Iran purchased Chinese TEE-01B high-resolution satellite to target US bases during March 2026 attacks
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Iran employed the Chinese-built TEE-01B high-resolution Earth observation satellite to conduct precision targeting during its March 2026 strikes against U.S. positions across the Middle East, according to a Financial Times investigation published on April 15, 2026.
The Chinese spy satellite enabled a full intelligence-surveillance-reconnaissance (ISR) cycle, from pre-strike reconnaissance to post-strike damage assessment, significantly enhancing Iran’s independent long-range targeting capability and reducing reliance on external intelligence sources. The satellite, operated by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Aerospace Force and acquired in late 2024, was used to monitor key sites, including Prince Sultan Air Base and U.S. Fifth Fleet facilities, with imagery collected before and after strikes to validate effects.
Related topic: Iran Uses Chinese AI Satellite Imagery to Target U.S. Military Bases and Equipment in Middle East
The TEE-01B operates in a sun-synchronous orbit at approximately 545 km altitude with an inclination of about 97.5°, completing 14 to 15 orbits per day with a period close to 95 minutes. (Picture source: Google Maps and Earth Eye Co.)
On April 15, 2026, an investigation from the Financial Times established that Iran employed the Chinese-built TEE-01B (Earth Eye 1) Earth observation satellite during the March 2026 attacks against U.S. targets across the Middle East. The satellite was secretly acquired by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Force in late 2024 under a contract valued at RMB 250 million, or $36.6 million, and was used to support a complete targeting cycle, including pre-strike reconnaissance, strike timing coordination, and post-strike damage assessment. Tasking records include time-stamped coordinate tasking, orbital alignment with target windows, and imagery collected before and after attacks.
The satellite’s role was not limited to observation but helped to synchronize Iran’s strike timing with available imaging passes, allowing confirmation of target status within hours to a maximum of two days. This constitutes the first confirmed use by Iran of a foreign-controlled electro-optical satellite with sub-meter resolution in active combat operations. This significantly reduced the country’s dependence on indirect intelligence channels and allowed independent verification of target status. According to leaked documents obtained by FT, the Chinese satellite was procured through a post-launch transfer model, avoiding conventional export procedures.
The TEE-01B (Earth Eye 1) was launched on June 6, 2024, from the Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center aboard a Ceres-1 rocket and inserted into a sun-synchronous orbit before control was transferred to Iran. The agreement covered the satellite bus, payload, launch services, mission software, and long-term operational support, forming a complete ISR package over its operational lifespan. The contract was executed directly by the IRGC Aerospace Force and signed by a brigadier general within that structure, with payment denominated in renminbi, indicating a direct financial transaction with the Chinese supplier. The satellite was not routed through Iran’s civilian space agency, ensuring immediate operational use from the outset.
The in-orbit delivery model removed the need for physical export of sensitive hardware, limiting its visibility, and allowed the rapid deployment of a fully functional high-resolution ISR capability without intermediate testing phases. The industrial chain behind the TEE-01B involves Earth Eye Co. as the primary manufacturer and system provider, with Emposat responsible for the ground segment services and operational infrastructure. Earth Eye Co built the satellite and executed the in-orbit transfer model, while Emposat supplied command uplink, telemetry handling, imagery reception, and mission planning software. Emposat operates a distributed network of ground stations across Asia, Latin America, and other regions, enabling global satellite control and data access from multiple geographic locations.
The company’s leadership includes personnel previously affiliated with the state-owned China Academy of Space Technology, and U.S congressional assessments have linked Emposat to the PLA Aerospace Force through personnel and operational overlap. Earth Eye staff also have affiliations with a group of defense-affiliated universities known as the “Seven Sons of National Defence,” which maintain institutional connections with China’s military-industrial ecosystem. This combination of commercial, academic, and military-linked actors enables the transfer of advanced capabilities for military use through nominally commercial channels. The TEE-01B operates in a sun-synchronous low Earth orbit at an altitude of approximately 545 km with an inclination of about 97.5°, completing roughly 14 to 15 revolutions per day with a period close to 95 minutes.
