Israel Intercepts Houthi Hypersonic Ballistic Missile Aimed at Ben Gurion Airport in New Escalation Phase
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On July 29, 2025, Israel’s air defense systems were once again activated to intercept a high-speed threat from Yemen, as reported by Anadolu Agency. Sirens blared across Tel Aviv and Jerusalem after the launch of a “hypersonic ballistic missile” targeting Ben Gurion Airport, claimed by Yemen’s Houthi movement. This marks the fourth known attempt involving the “Palestine 2” missile. The growing frequency and technological evolution of such attacks are raising deep concerns across regional and international defense circles. The latest incident underscores the escalating missile warfare in the Middle East with potential global security implications. Follow Army Recognition on Google News at this link
Palestine 2 missile presents a new challenge for Israeli layered air defenses, including the Arrow 3 and David’s Sling systems. Unlike conventional Scud variants or cruise missiles, the hypersonic nature of the Palestine 2 reduces engagement windows and complicates radar tracking due to its high speed and irregular trajectory (Picture source: RAFAEL)
The “Palestine 2” missile, unveiled by the Houthis in late 2024, is described as a hypersonic ballistic missile, allegedly capable of achieving Mach 16 speeds and maneuvering mid-flight to evade interception. Though limited technical details have been independently verified, open-source data and regional intelligence suggest it employs dual-stage propulsion and a maneuverable reentry vehicle (MaRV), making it substantially harder to track and engage than traditional ballistic threats. The warhead is reportedly designed for high-velocity impact against hardened infrastructure, enhancing its psychological and military effect when aimed at critical targets like international airports.
Developed covertly with assumed external technical support, most likely from Iran or via North Korean missile schematics, the Palestine 2 entered operational deployment in September 2024. Since then, it has been launched four times toward Israeli territory, with varying results. The March 2025 and July 2025 attempts were reportedly intercepted, while the May 2025 strike injured civilians and caused a crater near Terminal 3 of Ben Gurion Airport. Each event has been used by the Houthis to assert their growing missile capabilities and to showcase a symbolic alignment with Palestinian groups under siege in Gaza.
In terms of performance, the Palestine 2 missile presents a new challenge for Israeli layered air defenses, including the Arrow 3 and David’s Sling systems. Unlike conventional Scud variants or cruise missiles, the hypersonic nature of the Palestine 2 reduces engagement windows and complicates radar tracking due to its high speed and irregular trajectory. Comparatively, it shows similarities in doctrine, if not sophistication, with earlier Iranian systems like the Fattah or North Korea’s Hwasong-8, both of which prioritize speed and unpredictability over pinpoint precision. However, unlike U.S., Russian, or Chinese hypersonic weapons, the Palestine 2 lacks verified terminal guidance, suggesting it remains at an earlier stage of technological maturity.
The Palestine 2 missile carries significant strategic implications for regional security and deterrence dynamics. It represents a shift in asymmetric deterrence strategies where non-state or quasi-state actors attempt to nullify air superiority and threaten high-value urban targets. Its repeated use against Ben Gurion Airport, the core of Israel’s civilian air traffic, demonstrates a deliberate attempt to create economic disruption, instill psychological fear, and test the credibility of Israeli and allied missile defense architecture. Geopolitically, it also positions the Houthis not only as a regional proxy force but as an emerging missile player in broader anti-Israeli coalitions. Militarily, the growing range and velocity of such systems may eventually strain Israel’s multi-tiered defense layers if their rate of fire or simultaneous salvos increases.
The July 29 interception may have averted direct casualties, but it marks a threshold moment in regional security. The use of hypersonic-class weaponry by a non-state actor is a stark reminder of the evolving missile landscape in the Middle East, where deterrence, escalation, and civilian vulnerability are increasingly shaped by long-range high-speed threats. For Israeli defenses, maintaining dominance will now depend not only on technological adaptation but also on anticipatory strategic intelligence and new forms of regional cooperation.
