What lessons can be learned from the Berlin-Brandenburg Airport project? 

With over 35 years in management, science, and consulting, Dr. Klaus Radermacher KRBE GmbH brings a wealth of experience in analyzing and assessing transportation systems. His innovative approach integrates infrastructure and movement processes into holistic CO2 and energy comparisons.    

Follow Dr. Klaus Radermacher’s LinkedIn newsletter “Think. Mobility. Differently.” for regular insights on mobility concepts and transportation systems.     

The views and opinions expressed in this column are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of AeroTime. 

Every homeowner can relate to this, even in their private lives. It often takes longer to renovate and ends up being more expensive than planned! When renovating the Wilhelminian-era house my family and I have lived in for over 20 years, the total costs were about 10% higher than the estimate, which had been prepared by a professional to the best of his and our knowledge and belief. However, we were largely able to stick to the schedule. A 10% cost increase can be factored into financial planning, and it is widely recommended to have a corresponding buffer.

What I am writing about today takes on completely different dimensions. Unfortunately, in Germany we have almost become accustomed to the fact that transport infrastructure projects regularly exceed the originally planned costs and construction times by 50 to 100%. However, looking back at Berlin’s major airport, BER, even a 100% overrun barely scratched the surface of the spiraling costs and delays.

I certainly do not want to give the impression that I know best in hindsight. I do not work in the construction industry, nor do I have experience managing billion-dollar projects. I am not interested in looking for and stigmatizing those responsible. That is why I do not mention any names of people who were and are responsible for the disaster. I conducted time-consuming and intensive research against the backdrop of my experience with holistic Business Excellence. As a trained “Business Excellence Assessor” based on the EFQM model, I have taken part in dozens of assessments in Germany and abroad over a period of more than 25 years. Companies for which I have been responsible as Managing Director and CEO have won various national and international excellence awards on several occasions. To put it bluntly right at the beginning: the entire story around BER airport has nothing to do with practical excellence; the opposite is the case.

The number of results for a Google search with the keywords “BER cost increase” amounts to almost eight million. If one replaces “cost increase” with “delay” the number is almost 20 million. No one is in a position to retrospectively sift through all of these “sources”, evaluate them or even distinguish between correct information and false reports. In connection with the research, I read several dozen reports and newspaper articles from sources generally regarded as reputable. In doing so, several main reasons for the disastrous development of this project repeatedly emerged.

The same criticism is repeatedly found in the sources reviewed, which I would like to summarize as follows:

Choosing the wrong location

Shortly after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, initial considerations for the new capital airport were already underway. Lufthansa, the former East German airline Interflug, and later the companies Mannesmann and AEG conducted planning and drew up master plans. Before any spatial planning proceedings were even initiated in 1993, 100 hectares of farmland had already been purchased by the operator of the former East Berlin Schönefeld Airport at an inflated price of €200 million. This land was never used for the airport and today houses, among other things, a branch of a discount food retailer (Handelsblatt).

The spatial planning procedure conducted by the state of Brandenburg examined seven different locations based on five criteria: environmental impact, economic viability, landside transport links, airport planning, and spatial development. The systematic review found that Schönefeld was the least suitable of all the locations examined. In particular, it was already pointed out during this review that it would be impossible to build an airport of the envisioned size – 60 million passengers per year, four runways – in Schönefeld.

As is well known, the Schönefeld site was chosen after all. It was the first time in the history of the Federal Republic of Germany that the recommendation of the regional planning procedure was not followed (Wikipedia). The noise protection problems for thousands of residents were pointed out very early on but were initially simply ignored by the political authorities. After a massive wave of lawsuits from those affected and after the required noise protection requirements had been systematically ignored, around €600 million had to be spent on noise protection, which had not been included in any initial cost planning.

Failed privatization, fragmented contract award, and no general contractor

As early as 1996 it had been decided that the Berlin Airport Company would be privatized, and that the new airport should be built by private investors. Following a corresponding tender, a consortium was awarded the construction contract in 1999. Another consortium, which had lost the tender process, successfully sued, and the Brandenburg Higher Regional Court found that the company that had been awarded the contract was suspected of fraud. The two consortiums then submitted a joint bid, wanting to take over the airport company, among other things, but no agreement was reached with the political leaders responsible. The three shareholders, the states of Berlin and Brandenburg, and the Federal Republic of Germany then decided to build the airport at their own expense!

