Ukraine to receive first Gripen fighter jets from Sweden in early 2027 to counter Russian missiles
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Ukraine and Sweden finalized a bilateral agreement on June 30, 2026, solidifying the transfer of 16 active-inventory JAS 39 Gripen C/D fighter jets starting in early 2027 alongside a contract for 16 newly manufactured Gripen E variants. The phased procurement strategy addresses immediate operational attrition caused by ongoing Russian missile and drone strikes against fixed military infrastructure. Strategically, the Gripen fleet enhances the survival capabilities of the Ukrainian Air Force due to its specialized delta-canard design built for dispersed highway operations, minimal logistical footprints, and rapid turnaround execution.
The finalized defense package includes 16 Gripen C/D jets from the Swedish Air Force operational stock equipped with advanced Meteor, AIM-120 AMRAAM, and IRIS-T missile ecosystems. Financed by a 24.6 billion Swedish kronor European Union loan, the long-term phase ensures the subsequent delivery of 16 advanced Gripen E fighters starting in early 2029 to establish a sustainable multi-tier combat aviation model.
Related topic: Sweden approves transfer of 16 Gripen C/D fighter jets to Ukraine to counter Russian missile attacks
The Gripen C/D was designed to require fewer maintenance personnel, less ground equipment, and less fixed infrastructure than heavier Western fighter aircraft, which will help Ukraine operate under persistent Russian pressure against air bases. (Picture source: Hungarian MoD)
On June 30, 2026, Ukraine and Sweden confirmed that the first 16 Gripen C/D fighters will begin arriving in early 2027, while Russia continues to attack Ukrainian cities with ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and one-way attack drones. The Gripens will come from the Swedish Air Force’s active operational inventory, representing one tactical fighter squadron and close to 17% of Sweden’s roughly 94 operational Gripen C/D fighters. Ukrainian pilot, technician, armourer, and maintenance conversion training began in 2026, as the delivery schedule is tied to the availability of crews able to fly, service, arm, and sustain the aircraft. The package includes Meteor, AIM-120 AMRAAM and IRIS-T air-to-air missiles, spare engines, ground-support equipment, maintenance tooling, logistics support and technical assistance.
More importantly, Ukraine will receive 16 fighters designed for the kind of high-intensity, infrastructure-targeting warfare Russia conducts, with an emphasis on short-field operations, dispersed basing, rapid turnaround and survivability after attacks on fixed air bases. Sweden approved the transfer of up to 16 Gripen C/D fighters under its 22nd military support package on May 28, 2026, while Ukraine and Sweden signed a separate June 30, 2026 agreement for 16 newly built Gripen E fighters. This creates a phased force-generation model: the C/D provide a near-term operational fleet from early 2027, while the Gripen E contract supports a later transition to a more capable variant with greater fuel capacity, payload, and avionics growth.
The donated C/D fleet will include both Gripen C single-seat fighters and Gripen D two-seat aircraft, which gives Ukraine a conversion and continuation-training capacity inside the future Ukrainian Gripen force. That matters because Ukraine is already absorbing F-16s and Mirage 2000-5Fs while still operating Soviet-origin MiG-29s, Su-27s, Su-24s and Su-25s. The Swedish transfer therefore adds capability, but also another training, maintenance, weapons and software ecosystem that must be managed under wartime pressure. The Gripen C/D is a compact single-engine fighter with a maximum take-off weight of roughly 14,000 kg, an external payload capacity close to 5.3 tonnes and eight weapon stations. It is powered by the Volvo RM12 turbofan, a Swedish derivative of the General Electric F404, producing about 80 kN of thrust with afterburner and enabling speeds close to Mach 2.
Depending on mission profile, external fuel tanks and weapons load, combat radius is generally between 800 and 1,000 km, while ferry range exceeds 3,000 km with external tanks. This places the Gripen C/D below heavier fighters in payload and persistence, but its smaller size reduces runway, maintenance and ground-support demands. The delta-canard design gives the Gripen short-field handling, high manoeuvrability and rapid recovery between sorties, which is more relevant to Ukraine’s current air war than maximum payload carriage. For a defensive air campaign, the ability to keep fighters flying after runway and shelter attacks may be more important than the ability to carry the heaviest strike load.
The Gripen’s basing model is one of the main reasons the C/D is relevant to Ukraine. Sweden developed the aircraft around the Bas 90, a Cold War doctrine built on the assumption that Soviet strikes would disable major air bases early in a war. Therefore, the Gripen C/D can operate from road strips roughly 800 metres long, including highways and secondary roads, with refuelling and rearming conducted by small ground crews using limited specialist equipment. Maintenance relies on rapid replacement of line-replaceable units rather than complex repairs at the operating location, reducing the time aircraft and support personnel must remain exposed. Ukraine faces a similar infrastructure threat pattern from Russian Iskander ballistic missiles, Kh-101 cruise missiles, Shahed-type drones and reconnaissance-strike cycles aimed at runways, shelters, depots and parked aircraft.
