Analysis: Could the Su-57E become India’s next fighter jet as Putin arrives in New Delhi?
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India is entering a fresh round of negotiations with Russia on the Su-57E fighter, new S-400 units, and possible S 500 cooperation during President Vladimir Putin’s visit to New Delhi on December 4, 2025.
As reported by Bloomberg on November 30, 2025, India and Russia are preparing for an unusually wide-ranging defence discussion during President Vladimir Putin’s two-day visit to New Delhi, according to senior Indian officials familiar with the agenda. Russia’s proposals reportedly include the potential co-production and acquisition of Su-57E fifth-generation fighter jets, additional S-400 units, and possible future cooperation on the S-500 air defence system, as part of an ongoing assessment of capability needs, technology access, and supply chain risks.Follow Army Recognition on Google News at this link
A previous Russian proposal foresaw an initial delivery of about 20 to 30 Su-57Es to India within three to four years, followed by the local production of a further 70 to 100 units by the early 2030s. (Picture source: Yaplakal/Gurzho)
The visit includes the 22nd India-Russia Inter-Governmental Commission on Military and Military Technical Cooperation, co-chaired by Defence Minister Rajnath Singh and Russian Defence Minister Andrei Belousov, and the 23rd annual summit between Putin and Prime Minister Narendra Modi. The agenda covers the timely delivery of the remaining two S-400 systems from the original $5.4 billion contract for five units, India’s examination of further S-400 batteries, and an offer of the S-500 capable of intercepting ballistic targets at about 600 kilometres and airborne targets at about 400 kilometres, and wider cooperation in shipbuilding and jointly developed weapons such as new BrahMos variants. Moscow is also seeking to reinforce energy and trade ties after a period in which Russian crude exports to India are projected to fall to a three-year low, as New Delhi has explored greater purchases from the United States and the Middle East.
Both sides are studying a free trade agreement within the Eurasian Economic Union framework and mechanisms such as rupee-based trade and rupee loans from Russian banks like Sberbank, while Belousov’s visit programme includes a wreath laying at the National War Memorial in New Delhi. Indian officials describe the visit as an opportunity to review the full spectrum of defence and economic relations while managing the effects of U.S. sanctions and tariffs that have targeted both Russian entities and Indian exports. At the centre of the current discussions is a Russian proposal that combines an extensive Su-57E package with short-term reinforcement through Su-35M fighters, technology transfer, and high levels of industrial localisation in India. United Aircraft Corporation has previously offered India the co-production of the Su-57E at Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL)’s Nashik facility, where Su-30MKI aircraft are already assembled, with localisation projected to be between 40 and 60 percent across avionics, structural parts, engines, and mission systems.
The proposal foresees an initial delivery of about 20 to 30 Su-57Es within three to four years, followed by the local production of a further 70 to 100 units by the early 2030s, and the integration of Indian systems such as Astra air-to-air missiles, Rudram anti-radiation missiles, Gaurav guided bombs, and domestic AESA radars like the Virupaksha. In parallel, Russia has offered 36 to 40 Su-35M fighters for delivery within two to three years to address the Indian Air Force’s squadron strength, which stands at around 31 units compared to an authorized 42.5, stressing that the Su-35M shares 70 to 80 percent systems commonality with the Su-30MKI. Both the Su-35M and Su-57E use the AL-41F1S engine rated at about 142 kilonewtons of thrust, and Russia has proposed that India could later gain access to the newer Izdeliye 177S engine with serrated nozzles and an expected life of 6,000 hours, which has been displayed but not yet flight tested. Moscow has also revived a two-seat Su-57 concept aimed at export markets, intended for roles involving control of S-70 Okhotnik unmanned combat aircraft, electronic warfare, and airborne command and control missions, which aligns with Indian interest in manned-unmanned teaming.
