Putin offers India full access to Su-57 instead of Su-57E to revive failed FGFA fighter partnership
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Russian President Vladimir Putin publicly announced at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum that Moscow is ready to supply Sukhoi Su-57 fifth-generation fighter jets to India with completely unrestricted technology access. This revised proposal marks a significant departure from standard international defence export protocols by offering New Delhi direct access to internal source codes, mission software architecture, and active electronically scanned array radar configurations. The strategic framework aims to directly address the persistent industrial workshare, cost-sharing, and sovereign software customization disputes that previously prompted India to withdraw from the joint Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA) partnership in 2018.
The updated Russian aviation initiative offers India unrestricted access to the complete Su-57 family, including the two-seat Su-57D command variant, to bypass the standard operational limitations found in the earlier Su-57E export package. This strategic technology transfer is positioned to address the Indian Air Force’s current deficit of roughly 11 to 13 fighter squadrons while the domestic Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft program progresses toward its projected mid-2030s operational introduction.
Related topic: Russia proposes joint production of S-500 air defense system to India
Russia is offering India the Su-57 fighter jet with complete, unrestricted access to core software source codes, radar systems, and production technologies, effectively removing the technical and operational limitations of the Su-57E. (Picture source: UAC)
On June 5, 2026, Russian President Vladimir Putin publicly said at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum that Russia is ready to supply Su-57 fighters to India, highlighting for the first time the possibility of unrestricted access to the Su-57’s core systems rather than just the delivery of the controlled Su-57E export configuration. Russia is therefore prepared to grant complete access to source code, mission software, radar, and electronic warfare architecture, weapons integration interfaces, maintenance data, upgrade pathways, and production technologies to India, all of which are normally withheld from foreign operators.
India previously withdrew from the FGFA program largely because it was dissatisfied with the level of access and influence it would receive relative to the financial and industrial commitments required. If Moscow is now prepared to remove those restrictions and allow India to independently integrate domestic weapons, modify mission systems, conduct upgrades, and participate in future development, the proposal would represent a fundamentally different offer from earlier arrangements since India left the FGFA program in 2018. The offer matters because Putin did not limit the wording to the Su-57; he also linked the proposal to joint work, local production, Indian weapons integration, a two-seat version, and cooperation without stated limitations.
For India, that wording could radically change the current question around the potential purchase of the Su-57: whether New Delhi would receive a restricted export aircraft or obtain partial entry into the baseline Su-57 production, software, weapons, sensor, and upgrade structure. The timing is also relevant because the Indian Air Force is operating at about 29 to 31 fighter squadrons against an authorized strength of 42.5, while the AMCA, India’s planned indigenous fifth-generation fighter, is unlikely to enter operational service before the 2030s and more likely around 2035. The practical issue is therefore not only whether India needs a fifth-generation fighter before AMCA, but whether Russia can offer terms that overcome the same cost, access, performance, and industrial disputes that caused New Delhi to leave the earlier FGFA effort.
Putin’s remarks placed the offer within a long Russian-Indian combat aviation relationship. He said India has traditionally bought Russian aircraft and helicopters and added that Indian pilots are satisfied with this equipment, a reference that points to the Indian Air Force’s long use of Russian-origin combat aircraft, especially the Su-30MKI and MiG-29. He also said Russia had previously proposed joint work on the Su-57, but India did not proceed, after which Russia completed the aircraft independently. He then said Russia is now ready to supply the fighter to India, saying that “[Russia is] ready to work with India. We don’t have any issues or limitations. Same goes for air defence systems.”
Putin also referred to the Su-57D, a version with two pilots, and said such an aircraft could function as a command post, which would give a second crew member responsibility for managing sensors, weapons employment, communications, electronic warfare tasks, or coordination with other aircraft. That point is not minor because a two-seat Su-57 would be closer to the Indian Su-30MKI operating model than the Su-57 single-seat air-superiority fighter, and it could be relevant if India wants a command aircraft for mixed packages of manned fighters, strike aircraft, and unmanned systems such as the Ghatak. The Sukhoi Su-57 is Russia’s most modern fighter jet developed under the PAK FA program, while the Su-57E is the export variant intended for foreign customers.