Dispersed Gripen operations would not make the Ukrainian Air Force immune to attack, but they would reduce aircraft concentration, complicate Russian targeting and force Russia to search for mobile fuel, weapons, communications and maintenance nodes instead of focusing only on fixed airfields. The Gripen C/D uses the PS-05/A mechanically scanned pulse-Doppler radar, with later standards improving low-altitude detection, multi-target tracking and look-down/shoot-down performance. That sensor profile is relevant because Ukraine’s air defence missions include cruise missiles, drones, helicopters and tactical aircraft operating at low altitude or using terrain and clutter to reduce detection range.
The aircraft fuses radar, navigation, electronic warfare and datalink inputs into a single cockpit picture, reducing pilot workload during intercept missions where targets may be assigned by ground-based radar, airborne sensors or other fighters. Its internal electronic warfare suite includes radar warning receivers, electronic support measures, jamming functions and expendable countermeasures, giving the C/D organic defensive tools against radar-guided threats. Moreover, Link 16 allows Gripens to exchange tactical information with NATO-compatible command networks, Ukrainian F-16s and ground-based air defence systems. This is especially important because a Gripen can receive external target tracks and engagement cues without keeping its radar active throughout the engagement, reducing exposure to Russian electronic support and geolocation systems.
The missile package is the main operational addition. The Meteor gives the Gripen C/D a long-range beyond-visual-range weapon with an official range above 120 km and assessed engagement potential beyond 150 km, with higher-end estimates above 200 km under favourable altitude, speed and target-aspect conditions. Its throttleable ramjet sustainer preserves energy late in flight, increasing the no-escape zone against manoeuvring aircraft compared with solid-fuel missiles that lose speed after motor burnout. In Ukrainian service, this could be used against Russian Su-34s, Su-35Ss and other tactical aircraft releasing glide bombs by forcing them to operate farther from Ukrainian-controlled airspace, reducing release geometry and potentially degrading accuracy.
The AIM-120 AMRAAM provides the medium-range layer and keeps Gripen operations aligned with NATO-standard tactics already being introduced through Ukrainian F-16 units. Depending on the variant supplied, earlier AIM-120C missiles offer roughly 70 to 105 km of range, while the AIM-120D is widely assessed above 160 km, although its exact performance remains classified. Finally, the IRIS-T adds a short-range layer of roughly 25 km with imaging infrared guidance, thrust-vector control and high-off-boresight engagement through helmet-mounted cueing, making it relevant against fighters, helicopters, cruise missiles and UAVs. This trio gives Ukraine a layered air-to-air envelope from close-range engagements to beyond 120 to 150 km, but its real effect will depend, as always, on missile stocks, targeting data, rules of engagement, pilot proficiency and aircraft availability.
The maintenance model is also a major part of the operational calculation. As the Gripen C/D was built for smaller ground teams, fewer support vehicles and less fixed infrastructure than heavier Western fighters, it fits a Ukrainian environment where permanent air bases remain vulnerable. Rapid turnaround from road sites only works if fuel trucks, missile stocks, spare parts, communications equipment and ground crews can be dispersed and protected with the aircraft. Sweden’s package includes spare engines, maintenance equipment, logistics support and long-term sustainment planning, but Ukraine will still need secure storage, mobile arming points, field maintenance shelters, protected communications and local air defence coverage for temporary sites.
The hardest problem is therefore not only keeping the aircraft serviceable, but keeping the entire dispersed operating system intact under Russian surveillance and strike pressure. If fuel, missiles or technicians are concentrated in predictable locations, the advantage of the Gripen’s road-base design will be logically reduced. A 16-aircraft Gripen C/D fleet will not transform the overall air balance by itself, but it can create a specialized defensive counter-air force over selected sectors of Ukraine. Initial employment is likely to focus on cruise missile interception, one-way attack drone defence and deterrence of Russian tactical aviation rather than offensive penetration into dense Russian air defence coverage.
The Swedish aircraft complements the F-16 by adding a fighter with lower ground-support requirements, a mature Meteor integration and an operating concept built for dispersed basing. Its combat value will be determined less by maximum speed or published range than by availability rates, missile inventories, pilot throughput, spare engine supply, radar and electronic warfare updates, and the survivability of dispersed support sites. If Ukraine can sustain those inputs, the Gripen C/D transfer will give Kyiv a practical air defence tool against Russian missile, drone and tactical aviation threats while providing experience with an aircraft built specifically for such high-intensity operations under long-range strike pressure.
