Israel considers first indigenous stealth fighter and F-35 inspired drone to reduce reliance on US military aid
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An Israeli government official disclosed a ten-year strategic objective on July 30, 2026, to develop a domestically produced stealth fighter jet and an autonomous combat aircraft inspired by the F-35’s capabilities, according to Bloomberg and The Jerusalem Post. This initiative forms part of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s policy to phase out foreign military financing from the United States, which currently totals $3.8 billion annually, over the coming decade. The shift aims to hedge against potential long-term U.S. export restrictions while transitioning national defense procurement toward Israeli-funded acquisition, local manufacturing, and international co-development.
The proposed initiative targets a ten-year timeline for flight-demonstrator technology, marking Israel’s first clean-sheet combat aircraft development effort since the cancellation of the Lavi project in 1987. While Israeli defense prime contractors maintain capabilities in active electronically scanned array radars, electronic warfare suites, and avionics systems, domestic production would require establishing airframe stealth manufacturing lines, low-observable testing ranges, and high-thrust turbofan engine integration facilities.
Related topic: Israel deploys three new F-35I Adir fighter jets in combat as fleet reaches 48 units
Since the 1967 Six-Day War, every new frontline fighter jet introduced by Israel came from the United States: first the F-4, then the F-15 from 1976, the F-16 from 1980, the F-15I from the late 1990s, the F-16I from 2004, and the F-35I from 2016. (Picture source: Israeli MoD)
On July 29-30, 2026, both Bloomberg and The Jerusalem Post reported that an Israeli official, speaking on condition of anonymity, disclosed a ten-year objective for Israel to develop a domestically produced stealth fighter and a separate unmanned combat aircraft inspired by the F-35’s capabilities, 39 years after the Lavi program was terminated. The proposal coincides with Benjamin Netanyahu’s plan to reduce the financial component of U.S. military assistance from $3.8 billion annually to zero over roughly a decade and replace part of the existing arrangement with Israeli-funded acquisition, domestic production and multinational co-development. Under the 2018-2028 Memorandum of Understanding, Washington committed $38 billion to Israel, including $33 billion in Foreign Military Financing and $5 billion for missile defense.
This model has allowed Israel to acquire U.S. fighter jets at a scale that its national defense budget would otherwise have struggled to finance, but it has also concentrated production, engine supply, spares, and portions of support outside the country. The new objective would require Israel to reverse the industrial model adopted after 1987, when it stopped developing complete fighters and redirected resources toward radars, electronic warfare, missiles, mission computers, precision weapons and drones. A ten-year political target could therefore mean, given the sensitivity of the subject, a flying demonstrator by 2036 rather than an operational squadron, because a combat-ready aircraft would also require certification, testing, training systems, spare inventories, maintenance facilities and an established production line.
Israel’s interest is driven by the fact that every frontline fighter currently operated by the Israeli Air Force (IAF) depends on U.S. production and approval. The transition began in 1968, when President Lyndon B. Johnson approved the sale of F-4E Phantom II fighters after France withheld 50 Mirage 5J aircraft that Israel had ordered and paid for before the 1967 Six-Day War. The F-15 entered Israeli service in 1976, the F-16 in 1980, the F-15I Ra’am in 1998, the F-16I Sufa in 2004, and the F-35I Adir in 2016. The future force is consequently already tied to the F-35 and F-15 production, engine and support systems through at least the 2040s. Dependence also extends to F135 and F110 engines, radar modules, flight control components, structural parts, ejection seats, depot equipment, and weapons approved through U.S. export procedures.
In short, Israeli companies can modify mission systems and integrate national weapons, but they cannot independently restart an F-35 or F-15 production line, manufacture all engine components, or replace every imported assembly during a prolonged interruption. The strategic concern is therefore not the loss of U.S. support under current political conditions, but the inability to guarantee the same level of access through several future U.S. administrations, congressional majorities and regional crises. Moreover, the Israeli aerospace sector already produces much of the equipment that determines how a modern combat aircraft detects, identifies and attacks targets.
Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), Elbit Systems and Rafael manufacture AESA radars, synthetic aperture radar payloads, ground-moving-target indicators, radar warning receivers, electronic support measures, digital radio-frequency memory jammers, electro-optical sensors, mission computers, helmet-mounted displays, secure data links and precision-guided weapons. ELTA, an IAI subsidiary, produces radar and intelligence systems able to combine synthetic aperture imaging, maritime surveillance, signals intelligence, communications intelligence and electronic intelligence. Elbit supplies avionics, mission computers, displays, electronic warfare equipment and autonomous control systems, while Rafael produces air-to-air missiles, precision-strike weapons, data links and electronic warfare systems.
Israel also manufactures complete drone families such as the IAI Heron and Searcher, Elbit Hermes 450 and Hermes 900, and Harpy and Harop loitering munitions. These capabilities allow Israeli industry to build the sensor, communications, and weapons architecture of an advanced aircraft without starting from zero. The weakness is concentrated in the airframe production disciplines abandoned after the Lavi: large composite structures, low-observable inlet geometry, internal weapons bays, radar-absorbing coatings, tightly controlled panel alignment, signature verification, full-scale fatigue testing, and repeatable serial assembly. A stealth aircraft also requires gaps, fasteners, access panels, antenna apertures, and surface finishes to remain within narrow tolerances across every production aircraft, because small manufacturing deviations can increase radar returns.
Israel would also need dedicated radar cross-section (RCS) ranges, environmental test facilities, structural rigs, engine integration laboratories, and depot tooling that cannot be justified by a handful of prototypes. In short, Israel’s current advantage lies in high-value subsystems and integration, while the new initiative would require rebuilding the less visible manufacturing, certification and support infrastructure of an entire fighter industry. Propulsion would definitely be the most difficult single dependency to remove. Israel has never developed and fielded an indigenous fighter turbofan or turbojet, including during the period when it manufactured the Nesher, Kfir and Lavi. The Kfir used the General Electric J79-J1E, the Lavi used the Pratt & Whitney PW1120, the F-16I and F-15IA used the General Electric F110, and the F-35I uses the Pratt & Whitney F135.
Installing the J79 in the Kfir required substantial changes to the Mirage-derived fuselage, intake system, cooling architecture and structure, demonstrating that purchasing an engine does not eliminate integration cost. An Israeli-made stealth fighter would require an engine in the same broad category as the F110 or F135, with thrust likely exceeding 100 kN in afterburner. The engine would also need to power not only the aircraft but also an AESA radar, electronic warfare transmitters, processors, pumps, actuators and thermal management equipment. Developing such an engine nationally would require single-crystal turbine blades, advanced ceramic coatings, high-temperature alloys, precision casting, compressor testing and thousands of hours of ground and flight validation.
Licensed assembly could provide access to complete engines and some spare parts but would not necessarily transfer hot-section manufacturing, software authority or redesign rights. A foreign engine would reduce schedule and technical risk, but it would preserve exposure to export licensing and spare part restrictions. An international engine partnership could distribute cost, although it would also give another government influence over exports and upgrades. The first Israeli stealth fighter, if pursued, would therefore be more likely to combine an Israeli airframe and mission system with an imported engine than to achieve complete propulsion sovereignty within the planned timeframe. The unmanned aircraft is more achievable because it can be designed for a narrower range of missions and does not require a cockpit, canopy, ejection seat, oxygen system, pilot displays or provisions.
Removing those systems can free several hundred kilograms and internal volume for fuel, processors, cooling equipment, electronic warfare hardware or weapons, while allowing mission duration to be limited by fuel and mechanical reliability rather than pilot fatigue. That advantage does not make a stealth UCAV inexpensive or technically simple. The aircraft would still require low-observable shaping, internal weapons carriage, autonomous flight controls, secure communications, cyber protection, fault-tolerant computing, navigation without continuous satellite access and enough onboard decision-making to continue operating during jamming or data-link loss. Artificial intelligence could fuse radar, electro-optical and electronic-support data, identify emitters, replan routes, prioritize threats and coordinate with crewed aircraft, but weapons release authority would probably remain subject to human control for many missions.
