U.S. Navy Orders 1,890 Guidance Units for Advanced Radar-Hunting AARGM-ER Missiles
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The U.S. Navy has awarded Honeywell a $30.807 million contract for 1,890 inertial measurement units supporting the AGM-88G AARGM-ER missile program for U.S. services and allied partners. The purchase strengthens production of a long-range, jam-resistant anti-radiation weapon designed to defeat modern integrated air defense systems in GPS-denied environments.
The U.S. Navy has placed a $30.807 million order with Honeywell for Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile Extended Range inertial measurement units, reinforcing the guidance backbone that makes the AGM-88G AARGM-ER a credible anti-radar weapon in jammed, deception-heavy air defense battles. In a Feb. 26 contracts notice, the Navy lists a firm-fixed-price order for 1,890 “life of type buy” AARGM-ER IMUs, with deliveries supporting Navy and Air Force inventories as well as allied and partner demand through Foreign Military Sales. The breakdown is unusually explicit: 703 IMUs for the Navy, 530 for the Air Force, 104 for Italy, and 553 for multiple FMS customers, with work performed in Minneapolis, Minnesota and scheduled for completion in December 2027.Follow Army Recognition on Google News at this link
AARGM-ER equips NATO-capable fighters with a long-range, jam-resistant anti-radiation strike that can home on emitting radars, continue to the target when they shut down using inertial navigation, then finish the attack with millimeter-wave terminal guidance to suppress or destroy modern mobile air-defense systems (Picture source: U.S. Navy).
Although the line item is “only” an IMU, the operational stake is the missile. AARGM-ER is the Navy-led next step beyond the AGM-88E AARGM, designed to restore and expand suppression and destruction of enemy air defenses against modern integrated air defense systems that rely on mobility, emission control, and electronic warfare to survive. The Navy’s own acquisition reporting frames AARGM-ER as an air-launched missile that leverages prior AARGM investment while incorporating a new solid rocket motor for increased range, integrated on the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and EA-18G Growler, and configured for internal carriage on the F-35. The Air Force is formally listed as a supporting component, underscoring that this is a joint capability even when the contracting activity sits with Naval Air Systems Command.
AARGM-ER’s relevance comes from how it hunts radars that try to disappear. The AGM-88G employs a multi-mode seeker that passively detects and guides on radio-frequency emissions from a threat radar, then transitions to an active millimeter-wave terminal radar seeker to detect, track, and suppress or destroy RF-enabled surface-to-air missile systems. AARGM-ER uses the same millimeter-wave radar as AARGM but pairs it with a new warhead, a larger diameter, a shorter length to enable F-35A/C internal bay carriage, and a new rocket motor to deliver increased lethality at longer range against modern SAM threats.
This is where the inertial measurement unit moves from a component to a combat enabler. The IMU supplies the inertial sensing at the heart of the missile’s inertial navigation system, measuring acceleration and rotation so the weapon can maintain a stable navigation solution during high-G maneuvers, abrupt profile changes, and periods where GPS updates are denied or unreliable. Honeywell’s IMU family is designed around precise navigation, stabilization, and control for demanding aerospace and defense applications, which is the unglamorous but decisive requirement for a missile expected to fly a planned route, manage time-to-target, and execute terminal searches even as an opponent jams satellite navigation and manipulates the electromagnetic environment. In practice, a robust IMU directly supports AARGM-ER’s counter-shutdown purpose: if a radar stops emitting, the missile still needs to fly to the best estimated target area, transition to terminal sensing, and complete the kill chain rather than falling blind.
The airframe and control approach are optimized to survive and reach deeper. AARGM-ER represents a significant upgrade that reuses existing AARGM sensors and electronics while adding propulsion and warhead upgrades, removing mid-body wings, and adopting a tail-controlled configuration with thermal protection and strakes to support extended range and survivability requirements. Compatibility extends across F/A-18E/F, EA-18G, and external carriage on F-35 variants, and internal carriage on F-35A/C, widening the number of NATO-relevant launch platforms that can deliver a modern anti-radiation strike from more tactically flexible loadouts.