Written by Jérôme Brahy
Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
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Ukraine and Sweden finalized a bilateral agreement on June 30, 2026, solidifying the transfer of 16 active-inventory JAS 39 Gripen C/D fighter jets starting in early 2027 alongside a contract for 16 newly manufactured Gripen E variants. The phased procurement strategy addresses immediate operational attrition caused by ongoing Russian missile and drone strikes against fixed military infrastructure. Strategically, the Gripen fleet enhances the survival capabilities of the Ukrainian Air Force due to its specialized delta-canard design built for dispersed highway operations, minimal logistical footprints, and rapid turnaround execution.
The finalized defense package includes 16 Gripen C/D jets from the Swedish Air Force operational stock equipped with advanced Meteor, AIM-120 AMRAAM, and IRIS-T missile ecosystems. Financed by a 24.6 billion Swedish kronor European Union loan, the long-term phase ensures the subsequent delivery of 16 advanced Gripen E fighters starting in early 2029 to establish a sustainable multi-tier combat aviation model.
Related topic: Sweden approves transfer of 16 Gripen C/D fighter jets to Ukraine to counter Russian missile attacks
The Gripen C/D was designed to require fewer maintenance personnel, less ground equipment, and less fixed infrastructure than heavier Western fighter aircraft, which will help Ukraine operate under persistent Russian pressure against air bases. (Picture source: Hungarian MoD)
On June 30, 2026, Ukraine and Sweden confirmed that the first 16 Gripen C/D fighters will begin arriving in early 2027, while Russia continues to attack Ukrainian cities with ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and one-way attack drones. The Gripens will come from the Swedish Air Force’s active operational inventory, representing one tactical fighter squadron and close to 17% of Sweden’s roughly 94 operational Gripen C/D fighters. Ukrainian pilot, technician, armourer, and maintenance conversion training began in 2026, as the delivery schedule is tied to the availability of crews able to fly, service, arm, and sustain the aircraft. The package includes Meteor, AIM-120 AMRAAM and IRIS-T air-to-air missiles, spare engines, ground-support equipment, maintenance tooling, logistics support and technical assistance.
More importantly, Ukraine will receive 16 fighters designed for the kind of high-intensity, infrastructure-targeting warfare Russia conducts, with an emphasis on short-field operations, dispersed basing, rapid turnaround and survivability after attacks on fixed air bases. Sweden approved the transfer of up to 16 Gripen C/D fighters under its 22nd military support package on May 28, 2026, while Ukraine and Sweden signed a separate June 30, 2026 agreement for 16 newly built Gripen E fighters. This creates a phased force-generation model: the C/D provide a near-term operational fleet from early 2027, while the Gripen E contract supports a later transition to a more capable variant with greater fuel capacity, payload, and avionics growth.
The donated C/D fleet will include both Gripen C single-seat fighters and Gripen D two-seat aircraft, which gives Ukraine a conversion and continuation-training capacity inside the future Ukrainian Gripen force. That matters because Ukraine is already absorbing F-16s and Mirage 2000-5Fs while still operating Soviet-origin MiG-29s, Su-27s, Su-24s and Su-25s. The Swedish transfer therefore adds capability, but also another training, maintenance, weapons and software ecosystem that must be managed under wartime pressure. The Gripen C/D is a compact single-engine fighter with a maximum take-off weight of roughly 14,000 kg, an external payload capacity close to 5.3 tonnes and eight weapon stations. It is powered by the Volvo RM12 turbofan, a Swedish derivative of the General Electric F404, producing about 80 kN of thrust with afterburner and enabling speeds close to Mach 2.
Depending on mission profile, external fuel tanks and weapons load, combat radius is generally between 800 and 1,000 km, while ferry range exceeds 3,000 km with external tanks. This places the Gripen C/D below heavier fighters in payload and persistence, but its smaller size reduces runway, maintenance and ground-support demands. The delta-canard design gives the Gripen short-field handling, high manoeuvrability and rapid recovery between sorties, which is more relevant to Ukraine’s current air war than maximum payload carriage. For a defensive air campaign, the ability to keep fighters flying after runway and shelter attacks may be more important than the ability to carry the heaviest strike load.
The Gripen’s basing model is one of the main reasons the C/D is relevant to Ukraine. Sweden developed the aircraft around the Bas 90, a Cold War doctrine built on the assumption that Soviet strikes would disable major air bases early in a war. Therefore, the Gripen C/D can operate from road strips roughly 800 metres long, including highways and secondary roads, with refuelling and rearming conducted by small ground crews using limited specialist equipment. Maintenance relies on rapid replacement of line-replaceable units rather than complex repairs at the operating location, reducing the time aircraft and support personnel must remain exposed. Ukraine faces a similar infrastructure threat pattern from Russian Iskander ballistic missiles, Kh-101 cruise missiles, Shahed-type drones and reconnaissance-strike cycles aimed at runways, shelters, depots and parked aircraft.