Internal bays would be necessary during penetration operations because external missiles, bombs and fuel tanks substantially increase radar cross-section. Potential payloads could include air-to-air missiles, precision-guided bombs, anti-radiation weapons, electronic attack modules, passive sensors and decoys. Likely missions include suppression and destruction of enemy air defenses (SEADs), detection and geolocation of radars, electronic warfare, reconnaissance, decoy operations and strikes against fixed or relocatable targets. An F-35-like uncrewed aircraft optimized for these tasks would need to reproduce only the F-35’s most relevant parts: reduced observability, sensor fusion, secure networking, electronic warfare and precision engagement. Israel’s earlier fighters provide measurable evidence of both the country’s industrial capability and economic constraint.
The Nesher first flew in September 1971, entered service in 1972 and was produced in a total of 61 units. It incorporated Israeli communications, avionics and Shafrir missile compatibility, but remained a locally manufactured derivative of the Mirage 5 rather than an original fighter. The Kfir first flew in June 1973, entered service in 1975 and exceeded 220 units across the C1, C2, C7 and trainer variants. Its J79 engine enabled a maximum speed of Mach 2.3, but required changes to the fuselage, intakes and cooling system. The Lavi was Israel’s only clean-sheet fighter design. Development began in 1980, the first prototype flew on December 31, 1986, and three prototypes were completed. The aircraft used close-coupled canards, relaxed static stability, quadruplex digital fly-by-wire controls, composite structures and a glass cockpit.
It had an empty weight of 7.3 tonnes, maximum take-off weight of 19.3 tonnes, more than 3 tonnes of internal fuel, nine external hardpoints and a planned maximum speed of Mach 1.85. Production planning reached 300 aircraft, a number intended to distribute development expenditure across a larger fleet than Israel is likely to order today. However, the government cancelled the program by a 12-11 vote in August 1987 as costs increased, U.S.-financed F-16s remained available, and Washington opposed funding a potential competitor to American exports. In contrast, the U.S. Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) program provides the closest operational comparison for the unmanned proposal.
In May 2026, the U.S. Air Force informed Congress that it intended to procure more than 150 CCAs by FY2031, with the aircraft operating alongside F-35s and the future F-47: such a formation can add weapons, sensors, jammers and decoys without adding an equal number of pilots or accepting the cost of another fully equipped crewed fighter. An Israeli F-35I could therefore supervise several unmanned aircraft, and an F-15IA could remain outside the highest-threat area while receiving targeting data from the unmanned fighters operating farther forward. During a SEAD operation, the UCAV could force radars to activate by presenting a credible target, classify their emissions, transmit coordinates, and launch an anti-radiation weapon before crewed aircraft enter missile range.
During a strike mission, it could provide jamming, decoys, or additional weapons against separate aim points. This model would be relevant to operations against Iran’s layered air defense networks combining long-range surveillance radars, mobile missile batteries, passive sensors and missile systems. However, once fitted with a turbofan, AESA radar, electronic warfare system, internal bays and advanced processors, the drone’s cost could reach tens of millions of dollars. The economic case will therefore depend on production quantity, potential foreign participation and the division between the crewed and unmanned programs. The F-35 program’s projected $2.1 trillion lifetime cost through 2088 cannot be transferred directly to Israel, but its structure illustrates where expenditure accumulates: more than $1.5 trillion is associated with operations and sustainment, while development and procurement account for close to $400 billion.
An Israeli fleet would be much smaller, which reduces total spending but increases the cost assigned to each aircraft. A hypothetical $10 billion development program spread across 50 aircraft would add $200 million in non-recurring expenditure per aircraft before serial production, weapons, infrastructure, and sustainment. Spreading the same development cost across 150 aircraft would reduce that amount to $66.7 million per aircraft, but Israel would need export customers or a much larger domestic order. Exporting a fighter powered by a foreign engine would require approval from the engine supplier’s government, while international partners could demand workshare, access to technology, and authority over third-country sales.
At the same time, Israel must also finance 50 additional F-35s, 25 F-15IAs, KC-46A tankers, helicopters, air defense interceptors, ammunition and replacement stocks from the U.S. The more plausible sequence is therefore an unmanned demonstrator by 2036 followed by a limited operational UCAV, while work on a crewed fighter remains at the technology development stage until financing and partnerships are secured. Until those steps occur, the most credible future force is not a complete Israeli replacement for the American fighter jets, but a mixed inventory in which U.S.-built F-35Is and F-15IAs command Israeli-produced autonomous aircraft tailored for reconnaissance, electronic warfare, SEAD and deep strike.
