Oman examines JF-17 fighter jet purchase with Pakistan and China while operating F-16s and Eurofighters
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Oman is negotiating with Pakistan and China regarding the potential procurement of CAC/PAC JF-17 Thunder multirole fighter aircraft for the Royal Air Force of Oman. The discussions follow an October 2026 visit to Islamabad by Omani Foreign Minister Sayyid Badr Albusaidi for the eighth Pakistan-Oman Joint Ministerial Commission. If confirmed, the acquisition would logically allow Oman to either supplement its existing inventory of 17 F-16C/D fighters, 12 Eurofighter Typhoons, and 10 Hawk 200 attack aircraft, or initiate a long-term replacement strategy for legacy platforms.
Oman opens talks with Pakistan and China about the purchase of JF-17 Thunder fighter jets despite already operating American F-16s and European Eurofighter Typhoons, although no acquisition agreement has been confirmed. (Picture source: Pakistan Air Force)
Intelligence Online learned on October 21, 2026, that Oman is negotiating with Pakistan and China over a potential purchase of JF-17 Thunder fighter jets for the Royal Air Force of Oman (RAFO), which operates 12 Eurofighter Typhoons, 17 F-16C/D fighters, and 10 Hawk 200 light attack aircraft, meaning that this acquisition could either supplement existing fighter squadrons or support the eventual replacement of older aircraft. The disclosure follows the October 13-14, 2026, visit to Islamabad by Omani Foreign Minister Sayyid Badr Albusaidi, who met Pakistani Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Mohammad Ishaq Dar during the eighth Pakistan-Oman Joint Ministerial Commission, which included defense and security cooperation among its priorities.
Jointly developed by Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC) and China’s Chengdu Aircraft Corporation (CAC), the JF-17 is available in three principal production standards, with Block III incorporating an AESA radar, helmet-mounted targeting, and PL-15E long-range missile compatibility. Oman joins Bangladesh, Indonesia, Iraq, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Somalia among countries negotiating or examining JF-17 acquisitions since January 2026, although no Omani order has been confirmed. The JF-17 Thunder originated from a June 1999 Pakistani-Chinese agreement to replace Pakistan’s aging Chengdu F-7P/PG interceptors, Nanchang A-5C attack aircraft, and Dassault Mirage III and Mirage 5 fighters.
Related topic: Somalia seeks 24 JF-17 Block III fighter jets from Pakistan in $900 million deal
Prototype PT-01 first flew on August 25, 2003; two initial production fighters arrived in March 2007; PAC delivered its first locally assembled aircraft on November 23, 2009; and No. 26 Squadron entered service with 14 JF-17s on February 18, 2010. The fighter measures 14.33 m long, 9.44 m wide, and 4.57 m high, with a 24.43 m² wing area and a Block III empty weight of 7,965 kg. Its cropped-delta wings, diverterless supersonic inlets, and digital fly-by-wire controls support a maximum speed of Mach 1.6 (1,910 km/h). The original airframe has a design life of 4,000 flight hours or 25 years, with an initial overhaul after 1,200 hours. Block I production ended in December 2013 after 50 units, Block II manufacturing began that month, and Block III progressed from its December 15, 2019, first flight to operational service in March 2023.
Historical prices ranged from $15 million for Block I to $25 million for Block II, but Azerbaijan’s June 2025 agreement reached $4.6 billion, or $115 million per aircraft including the complete procurement package. Block I and Block II jets use a single Russian Klimov RD-93 afterburning turbofan derived from the MiG-29’s RD-33, while the JF-17 Block III development has been associated with the uprated RD-93MA and China’s WS-13 as an alternative. The thrust-to-weight ratio reaches 0.99 with full internal fuel and no external payload, decreasing as weapons and external tanks increase aircraft weight. Internal fuel capacity is 2,330 kg, supplemented by an 800-liter centerline tank and two underwing tanks holding either 800 or 1,110 liters each, providing up to 3,020 additional liters. The original seven weapon stations comprise two wingtip, four underwing, and one centerline hardpoint, with an early published external load of 1,500 kg.