{loadposition bannertop}
{loadposition sidebarpub}
On July 29, 2025, Israel’s air defense systems were once again activated to intercept a high-speed threat from Yemen, as reported by Anadolu Agency. Sirens blared across Tel Aviv and Jerusalem after the launch of a “hypersonic ballistic missile” targeting Ben Gurion Airport, claimed by Yemen’s Houthi movement. This marks the fourth known attempt involving the “Palestine 2” missile. The growing frequency and technological evolution of such attacks are raising deep concerns across regional and international defense circles. The latest incident underscores the escalating missile warfare in the Middle East with potential global security implications.
Follow Army Recognition on Google News at this link
Palestine 2 missile presents a new challenge for Israeli layered air defenses, including the Arrow 3 and David’s Sling systems. Unlike conventional Scud variants or cruise missiles, the hypersonic nature of the Palestine 2 reduces engagement windows and complicates radar tracking due to its high speed and irregular trajectory (Picture source: RAFAEL)
The “Palestine 2” missile, unveiled by the Houthis in late 2024, is described as a hypersonic ballistic missile, allegedly capable of achieving Mach 16 speeds and maneuvering mid-flight to evade interception. Though limited technical details have been independently verified, open-source data and regional intelligence suggest it employs dual-stage propulsion and a maneuverable reentry vehicle (MaRV), making it substantially harder to track and engage than traditional ballistic threats. The warhead is reportedly designed for high-velocity impact against hardened infrastructure, enhancing its psychological and military effect when aimed at critical targets like international airports.
Developed covertly with assumed external technical support, most likely from Iran or via North Korean missile schematics, the Palestine 2 entered operational deployment in September 2024. Since then, it has been launched four times toward Israeli territory, with varying results. The March 2025 and July 2025 attempts were reportedly intercepted, while the May 2025 strike injured civilians and caused a crater near Terminal 3 of Ben Gurion Airport. Each event has been used by the Houthis to assert their growing missile capabilities and to showcase a symbolic alignment with Palestinian groups under siege in Gaza.
In terms of performance, the Palestine 2 missile presents a new challenge for Israeli layered air defenses, including the Arrow 3 and David’s Sling systems. Unlike conventional Scud variants or cruise missiles, the hypersonic nature of the Palestine 2 reduces engagement windows and complicates radar tracking due to its high speed and irregular trajectory. Comparatively, it shows similarities in doctrine, if not sophistication, with earlier Iranian systems like the Fattah or North Korea’s Hwasong-8, both of which prioritize speed and unpredictability over pinpoint precision. However, unlike U.S., Russian, or Chinese hypersonic weapons, the Palestine 2 lacks verified terminal guidance, suggesting it remains at an earlier stage of technological maturity.
The Palestine 2 missile carries significant strategic implications for regional security and deterrence dynamics. It represents a shift in asymmetric deterrence strategies where non-state or quasi-state actors attempt to nullify air superiority and threaten high-value urban targets. Its repeated use against Ben Gurion Airport, the core of Israel’s civilian air traffic, demonstrates a deliberate attempt to create economic disruption, instill psychological fear, and test the credibility of Israeli and allied missile defense architecture. Geopolitically, it also positions the Houthis not only as a regional proxy force but as an emerging missile player in broader anti-Israeli coalitions. Militarily, the growing range and velocity of such systems may eventually strain Israel’s multi-tiered defense layers if their rate of fire or simultaneous salvos increases.
The July 29 interception may have averted direct casualties, but it marks a threshold moment in regional security. The use of hypersonic-class weaponry by a non-state actor is a stark reminder of the evolving missile landscape in the Middle East, where deterrence, escalation, and civilian vulnerability are increasingly shaped by long-range high-speed threats. For Israeli defenses, maintaining dominance will now depend not only on technological adaptation but also on anticipatory strategic intelligence and new forms of regional cooperation.