Written by Jérôme Brahy
Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
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An Israeli government official disclosed a ten-year strategic objective on July 30, 2026, to develop a domestically produced stealth fighter jet and an autonomous combat aircraft inspired by the F-35’s capabilities, according to Bloomberg and The Jerusalem Post. This initiative forms part of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s policy to phase out foreign military financing from the United States, which currently totals $3.8 billion annually, over the coming decade. The shift aims to hedge against potential long-term U.S. export restrictions while transitioning national defense procurement toward Israeli-funded acquisition, local manufacturing, and international co-development.
The proposed initiative targets a ten-year timeline for flight-demonstrator technology, marking Israel’s first clean-sheet combat aircraft development effort since the cancellation of the Lavi project in 1987. While Israeli defense prime contractors maintain capabilities in active electronically scanned array radars, electronic warfare suites, and avionics systems, domestic production would require establishing airframe stealth manufacturing lines, low-observable testing ranges, and high-thrust turbofan engine integration facilities.
Related topic: Israel deploys three new F-35I Adir fighter jets in combat as fleet reaches 48 units
Since the 1967 Six-Day War, every new frontline fighter jet introduced by Israel came from the United States: first the F-4, then the F-15 from 1976, the F-16 from 1980, the F-15I from the late 1990s, the F-16I from 2004, and the F-35I from 2016. (Picture source: Israeli MoD)
On July 29-30, 2026, both Bloomberg and The Jerusalem Post reported that an Israeli official, speaking on condition of anonymity, disclosed a ten-year objective for Israel to develop a domestically produced stealth fighter and a separate unmanned combat aircraft inspired by the F-35‘s capabilities, 39 years after the Lavi program was terminated. The proposal coincides with Benjamin Netanyahu’s plan to reduce the financial component of U.S. military assistance from $3.8 billion annually to zero over roughly a decade and replace part of the existing arrangement with Israeli-funded acquisition, domestic production and multinational co-development. Under the 2018-2028 Memorandum of Understanding, Washington committed $38 billion to Israel, including $33 billion in Foreign Military Financing and $5 billion for missile defense.
This model has allowed Israel to acquire U.S. fighter jets at a scale that its national defense budget would otherwise have struggled to finance, but it has also concentrated production, engine supply, spares, and portions of support outside the country. The new objective would require Israel to reverse the industrial model adopted after 1987, when it stopped developing complete fighters and redirected resources toward radars, electronic warfare, missiles, mission computers, precision weapons and drones. A ten-year political target could therefore mean, given the sensitivity of the subject, a flying demonstrator by 2036 rather than an operational squadron, because a combat-ready aircraft would also require certification, testing, training systems, spare inventories, maintenance facilities and an established production line.
Israel’s interest is driven by the fact that every frontline fighter currently operated by the Israeli Air Force (IAF) depends on U.S. production and approval. The transition began in 1968, when President Lyndon B. Johnson approved the sale of F-4E Phantom II fighters after France withheld 50 Mirage 5J aircraft that Israel had ordered and paid for before the 1967 Six-Day War. The F-15 entered Israeli service in 1976, the F-16 in 1980, the F-15I Ra’am in 1998, the F-16I Sufa in 2004, and the F-35I Adir in 2016. The future force is consequently already tied to the F-35 and F-15 production, engine and support systems through at least the 2040s. Dependence also extends to F135 and F110 engines, radar modules, flight control components, structural parts, ejection seats, depot equipment, and weapons approved through U.S. export procedures.
In short, Israeli companies can modify mission systems and integrate national weapons, but they cannot independently restart an F-35 or F-15 production line, manufacture all engine components, or replace every imported assembly during a prolonged interruption. The strategic concern is therefore not the loss of U.S. support under current political conditions, but the inability to guarantee the same level of access through several future U.S. administrations, congressional majorities and regional crises. Moreover, the Israeli aerospace sector already produces much of the equipment that determines how a modern combat aircraft detects, identifies and attacks targets.
Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), Elbit Systems and Rafael manufacture AESA radars, synthetic aperture radar payloads, ground-moving-target indicators, radar warning receivers, electronic support measures, digital radio-frequency memory jammers, electro-optical sensors, mission computers, helmet-mounted displays, secure data links and precision-guided weapons. ELTA, an IAI subsidiary, produces radar and intelligence systems able to combine synthetic aperture imaging, maritime surveillance, signals intelligence, communications intelligence and electronic intelligence. Elbit supplies avionics, mission computers, displays, electronic warfare equipment and autonomous control systems, while Rafael produces air-to-air missiles, precision-strike weapons, data links and electronic warfare systems.
Israel also manufactures complete drone families such as the IAI Heron and Searcher, Elbit Hermes 450 and Hermes 900, and Harpy and Harop loitering munitions. These capabilities allow Israeli industry to build the sensor, communications, and weapons architecture of an advanced aircraft without starting from zero. The weakness is concentrated in the airframe production disciplines abandoned after the Lavi: large composite structures, low-observable inlet geometry, internal weapons bays, radar-absorbing coatings, tightly controlled panel alignment, signature verification, full-scale fatigue testing, and repeatable serial assembly. A stealth aircraft also requires gaps, fasteners, access panels, antenna apertures, and surface finishes to remain within narrow tolerances across every production aircraft, because small manufacturing deviations can increase radar returns.
Israel would also need dedicated radar cross-section (RCS) ranges, environmental test facilities, structural rigs, engine integration laboratories, and depot tooling that cannot be justified by a handful of prototypes. In short, Israel’s current advantage lies in high-value subsystems and integration, while the new initiative would require rebuilding the less visible manufacturing, certification and support infrastructure of an entire fighter industry. Propulsion would definitely be the most difficult single dependency to remove. Israel has never developed and fielded an indigenous fighter turbofan or turbojet, including during the period when it manufactured the Nesher, Kfir and Lavi. The Kfir used the General Electric J79-J1E, the Lavi used the Pratt & Whitney PW1120, the F-16I and F-15IA used the General Electric F110, and the F-35I uses the Pratt & Whitney F135.
Installing the J79 in the Kfir required substantial changes to the Mirage-derived fuselage, intake system, cooling architecture and structure, demonstrating that purchasing an engine does not eliminate integration cost. An Israeli-made stealth fighter would require an engine in the same broad category as the F110 or F135, with thrust likely exceeding 100 kN in afterburner. The engine would also need to power not only the aircraft but also an AESA radar, electronic warfare transmitters, processors, pumps, actuators and thermal management equipment. Developing such an engine nationally would require single-crystal turbine blades, advanced ceramic coatings, high-temperature alloys, precision casting, compressor testing and thousands of hours of ground and flight validation.
Licensed assembly could provide access to complete engines and some spare parts but would not necessarily transfer hot-section manufacturing, software authority or redesign rights. A foreign engine would reduce schedule and technical risk, but it would preserve exposure to export licensing and spare part restrictions. An international engine partnership could distribute cost, although it would also give another government influence over exports and upgrades. The first Israeli stealth fighter, if pursued, would therefore be more likely to combine an Israeli airframe and mission system with an imported engine than to achieve complete propulsion sovereignty within the planned timeframe. The unmanned aircraft is more achievable because it can be designed for a narrower range of missions and does not require a cockpit, canopy, ejection seat, oxygen system, pilot displays or provisions.
Removing those systems can free several hundred kilograms and internal volume for fuel, processors, cooling equipment, electronic warfare hardware or weapons, while allowing mission duration to be limited by fuel and mechanical reliability rather than pilot fatigue. That advantage does not make a stealth UCAV inexpensive or technically simple. The aircraft would still require low-observable shaping, internal weapons carriage, autonomous flight controls, secure communications, cyber protection, fault-tolerant computing, navigation without continuous satellite access and enough onboard decision-making to continue operating during jamming or data-link loss. Artificial intelligence could fuse radar, electro-optical and electronic-support data, identify emitters, replan routes, prioritize threats and coordinate with crewed aircraft, but weapons release authority would probably remain subject to human control for many missions.
Internal bays would be necessary during penetration operations because external missiles, bombs and fuel tanks substantially increase radar cross-section. Potential payloads could include air-to-air missiles, precision-guided bombs, anti-radiation weapons, electronic attack modules, passive sensors and decoys. Likely missions include suppression and destruction of enemy air defenses (SEADs), detection and geolocation of radars, electronic warfare, reconnaissance, decoy operations and strikes against fixed or relocatable targets. An F-35-like uncrewed aircraft optimized for these tasks would need to reproduce only the F-35’s most relevant parts: reduced observability, sensor fusion, secure networking, electronic warfare and precision engagement. Israel’s earlier fighters provide measurable evidence of both the country’s industrial capability and economic constraint.
