U.S. Space Force Selects Texas DARC Radar to Track Enemy Satellites in Geostationary Orbit
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The U.S. Space Force has selected Lake Kickapoo, Texas, as the preferred U.S. location for the third and final Deep Space Advanced Radar Capability (DARC) site, pending final approvals. The Texas radar will complete a U.S.-UK-Australia network designed to maintain persistent surveillance of geostationary orbit, strengthening the ability to detect and characterize activity near satellites supporting missile warning, military communications, and other critical national-security missions.
Announced by the U.S. Secretary of the Air Force Public Affairs on September 9, 2026, the decision puts construction of the Texas site on track to begin in 2027, with operational acceptance targeted for 2030. Its addition will provide the final geographic leg of a three-site network intended to deliver overlapping, all-weather and day-and-night coverage of the geostationary belt, reducing surveillance gaps as China and Russia expand counterspace capabilities that U.S. military assessments identify as threats to American space operations.Related Topic: U.S. Space Force Selects Leonardo DRS Sensor to Track and Target Fast-Moving Threats in Space
The Deep Space Advanced Radar Capability (DARC) Site 1 receive array in Western Australia forms part of the U.S.-UK-Australia radar network designed to provide persistent, all-weather surveillance of geosynchronous orbit and improve tracking of potential threats near critical military satellites. (Photo: U.S. Space Force / Apache Drone Photography.)
The DARC (Deep Space Advanced Radar Capability) is a high-sensitivity ground-based radar system designed to detect, track, and characterize smaller objects at geosynchronous and geostationary distances, about 35,000 kilometers above Earth. Space Systems Command says the system provides improved sensitivity, accuracy, capacity and agile tracking compared with existing radar capabilities, while its ability to operate through darkness, daylight and adverse weather addresses limitations affecting optical surveillance. For military operators, this means maintaining more continuous custody of spacecraft maneuvering near high-value U.S. and allied satellites, rather than relying on intermittent observations.
Northrop Grumman is the principal industrial contractor behind DARC. Space Systems Command awarded a $341 million rapid-prototyping Other Transaction agreement through the Space Enterprise Consortium in May 2022 for the first DARC site, using an accelerated acquisition approach that SSC says saved additional time compared with conventional procurement. The command has described DARC as its highest-priority space-surveillance requirement and envisions 27 synchronized radar units across the completed architecture operating continuously to monitor the geosynchronous orbital regime.
The first DARC site in Western Australia demonstrates how that architecture is being assembled. Construction began in October 2023, and U.S. Guardians are now operating the sensor under an early-use arrangement. A second site is planned for Pembrokeshire in Wales, while Lake Kickapoo will provide the U.S. component. Positioning radars in Australia, Britain and the United States gives the network the geographic separation required to hand surveillance coverage between sites and maintain a more persistent picture of activity around Earth.
The operational requirement is becoming more urgent as China develops spacecraft capable of sophisticated rendezvous and proximity operations. In its July 2026 Space Threat Fact Sheet, the U.S. Space Force said multiple Chinese SJ-series and TJS-series experimental satellites have performed unusually large and rapid maneuvers in GEO. It also highlighted China’s SJ-21 spacecraft, which moved a defunct BeiDou navigation satellite into a graveyard orbit above GEO in 2022, demonstrating technology that can support legitimate servicing missions but could also have military applications.
The same U.S. assessment states that China is developing a broader range of counterspace weapons, including electronic warfare systems, ground-based lasers and anti-satellite missiles. The Defense Intelligence Agency assesses that Beijing probably intends to field anti-satellite weapons capable of reaching GEO, while Chinese military exercises regularly incorporate jamming against satellite communications, radar and navigation services. These capabilities increase the importance of detecting not only an attack but also the movements and positioning that could precede hostile action against a spacecraft.
Russia presents a separate surveillance challenge. According to the U.S. Space Force’s 2026 threat assessment, Moscow continues developing electronic warfare, directed-energy, kinetic, and orbital counterspace capabilities. The service reported that four Russian military satellites maneuvered close to a Western commercial radar-imaging satellite in May 2026, while another group of Russian spacecraft launched in 2025 conducted approaches separated by less than one kilometer. The Space Force assesses that operations of this type could support surveillance of, or threats against, other satellites.
DARC does not attack or disable hostile spacecraft. Its military value lies in providing the persistent detection and tracking required to determine what an object is doing, how its orbit is changing, and whether it is approaching another spacecraft. Continuous observations can help commanders distinguish routine orbital behavior from collision risks, inspection activity, or potentially hostile maneuvering, while creating a stronger attribution record if an incident develops.
That distinction matters especially in geostationary orbit. Satellites operating there can maintain coverage over large portions of Earth, making GEO valuable for strategic communications, missile warning, and other military missions requiring continuous observation or connectivity. A spacecraft threatening these assets would not necessarily need to destroy them: interference, jamming, sensor dazzling, close approaches, or other actions could degrade their military utility at a critical moment.
