U.S. Space Force launches new triad of jammers to disrupt Chinese and Russian satellites
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The U.S. Space Force is preparing to field two additional reversible counterspace systems, L3Harris’s Meadowlands and the Remote Modular Terminal, to operate alongside the Counter Communications System. These mobile and remotely operated jammers are meant to temporarily blind or corrupt adversary satellite links while avoiding orbital debris.
According to information published by Bloomberg, on November 4, 2025, the U.S. Space Force is moving to field two additional reversible counterspace weapons, L3Harris’s Meadowlands and the Remote Modular Terminal, alongside the Counter Communications System that reached initial operational capability on March 9, 2020. The new systems will be dispersed globally, can be operated remotely, and are intended to blind or corrupt adversary satellite links without creating debris. Bloomberg also reports a new Space Electromagnetic Tactical Operations Center to coordinate effects with the Bounty Hunter monitoring network.Follow Army Recognition on Google News at this link
Meadowlands’ mobile high-power jamming, dispersed RMT nodes, and upgraded CCS combined to deliver layered, reversible RF effects that deny or degrade adversary satellite communications and ISR without creating orbital debris (Picture source: L3Harris/U.S Space Force).
Meadowlands is the Space Force’s next-generation offensive space control platform. The service accepted early units in spring 2025, cleared fielding on May 2, and moved into operational testing to validate faster set-up, higher jam-to-signal performance, and a smaller, more mobile footprint than legacy gear. “A step-change in capability,” is how an L3Harris official characterized it when the first two units were delivered in June. Practically, Meadowlands can time and focus radio-frequency energy to deny uplinks that task imaging satellites or to corrupt downlinks carrying collected data, creating short, reversible windows that break a targeting chain.
The Counter Communications System remains the workhorse. CCS is a transportable, ground-based RF jammer that historically targeted geostationary SATCOM links supporting command-and-control, relay, and data distribution. Block 10.2 added software-defined flexibility and cyber hardening when it achieved IOC in 2020, and the Air Force and Space Force have funded a multiyear upgrade effort covering 16 fielded systems. Contract disclosures in late 2021 put the modernization effort in the roughly 120–125 million range as part of a broader CCS sustainment and enhancement portfolio.
The Remote Modular Terminal is the proliferated counterpart. Developed by Northstrat and CACI under a 2022 Space Force award, RMT is a compact, distributed jammer now placed at undisclosed overseas locations in an early-use configuration and controllable from standoff sites. Bloomberg’s prior reporting indicated a planning figure of up to 24 RMTs, underscoring a concept that favors many small emitters over a few large ones for persistence, attribution complexity, and resilience.
These weapons are not fielded in isolation: Space Delta 3 provides the operators for space electromagnetic warfare, while the nascent operations center links jamming missions with intelligence support and theater demands. Bounty Hunter, first delivered to Indo-Pacific Command in 2018 and to Central Command in 2019, detects and geolocates interference against U.S. and commercial satellites, guiding where and when to apply reversible effects.
Space Force’s 2025 Space Threat Fact Sheet catalogs China’s rapidly expanding orbital network, noting the People’s Liberation Army benefits from more than 510 ISR satellites across optical, multispectral, radar, and RF sensors, enabling a maritime kill web that can find U.S. carriers and amphibious groups. Timed jamming against LEO synthetic aperture radar overpasses or SATCOM relay during key windows would degrade that web, forcing the PLA to rely on slower airborne and surface sensors and widening maneuver space for the joint force. As Gen. Chance Saltzman has argued, the United States must “think of space as a warfighting domain,” and these reversible tools are calibrated for that reality.
Against Russia, reversible, geographically bounded jamming provides options to disrupt satellite-enabled targeting and battle-damage assessment without debris or destructive anti-satellite use. Secure World Foundation’s 2025 assessment underscores that Moscow fields a full spectrum of counterspace tools, from uplink and downlink jamming to co-orbital threats, which argues for scalable U.S. responses that impose delay and uncertainty rather than permanent damage in early phases of a crisis.
CCS delivers sustained GEO SATCOM denial for major operations where persistent, higher-gain effects are needed. Meadowlands brings mobile, higher-power, faster-emplacement ISR denial to blind collection passes and sever kill chains at the moment of need. RMT proliferates low-signature, remotely cued jamming across theaters, raising the enemy’s cost to find, fix, and counter U.S. emitters. Together, they provide layered, reversible effects that commanders can synchronize with deception, mobility, and emissions control.
Beyond the Meadowlands fielding approval, publicly released contracting shows CCS modernization and sustainment as a funded line with upgrades across 16 systems and work completing through 2025. That resourcing, paired with a centralized operations center and the Bounty Hunter sensor layer, turns three jammers into an enterprise able to deliver repeatable effects under legal and policy oversight.
The doctrinal frame is explicit: Space Force doctrine defines space superiority as ensuring freedom of action to and from space while denying the same to an adversary, often through non-kinetic, policy-compliant means. Reversible jamming fits that bill, providing commanders options that are fast, precise, and legally supportable under the law of armed conflict while minimizing escalation risks and avoiding orbital debris. Allies can integrate such effects more easily than destructive ASATs, a point U.S. Space Command leadership has emphasized as coalition space operations mature.
With CCS as the dependable base, Meadowlands as the agile punch, and RMT as the dispersed hedge, the United States is assembling a warfighting triad for the electromagnetic layer of space that directly addresses China’s and Russia’s most dangerous advantages. It is also a statement of intent: fielded, funded, and trained forces ready to disrupt adversary kill webs long before any missile flies.