In practical terms, an export variant of the Su-57, such as the one delivered to Algeria, would normally carry limits on radar modes, electronic warfare libraries, encryption, datalinks, mission software, weapons interfaces, source code access, and upgrade authority. For India, those limits would affect whether the stealth fighter can use Indian weapons without Russian control over each integration step, whether Indian engineers can manage mission data files, whether maintenance can be performed independently at scale, and whether future upgrades can be made inside India. A standard Su-57E purchase would likely resemble a controlled export acquisition, with Russia retaining authority over many sensitive functions.
A Su-57 joint production would be closer to the abandoned FGFA concept, especially if it includes access to mission computers, radar and EW configuration, software tools, production workshare, weapons clearance authority, and upgrade rights. The decisive content would become the contract annexes that determine what India can modify, produce, integrate, export, and sustain without returning to Moscow for every major change. The Su-57 itself is a twin-engine fifth-generation fighter developed by Sukhoi, with production at the Komsomolsk-on-Amur Aircraft Plant in Russia’s Far East. Its first flight took place on January 29, 2010, and it entered Russian service in 2020.
For now, Russia has a contract for 76 aircraft intended to equip three regiments, with deliveries planned through 2028. The fighter uses internal weapons bays to reduce radar signature during combat missions, while external stores would increase radar return and reduce the value of its low-observable shaping. Its main design features include reduced radar signature, an AESA radar complex, a supercruise requirement, thrust-vectoring engines, an electronic warfare suite, and an air-to-air and air-to-ground mission set. For India, these features would have to be assessed against maintainability, sortie generation, production quality, available weapons, engine maturity, radar performance, and the degree of Indian control over mission systems.
The Su-57’s value would be reduced if India could not integrate its own weapons or adapt the fighter to Indian operational requirements over a service life that could last three decades. The Su-57’s sensor package would be one of the first areas of Indian scrutiny. The Su-57 Felon uses the N036 Belka AESA radar suite, including a forward radar, side-looking arrays, and L-band arrays, giving it a more distributed radar layout than fighters relying only on a nose-mounted array. The aircraft’s internal carriage is central to its low-observable role because radar signature rises once large weapons or fuel tanks are carried externally. Early aircraft used AL-41F1 engines, while the second-stage engine, usually associated with Izdeliye 30 or AL-51F1, remains central to future Russian performance claims.
That engine issue matters because propulsion affects range, acceleration, supercruise, infrared signature, maintenance intervals, spare-parts demand, and lifecycle cost. The aircraft is designed for advanced Russian air-to-air and air-to-ground weapons, but Indian weapons integration would require access to software, interfaces, mission computers, weapons control architecture, and certification procedures. India would likely examine radar maturity, engine reliability, low-observable maintainability, mission-system access, and production consistency because these were also among the categories that weakened confidence during the earlier FGFA period.
The Sukhoi/HAL Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA) history remains the main warning sign for any revived arrangement. India and Russia launched the FGFA effort in 2007 as an Indian derivative of the Su-57/PAK FA design. Hindustan Aeronautics Limited was expected to participate in avionics, navigation, cockpit displays, mission systems, and integration work, giving India more than a buyer role. India left the $6 billion program in 2018 after disputes over cost, technology access, stealth characteristics, engine maturity, and workshare. The 2026 Russian offer appears aimed directly at those friction points because it now implies technology transfer, co-production, two-seat development, and Indian weapons integration.
Any Indian return would therefore require stronger guarantees than the original FGFA framework, especially on access to software, radar, and electronic warfare configuration, manufacturing depth, and future modernization authority. Without such guarantees, New Delhi would risk re-entering a program while still lacking control over the systems that determine operational autonomy. The Indian Air Force requirement is immediate but not simple. Its authorized fighter strength is 42.5 squadrons, yet its current strength is cited at about 29 squadrons, with other estimates at about 31. A two-squadron Su-57 purchase would mean about 36 aircraft, which would help with numbers but would not by itself close the force-structure gap.
The IAF still depends heavily on Russian-made fighters, especially the Su-30MKI and MiG-29, giving India existing maintenance, training, basing, and supply-chain familiarity with Russian systems. India has also diversified through 36 Rafale fighters from France and has pursued further Rafale procurement efforts. The Tejas Mk1A and future Tejas Mk2 will support the replacement of older aircraft, but they cannot rapidly deliver a fifth-generation capability. For now, the AMCA remains the national fifth-generation answer, but operational entry is unlikely before roughly 2035, leaving India with a capability gap during the late 2020s and early 2030s.