Each orbit produces a different ground track due to Earth’s rotation, which limits observation opportunities for a specific target location to one or two passes per day. Only one pass is typically usable for image acquisition due to solar illumination and viewing angle constraints, as the satellite crosses targets at a consistent local solar time, often near mid-morning conditions. The TEE-01B’s payload consists of an electro-optical imaging system capable of both panchromatic resolution (between 0.5 and 0.52 meters) and multispectral imaging (at approximately 2 meters resolution). The swath width is about 14.8 km, which constrains coverage to defined corridors during each pass rather than wide-area continuous surveillance. E
Effective use of the satellite requires pre-planned tasking aligned with orbital windows, meaning target observation must be scheduled within specific time intervals rather than conducted on demand. For Iran, the performance difference between TEE-01B and domestic alternatives is substantial and directly affects the level of detail available for targeting. For instance, the Noor-2 provides imagery at 12 to 15 meters resolution, and Noor-3 improves this to about 5 meters, but both are insufficient for detailed identification of tactical targets. China’s TEE-01B, with its 0.5 meter resolution, allows the identification of aircraft types, detection of ground support equipment, tracking of vehicle movement, and assessment of infrastructure damage for post-strike analysis.
This represents a 10× improvement over Noor-3 and a 20 to 30× improvement over Noor-2, shifting capability from area surveillance to object-level intelligence. The higher resolution allows the confirmation of target presence, configuration, and post-strike effects without external verification. This capability provides near real-time intelligence within operational planning cycles, which reduces uncertainty in strike execution and enables rapid feedback. During March 2026, the satellite was tasked to observe a precise set of military and infrastructure targets across multiple countries, with imaging conducted immediately before and after strikes. Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia was imaged on March 13, 14, and 15, with confirmed strike damage on March 14 involving five U.S Air Force refuelling aircraft and an E-3G AWACS.
Additional surveillance across the Gulf region covered Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan, locations near the U.S Fifth Fleet headquarters in Manama, Bahrain, and the Erbil airport area in Iraq, all within the timeframe of Iranian strike activity. The satellite also monitored Camp Buehring and Ali Al Salem Air Base in Kuwait, Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti, and Duqm International Airport in Oman. Civilian and dual-use infrastructure included Khor Fakkan port, the Qidfa desalination plant in the UAE, and the Alba aluminum facility in Bahrain. Imagery was also collected after strikes to assess damage and confirm target engagement. The time interval between imaging and strike execution indicates operational cycles of 24 to 48 hours, confirming a full targeting loop from identification to strike to assessment into Iran’s active operational planning.
The ground segment supporting TEE-01B relies on Emposat’s global network of ground stations, which provides command, telemetry, and data transmission capabilities. This network allows satellite control from locations outside Iranian territory, reducing the dependence on domestic ground stations, which have been vulnerable to strikes during 2025 and 2026. By using external ground infrastructure, the system maintains operational continuity even when national facilities are degraded or destroyed. The network enables uplink of tasking commands, reception of telemetry data, and downlink of imagery through geographically dispersed nodes, reducing the risk of single-point failure. This architecture complicates efforts to disrupt operations through conventional strikes, as it would require targeting multiple facilities across different countries.
It also allows flexible scheduling and faster data access, improving responsiveness within operational timelines. The satellite is integrated into a broader intelligence framework combining imagery with other sources to improve targeting accuracy. Iranian forces maintain human intelligence networks across the region, which provide ground-level information that can be cross-referenced with satellite imagery to validate targets and assess activity patterns. There are also references to concurrent use of Russian satellite imagery, indicating multiple independent data streams feeding into the same targeting process. This allows cross-cueing, where one source directs the tasking of another, improving the accuracy of missile and drone strikes by confirming both location and activity patterns. It also allows monitoring of changes over time, such as asset movement or infrastructure status.
The combination of HUMINT (Human Intelligence) and IMINT (Imagery Intelligence) increases the precision of Iran’s missile and UAV strikes by confirming both the location and operational status of targets. It also enables monitoring of changes over time, such as aircraft movement or infrastructure activity, supporting dynamic planning. This layered approach represents a shift toward a more resilient and redundant ISR architecture. The broader context of the program reflects increasing interaction between Chinese commercial space entities and Iranian military requirements within a dual-use framework. Although the companies involved operate commercially, their personnel and institutional links connect them to state-backed aerospace and defense structures.
Satellite launches in China require government authorization, and funding often involves military-civil fusion mechanisms, linking commercial activity to national strategic programs. Previous instances have involved Chinese firms such as MizarVision providing satellite imagery to Iranian allies such as the Houthis, including data used for targeting maritime and land-based assets. U.S authorities are monitoring the potential extension of such cooperation to additional military systems, including shoulder-fired missile capabilities. Chinese officials have denied involvement in military support and characterized these activities as standard commercial operations. In the future, the TEE-01B case might demonstrate how the access to high-resolution satellite imagery can directly influence targeting capability and operational tempo in a regional conflict.