Operationally, the combination changes SEAD from “find an emitter and shoot before it goes quiet” into a more resilient suppression and destruction toolkit. AARGM-ER is designed to prosecute relocatable radars that exploit shutdown tactics, forcing adversary operators into a dilemma: emit and be targeted, or shut down and surrender surveillance and engagement quality at the moment NATO aircraft need access corridors. The program has moved through live-fire testing in GPS-denied environments as it approaches initial operational capability, highlighting that navigation resilience is not a theoretical requirement but a test-driven program discriminator. For NATO ground forces, that matters because survivable air access is the prerequisite for responsive close air support, deep interdiction of SAM resupply and reload nodes, and persistent ISR that can cue land-based fires. SEAD is not an “air-only” mission; it is the enabling function that lets joint forces maneuver under an air defense umbrella that would otherwise compress the battlespace.
The repartition of this IMU order shows how the Navy is acting as a capability broker for a coalition ecosystem. The contracting activity is Navy, but the allocation and funding streams span U.S. services and international customers, including dedicated Italian cooperative program funding and multiple FMS lines. Italy’s presence reflects its longstanding participation in the AARGM program and its expansion of F-35 operations and precision strike options. Beyond Italy, additional NATO partners are pursuing AARGM-ER through Foreign Military Sales channels, aligning anti-radiation strike capabilities across alliance air forces.
Looking ahead, the “life of type buy” language suggests the Navy is deliberately buying down supply-chain risk for a guidance component that may face obsolescence pressures, a common tactic when a critical commercial or dual-use part is no longer assured in the quantities and timelines required for munitions production. For NATO, that kind of procurement discipline is as strategically important as the missile’s kinematics: deterrence depends on having enough modern weapons, built on stable industrial throughput, to hold an adversary’s air defense architecture at risk from day one of a crisis.
Written by Evan Lerouvillois, Defense Analyst.
Evan studied International Relations, and quickly specialized in defense and security. He is particularly interested in the influence of the defense sector on global geopolitics, and analyzes how technological innovations in defense, arms export contracts, and military strategies influence the international geopolitical scene.
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The U.S. Navy has awarded Honeywell a $30.807 million contract for 1,890 inertial measurement units supporting the AGM-88G AARGM-ER missile program for U.S. services and allied partners. The purchase strengthens production of a long-range, jam-resistant anti-radiation weapon designed to defeat modern integrated air defense systems in GPS-denied environments.
The U.S. Navy has placed a $30.807 million order with Honeywell for Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile Extended Range inertial measurement units, reinforcing the guidance backbone that makes the AGM-88G AARGM-ER a credible anti-radar weapon in jammed, deception-heavy air defense battles. In a Feb. 26 contracts notice, the Navy lists a firm-fixed-price order for 1,890 “life of type buy” AARGM-ER IMUs, with deliveries supporting Navy and Air Force inventories as well as allied and partner demand through Foreign Military Sales. The breakdown is unusually explicit: 703 IMUs for the Navy, 530 for the Air Force, 104 for Italy, and 553 for multiple FMS customers, with work performed in Minneapolis, Minnesota and scheduled for completion in December 2027.
Follow Army Recognition on Google News at this link
AARGM-ER equips NATO-capable fighters with a long-range, jam-resistant anti-radiation strike that can home on emitting radars, continue to the target when they shut down using inertial navigation, then finish the attack with millimeter-wave terminal guidance to suppress or destroy modern mobile air-defense systems (Picture source: U.S. Navy).
Although the line item is “only” an IMU, the operational stake is the missile. AARGM-ER is the Navy-led next step beyond the AGM-88E AARGM, designed to restore and expand suppression and destruction of enemy air defenses against modern integrated air defense systems that rely on mobility, emission control, and electronic warfare to survive. The Navy’s own acquisition reporting frames AARGM-ER as an air-launched missile that leverages prior AARGM investment while incorporating a new solid rocket motor for increased range, integrated on the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and EA-18G Growler, and configured for internal carriage on the F-35. The Air Force is formally listed as a supporting component, underscoring that this is a joint capability even when the contracting activity sits with Naval Air Systems Command.