A Su-57 arrangement would therefore function either as a bridge to the AMCA, a parallel fifth-generation fleet, or a negotiating instrument in India’s broader fighter modernization strategy. Russia also has its own reasons to seek Indian participation. The Su-57 has entered Russian service, but its production scale remains limited when compared with U.S. and Chinese fifth-generation fighter fleets. The domestic order for 76 aircraft is enough to support a defined Russian procurement plan, but modest for sustaining a large fighter industrial ecosystem over many years. Export success would help spread development, production, and upgrade costs across more aircraft and more users.
India offers a rare combination of large potential demand, existing Russian aircraft infrastructure, and experience with licensed production. The Su-30MKI program created an Indian industrial base for Russian-origin combat aircraft, while BrahMos remains the clearest example of joint development between the two countries. A limited Indian purchase of about 36 aircraft would support Russian export objectives, while a deeper local-production program could be more important because it would add volume, financing, and long-term sustainment work to the Su-57 ecosystem. Moscow’s renewed offer can therefore be read both as a response to India’s fighter deficit and as an attempt to internationalize and financially stabilize the Su-57.
A future Su-57 agreement would be judged against existing Russia-India defence-industrial models rather than against a normal aircraft sale. Putin linked current cooperation to air defense systems, submarines, and surface ships, and India already operates S-400 systems while also having considered S-500 procurement. The relevant precedents are the Su-30MKI and BrahMos programs because both involved deeper industrial cooperation than a simple import contract. For the Su-57, India would likely focus on local production depth, Indian workshare, export rights, upgrade freedom, weapons integration authority, software access, sustainment arrangements, and whether the aircraft can be adapted to Indian doctrine over time.
If Russia offers only the Su-57E, the deal would likely be a controlled export purchase with limited Indian authority over sensitive systems. If Russia offers meaningful access to the baseline Su-57 ecosystem, the arrangement could become a strategic aerospace partnership with implications for India’s fighter fleet, Russia’s production base, and the long-term balance between imported capability and India’s AMCA program. The central question is therefore whether Moscow is offering India a fighter aircraft, or whether it is offering India an increased role in the Su-57’s production, configuration, modernization, and operational future.
Written by Jérôme Brahy
Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
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Russian President Vladimir Putin publicly announced at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum that Moscow is ready to supply Sukhoi Su-57 fifth-generation fighter jets to India with completely unrestricted technology access. This revised proposal marks a significant departure from standard international defence export protocols by offering New Delhi direct access to internal source codes, mission software architecture, and active electronically scanned array radar configurations. The strategic framework aims to directly address the persistent industrial workshare, cost-sharing, and sovereign software customization disputes that previously prompted India to withdraw from the joint Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA) partnership in 2018.
The updated Russian aviation initiative offers India unrestricted access to the complete Su-57 family, including the two-seat Su-57D command variant, to bypass the standard operational limitations found in the earlier Su-57E export package. This strategic technology transfer is positioned to address the Indian Air Force’s current deficit of roughly 11 to 13 fighter squadrons while the domestic Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft program progresses toward its projected mid-2030s operational introduction.
Related topic: Russia proposes joint production of S-500 air defense system to India
Russia is offering India the Su-57 fighter jet with complete, unrestricted access to core software source codes, radar systems, and production technologies, effectively removing the technical and operational limitations of the Su-57E. (Picture source: UAC)
On June 5, 2026, Russian President Vladimir Putin publicly said at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum that Russia is ready to supply Su-57 fighters to India, highlighting for the first time the possibility of unrestricted access to the Su-57’s core systems rather than just the delivery of the controlled Su-57E export configuration. Russia is therefore prepared to grant complete access to source code, mission software, radar, and electronic warfare architecture, weapons integration interfaces, maintenance data, upgrade pathways, and production technologies to India, all of which are normally withheld from foreign operators.
India previously withdrew from the FGFA program largely because it was dissatisfied with the level of access and influence it would receive relative to the financial and industrial commitments required. If Moscow is now prepared to remove those restrictions and allow India to independently integrate domestic weapons, modify mission systems, conduct upgrades, and participate in future development, the proposal would represent a fundamentally different offer from earlier arrangements since India left the FGFA program in 2018. The offer matters because Putin did not limit the wording to the Su-57; he also linked the proposal to joint work, local production, Indian weapons integration, a two-seat version, and cooperation without stated limitations.