Written by Jérôme Brahy
Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
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Iran employed the Chinese-built TEE-01B high-resolution Earth observation satellite to conduct precision targeting during its March 2026 strikes against U.S. positions across the Middle East, according to a Financial Times investigation published on April 15, 2026.
The Chinese spy satellite enabled a full intelligence-surveillance-reconnaissance (ISR) cycle, from pre-strike reconnaissance to post-strike damage assessment, significantly enhancing Iran’s independent long-range targeting capability and reducing reliance on external intelligence sources. The satellite, operated by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Aerospace Force and acquired in late 2024, was used to monitor key sites, including Prince Sultan Air Base and U.S. Fifth Fleet facilities, with imagery collected before and after strikes to validate effects.
Related topic: Iran Uses Chinese AI Satellite Imagery to Target U.S. Military Bases and Equipment in Middle East
The TEE-01B operates in a sun-synchronous orbit at approximately 545 km altitude with an inclination of about 97.5°, completing 14 to 15 orbits per day with a period close to 95 minutes. (Picture source: Google Maps and Earth Eye Co.)
On April 15, 2026, an investigation from the Financial Times established that Iran employed the Chinese-built TEE-01B (Earth Eye 1) Earth observation satellite during the March 2026 attacks against U.S. targets across the Middle East. The satellite was secretly acquired by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Force in late 2024 under a contract valued at RMB 250 million, or $36.6 million, and was used to support a complete targeting cycle, including pre-strike reconnaissance, strike timing coordination, and post-strike damage assessment. Tasking records include time-stamped coordinate tasking, orbital alignment with target windows, and imagery collected before and after attacks.
The satellite’s role was not limited to observation but helped to synchronize Iran’s strike timing with available imaging passes, allowing confirmation of target status within hours to a maximum of two days. This constitutes the first confirmed use by Iran of a foreign-controlled electro-optical satellite with sub-meter resolution in active combat operations. This significantly reduced the country’s dependence on indirect intelligence channels and allowed independent verification of target status. According to leaked documents obtained by FT, the Chinese satellite was procured through a post-launch transfer model, avoiding conventional export procedures.
The TEE-01B (Earth Eye 1) was launched on June 6, 2024, from the Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center aboard a Ceres-1 rocket and inserted into a sun-synchronous orbit before control was transferred to Iran. The agreement covered the satellite bus, payload, launch services, mission software, and long-term operational support, forming a complete ISR package over its operational lifespan. The contract was executed directly by the IRGC Aerospace Force and signed by a brigadier general within that structure, with payment denominated in renminbi, indicating a direct financial transaction with the Chinese supplier. The satellite was not routed through Iran’s civilian space agency, ensuring immediate operational use from the outset.
The in-orbit delivery model removed the need for physical export of sensitive hardware, limiting its visibility, and allowed the rapid deployment of a fully functional high-resolution ISR capability without intermediate testing phases. The industrial chain behind the TEE-01B involves Earth Eye Co. as the primary manufacturer and system provider, with Emposat responsible for the ground segment services and operational infrastructure. Earth Eye Co built the satellite and executed the in-orbit transfer model, while Emposat supplied command uplink, telemetry handling, imagery reception, and mission planning software. Emposat operates a distributed network of ground stations across Asia, Latin America, and other regions, enabling global satellite control and data access from multiple geographic locations.
The company’s leadership includes personnel previously affiliated with the state-owned China Academy of Space Technology, and U.S congressional assessments have linked Emposat to the PLA Aerospace Force through personnel and operational overlap. Earth Eye staff also have affiliations with a group of defense-affiliated universities known as the “Seven Sons of National Defence,” which maintain institutional connections with China’s military-industrial ecosystem. This combination of commercial, academic, and military-linked actors enables the transfer of advanced capabilities for military use through nominally commercial channels. The TEE-01B operates in a sun-synchronous low Earth orbit at an altitude of approximately 545 km with an inclination of about 97.5°, completing roughly 14 to 15 revolutions per day with a period close to 95 minutes.