Carrying three external tanks occupies three stations, reducing those available for weapons. Block II introduced aerial refueling, improved tactical data links, electronic warfare equipment, and increased load-carrying capacity, while Block III added a chin-mounted station. These characteristics matter for Oman because the RAFO must cover the Musandam Peninsula near the Strait of Hormuz, the Gulf of Oman, and Dhofar, potentially making fuel endurance and tanker compatibility important procurement considerations. The original JF-17 uses the Chinese KLJ-7 pulse-Doppler radar, capable of detecting a 5 m² radar-cross-section target at least 105 km in look-up conditions and 85 km in look-down conditions. Its track-while-scan function follows ten targets and supports simultaneous engagements against two. Block III introduces the KLJ-7A AESA radar, increasing tracking capacity to 15 targets and simultaneous engagements to four, representing improvements of 50% and 100%, respectively.
Electronic beam steering allows radar surveillance sectors to change without mechanically repositioning the antenna. Block III also adds helmet-mounted targeting for off-boresight missiles, a larger holographic head-up display, upgraded cockpit screens, radar warning equipment, missile approach sensors, electronic countermeasures, and chaff and flare dispensers. However, tracking capacity does not establish detection range against low-observable aircraft or missile effectiveness under electronic interference. For Oman, compatibility with existing F-16 and Typhoon communications, identification systems, and tactical data links would logically require separate integration arrangements. The JF-17 carries Chinese PL-5E and PL-9C infrared missiles and SD-10/PL-12 radar-guided missiles, while Block III adds the PL-15E, with a claimed export engagement range of 145 km, and the PL-10E high-off-boresight missile integrated in April 2021.
Ground-attack armament includes a 23 mm GSh-23-2 cannon, Mk 82 and Mk 83 bombs, GBU-12 laser-guided bombs, rocket pods, satellite-guided weapons, and compatible anti-ship and anti-radiation missiles. Pakistani JF-17s have also been associated with the CM-400AKG supersonic air-to-surface missile. JF-17s conducted counterinsurgency strikes in North Waziristan and participated in Pakistan’s February 2019 attacks against Indian targets using Mk 83 bombs with range-extension kits. During the May 2025 India-Pakistan conflict, Pakistan employed JF-17s in air-to-air and strike missions and claimed an attack against the 96L6E radar associated with an Indian S-400 air defense system at Adampur, but India rejected claims that its S-400 had been destroyed, leaving the attack’s outcome disputed. PAC manufactures 58% of the JF-17 airframe, including the forward fuselage, wings, and vertical stabilizer, while Chinese industry produces the remaining 42%, with final assembly at Kamra.
Pakistani component manufacturing began in 2005, subassembly production in January 2008, and final assembly in June 2009. PAC completed 16 fighters in 2015, while subsequent annual capacity reached 20 to 25 aircraft. At this rate, manufacturing 40 fighters would require 19.2 to 24 months if the entire production line were dedicated to one customer such as Azerbaijan, excluding delivery preparations and interruptions. The dual-seat JF-17B first flew on April 27, 2017, and 26 Block II examples were completed by December 2020, including four at Chengdu and 22 at Kamra. However, Russian RD-93 engines, Chinese avionics and weapons, and British Martin-Baker ejection seats create separate supply dependencies, while Pakistani domestic orders and Azerbaijan’s 40-aircraft contract compete for manufacturing capacity. To date, more than 200 JF-17s have been manufactured since 2006-2007, primarily for Pakistan, with Myanmar, Nigeria, and Azerbaijan becoming export customers.