These offers are also linked to a broader proposal to use Su-57-derived engines and systems in a future “Super 30” modernisation of the Su-30MKI fleet, leveraging HAL’s experience building more than 900 AL-31FP engines and existing industrial infrastructure in India. The Su-57E itself is a fifth-generation multirole aircraft developed under the PAK-FA programme to perform air superiority, ground attack, and maritime strike missions in all weather conditions with reduced radar and infrared signatures. The Su-57E has a maximum takeoff weight of 34,000 to 35,500 kg, an internal fuel load of about 11,100 kg, and an internal and external weapons capacity of up to 7,500 kg distributed among internal bays and 12 external hardpoints. The aircraft is credited with a top speed of around 2,600 km/h at altitude, a practical ceiling of about 20,000 m, an unrefuelled range of roughly 2,800 km that can be extended to 5,200 km with one aerial refuelling and 7,800 km with two, and an endurance close to 10 hours with a load factor tolerance of 11g.
The Su-57E is credited with a top speed of around 2,600 km/h, a practical ceiling of about 20,000 m, an unrefuelled range of roughly 2,800 km that can be extended to 5,200 km with one aerial refuelling and 7,800 km with two, and an endurance close to 10 hours. (Picture source: Yaplakal/Gurzho)
The avionics suite includes the N036 Belka radar system, combining an X-band AESA array in the nose, side-facing arrays, and L-band radar elements in the wing roots, with roughly 1,526 transmit/receive modules made using Russian gallium arsenide technology. Weapon options include R-77M active radar-guided and R-74M2 infrared guided air-to-air missiles, Kh-38 and Kh-58USHKE air-to-surface missiles, Kh-35UE and Kh-69 anti-ship and land attack missiles, and guided bombs such as KAB-250, KAB-500, and UPAB-1500B-E, supplemented by a 30 mm internal cannon derived from the GSh-30-1. At the same time, the program has experienced structural and production issues, with observers at Zhuhai Airshow China 2024 and other events noting misaligned fuselage panels, extensive use of external fasteners of differing types around weapons bays, and concerns that radar cross section estimates in the range of 0.1 to 0.5 square metres would lag behind the lowest signature levels claimed by other fifth-generation designs.
The production of the Su-57 has also been constrained by dependence on Western electronics and high precision machine tools obtained through dual use channels, with around ten aircraft delivered in 2022, eleven in 2023, a small number in 2024, and losses that include a prototype and at least one production aircraft in crashes, as well as damage from a Ukrainian drone strike on Su-57s parked at Akhtubinsk flight test centre. Indian deliberations about the Su-57E take place against the background of a fleet structure in which Russian jets remain predominant, alongside the gradual expansion of Western and indigenous aircraft. The Indian Air Force operates more than 260 Su-30MKI multirole fighters and about 60 MiG-29s, together with 28 Rafale and 44 Mirage 2000 aircraft from France and 37 HAL Tejas light fighters, and has historically drawn over 60 percent of its major platforms from Russia.
India already fields several S-400 systems from the five-unit contract signed in 2018, locally designated Sudarshan Chakra and used in Operation Sindoor during a four-day confrontation with Pakistan, with three systems delivered and two more planned for 2026 and 2027. At the same time, India previously halted its participation in the joint Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft project in 2018 after internal evaluations identified multiple shortcomings in the Su-57’s stealth performance, sensor fusion, and engines, while pointing out that the Indian specific variant existed only on paper and that cost and schedule projections were unsatisfactory. Separately, India has declined earlier offers related to the S-500, while the S-400 contract is still being fulfilled, and while sanctions linked to the Ukraine war have slowed deliveries. More recently, Indian Defence Secretary Rajesh Kumar Singh has stated that defence cooperation with Russia is long-standing and ongoing, but will coexist with increased acquisitions from the United States and Europe as India reduces over-reliance on a single supplier.
Concerns also persist about sustainment and supply chain issues, as past assessments indicated that up to 40 percent of the Su-30MKI fleet could be grounded at times due to spares shortages, and there is awareness that some Su-57 subsystems may incorporate foreign or Chinese origin components that could be difficult to support in a crisis. Parallel to Russia’s proposals, the United States has put forward the F-35A Lightning II as an alternative fifth-generation solution, while maintaining strict limits on technology access and local integration. The F-35 is a single-engine stealth aircraft available in three variants for air force, short takeoff and vertical landing, and carrier operations, combining the AN/APG-81 AESA radar with a distributed aperture system, sensor fusion, and network-centric capabilities intended to link aircraft, ships, ground units, and air defence systems. It has a combat radius of roughly 1,200 km, can carry about 8,000 kg of ordnance, and places an emphasis on low observability and electronic warfare features, although top speed and agility are lower than those of twin-engine jets such as the Su-57.