AARGM-ER’s relevance comes from how it hunts radars that try to disappear. The AGM-88G employs a multi-mode seeker that passively detects and guides on radio-frequency emissions from a threat radar, then transitions to an active millimeter-wave terminal radar seeker to detect, track, and suppress or destroy RF-enabled surface-to-air missile systems. AARGM-ER uses the same millimeter-wave radar as AARGM but pairs it with a new warhead, a larger diameter, a shorter length to enable F-35A/C internal bay carriage, and a new rocket motor to deliver increased lethality at longer range against modern SAM threats.
This is where the inertial measurement unit moves from a component to a combat enabler. The IMU supplies the inertial sensing at the heart of the missile’s inertial navigation system, measuring acceleration and rotation so the weapon can maintain a stable navigation solution during high-G maneuvers, abrupt profile changes, and periods where GPS updates are denied or unreliable. Honeywell’s IMU family is designed around precise navigation, stabilization, and control for demanding aerospace and defense applications, which is the unglamorous but decisive requirement for a missile expected to fly a planned route, manage time-to-target, and execute terminal searches even as an opponent jams satellite navigation and manipulates the electromagnetic environment. In practice, a robust IMU directly supports AARGM-ER’s counter-shutdown purpose: if a radar stops emitting, the missile still needs to fly to the best estimated target area, transition to terminal sensing, and complete the kill chain rather than falling blind.
The airframe and control approach are optimized to survive and reach deeper. AARGM-ER represents a significant upgrade that reuses existing AARGM sensors and electronics while adding propulsion and warhead upgrades, removing mid-body wings, and adopting a tail-controlled configuration with thermal protection and strakes to support extended range and survivability requirements. Compatibility extends across F/A-18E/F, EA-18G, and external carriage on F-35 variants, and internal carriage on F-35A/C, widening the number of NATO-relevant launch platforms that can deliver a modern anti-radiation strike from more tactically flexible loadouts.
Operationally, the combination changes SEAD from “find an emitter and shoot before it goes quiet” into a more resilient suppression and destruction toolkit. AARGM-ER is designed to prosecute relocatable radars that exploit shutdown tactics, forcing adversary operators into a dilemma: emit and be targeted, or shut down and surrender surveillance and engagement quality at the moment NATO aircraft need access corridors. The program has moved through live-fire testing in GPS-denied environments as it approaches initial operational capability, highlighting that navigation resilience is not a theoretical requirement but a test-driven program discriminator. For NATO ground forces, that matters because survivable air access is the prerequisite for responsive close air support, deep interdiction of SAM resupply and reload nodes, and persistent ISR that can cue land-based fires. SEAD is not an “air-only” mission; it is the enabling function that lets joint forces maneuver under an air defense umbrella that would otherwise compress the battlespace.
The repartition of this IMU order shows how the Navy is acting as a capability broker for a coalition ecosystem. The contracting activity is Navy, but the allocation and funding streams span U.S. services and international customers, including dedicated Italian cooperative program funding and multiple FMS lines. Italy’s presence reflects its longstanding participation in the AARGM program and its expansion of F-35 operations and precision strike options. Beyond Italy, additional NATO partners are pursuing AARGM-ER through Foreign Military Sales channels, aligning anti-radiation strike capabilities across alliance air forces.
Looking ahead, the “life of type buy” language suggests the Navy is deliberately buying down supply-chain risk for a guidance component that may face obsolescence pressures, a common tactic when a critical commercial or dual-use part is no longer assured in the quantities and timelines required for munitions production. For NATO, that kind of procurement discipline is as strategically important as the missile’s kinematics: deterrence depends on having enough modern weapons, built on stable industrial throughput, to hold an adversary’s air defense architecture at risk from day one of a crisis.
Written by Evan Lerouvillois, Defense Analyst.
Evan studied International Relations, and quickly specialized in defense and security. He is particularly interested in the influence of the defense sector on global geopolitics, and analyzes how technological innovations in defense, arms export contracts, and military strategies influence the international geopolitical scene.