Dispersed Gripen operations would not make the Ukrainian Air Force immune to attack, but they would reduce aircraft concentration, complicate Russian targeting and force Russia to search for mobile fuel, weapons, communications and maintenance nodes instead of focusing only on fixed airfields. The Gripen C/D uses the PS-05/A mechanically scanned pulse-Doppler radar, with later standards improving low-altitude detection, multi-target tracking and look-down/shoot-down performance. That sensor profile is relevant because Ukraine’s air defence missions include cruise missiles, drones, helicopters and tactical aircraft operating at low altitude or using terrain and clutter to reduce detection range.
The aircraft fuses radar, navigation, electronic warfare and datalink inputs into a single cockpit picture, reducing pilot workload during intercept missions where targets may be assigned by ground-based radar, airborne sensors or other fighters. Its internal electronic warfare suite includes radar warning receivers, electronic support measures, jamming functions and expendable countermeasures, giving the C/D organic defensive tools against radar-guided threats. Moreover, Link 16 allows Gripens to exchange tactical information with NATO-compatible command networks, Ukrainian F-16s and ground-based air defence systems. This is especially important because a Gripen can receive external target tracks and engagement cues without keeping its radar active throughout the engagement, reducing exposure to Russian electronic support and geolocation systems.
The missile package is the main operational addition. The Meteor gives the Gripen C/D a long-range beyond-visual-range weapon with an official range above 120 km and assessed engagement potential beyond 150 km, with higher-end estimates above 200 km under favourable altitude, speed and target-aspect conditions. Its throttleable ramjet sustainer preserves energy late in flight, increasing the no-escape zone against manoeuvring aircraft compared with solid-fuel missiles that lose speed after motor burnout. In Ukrainian service, this could be used against Russian Su-34s, Su-35Ss and other tactical aircraft releasing glide bombs by forcing them to operate farther from Ukrainian-controlled airspace, reducing release geometry and potentially degrading accuracy.
The AIM-120 AMRAAM provides the medium-range layer and keeps Gripen operations aligned with NATO-standard tactics already being introduced through Ukrainian F-16 units. Depending on the variant supplied, earlier AIM-120C missiles offer roughly 70 to 105 km of range, while the AIM-120D is widely assessed above 160 km, although its exact performance remains classified. Finally, the IRIS-T adds a short-range layer of roughly 25 km with imaging infrared guidance, thrust-vector control and high-off-boresight engagement through helmet-mounted cueing, making it relevant against fighters, helicopters, cruise missiles and UAVs. This trio gives Ukraine a layered air-to-air envelope from close-range engagements to beyond 120 to 150 km, but its real effect will depend, as always, on missile stocks, targeting data, rules of engagement, pilot proficiency and aircraft availability.
The maintenance model is also a major part of the operational calculation. As the Gripen C/D was built for smaller ground teams, fewer support vehicles and less fixed infrastructure than heavier Western fighters, it fits a Ukrainian environment where permanent air bases remain vulnerable. Rapid turnaround from road sites only works if fuel trucks, missile stocks, spare parts, communications equipment and ground crews can be dispersed and protected with the aircraft. Sweden’s package includes spare engines, maintenance equipment, logistics support and long-term sustainment planning, but Ukraine will still need secure storage, mobile arming points, field maintenance shelters, protected communications and local air defence coverage for temporary sites.
The hardest problem is therefore not only keeping the aircraft serviceable, but keeping the entire dispersed operating system intact under Russian surveillance and strike pressure. If fuel, missiles or technicians are concentrated in predictable locations, the advantage of the Gripen’s road-base design will be logically reduced. A 16-aircraft Gripen C/D fleet will not transform the overall air balance by itself, but it can create a specialized defensive counter-air force over selected sectors of Ukraine. Initial employment is likely to focus on cruise missile interception, one-way attack drone defence and deterrence of Russian tactical aviation rather than offensive penetration into dense Russian air defence coverage.
The Swedish aircraft complements the F-16 by adding a fighter with lower ground-support requirements, a mature Meteor integration and an operating concept built for dispersed basing. Its combat value will be determined less by maximum speed or published range than by availability rates, missile inventories, pilot throughput, spare engine supply, radar and electronic warfare updates, and the survivability of dispersed support sites. If Ukraine can sustain those inputs, the Gripen C/D transfer will give Kyiv a practical air defence tool against Russian missile, drone and tactical aviation threats while providing experience with an aircraft built specifically for such high-intensity operations under long-range strike pressure.
Written by Jérôme Brahy
Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
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• Naval Defense News
• Defense Aerospace News