At the same time, it was decided that the new terminal was not to be built by one company, but would be divided into seven construction lots, which later led to a total of 50 partial lots. The absence of a responsible general contractor is seen in retrospect as one of the most serious mistakes and one of the main causes of the disaster that later developed. The resulting multitude of tenders led to planning and construction taking place in parallel. The company commissioned with the planning was overwhelmed by the tenders, and the detailed plans required at the start of construction were simply not available. To make matters worse, the planning company was terminated during construction, which many companies involved in the project considered “completely idiotic: They cut off their head” (FAZ).

Lack of expertise among decision-makers, no external independent controlling

Also of little help to successful project management was the fact that the politicians responsible who had steered the project for years as members of the Supervisory Board lacked any professional expertise. They were politicians with no experience in large-scale construction projects. When difficulties arose, new managing directors and project managers were repeatedly hired in as ‘saviors,’ released from their duties, and then brought back again.

At no point was a technically competent project organization established. There was also never an external controlling department that could have provided advice on major strategic decisions. Rather, politicians repeatedly decided during construction to make drastic changes to the previous plans and implemented them against any understanding of the project. For example, it was subsequently decided to convert the two-story terminal building into a three-story building by adding a mezzanine. This significantly complicated previously planned technical systems, such as the fire protection system, which later led to the smoke extraction system becoming inoperable.

The proven professional incompetence of various members of the supervisory board was an issue for years, repeatedly making political headlines and leading to accusations, but never resulted in any change. The supervisory board was repeatedly accused of “being completely incapable of critically examining the processes” (FAZ). In retrospect, there are numerous reports that this lack of competence was sometimes compensated for by an arrogant demeanor. In addition, critical voices from within the project were consistently silenced. Scaremongering, a “train of wagons mentality”, and an “unspeakable atmosphere” are terms that were repeatedly used by those involved. As early as 2012, one of the building contractors was quoted as saying: “Anyone who dared to say something was made a pig of.” (FAZ).

Dishonest communication, cover-up and whitewashing of the facts

For years, the repeated postponements of the opening date and the dramatically rising costs were publicly attributed to the lack of effective fire protection. The fact is that the problems with fire protection began at the latest when, in the middle of the advanced planning phase, the decision was made to add another floor. In addition to the repeatedly mentioned fire protection system, there were many other serious deficiencies whose rectification cost billions and resulted in years of delays. Cables were laid improperly, sometimes without documentation, which made inspections and repairs difficult. There were faulty and incorrectly dimensioned escalators, non-functioning automatic doors, and leaky roof structures. Leaky shafts and inadequate seals allowed water to penetrate cable trays and technical shafts, leading to short circuits and corrosion in electrical installations and control systems. At the peak, around 120,000 individual deficiencies were recorded.

Although these defects were already known and it was predicted that it would take years to rectify them, the public was repeatedly presented with new opening dates. According to experts, these dates were already unachievable at the time of communication. The fact that during the construction phase and particularly during the rectification of defects, settlements were reached with individual companies involved in the construction work, whereby the companies were fully or partially released from their usual warranty obligations, is further evidence of the incredible incompetence of those involved. The aim was to avoid time-consuming disputes which could have led to further delays. Furthermore, in the overall project, which can only be described as chaotic, it was often no longer possible to attribute proven defects to the source due to a lack of planning and documentation. To this day, many of these agreements are not transparent, but there are numerous dubious “confidentiality clauses” in contracts and agreements not publicly available in which companies received lump sum compensation payments.

Unfortunately, this cover-up tactic and lack of transparency towards the public, who ultimately have to pay with their tax money for the additional billions created by mismanagement and incompetence, continues to this day. A special report prepared by the Federal Audit Office in 2020 is subject to secrecy and has not been published, contrary to the Federal Audit Office’s usual practice. However, it is known that the Federal Audit Office continues to point out that further financial aid in the hundreds of millions of euros to the airport company may be necessary from the federal government.

Are things different elsewhere?

Airports have been and continue to be built all over the world, including major expansions of existing airports and completely new and replacement buildings (Phnom Penh, New Delhi, Dubai, Riyadh, Gujarat, Lisbon). Two of the largest new construction projects to have taken place in the past decades have already been in operation for several years. The construction of the four current terminals of Changi Airport in Singapore (SIN), which were completed in 1980, 1990, 2008 and 2017, were very successful projects in terms of cost and time. SIN is considered a global benchmark for airports, both in terms of planning and construction, as well as subsequent operation, and has received numerous awards for efficiency, customer satisfaction, and cost management. Singapore Airport is now also one of the city-state’s tourist attractions. Residents and visitors are explicitly encouraged to visit the airport as a leisure attraction; every Singapore travel guide recommends setting aside at least half a day for it.