Myanmar ordered 16 JF-17 Block II fighters for $560 million in July 2015, receiving its first aircraft in December 2018, but subsequently encountered structural cracking, KLJ-7 radar problems, and limited availability requiring Pakistani technical assistance in 2022-2023. Nigeria acquired three Block IIs under a $184.3 million arrangement, inducted them on May 21, 2021, and confirmed counterinsurgency employment in January 2023. Azerbaijan’s initial $1.6 billion agreement in February 2024 expanded to 40 Block III fighters worth $4.6 billion in June 2025; deliveries began that October, and its 408th Squadron conducted exercises with the aircraft by July 2026. Pakistan also reportedly reached a $4 billion to $4.6 billion agreement with the Libyan National Army in December 2025, including 16 JF-17s, while Somalia negotiated for 24 Block III fighters in February 2026.
Bangladesh entered Block III discussions in January 2026, Indonesia examined a package involving 40 fighters and armed drones, Iraq expressed interest on January 10, and Saudi Arabia considered converting $2 billion in loans into aircraft deliveries. Morocco renewed engagement with Pakistan, while Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, South Africa, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela have also shown interest. The JF-17’s principal commercial advantage is the availability of new-production supersonic fighters in several configurations, with historical airframe prices below those of many Western alternatives. However, export contract averages differ considerably: Myanmar paid $35 million per aircraft at package level, Nigeria $61.4 million, and Azerbaijan $115 million, reflecting different fleet sizes, equipment standards, weapons, training, and support requirements.
Block II provides aerial refueling and improved avionics, while Block III adds AESA radar and longer-range missile compatibility; the JF-17B supports conversion training without introducing another aircraft family. PAC’s 20-25-aircraft annual capacity provides an established production source, but Russian engine supply, Chinese components, and Pakistani maintenance assistance remain critical dependencies, as Myanmar’s serviceability problems illustrate. Oman would also need to integrate Chinese-origin weapons, mission planning, maintenance, and training into an air force already operating American F-16s and European Typhoons, none of which can be assumed compatible with the JF-17. The procurement decision therefore involves not only fighter acquisition costs but also the expense of establishing another logistics chain, training technicians and pilots, acquiring separate weapons inventories, and maintaining sufficient aircraft availability throughout the fleet’s service life.
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Written by Jérôme Brahy
Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, South Korea, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
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Oman is negotiating with Pakistan and China regarding the potential procurement of CAC/PAC JF-17 Thunder multirole fighter aircraft for the Royal Air Force of Oman. The discussions follow an October 2026 visit to Islamabad by Omani Foreign Minister Sayyid Badr Albusaidi for the eighth Pakistan-Oman Joint Ministerial Commission. If confirmed, the acquisition would logically allow Oman to either supplement its existing inventory of 17 F-16C/D fighters, 12 Eurofighter Typhoons, and 10 Hawk 200 attack aircraft, or initiate a long-term replacement strategy for legacy platforms.
Oman opens talks with Pakistan and China about the purchase of JF-17 Thunder fighter jets despite already operating American F-16s and European Eurofighter Typhoons, although no acquisition agreement has been confirmed. (Picture source: Pakistan Air Force)
Intelligence Online learned on October 21, 2026, that Oman is negotiating with Pakistan and China over a potential purchase of JF-17 Thunder fighter jets for the Royal Air Force of Oman (RAFO), which operates 12 Eurofighter Typhoons, 17 F-16C/D fighters, and 10 Hawk 200 light attack aircraft, meaning that this acquisition could either supplement existing fighter squadrons or support the eventual replacement of older aircraft. The disclosure follows the October 13-14, 2026, visit to Islamabad by Omani Foreign Minister Sayyid Badr Albusaidi, who met Pakistani Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Mohammad Ishaq Dar during the eighth Pakistan-Oman Joint Ministerial Commission, which included defense and security cooperation among its priorities.
Jointly developed by Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC) and China’s Chengdu Aircraft Corporation (CAC), the JF-17 is available in three principal production standards, with Block III incorporating an AESA radar, helmet-mounted targeting, and PL-15E long-range missile compatibility. Oman joins Bangladesh, Indonesia, Iraq, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Somalia among countries negotiating or examining JF-17 acquisitions since January 2026, although no Omani order has been confirmed. The JF-17 Thunder originated from a June 1999 Pakistani-Chinese agreement to replace Pakistan’s aging Chengdu F-7P/PG interceptors, Nanchang A-5C attack aircraft, and Dassault Mirage III and Mirage 5 fighters.