DARC therefore adds another layer to a wider U.S. space domain awareness architecture rather than replacing existing surveillance systems. Radar observations can complement optical telescopes and space-based sensors, allowing operators to combine different types of data and maintain track custody when individual sensors encounter weather, illumination or viewing limitations. Space Systems Command specifically describes DARC as an all-weather global capability for tracking very small objects in GEO and protecting critical U.S. and allied satellite services.
The trilateral structure also gives DARC strategic significance beyond the radar technology itself. Australia provides a southern-hemisphere location with major value for Indo-Pacific surveillance, Britain adds another geographically separated observation site, and Texas completes the global arrangement. The three countries signed their DARC memorandum of understanding in September 2023 for a 22-year period, making deep-space surveillance a long-term element of allied defense cooperation.
The selection of Lake Kickapoo comes as the U.S. Space Force publicly emphasizes preparing for military competition in orbit. Its July 2026 threat assessment states that China and Russia are testing and fielding counterspace capabilities intended to disrupt and degrade U.S. space-enabled capabilities, while the service’s Future Operating Environment 2040 assessment expects China to continue investing in systems capable of projecting power from GEO toward cislunar space and in capabilities designed to interfere with or destroy adversary satellites.
Completing DARC consequently has implications beyond improving the U.S. catalog of objects in orbit. Persistent radar surveillance can shorten warning timelines, improve characterization of suspicious maneuvers, and provide commanders with stronger evidence for attribution, making it harder for an adversary to exploit surveillance gaps around strategically important spacecraft. That strengthens deterrence because protecting military satellites begins with knowing which objects are approaching them and maintaining custody as those objects maneuver.
If construction at Lake Kickapoo begins as planned in 2027 and operational acceptance follows in 2030, Texas will complete the geographic architecture needed for the United States, United Kingdom and Australia to maintain persistent DARC coverage of GEO. Against a backdrop of expanding Chinese and Russian counterspace capabilities, the network will give allied forces a more resilient way to monitor activity near satellites that underpin missile warning, military communications, and other operations on which U.S. forces depend.
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• Land Defense News• Naval Defense News• Defense Aerospace NewsWritten by Alain Servaes – Chief Editor, Army Recognition GroupAlain Servaes is a former infantry non-commissioned officer and the founder of Army Recognition. With over 20 years in defense journalism, he provides expert analysis on military equipment, NATO operations, and the global defense industry.
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The U.S. Space Force has selected Lake Kickapoo, Texas, as the preferred U.S. location for the third and final Deep Space Advanced Radar Capability (DARC) site, pending final approvals. The Texas radar will complete a U.S.-UK-Australia network designed to maintain persistent surveillance of geostationary orbit, strengthening the ability to detect and characterize activity near satellites supporting missile warning, military communications, and other critical national-security missions.
Announced by the U.S. Secretary of the Air Force Public Affairs on September 9, 2026, the decision puts construction of the Texas site on track to begin in 2027, with operational acceptance targeted for 2030. Its addition will provide the final geographic leg of a three-site network intended to deliver overlapping, all-weather and day-and-night coverage of the geostationary belt, reducing surveillance gaps as China and Russia expand counterspace capabilities that U.S. military assessments identify as threats to American space operations.
Related Topic: U.S. Space Force Selects Leonardo DRS Sensor to Track and Target Fast-Moving Threats in Space
The Deep Space Advanced Radar Capability (DARC) Site 1 receive array in Western Australia forms part of the U.S.-UK-Australia radar network designed to provide persistent, all-weather surveillance of geosynchronous orbit and improve tracking of potential threats near critical military satellites. (Photo: U.S. Space Force / Apache Drone Photography.)
The DARC (Deep Space Advanced Radar Capability) is a high-sensitivity ground-based radar system designed to detect, track, and characterize smaller objects at geosynchronous and geostationary distances, about 35,000 kilometers above Earth. Space Systems Command says the system provides improved sensitivity, accuracy, capacity and agile tracking compared with existing radar capabilities, while its ability to operate through darkness, daylight and adverse weather addresses limitations affecting optical surveillance. For military operators, this means maintaining more continuous custody of spacecraft maneuvering near high-value U.S. and allied satellites, rather than relying on intermittent observations.
Northrop Grumman is the principal industrial contractor behind DARC. Space Systems Command awarded a $341 million rapid-prototyping Other Transaction agreement through the Space Enterprise Consortium in May 2022 for the first DARC site, using an accelerated acquisition approach that SSC says saved additional time compared with conventional procurement. The command has described DARC as its highest-priority space-surveillance requirement and envisions 27 synchronized radar units across the completed architecture operating continuously to monitor the geosynchronous orbital regime.