These offers are also linked to a broader proposal to use Su-57-derived engines and systems in a future “Super 30” modernisation of the Su-30MKI fleet, leveraging HAL’s experience building more than 900 AL-31FP engines and existing industrial infrastructure in India. (Picture source: Yaplakal/Gurzho)
U.S. policy keeps the F-35’s core software and source code under American control, even for close partners, limiting access to what is needed for routine maintenance and preventing users from freely integrating national weapons or modifying mission systems without the prime contractor’s involvement. Unit prices in the range of $110 million for the F-35A and higher life-cycle costs have been key factors for India, especially in the context of domestic budget priorities and the need to fund indigenous programmes. Recent trade friction has added another layer, as U.S. tariffs on Indian goods have been increased up to 50 percent in some cases, including a 25 percent hike imposed on August 1, 2025, after India’s continued import of Russian crude, and New Delhi has considered options to rebalance trade through increased imports of U.S. gas, gold, and communications equipment while reserving the right to challenge tariffs at the World Trade Organization at a chosen time. Although India has not formally closed the door to the F-35, the combination of cost, software restrictions, lack of local manufacturing, and the political context of tariffs and sanctions has narrowed the space for a near-term agreement on this aircraft.
Within India, these two external offers intersect with the trajectory of the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) program and with a wider policy of technological self-reliance under Aatmanirbhar Bharat. The Cabinet Committee on Security approved the AMCA in May 2025, and the Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) has issued an expression of interest and a request for information to select both public sector and private partners within an expected three to six-month window, moving away from a development model centred on HAL alone. The AMCA is planned as a twin-engine multirole stealth aircraft capable of deep strike, air superiority, and electronic warfare missions, with an eventual family that includes manned and unmanned variants, and a development and induction timeline of around ten years from contract award to operational service. Defence Secretary Singh has described foreign fifth-generation procurement as a possible interim measure while the AMCA matures, stating that discussions with several partners, including Russia, are underway but remain at an early stage and will only be revealed when they reach milestones such as an Acceptance of Necessity, a request for proposals, or a signed contract.
Former commanders and commentators in India are divided, with some seeing the Su-57E offer with source code access and local integration of Indian munitions as an opportunity to strengthen national capabilities and bridge the gap until AMCA enters service, and others warning that greater dependence on Russian platforms exposed to sanctions and supply constraints could undermine long term autonomy and complicate relations with partners such as the United States and France. There is also awareness that Pakistan is expected to induct Chinese fifth-generation jets, and that China continues to expand its own J-20 and J-35 fleet, reinforcing the need for India to maintain credible airpower in the short and medium term while investing in indigenous solutions for the longer term. For now, Russia remains India’s largest supplier of military hardware, even as New Delhi has diversified towards Western systems, reduced the proportional share of Russian equipment in new orders in the four years up to 2024, and has become a major buyer of Russian seaborne oil despite sanctions after the invasion of Ukraine.
At the same time, however, Indian crude imports from Russia are projected to decline as sanctions tighten, as Indian refiners adjust their portfolios, and as U.S. pressure has included both tariffs and concerns about further large-scale defence deals with Moscow, such as the S-500 and Su-57E. Russia is therefore combining offers of advanced fighters, long-range air defence systems, and co-production arrangements with efforts to deepen energy, banking, and trade links, while seeking to maintain its profile in South Asia at a time when Western restrictions and Ukrainian strikes have exposed vulnerabilities in its defence industrial base. For India, choices on Su-57E, Su-35M, S-500, and F-35 are interwoven with the need to restore the Indian Air Force’s squadron strength, protect airspace against regional competitors, support industrial programmes like AMCA and BrahMos, and avoid excessive exposure to any single foreign supplier or sanctions regime. The outcome of the current cycle of negotiations will indicate whether New Delhi opts for a high degree of technological access through Russian offers, maintains a more cautious posture while relying on existing fleets and incremental upgrades, or keeps multiple pathways open while giving priority to domestic development, but in all scenarios the relationship with Russia will remain an important variable alongside expanding defence and economic ties with the United States, Europe, and other partners.