The Nesher first flew in September 1971, entered service in 1972 and was produced in a total of 61 units. It incorporated Israeli communications, avionics and Shafrir missile compatibility, but remained a locally manufactured derivative of the Mirage 5 rather than an original fighter. The Kfir first flew in June 1973, entered service in 1975 and exceeded 220 units across the C1, C2, C7 and trainer variants. Its J79 engine enabled a maximum speed of Mach 2.3, but required changes to the fuselage, intakes and cooling system. The Lavi was Israel’s only clean-sheet fighter design. Development began in 1980, the first prototype flew on December 31, 1986, and three prototypes were completed. The aircraft used close-coupled canards, relaxed static stability, quadruplex digital fly-by-wire controls, composite structures and a glass cockpit.
It had an empty weight of 7.3 tonnes, maximum take-off weight of 19.3 tonnes, more than 3 tonnes of internal fuel, nine external hardpoints and a planned maximum speed of Mach 1.85. Production planning reached 300 aircraft, a number intended to distribute development expenditure across a larger fleet than Israel is likely to order today. However, the government cancelled the program by a 12-11 vote in August 1987 as costs increased, U.S.-financed F-16s remained available, and Washington opposed funding a potential competitor to American exports. In contrast, the U.S. Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) program provides the closest operational comparison for the unmanned proposal.
In May 2026, the U.S. Air Force informed Congress that it intended to procure more than 150 CCAs by FY2031, with the aircraft operating alongside F-35s and the future F-47: such a formation can add weapons, sensors, jammers and decoys without adding an equal number of pilots or accepting the cost of another fully equipped crewed fighter. An Israeli F-35I could therefore supervise several unmanned aircraft, and an F-15IA could remain outside the highest-threat area while receiving targeting data from the unmanned fighters operating farther forward. During a SEAD operation, the UCAV could force radars to activate by presenting a credible target, classify their emissions, transmit coordinates, and launch an anti-radiation weapon before crewed aircraft enter missile range.
During a strike mission, it could provide jamming, decoys, or additional weapons against separate aim points. This model would be relevant to operations against Iran’s layered air defense networks combining long-range surveillance radars, mobile missile batteries, passive sensors and missile systems. However, once fitted with a turbofan, AESA radar, electronic warfare system, internal bays and advanced processors, the drone’s cost could reach tens of millions of dollars. The economic case will therefore depend on production quantity, potential foreign participation and the division between the crewed and unmanned programs. The F-35 program’s projected $2.1 trillion lifetime cost through 2088 cannot be transferred directly to Israel, but its structure illustrates where expenditure accumulates: more than $1.5 trillion is associated with operations and sustainment, while development and procurement account for close to $400 billion.
An Israeli fleet would be much smaller, which reduces total spending but increases the cost assigned to each aircraft. A hypothetical $10 billion development program spread across 50 aircraft would add $200 million in non-recurring expenditure per aircraft before serial production, weapons, infrastructure, and sustainment. Spreading the same development cost across 150 aircraft would reduce that amount to $66.7 million per aircraft, but Israel would need export customers or a much larger domestic order. Exporting a fighter powered by a foreign engine would require approval from the engine supplier’s government, while international partners could demand workshare, access to technology, and authority over third-country sales.
At the same time, Israel must also finance 50 additional F-35s, 25 F-15IAs, KC-46A tankers, helicopters, air defense interceptors, ammunition and replacement stocks from the U.S. The more plausible sequence is therefore an unmanned demonstrator by 2036 followed by a limited operational UCAV, while work on a crewed fighter remains at the technology development stage until financing and partnerships are secured. Until those steps occur, the most credible future force is not a complete Israeli replacement for the American fighter jets, but a mixed inventory in which U.S.-built F-35Is and F-15IAs command Israeli-produced autonomous aircraft tailored for reconnaissance, electronic warfare, SEAD and deep strike.
Written by Jérôme Brahy
Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
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