Each orbit produces a different ground track due to Earth’s rotation, which limits observation opportunities for a specific target location to one or two passes per day. Only one pass is typically usable for image acquisition due to solar illumination and viewing angle constraints, as the satellite crosses targets at a consistent local solar time, often near mid-morning conditions. The TEE-01B’s payload consists of an electro-optical imaging system capable of both panchromatic resolution (between 0.5 and 0.52 meters) and multispectral imaging (at approximately 2 meters resolution). The swath width is about 14.8 km, which constrains coverage to defined corridors during each pass rather than wide-area continuous surveillance. E
Effective use of the satellite requires pre-planned tasking aligned with orbital windows, meaning target observation must be scheduled within specific time intervals rather than conducted on demand. For Iran, the performance difference between TEE-01B and domestic alternatives is substantial and directly affects the level of detail available for targeting. For instance, the Noor-2 provides imagery at 12 to 15 meters resolution, and Noor-3 improves this to about 5 meters, but both are insufficient for detailed identification of tactical targets. China’s TEE-01B, with its 0.5 meter resolution, allows the identification of aircraft types, detection of ground support equipment, tracking of vehicle movement, and assessment of infrastructure damage for post-strike analysis.
This represents a 10× improvement over Noor-3 and a 20 to 30× improvement over Noor-2, shifting capability from area surveillance to object-level intelligence. The higher resolution allows the confirmation of target presence, configuration, and post-strike effects without external verification. This capability provides near real-time intelligence within operational planning cycles, which reduces uncertainty in strike execution and enables rapid feedback. During March 2026, the satellite was tasked to observe a precise set of military and infrastructure targets across multiple countries, with imaging conducted immediately before and after strikes. Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia was imaged on March 13, 14, and 15, with confirmed strike damage on March 14 involving five U.S Air Force refuelling aircraft and an E-3G AWACS.
Additional surveillance across the Gulf region covered Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan, locations near the U.S Fifth Fleet headquarters in Manama, Bahrain, and the Erbil airport area in Iraq, all within the timeframe of Iranian strike activity. The satellite also monitored Camp Buehring and Ali Al Salem Air Base in Kuwait, Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti, and Duqm International Airport in Oman. Civilian and dual-use infrastructure included Khor Fakkan port, the Qidfa desalination plant in the UAE, and the Alba aluminum facility in Bahrain. Imagery was also collected after strikes to assess damage and confirm target engagement. The time interval between imaging and strike execution indicates operational cycles of 24 to 48 hours, confirming a full targeting loop from identification to strike to assessment into Iran’s active operational planning.
The ground segment supporting TEE-01B relies on Emposat’s global network of ground stations, which provides command, telemetry, and data transmission capabilities. This network allows satellite control from locations outside Iranian territory, reducing the dependence on domestic ground stations, which have been vulnerable to strikes during 2025 and 2026. By using external ground infrastructure, the system maintains operational continuity even when national facilities are degraded or destroyed. The network enables uplink of tasking commands, reception of telemetry data, and downlink of imagery through geographically dispersed nodes, reducing the risk of single-point failure. This architecture complicates efforts to disrupt operations through conventional strikes, as it would require targeting multiple facilities across different countries.
It also allows flexible scheduling and faster data access, improving responsiveness within operational timelines. The satellite is integrated into a broader intelligence framework combining imagery with other sources to improve targeting accuracy. Iranian forces maintain human intelligence networks across the region, which provide ground-level information that can be cross-referenced with satellite imagery to validate targets and assess activity patterns. There are also references to concurrent use of Russian satellite imagery, indicating multiple independent data streams feeding into the same targeting process. This allows cross-cueing, where one source directs the tasking of another, improving the accuracy of missile and drone strikes by confirming both location and activity patterns. It also allows monitoring of changes over time, such as asset movement or infrastructure status.
The combination of HUMINT (Human Intelligence) and IMINT (Imagery Intelligence) increases the precision of Iran’s missile and UAV strikes by confirming both the location and operational status of targets. It also enables monitoring of changes over time, such as aircraft movement or infrastructure activity, supporting dynamic planning. This layered approach represents a shift toward a more resilient and redundant ISR architecture. The broader context of the program reflects increasing interaction between Chinese commercial space entities and Iranian military requirements within a dual-use framework. Although the companies involved operate commercially, their personnel and institutional links connect them to state-backed aerospace and defense structures.
Satellite launches in China require government authorization, and funding often involves military-civil fusion mechanisms, linking commercial activity to national strategic programs. Previous instances have involved Chinese firms such as MizarVision providing satellite imagery to Iranian allies such as the Houthis, including data used for targeting maritime and land-based assets. U.S authorities are monitoring the potential extension of such cooperation to additional military systems, including shoulder-fired missile capabilities. Chinese officials have denied involvement in military support and characterized these activities as standard commercial operations. In the future, the TEE-01B case might demonstrate how the access to high-resolution satellite imagery can directly influence targeting capability and operational tempo in a regional conflict.
Written by Jérôme Brahy
Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