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The U.S. Space Force is preparing to field two additional reversible counterspace systems, L3Harris’s Meadowlands and the Remote Modular Terminal, to operate alongside the Counter Communications System. These mobile and remotely operated jammers are meant to temporarily blind or corrupt adversary satellite links while avoiding orbital debris.
According to information published by Bloomberg, on November 4, 2025, the U.S. Space Force is moving to field two additional reversible counterspace weapons, L3Harris’s Meadowlands and the Remote Modular Terminal, alongside the Counter Communications System that reached initial operational capability on March 9, 2020. The new systems will be dispersed globally, can be operated remotely, and are intended to blind or corrupt adversary satellite links without creating debris. Bloomberg also reports a new Space Electromagnetic Tactical Operations Center to coordinate effects with the Bounty Hunter monitoring network.
Follow Army Recognition on Google News at this link
Meadowlands’ mobile high-power jamming, dispersed RMT nodes, and upgraded CCS combined to deliver layered, reversible RF effects that deny or degrade adversary satellite communications and ISR without creating orbital debris (Picture source: L3Harris/U.S Space Force).
Meadowlands is the Space Force’s next-generation offensive space control platform. The service accepted early units in spring 2025, cleared fielding on May 2, and moved into operational testing to validate faster set-up, higher jam-to-signal performance, and a smaller, more mobile footprint than legacy gear. “A step-change in capability,” is how an L3Harris official characterized it when the first two units were delivered in June. Practically, Meadowlands can time and focus radio-frequency energy to deny uplinks that task imaging satellites or to corrupt downlinks carrying collected data, creating short, reversible windows that break a targeting chain.
The Counter Communications System remains the workhorse. CCS is a transportable, ground-based RF jammer that historically targeted geostationary SATCOM links supporting command-and-control, relay, and data distribution. Block 10.2 added software-defined flexibility and cyber hardening when it achieved IOC in 2020, and the Air Force and Space Force have funded a multiyear upgrade effort covering 16 fielded systems. Contract disclosures in late 2021 put the modernization effort in the roughly 120–125 million range as part of a broader CCS sustainment and enhancement portfolio.
The Remote Modular Terminal is the proliferated counterpart. Developed by Northstrat and CACI under a 2022 Space Force award, RMT is a compact, distributed jammer now placed at undisclosed overseas locations in an early-use configuration and controllable from standoff sites. Bloomberg’s prior reporting indicated a planning figure of up to 24 RMTs, underscoring a concept that favors many small emitters over a few large ones for persistence, attribution complexity, and resilience.
These weapons are not fielded in isolation: Space Delta 3 provides the operators for space electromagnetic warfare, while the nascent operations center links jamming missions with intelligence support and theater demands. Bounty Hunter, first delivered to Indo-Pacific Command in 2018 and to Central Command in 2019, detects and geolocates interference against U.S. and commercial satellites, guiding where and when to apply reversible effects.
Space Force’s 2025 Space Threat Fact Sheet catalogs China’s rapidly expanding orbital network, noting the People’s Liberation Army benefits from more than 510 ISR satellites across optical, multispectral, radar, and RF sensors, enabling a maritime kill web that can find U.S. carriers and amphibious groups. Timed jamming against LEO synthetic aperture radar overpasses or SATCOM relay during key windows would degrade that web, forcing the PLA to rely on slower airborne and surface sensors and widening maneuver space for the joint force. As Gen. Chance Saltzman has argued, the United States must “think of space as a warfighting domain,” and these reversible tools are calibrated for that reality.
Against Russia, reversible, geographically bounded jamming provides options to disrupt satellite-enabled targeting and battle-damage assessment without debris or destructive anti-satellite use. Secure World Foundation’s 2025 assessment underscores that Moscow fields a full spectrum of counterspace tools, from uplink and downlink jamming to co-orbital threats, which argues for scalable U.S. responses that impose delay and uncertainty rather than permanent damage in early phases of a crisis.
CCS delivers sustained GEO SATCOM denial for major operations where persistent, higher-gain effects are needed. Meadowlands brings mobile, higher-power, faster-emplacement ISR denial to blind collection passes and sever kill chains at the moment of need. RMT proliferates low-signature, remotely cued jamming across theaters, raising the enemy’s cost to find, fix, and counter U.S. emitters. Together, they provide layered, reversible effects that commanders can synchronize with deception, mobility, and emissions control.
Beyond the Meadowlands fielding approval, publicly released contracting shows CCS modernization and sustainment as a funded line with upgrades across 16 systems and work completing through 2025. That resourcing, paired with a centralized operations center and the Bounty Hunter sensor layer, turns three jammers into an enterprise able to deliver repeatable effects under legal and policy oversight.
The doctrinal frame is explicit: Space Force doctrine defines space superiority as ensuring freedom of action to and from space while denying the same to an adversary, often through non-kinetic, policy-compliant means. Reversible jamming fits that bill, providing commanders options that are fast, precise, and legally supportable under the law of armed conflict while minimizing escalation risks and avoiding orbital debris. Allies can integrate such effects more easily than destructive ASATs, a point U.S. Space Command leadership has emphasized as coalition space operations mature.
With CCS as the dependable base, Meadowlands as the agile punch, and RMT as the dispersed hedge, the United States is assembling a warfighting triad for the electromagnetic layer of space that directly addresses China’s and Russia’s most dangerous advantages. It is also a statement of intent: fielded, funded, and trained forces ready to disrupt adversary kill webs long before any missile flies.