For India, that wording could radically change the current question around the potential purchase of the Su-57: whether New Delhi would receive a restricted export aircraft or obtain partial entry into the baseline Su-57 production, software, weapons, sensor, and upgrade structure. The timing is also relevant because the Indian Air Force is operating at about 29 to 31 fighter squadrons against an authorized strength of 42.5, while the AMCA, India’s planned indigenous fifth-generation fighter, is unlikely to enter operational service before the 2030s and more likely around 2035. The practical issue is therefore not only whether India needs a fifth-generation fighter before AMCA, but whether Russia can offer terms that overcome the same cost, access, performance, and industrial disputes that caused New Delhi to leave the earlier FGFA effort.
Putin’s remarks placed the offer within a long Russian-Indian combat aviation relationship. He said India has traditionally bought Russian aircraft and helicopters and added that Indian pilots are satisfied with this equipment, a reference that points to the Indian Air Force’s long use of Russian-origin combat aircraft, especially the Su-30MKI and MiG-29. He also said Russia had previously proposed joint work on the Su-57, but India did not proceed, after which Russia completed the aircraft independently. He then said Russia is now ready to supply the fighter to India, saying that “[Russia is] ready to work with India. We don’t have any issues or limitations. Same goes for air defence systems.”
Putin also referred to the Su-57D, a version with two pilots, and said such an aircraft could function as a command post, which would give a second crew member responsibility for managing sensors, weapons employment, communications, electronic warfare tasks, or coordination with other aircraft. That point is not minor because a two-seat Su-57 would be closer to the Indian Su-30MKI operating model than the Su-57 single-seat air-superiority fighter, and it could be relevant if India wants a command aircraft for mixed packages of manned fighters, strike aircraft, and unmanned systems such as the Ghatak. The Sukhoi Su-57 is Russia’s most modern fighter jet developed under the PAK FA program, while the Su-57E is the export variant intended for foreign customers.
In practical terms, an export variant of the Su-57, such as the one delivered to Algeria, would normally carry limits on radar modes, electronic warfare libraries, encryption, datalinks, mission software, weapons interfaces, source code access, and upgrade authority. For India, those limits would affect whether the stealth fighter can use Indian weapons without Russian control over each integration step, whether Indian engineers can manage mission data files, whether maintenance can be performed independently at scale, and whether future upgrades can be made inside India. A standard Su-57E purchase would likely resemble a controlled export acquisition, with Russia retaining authority over many sensitive functions.
A Su-57 joint production would be closer to the abandoned FGFA concept, especially if it includes access to mission computers, radar and EW configuration, software tools, production workshare, weapons clearance authority, and upgrade rights. The decisive content would become the contract annexes that determine what India can modify, produce, integrate, export, and sustain without returning to Moscow for every major change. The Su-57 itself is a twin-engine fifth-generation fighter developed by Sukhoi, with production at the Komsomolsk-on-Amur Aircraft Plant in Russia’s Far East. Its first flight took place on January 29, 2010, and it entered Russian service in 2020.
For now, Russia has a contract for 76 aircraft intended to equip three regiments, with deliveries planned through 2028. The fighter uses internal weapons bays to reduce radar signature during combat missions, while external stores would increase radar return and reduce the value of its low-observable shaping. Its main design features include reduced radar signature, an AESA radar complex, a supercruise requirement, thrust-vectoring engines, an electronic warfare suite, and an air-to-air and air-to-ground mission set. For India, these features would have to be assessed against maintainability, sortie generation, production quality, available weapons, engine maturity, radar performance, and the degree of Indian control over mission systems.
The Su-57’s value would be reduced if India could not integrate its own weapons or adapt the fighter to Indian operational requirements over a service life that could last three decades. The Su-57’s sensor package would be one of the first areas of Indian scrutiny. The Su-57 Felon uses the N036 Belka AESA radar suite, including a forward radar, side-looking arrays, and L-band arrays, giving it a more distributed radar layout than fighters relying only on a nose-mounted array. The aircraft’s internal carriage is central to its low-observable role because radar signature rises once large weapons or fuel tanks are carried externally. Early aircraft used AL-41F1 engines, while the second-stage engine, usually associated with Izdeliye 30 or AL-51F1, remains central to future Russian performance claims.