In Hong Kong, too, an entire airport was relocated from the city center to the surrounding area. Today’s Hong Kong International Airport (HKG), located on an island in the west of the city, opened in July 1998, replacing the old Kai Tak Airport, which was located much closer to the city. Construction began in 1991, and the opening was originally planned for 1997 but had to be postponed by about six months. Planning and construction took place when Hong Kong was still a British crown colony, and therefore outside of China’s political system. The costs of this project were also underestimated and, upon completion, were roughly double the initial estimates. In retrospect, the technical complexity is primarily cited for this; the new airport is located on an artificially created island, on which around 1,200 hectares of land were reclaimed through land removal. During the construction period, not only the airport, which is now one of the largest aviation hubs in the world, but also the entire transport infrastructure including tunnels, bridges, and high-speed trains was completed.

Conclusion

“Berlin residents will be getting the best airport in the world!” was one of the euphoric statements made by one of the “managers” responsible when the construction of the airport, under the responsibility of politicians, was still being described as a “showpiece project.” Later, this quote appeared primarily in satirical formats and cabaret events. But back to the facts.

The opening of the airport was officially postponed six times. After construction began in 2006, October 2011 was considered the official opening date for many years. Afterwards, a salami tactic was used: June 2012, March 2013 and October 2013 were all officially communicated opening dates.

When nothing came of it in October 2013 and the full extent of the disaster gradually became public, the opening was postponed indefinitely. The end of 2017 was long on the table as a completion date, but even that was several years too optimistic. The opening finally took place on October 31, 2020. The planned five-year construction period turned into 14 years!

This is a brief overview of the delays: almost a tripling of the construction time, and six announced opening dates! Most sources estimate the construction costs at the start of construction to be between just over €2 and 2.4 billion. After the opening was canceled for the first time, the first major cost explosion occurred, with estimates of €4.3 billion in 2012. By 2017, the figure had risen to €5.4 billion. In 2020, construction costs alone were estimated at between €6 and €6.5 billion. If the interest payments and other capital costs, which must be considered from a business perspective as well, are properly calculated, the total costs amount to more than €7 billion.

On the cost side, it is also important to mention that the airport operating company is heavily indebted due to its construction history. Although positive operating results have been achieved in recent years, the bottom line for 2023 was a loss of €212 million.

All in all, this is a shocking assessment. The analysis shows that serious mistakes were made right from the start, many of which in retrospect appear avoidable. It starts with the disregard of the site report and the political decision in favor of the least suitable location. The offer from a general contractor was too expensive for the decision-makers, which is why they thought it could be made cheaper without a general contractor. The result of this assessment is now known all over the world. During my research I have found several indications that it was clear from the outset that the costs would be considerably higher, but that approval for the project would probably never have been obtained, if the truth had been told at that time. This would not be an isolated case for transport infrastructure projects in Germany, we have seen this many times before (LinkedIn).

When it became clear midway through the project that it would be much, much more expensive and take much, much longer, a series of wrong decisions were made that worsened the situation and made it more expensive for taxpayers. The principle was: close your eyes and go, whatever the cost.

A systematic project review, as would be customary in any properly managed company, has not yet taken place. Quite the opposite. Existing investigation reports are being withheld from the public on flimsy grounds. Evidently, nothing has been learned from the BER disaster. None of the people involved have been held accountable in any way. The story of BER must serve as a lesson that the legitimacy of politicians acquired through democratic elections should under no circumstances be equated with professional qualifications. I’ve written about this before (LinkedIn).

So, has BER become the best airport in the world for passengers? This question is certainly assessed subjectively and differently by every traveler. A somewhat more objective approach, based on surveys of thousands of travelers according to internationally defined criteria, is the World Airport Award presented every year by Skytrax. Two of the airports mentioned earlier as positive examples are at the top of the awards, which were last presented in April 2025: Singapore in 1st place (winning the global airport ranking for the 13th time) and Hong Kong in 6th place. European airports also made it into the top 10, with Munich in Germany, for example, coming in 9th. BER took 58th place in this ranking. Coming up from 100th place (!) in 2024, BER was named “World’s Most Improved Airport” this year. That is something, at least.The post What lessons can be learned from the Berlin-Brandenburg Airport project?  appeared first on AeroTime.

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