Written by Jérôme Brahy
Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
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India is entering a fresh round of negotiations with Russia on the Su-57E fighter, new S-400 units, and possible S 500 cooperation during President Vladimir Putin’s visit to New Delhi on December 4, 2025.
As reported by Bloomberg on November 30, 2025, India and Russia are preparing for an unusually wide-ranging defence discussion during President Vladimir Putin’s two-day visit to New Delhi, according to senior Indian officials familiar with the agenda. Russia’s proposals reportedly include the potential co-production and acquisition of Su-57E fifth-generation fighter jets, additional S-400 units, and possible future cooperation on the S-500 air defence system, as part of an ongoing assessment of capability needs, technology access, and supply chain risks.
Follow Army Recognition on Google News at this link
A previous Russian proposal foresaw an initial delivery of about 20 to 30 Su-57Es to India within three to four years, followed by the local production of a further 70 to 100 units by the early 2030s. (Picture source: Yaplakal/Gurzho)
The visit includes the 22nd India-Russia Inter-Governmental Commission on Military and Military Technical Cooperation, co-chaired by Defence Minister Rajnath Singh and Russian Defence Minister Andrei Belousov, and the 23rd annual summit between Putin and Prime Minister Narendra Modi. The agenda covers the timely delivery of the remaining two S-400 systems from the original $5.4 billion contract for five units, India’s examination of further S-400 batteries, and an offer of the S-500 capable of intercepting ballistic targets at about 600 kilometres and airborne targets at about 400 kilometres, and wider cooperation in shipbuilding and jointly developed weapons such as new BrahMos variants. Moscow is also seeking to reinforce energy and trade ties after a period in which Russian crude exports to India are projected to fall to a three-year low, as New Delhi has explored greater purchases from the United States and the Middle East.
Both sides are studying a free trade agreement within the Eurasian Economic Union framework and mechanisms such as rupee-based trade and rupee loans from Russian banks like Sberbank, while Belousov’s visit programme includes a wreath laying at the National War Memorial in New Delhi. Indian officials describe the visit as an opportunity to review the full spectrum of defence and economic relations while managing the effects of U.S. sanctions and tariffs that have targeted both Russian entities and Indian exports. At the centre of the current discussions is a Russian proposal that combines an extensive Su-57E package with short-term reinforcement through Su-35M fighters, technology transfer, and high levels of industrial localisation in India. United Aircraft Corporation has previously offered India the co-production of the Su-57E at Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL)’s Nashik facility, where Su-30MKI aircraft are already assembled, with localisation projected to be between 40 and 60 percent across avionics, structural parts, engines, and mission systems.
The proposal foresees an initial delivery of about 20 to 30 Su-57Es within three to four years, followed by the local production of a further 70 to 100 units by the early 2030s, and the integration of Indian systems such as Astra air-to-air missiles, Rudram anti-radiation missiles, Gaurav guided bombs, and domestic AESA radars like the Virupaksha. In parallel, Russia has offered 36 to 40 Su-35M fighters for delivery within two to three years to address the Indian Air Force’s squadron strength, which stands at around 31 units compared to an authorized 42.5, stressing that the Su-35M shares 70 to 80 percent systems commonality with the Su-30MKI. Both the Su-35M and Su-57E use the AL-41F1S engine rated at about 142 kilonewtons of thrust, and Russia has proposed that India could later gain access to the newer Izdeliye 177S engine with serrated nozzles and an expected life of 6,000 hours, which has been displayed but not yet flight tested. Moscow has also revived a two-seat Su-57 concept aimed at export markets, intended for roles involving control of S-70 Okhotnik unmanned combat aircraft, electronic warfare, and airborne command and control missions, which aligns with Indian interest in manned-unmanned teaming.
These offers are also linked to a broader proposal to use Su-57-derived engines and systems in a future “Super 30” modernisation of the Su-30MKI fleet, leveraging HAL’s experience building more than 900 AL-31FP engines and existing industrial infrastructure in India. The Su-57E itself is a fifth-generation multirole aircraft developed under the PAK-FA programme to perform air superiority, ground attack, and maritime strike missions in all weather conditions with reduced radar and infrared signatures. The Su-57E has a maximum takeoff weight of 34,000 to 35,500 kg, an internal fuel load of about 11,100 kg, and an internal and external weapons capacity of up to 7,500 kg distributed among internal bays and 12 external hardpoints. The aircraft is credited with a top speed of around 2,600 km/h at altitude, a practical ceiling of about 20,000 m, an unrefuelled range of roughly 2,800 km that can be extended to 5,200 km with one aerial refuelling and 7,800 km with two, and an endurance close to 10 hours with a load factor tolerance of 11g.