Prototype PT-01 first flew on August 25, 2003; two initial production fighters arrived in March 2007; PAC delivered its first locally assembled aircraft on November 23, 2009; and No. 26 Squadron entered service with 14 JF-17s on February 18, 2010. The fighter measures 14.33 m long, 9.44 m wide, and 4.57 m high, with a 24.43 m² wing area and a Block III empty weight of 7,965 kg. Its cropped-delta wings, diverterless supersonic inlets, and digital fly-by-wire controls support a maximum speed of Mach 1.6 (1,910 km/h). The original airframe has a design life of 4,000 flight hours or 25 years, with an initial overhaul after 1,200 hours. Block I production ended in December 2013 after 50 units, Block II manufacturing began that month, and Block III progressed from its December 15, 2019, first flight to operational service in March 2023.
Historical prices ranged from $15 million for Block I to $25 million for Block II, but Azerbaijan’s June 2025 agreement reached $4.6 billion, or $115 million per aircraft including the complete procurement package. Block I and Block II jets use a single Russian Klimov RD-93 afterburning turbofan derived from the MiG-29’s RD-33, while the JF-17 Block III development has been associated with the uprated RD-93MA and China’s WS-13 as an alternative. The thrust-to-weight ratio reaches 0.99 with full internal fuel and no external payload, decreasing as weapons and external tanks increase aircraft weight. Internal fuel capacity is 2,330 kg, supplemented by an 800-liter centerline tank and two underwing tanks holding either 800 or 1,110 liters each, providing up to 3,020 additional liters. The original seven weapon stations comprise two wingtip, four underwing, and one centerline hardpoint, with an early published external load of 1,500 kg.
Carrying three external tanks occupies three stations, reducing those available for weapons. Block II introduced aerial refueling, improved tactical data links, electronic warfare equipment, and increased load-carrying capacity, while Block III added a chin-mounted station. These characteristics matter for Oman because the RAFO must cover the Musandam Peninsula near the Strait of Hormuz, the Gulf of Oman, and Dhofar, potentially making fuel endurance and tanker compatibility important procurement considerations. The original JF-17 uses the Chinese KLJ-7 pulse-Doppler radar, capable of detecting a 5 m² radar-cross-section target at least 105 km in look-up conditions and 85 km in look-down conditions. Its track-while-scan function follows ten targets and supports simultaneous engagements against two. Block III introduces the KLJ-7A AESA radar, increasing tracking capacity to 15 targets and simultaneous engagements to four, representing improvements of 50% and 100%, respectively.
Electronic beam steering allows radar surveillance sectors to change without mechanically repositioning the antenna. Block III also adds helmet-mounted targeting for off-boresight missiles, a larger holographic head-up display, upgraded cockpit screens, radar warning equipment, missile approach sensors, electronic countermeasures, and chaff and flare dispensers. However, tracking capacity does not establish detection range against low-observable aircraft or missile effectiveness under electronic interference. For Oman, compatibility with existing F-16 and Typhoon communications, identification systems, and tactical data links would logically require separate integration arrangements. The JF-17 carries Chinese PL-5E and PL-9C infrared missiles and SD-10/PL-12 radar-guided missiles, while Block III adds the PL-15E, with a claimed export engagement range of 145 km, and the PL-10E high-off-boresight missile integrated in April 2021.