The first DARC site in Western Australia demonstrates how that architecture is being assembled. Construction began in October 2023, and U.S. Guardians are now operating the sensor under an early-use arrangement. A second site is planned for Pembrokeshire in Wales, while Lake Kickapoo will provide the U.S. component. Positioning radars in Australia, Britain and the United States gives the network the geographic separation required to hand surveillance coverage between sites and maintain a more persistent picture of activity around Earth.
The operational requirement is becoming more urgent as China develops spacecraft capable of sophisticated rendezvous and proximity operations. In its July 2026 Space Threat Fact Sheet, the U.S. Space Force said multiple Chinese SJ-series and TJS-series experimental satellites have performed unusually large and rapid maneuvers in GEO. It also highlighted China’s SJ-21 spacecraft, which moved a defunct BeiDou navigation satellite into a graveyard orbit above GEO in 2022, demonstrating technology that can support legitimate servicing missions but could also have military applications.
The same U.S. assessment states that China is developing a broader range of counterspace weapons, including electronic warfare systems, ground-based lasers and anti-satellite missiles. The Defense Intelligence Agency assesses that Beijing probably intends to field anti-satellite weapons capable of reaching GEO, while Chinese military exercises regularly incorporate jamming against satellite communications, radar and navigation services. These capabilities increase the importance of detecting not only an attack but also the movements and positioning that could precede hostile action against a spacecraft.
Russia presents a separate surveillance challenge. According to the U.S. Space Force’s 2026 threat assessment, Moscow continues developing electronic warfare, directed-energy, kinetic, and orbital counterspace capabilities. The service reported that four Russian military satellites maneuvered close to a Western commercial radar-imaging satellite in May 2026, while another group of Russian spacecraft launched in 2025 conducted approaches separated by less than one kilometer. The Space Force assesses that operations of this type could support surveillance of, or threats against, other satellites.
DARC does not attack or disable hostile spacecraft. Its military value lies in providing the persistent detection and tracking required to determine what an object is doing, how its orbit is changing, and whether it is approaching another spacecraft. Continuous observations can help commanders distinguish routine orbital behavior from collision risks, inspection activity, or potentially hostile maneuvering, while creating a stronger attribution record if an incident develops.
That distinction matters especially in geostationary orbit. Satellites operating there can maintain coverage over large portions of Earth, making GEO valuable for strategic communications, missile warning, and other military missions requiring continuous observation or connectivity. A spacecraft threatening these assets would not necessarily need to destroy them: interference, jamming, sensor dazzling, close approaches, or other actions could degrade their military utility at a critical moment.
DARC therefore adds another layer to a wider U.S. space domain awareness architecture rather than replacing existing surveillance systems. Radar observations can complement optical telescopes and space-based sensors, allowing operators to combine different types of data and maintain track custody when individual sensors encounter weather, illumination or viewing limitations. Space Systems Command specifically describes DARC as an all-weather global capability for tracking very small objects in GEO and protecting critical U.S. and allied satellite services.
The trilateral structure also gives DARC strategic significance beyond the radar technology itself. Australia provides a southern-hemisphere location with major value for Indo-Pacific surveillance, Britain adds another geographically separated observation site, and Texas completes the global arrangement. The three countries signed their DARC memorandum of understanding in September 2023 for a 22-year period, making deep-space surveillance a long-term element of allied defense cooperation.
The selection of Lake Kickapoo comes as the U.S. Space Force publicly emphasizes preparing for military competition in orbit. Its July 2026 threat assessment states that China and Russia are testing and fielding counterspace capabilities intended to disrupt and degrade U.S. space-enabled capabilities, while the service’s Future Operating Environment 2040 assessment expects China to continue investing in systems capable of projecting power from GEO toward cislunar space and in capabilities designed to interfere with or destroy adversary satellites.
Completing DARC consequently has implications beyond improving the U.S. catalog of objects in orbit. Persistent radar surveillance can shorten warning timelines, improve characterization of suspicious maneuvers, and provide commanders with stronger evidence for attribution, making it harder for an adversary to exploit surveillance gaps around strategically important spacecraft. That strengthens deterrence because protecting military satellites begins with knowing which objects are approaching them and maintaining custody as those objects maneuver.
If construction at Lake Kickapoo begins as planned in 2027 and operational acceptance follows in 2030, Texas will complete the geographic architecture needed for the United States, United Kingdom and Australia to maintain persistent DARC coverage of GEO. Against a backdrop of expanding Chinese and Russian counterspace capabilities, the network will give allied forces a more resilient way to monitor activity near satellites that underpin missile warning, military communications, and other operations on which U.S. forces depend.
Explore More Defense News
• Land Defense News
• Naval Defense News
• Defense Aerospace News
Written by Alain Servaes – Chief Editor, Army Recognition Group
Alain Servaes is a former infantry non-commissioned officer and the founder of Army Recognition. With over 20 years in defense journalism, he provides expert analysis on military equipment, NATO operations, and the global defense industry.