The Su-57E is credited with a top speed of around 2,600 km/h, a practical ceiling of about 20,000 m, an unrefuelled range of roughly 2,800 km that can be extended to 5,200 km with one aerial refuelling and 7,800 km with two, and an endurance close to 10 hours. (Picture source: Yaplakal/Gurzho)
The avionics suite includes the N036 Belka radar system, combining an X-band AESA array in the nose, side-facing arrays, and L-band radar elements in the wing roots, with roughly 1,526 transmit/receive modules made using Russian gallium arsenide technology. Weapon options include R-77M active radar-guided and R-74M2 infrared guided air-to-air missiles, Kh-38 and Kh-58USHKE air-to-surface missiles, Kh-35UE and Kh-69 anti-ship and land attack missiles, and guided bombs such as KAB-250, KAB-500, and UPAB-1500B-E, supplemented by a 30 mm internal cannon derived from the GSh-30-1. At the same time, the program has experienced structural and production issues, with observers at Zhuhai Airshow China 2024 and other events noting misaligned fuselage panels, extensive use of external fasteners of differing types around weapons bays, and concerns that radar cross section estimates in the range of 0.1 to 0.5 square metres would lag behind the lowest signature levels claimed by other fifth-generation designs.
The production of the Su-57 has also been constrained by dependence on Western electronics and high precision machine tools obtained through dual use channels, with around ten aircraft delivered in 2022, eleven in 2023, a small number in 2024, and losses that include a prototype and at least one production aircraft in crashes, as well as damage from a Ukrainian drone strike on Su-57s parked at Akhtubinsk flight test centre. Indian deliberations about the Su-57E take place against the background of a fleet structure in which Russian jets remain predominant, alongside the gradual expansion of Western and indigenous aircraft. The Indian Air Force operates more than 260 Su-30MKI multirole fighters and about 60 MiG-29s, together with 28 Rafale and 44 Mirage 2000 aircraft from France and 37 HAL Tejas light fighters, and has historically drawn over 60 percent of its major platforms from Russia.
India already fields several S-400 systems from the five-unit contract signed in 2018, locally designated Sudarshan Chakra and used in Operation Sindoor during a four-day confrontation with Pakistan, with three systems delivered and two more planned for 2026 and 2027. At the same time, India previously halted its participation in the joint Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft project in 2018 after internal evaluations identified multiple shortcomings in the Su-57’s stealth performance, sensor fusion, and engines, while pointing out that the Indian specific variant existed only on paper and that cost and schedule projections were unsatisfactory. Separately, India has declined earlier offers related to the S-500, while the S-400 contract is still being fulfilled, and while sanctions linked to the Ukraine war have slowed deliveries. More recently, Indian Defence Secretary Rajesh Kumar Singh has stated that defence cooperation with Russia is long-standing and ongoing, but will coexist with increased acquisitions from the United States and Europe as India reduces over-reliance on a single supplier.
Concerns also persist about sustainment and supply chain issues, as past assessments indicated that up to 40 percent of the Su-30MKI fleet could be grounded at times due to spares shortages, and there is awareness that some Su-57 subsystems may incorporate foreign or Chinese origin components that could be difficult to support in a crisis. Parallel to Russia’s proposals, the United States has put forward the F-35A Lightning II as an alternative fifth-generation solution, while maintaining strict limits on technology access and local integration. The F-35 is a single-engine stealth aircraft available in three variants for air force, short takeoff and vertical landing, and carrier operations, combining the AN/APG-81 AESA radar with a distributed aperture system, sensor fusion, and network-centric capabilities intended to link aircraft, ships, ground units, and air defence systems. It has a combat radius of roughly 1,200 km, can carry about 8,000 kg of ordnance, and places an emphasis on low observability and electronic warfare features, although top speed and agility are lower than those of twin-engine jets such as the Su-57.