Ground-attack armament includes a 23 mm GSh-23-2 cannon, Mk 82 and Mk 83 bombs, GBU-12 laser-guided bombs, rocket pods, satellite-guided weapons, and compatible anti-ship and anti-radiation missiles. Pakistani JF-17s have also been associated with the CM-400AKG supersonic air-to-surface missile. JF-17s conducted counterinsurgency strikes in North Waziristan and participated in Pakistan’s February 2019 attacks against Indian targets using Mk 83 bombs with range-extension kits. During the May 2025 India-Pakistan conflict, Pakistan employed JF-17s in air-to-air and strike missions and claimed an attack against the 96L6E radar associated with an Indian S-400 air defense system at Adampur, but India rejected claims that its S-400 had been destroyed, leaving the attack’s outcome disputed. PAC manufactures 58% of the JF-17 airframe, including the forward fuselage, wings, and vertical stabilizer, while Chinese industry produces the remaining 42%, with final assembly at Kamra.
Pakistani component manufacturing began in 2005, subassembly production in January 2008, and final assembly in June 2009. PAC completed 16 fighters in 2015, while subsequent annual capacity reached 20 to 25 aircraft. At this rate, manufacturing 40 fighters would require 19.2 to 24 months if the entire production line were dedicated to one customer such as Azerbaijan, excluding delivery preparations and interruptions. The dual-seat JF-17B first flew on April 27, 2017, and 26 Block II examples were completed by December 2020, including four at Chengdu and 22 at Kamra. However, Russian RD-93 engines, Chinese avionics and weapons, and British Martin-Baker ejection seats create separate supply dependencies, while Pakistani domestic orders and Azerbaijan’s 40-aircraft contract compete for manufacturing capacity. To date, more than 200 JF-17s have been manufactured since 2006-2007, primarily for Pakistan, with Myanmar, Nigeria, and Azerbaijan becoming export customers.
Myanmar ordered 16 JF-17 Block II fighters for $560 million in July 2015, receiving its first aircraft in December 2018, but subsequently encountered structural cracking, KLJ-7 radar problems, and limited availability requiring Pakistani technical assistance in 2022-2023. Nigeria acquired three Block IIs under a $184.3 million arrangement, inducted them on May 21, 2021, and confirmed counterinsurgency employment in January 2023. Azerbaijan‘s initial $1.6 billion agreement in February 2024 expanded to 40 Block III fighters worth $4.6 billion in June 2025; deliveries began that October, and its 408th Squadron conducted exercises with the aircraft by July 2026. Pakistan also reportedly reached a $4 billion to $4.6 billion agreement with the Libyan National Army in December 2025, including 16 JF-17s, while Somalia negotiated for 24 Block III fighters in February 2026.
Bangladesh entered Block III discussions in January 2026, Indonesia examined a package involving 40 fighters and armed drones, Iraq expressed interest on January 10, and Saudi Arabia considered converting $2 billion in loans into aircraft deliveries. Morocco renewed engagement with Pakistan, while Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, South Africa, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela have also shown interest. The JF-17’s principal commercial advantage is the availability of new-production supersonic fighters in several configurations, with historical airframe prices below those of many Western alternatives. However, export contract averages differ considerably: Myanmar paid $35 million per aircraft at package level, Nigeria $61.4 million, and Azerbaijan $115 million, reflecting different fleet sizes, equipment standards, weapons, training, and support requirements.
Block II provides aerial refueling and improved avionics, while Block III adds AESA radar and longer-range missile compatibility; the JF-17B supports conversion training without introducing another aircraft family. PAC’s 20-25-aircraft annual capacity provides an established production source, but Russian engine supply, Chinese components, and Pakistani maintenance assistance remain critical dependencies, as Myanmar’s serviceability problems illustrate. Oman would also need to integrate Chinese-origin weapons, mission planning, maintenance, and training into an air force already operating American F-16s and European Typhoons, none of which can be assumed compatible with the JF-17. The procurement decision therefore involves not only fighter acquisition costs but also the expense of establishing another logistics chain, training technicians and pilots, acquiring separate weapons inventories, and maintaining sufficient aircraft availability throughout the fleet’s service life.
Explore More Defense News
• Land Defense News
• Naval Defense News
• Defense Aerospace News
Written by Jérôme Brahy
Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, South Korea, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