That engine issue matters because propulsion affects range, acceleration, supercruise, infrared signature, maintenance intervals, spare-parts demand, and lifecycle cost. The aircraft is designed for advanced Russian air-to-air and air-to-ground weapons, but Indian weapons integration would require access to software, interfaces, mission computers, weapons control architecture, and certification procedures. India would likely examine radar maturity, engine reliability, low-observable maintainability, mission-system access, and production consistency because these were also among the categories that weakened confidence during the earlier FGFA period.
The Sukhoi/HAL Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA) history remains the main warning sign for any revived arrangement. India and Russia launched the FGFA effort in 2007 as an Indian derivative of the Su-57/PAK FA design. Hindustan Aeronautics Limited was expected to participate in avionics, navigation, cockpit displays, mission systems, and integration work, giving India more than a buyer role. India left the $6 billion program in 2018 after disputes over cost, technology access, stealth characteristics, engine maturity, and workshare. The 2026 Russian offer appears aimed directly at those friction points because it now implies technology transfer, co-production, two-seat development, and Indian weapons integration.
Any Indian return would therefore require stronger guarantees than the original FGFA framework, especially on access to software, radar, and electronic warfare configuration, manufacturing depth, and future modernization authority. Without such guarantees, New Delhi would risk re-entering a program while still lacking control over the systems that determine operational autonomy. The Indian Air Force requirement is immediate but not simple. Its authorized fighter strength is 42.5 squadrons, yet its current strength is cited at about 29 squadrons, with other estimates at about 31. A two-squadron Su-57 purchase would mean about 36 aircraft, which would help with numbers but would not by itself close the force-structure gap.
The IAF still depends heavily on Russian-made fighters, especially the Su-30MKI and MiG-29, giving India existing maintenance, training, basing, and supply-chain familiarity with Russian systems. India has also diversified through 36 Rafale fighters from France and has pursued further Rafale procurement efforts. The Tejas Mk1A and future Tejas Mk2 will support the replacement of older aircraft, but they cannot rapidly deliver a fifth-generation capability. For now, the AMCA remains the national fifth-generation answer, but operational entry is unlikely before roughly 2035, leaving India with a capability gap during the late 2020s and early 2030s.
A Su-57 arrangement would therefore function either as a bridge to the AMCA, a parallel fifth-generation fleet, or a negotiating instrument in India’s broader fighter modernization strategy. Russia also has its own reasons to seek Indian participation. The Su-57 has entered Russian service, but its production scale remains limited when compared with U.S. and Chinese fifth-generation fighter fleets. The domestic order for 76 aircraft is enough to support a defined Russian procurement plan, but modest for sustaining a large fighter industrial ecosystem over many years. Export success would help spread development, production, and upgrade costs across more aircraft and more users.
India offers a rare combination of large potential demand, existing Russian aircraft infrastructure, and experience with licensed production. The Su-30MKI program created an Indian industrial base for Russian-origin combat aircraft, while BrahMos remains the clearest example of joint development between the two countries. A limited Indian purchase of about 36 aircraft would support Russian export objectives, while a deeper local-production program could be more important because it would add volume, financing, and long-term sustainment work to the Su-57 ecosystem. Moscow’s renewed offer can therefore be read both as a response to India’s fighter deficit and as an attempt to internationalize and financially stabilize the Su-57.
A future Su-57 agreement would be judged against existing Russia-India defence-industrial models rather than against a normal aircraft sale. Putin linked current cooperation to air defense systems, submarines, and surface ships, and India already operates S-400 systems while also having considered S-500 procurement. The relevant precedents are the Su-30MKI and BrahMos programs because both involved deeper industrial cooperation than a simple import contract. For the Su-57, India would likely focus on local production depth, Indian workshare, export rights, upgrade freedom, weapons integration authority, software access, sustainment arrangements, and whether the aircraft can be adapted to Indian doctrine over time.
If Russia offers only the Su-57E, the deal would likely be a controlled export purchase with limited Indian authority over sensitive systems. If Russia offers meaningful access to the baseline Su-57 ecosystem, the arrangement could become a strategic aerospace partnership with implications for India’s fighter fleet, Russia’s production base, and the long-term balance between imported capability and India’s AMCA program. The central question is therefore whether Moscow is offering India a fighter aircraft, or whether it is offering India an increased role in the Su-57’s production, configuration, modernization, and operational future.
Written by Jérôme Brahy
Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
Explore More Defense News
• Land Defense News
• Naval Defense News
• Defense Aerospace News