These offers are also linked to a broader proposal to use Su-57-derived engines and systems in a future “Super 30” modernisation of the Su-30MKI fleet, leveraging HAL’s experience building more than 900 AL-31FP engines and existing industrial infrastructure in India. (Picture source: Yaplakal/Gurzho)
U.S. policy keeps the F-35’s core software and source code under American control, even for close partners, limiting access to what is needed for routine maintenance and preventing users from freely integrating national weapons or modifying mission systems without the prime contractor’s involvement. Unit prices in the range of $110 million for the F-35A and higher life-cycle costs have been key factors for India, especially in the context of domestic budget priorities and the need to fund indigenous programmes. Recent trade friction has added another layer, as U.S. tariffs on Indian goods have been increased up to 50 percent in some cases, including a 25 percent hike imposed on August 1, 2025, after India’s continued import of Russian crude, and New Delhi has considered options to rebalance trade through increased imports of U.S. gas, gold, and communications equipment while reserving the right to challenge tariffs at the World Trade Organization at a chosen time. Although India has not formally closed the door to the F-35, the combination of cost, software restrictions, lack of local manufacturing, and the political context of tariffs and sanctions has narrowed the space for a near-term agreement on this aircraft.
Within India, these two external offers intersect with the trajectory of the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) program and with a wider policy of technological self-reliance under Aatmanirbhar Bharat. The Cabinet Committee on Security approved the AMCA in May 2025, and the Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) has issued an expression of interest and a request for information to select both public sector and private partners within an expected three to six-month window, moving away from a development model centred on HAL alone. The AMCA is planned as a twin-engine multirole stealth aircraft capable of deep strike, air superiority, and electronic warfare missions, with an eventual family that includes manned and unmanned variants, and a development and induction timeline of around ten years from contract award to operational service. Defence Secretary Singh has described foreign fifth-generation procurement as a possible interim measure while the AMCA matures, stating that discussions with several partners, including Russia, are underway but remain at an early stage and will only be revealed when they reach milestones such as an Acceptance of Necessity, a request for proposals, or a signed contract.
Former commanders and commentators in India are divided, with some seeing the Su-57E offer with source code access and local integration of Indian munitions as an opportunity to strengthen national capabilities and bridge the gap until AMCA enters service, and others warning that greater dependence on Russian platforms exposed to sanctions and supply constraints could undermine long term autonomy and complicate relations with partners such as the United States and France. There is also awareness that Pakistan is expected to induct Chinese fifth-generation jets, and that China continues to expand its own J-20 and J-35 fleet, reinforcing the need for India to maintain credible airpower in the short and medium term while investing in indigenous solutions for the longer term. For now, Russia remains India’s largest supplier of military hardware, even as New Delhi has diversified towards Western systems, reduced the proportional share of Russian equipment in new orders in the four years up to 2024, and has become a major buyer of Russian seaborne oil despite sanctions after the invasion of Ukraine.
At the same time, however, Indian crude imports from Russia are projected to decline as sanctions tighten, as Indian refiners adjust their portfolios, and as U.S. pressure has included both tariffs and concerns about further large-scale defence deals with Moscow, such as the S-500 and Su-57E. Russia is therefore combining offers of advanced fighters, long-range air defence systems, and co-production arrangements with efforts to deepen energy, banking, and trade links, while seeking to maintain its profile in South Asia at a time when Western restrictions and Ukrainian strikes have exposed vulnerabilities in its defence industrial base. For India, choices on Su-57E, Su-35M, S-500, and F-35 are interwoven with the need to restore the Indian Air Force’s squadron strength, protect airspace against regional competitors, support industrial programmes like AMCA and BrahMos, and avoid excessive exposure to any single foreign supplier or sanctions regime. The outcome of the current cycle of negotiations will indicate whether New Delhi opts for a high degree of technological access through Russian offers, maintains a more cautious posture while relying on existing fleets and incremental upgrades, or keeps multiple pathways open while giving priority to domestic development, but in all scenarios the relationship with Russia will remain an important variable alongside expanding defence and economic ties with the United States, Europe, and other partners.
Written by Jérôme Brahy
Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
