contested environments.
U.S. naval aviation has long treated anti-radiation weapons as a core tool for suppressing IADS elements, enabling strike packages to penetrate or operate from standoff distances. The problem set has evolved, however, as modern air defenses rely on mobility, frequency agility, passive detection, and layered sensor architectures that complicate classic “radar-on, missile-away” engagements. Adding an airborne-emitter target set is a logical extension of this reality: it acknowledges that modern defenses are increasingly networked, with airborne sensors and battle-management functions contributing to the broader engagement picture.
Tactically, an AESM-type capability would expand how planners open corridors through an IADS. Instead of relying solely on escort jamming or repeated ARM shots against surface search and fire-control radars, a dual-role emission-seeking missile could impose risk on the sensing and coordination layer that supports engagement timelines. In practical terms, threatening AEW&C-type emitters can reduce adversary situational awareness, disrupt cueing for long-range SAMs and fighters, and force more restrictive emissions control measures that degrade defensive efficiency.
The requirement fits a broader push to counter anti-access/area denial architectures by attacking the “eyes and ears” of the kill web. In a high-end scenario, denying an opponent the ability to generate and maintain a coherent air and maritime picture can be as decisive as destroying launchers. By exploring a weapon that can engage both terrestrial emitters and airborne radar nodes, the Navy is effectively looking to widen its options for electromagnetic and kinetic disruption while preserving the survivability and operational reach of carrier-based airpower.
